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Foreword 
In the summer of 1993, just before the XI Nordic Conference on Mass Communi­
cation Research took place in Trondheim, the first comprehensive book about the 
development of the Baltic media was published: Towards a Civic Society: The Baltic 
Media's Long Road to Freedom (edited by Svennik Hoyer, Epp Lauk and Peeter 
Vihalemm, published in Tartu by the Baltic Association for Media Research and 
Nota Baltica Ltd.). The book traced the manifold and complex history of the Baltic 
media from the 1760s, when the first Estonian and Latvian periodicals were pub­
lished, to the early 1990s, the new beginning of democratic development in an 
environment of restored national independence. 
The present volume continues the analysis presented in that first extensive sur­
vey. This examination explores the general trends of society and media develop­
ment in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the 1990s and the beginning of the new 
millennium, and details the development of newspapers and broadcasting in 
Estonia, as well as Russian-language media and media regulation. This examina­
tion will hopefully be continued in the near future - many more contributions 
concerning the Baltic media's role in social transformations were proposed than 
was possible to include in this volume. 
All the contributors express their sincere gratitude to the Estonian Science 
Foundation and the Estonian Ministry of Education, whose research grants made 
possible the compilation and publication of this book. We also thank the col­
leagues whose remarks and recommendations helped us in preparing this publi­
cation: Epp Lauk, Svennik Hoyer, Vita Zelce and Nerijus Prekevicius and many 
others. Finally, we are indebted to those who helped translate and edit the man­
uscript - Steve Gardetto, Roosmarii Kurvits, Tiit Hennoste, Karlis Streips, Alec 
Charles, Maiu Reinhold and others. 
Peeter Vihalemm 
Tartu, 10 December 2001 
1. The Transformation 
of Estonian Society and Media: 1987-2001 
Marju Lauristin, Peeter Vihalemm 
This chapter examines the changes in the political, economic and social context of 
the Estonian media and in the media system, starting from the last years of Com­
munist rule (Gorbachev's time) to the autumn of 2001. This was a period of dra­
matic change in Estonian society, which can be summarised in terms of transition 
from state socialism to capitalism. In economic terms, these changes, based on 
radical privatisation and open market policy, have made Estonia one of the most 
advanced post-Communist countries, demonstrated by its inclusion in the first 
group of the EU-candidate countries. In political development, after abolition of 
the rule of the Communist Party, Estonia transitioned from a period of high polit­
ical mobilisation and participation to years of consolidation of the pluralist party 
system and the formation of the new political élite. However, rapid economic 
reforms have had a quite high social cost, and the professionalisation of politics 
has produced alienation and disappointment among some people. There are seri­
ous contradictions under the surface of the success story of Estonia. 
This chapter looks into the complicated process of change from the viewpoint 
of its social, political and cultural results. Of special interest is the role of media 
in these changes, and, vice versa, the impact of the changing political and eco­
nomic order on the structure and performance of Estonia's media. 
1. Stages of transition 
In general, processes of post-Communist transition have been divided into three 
phases (Brzezinski, 1994; Jakubowicz, 1995): breakthrough, structural reforms, 
and stabilisation and consolidation. Using this framework, the Estonian post-
Communist transition can be divided into the following three stages and their 
sub-periods (Lauristin & P. Vihalemm, 1997): 
Stage 1: The period of political breakthrough (1987-1991): 
• February 1987 - May 1988: "the awakening," birth of the political public 
sphere; 
• June 1988 - December 1989: consolidation of national forces, Singing Revolu­
tion - the peak of mass movements; 
• January 1990 - August 1991: institutionalised struggle for the restoration of 
national independence. 
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Stage 2: Laying the foundations of the Estonian state and launching radical 
economic reforms (1991-1994): 
• August 1991 - September 1992: creating a new constitutional order; 
• October 1992 - December 1994: radical political and economic reforms. 
Stage 3: Stabilisation period (1995-1999): 
• 1995-1997: economic growth and retardation of reforms; 
• 1998-1999: economic slowdown, preparations for joining the European Union. 
One of the authors of this periodisation framework, Zbigniew Brzezinski, pre­
dicted in 1994 that the entire process, from the breakthrough to the end of stabil­
isation, would take 10-30 years. In Estonia, as in the other advanced countries of 
post-Communist Europe, it took less than 15 years. 
The stabilisation phase, indicated by the steady growth of the economy, was 
achieved after only several years of radical reforms. Inclusion in the first group 
of EU pre-accession countries also accelerated the processes of legislation and 
institution-building. After three rounds of free elections (1992, 1995 and 1999), 
there were also signs of political consolidation. Several mergers had reduced the 
number of political parties represented in parliament to five larger and two 
smaller ones. Political allies and opponents became clearly distinguishable and 
the preferences of the electorate along party lines stabilised. 
Stabilisation and consolidation, however, did not mean higher trust in demo­
cratic institutions. In fact, only a year after the 1999 elections, in the summer of 
2000, people started to speak about a political crisis as indicated by the collapse 
of trust in almost all political institutions, with trust in president the only excep­
tion. At the same time there was no external cause for the crisis: economic growth 
continued, human development indicators improved, and international recogni­
tion of Estonia's success (primarily its suitability for future membership in the EU 
and NATO) were confirmed. 
The unexpected turn in public opinion towards growing dissatisfaction can be 
interpreted as the start of a new, fourth period in Estonian post-Communist 
development. Under this view, the transition in the narrow sense of economic 
and political movement from point A (communism) to point В (capitalism) is 
coming to the end and Estonia is joining the global process of "normal" transfor­
mation from an industrial to a post-industrial society. 
This chapter will examine the main development trends of Estonian society 
and media during three stages of transition. The premises and meaning of the 
current fourth stage - turning from transition to transformation - will be estab­
lished, focusing on the social and political landscape of Estonian society. The role 
of media in these changes will also be analysed. 
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2. The period of political breakthrough: 1987-1991 
2.1. Readiness for change 
The politics of glasnost announced by Gorbachev provided a legitimate opportu­
nity for Baltic people to express their disagreement with Soviet rule and to 
reclaim their independence. During five decades of Soviet occupation, the situa­
tion in the Baltic countries and the forms of resistance had changed. In the 1940s 
and 1950s it was a violent conflict. New rulers carried out massive repression 
against the population, while Baltic people attempted to resist the Communist 
regime. Armed resistance lasted until the end of Stalin's rule and even longer (see 
Misiunas & Taagepera, 1993). During Khrushchev's "thaw," the overt violence 
was reduced to the control of minds. Opportunities for artistic expression were 
slightly restored and the contacts of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians with 
their national cultural heritage and to some extent with Western culture were 
restored, albeit in censored forms. Baltic cultural élites were allowed to be more 
"Western" in their formal qualities than the Russian ones, as the Baltic republics 
were used as a "show window" of Soviet socialism to the West (see Lauristin & 
Vihalemm, 1993b). 
Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian intellectuals (and also some journalists) used 
this situation to maintain national identity. The lost national sovereignty was 
recalled in the metaphoric language of poems, dramas, songs, paintings and lit­
erary essays. A very special role was played by the institution of national 
songfests, which was preserved by the Soviets as a demonstration of the multi­
national character of Soviet culture, but in reality served as a powerful expression 
of national identity and will for the cultural resistance. Regular songfests not only 
helped to maintain national cultural values and support Estonians' national iden­
tity, but the organisation of songfests also preserved and developed a nationwide 
network of voluntary choir associations, which served as a medium for the inter-
generational transfer of these values and created considerable social capital. 
Cultural resistance to the Soviet system (interpreted popularly as the "Russian 
rule") penetrated all strata of the Baltic societies, from peasants to professors. 
Even in the highest echelons of the Communist Party and local administration, 
some "nationalists" made attempts to avoid or soften damages created by 
Moscow's rule. "National communists" were sometimes quite successful in their 
attempts to create better opportunities for the Estonian economy, especially for 
agriculture, which was considered to be a foundation of Estonian national self-
esteem (see Unwin, 1998). The Moscow rulers expressed their mistrust towards 
the Baltic "nationalist nomenklatura" by recruiting from Russia cadres for the local 
KGB and Communist Party apparatus and industrial management. 
Although cultural resistance to the prevailing system and expressions of 
national feelings were tolerated, even in the official media, any attempt at politi­
cal resistance was prosecuted and overt dissidents were as repressed in the time 
of Khrushchev as during Brezhnev's time. 
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Intellectuals and even ordinary Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians became 
experienced in language games and used metaphors to express their hidden 
thoughts, often balancing on the border of what was prohibited. The efforts to 
maintain one's national identity and to survive spiritually under the pressure of 
the totalitarian Communist system created permanent stress, which was experi­
enced as a uniting anti-Soviet attitude by the majority of people in the Baltic 
countries. 
One of the leaders of the Estonian Artists Union, Enn Põldroos, has given a 
vivid picture of this "double existence" in his recently published memoirs: 
It was indeed a schizophrenic split of time. On the one side of our con­
sciousness we lived in "Estonian time," or in Zen-Buddism, or in an imagi­
nary world abroad, or in nature, or God knows where. On the other side, one 
had to deal with the everyday life going on in the "Russian time." In some 
sense this Russian (resp. Soviet - M.L. & PV.) world was less real than the 
imaginary inner landscape and therefore it was experienced like a game 
/.../. Estonian time was real, when you were sitting with your friends. Or 
being with your family. Or wandering across the summer landscapes of 
Estonia. Estonian time was also real when you cheated the Russian state. 
(Põldroos, 2001: 182) 
The Soviet state was identified with the Russian empire. Silent knowledge about 
repressed national memories and sentiments developed a sense of solidarity 
between people in non-Russian republics, oppressed by the Moscow rulers. This 
solidarity was openly expressed for the first time in the slogan of the national 
movements during glasnost: "For our freedom and yours," which was borrowed 
from the 19th century Polish resistance against Russian rule. 
2.2. The Singing Revolution 
In the beginning, protest movements arose from different backgrounds. Dissident 
groups focused on the illegitimacy of the Soviet occupation of the Baltic countries 
as an outcome of the pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union (Molo-
tov-Ribbentrop pact). Intellectuals and students protested against the Russifica­
tion of culture. Environmentalists started a protest movement against Moscow's 
plans to expand the huge phosphate mines towards the boundary of a national 
park. For the first time since the Soviet occupation, concerns were publicly 
expressed about the demographic changes created by the massive migration of 
Soviet industrial workers into the Baltic area, which threatened to make the 
indigenous populations a minority in their own country. 
A wave of protest against plans to establish phosphate mines in northern Esto­
nia grew in the spring of 1987 into a massive national movement (the "phosphate 
war"). It was aimed not only at environmental protection, but also against 
Moscow's colonial rule over the Estonian economy, against the habit of making 
decisions concerning Estonia without ever asking for the opinions of the Estoni­
ans themselves. The success of the protest was encouraging. In an atmosphere of 
national arousal, the first public post-war demonstrations against Soviet occupa-
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tion took place on 23 August 1987, organised by dissident groups. On another 
tack, intellectuals tried to find rational ways to establish national sovereignty. In 
September 1987, the idea of Estonian economic autonomy - the first public alter­
native plan of development - was proposed. In the first days of April 1988, the 
plenum of Estonian creative unions openly accused Soviet rule of putting the 
very survival of the Estonian nation into danger. 
The liberation movement also embraced Latvia and Lithuania, and soon spread 
to other regions of the Soviet Empire. The Popular Front movement was estab­
lished in Estonia in April-May 1988, and in Lithuania and Latvia several months 
later (see the chronology of the major events in the Baltics 1987-2001 in the 
Appendix). Following these examples, Popular Fronts were soon established in 
all of the Soviet Republics and in a number of regions of Russia (see Smith, 1999: 
38-39, 114). Their common aim was to turn "perestroika from above" into demo­
cratic reforms from below. During this first phase, freedom for the oppressed 
nations of the Soviet Union was part the general democratic design supported by 
Sakharov, Starovoitova and other Russian democratic leaders. 
Under pressure from the Popular Front, the Supreme Soviet of Estonia passed 
the Declaration of Sovereignty in November 1988, establishing supremacy of the 
Estonian SSR laws over the laws of the Soviet Union. The same legal model was 
soon used in other national republics. In the end, the "parade of sovereignties" 
initiated by Estonia brought about the dissolution of the Soviet Union (see Cern­
er & Hedlund, 1993; Clemens, 1997; Hale, 2000). 
The next steps moved the three Baltic nations far beyond the concept of "sov­
ereign republics." In the spring and summer of 1989, previous dissident leaders 
formed the Estonian Citizens' Movement. This movement provided a radical 
alternative to the step-by-step model of national liberation through disintegra­
tion of the Soviet Union "from inside," developed by the Popular Front. The Cit­
izens' Movement declared that the only legitimate way to sovereignty was factu­
al restoration of the independent Republic of Estonia, as it was before occupation 
by the Soviets in June 1940. This concept relied on a policy of non-recognition of 
the occupied Baltic countries as legitimate parts of the Soviet Union, as exercised 
by the government of the United States and other Western countries. 
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent events in Central Europe during 
the autumn and winter of 1989-1990 showed the Soviet command economy 
could not be renewed and that the weakened empire itself would be unable to 
retain control over the countries of the Eastern bloc. The Baltic nations were look­
ing for an opportunity to re-establish their full independence and rejoin the West­
ern world. The efforts of the Baltic countries to "rock the boat" and achieve full 
independence made some Western politicians to afraid of a "domino effect" that 
would encourage many other nations in their claims for national independence. 
Under these circumstances, the road to independence through restoration, stress­
ing the special historic position of Baltic countries (whose occupation by the Sovi­
et Union was never recognised by the West), became internationally more attrac­
tive than the route proposed by the Popular Front. The West clearly was not inter­
ested in the dissolution of the entire Soviet Union and the creation of an uncer­
tain new international order different from the nuclear balance of the Cold War 
era. 
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The turning point in the story of Baltic independence occurred in January 1991, 
when Moscow attempted to crush the Lithuanian and Latvian revolutions by 
force. The bloody events in Vilnius and Riga resulted in political and moral vic­
tory for the Baits. 
Subsequent events brought about the final, inevitable outcome: international 
recognition of the independent Baltic States. In March 1991, the results of référ­
endums in all three Baltic countries showed that not only absolute majorities of 
the native populations, but even a considerable part of local Russians preferred 
complete independence to any form of inclusion in the Soviet Union. In the 
spring and summer, Baltic leaders were actively lobbying in the United States 
and the Nordic countries for more definite support of their full independence. A 
plan was developed to organise a high-level international conference on the 
Baltic question, which would prepare the way for recognition of Baltic inde­
pendence by organisations such as the UN and OSCE. 
However, the different scenario unfolded. The coup in Moscow in August 1991 
was like a deus ex machina, immediately used by the Estonian, Latvian and 
Lithuanian Supreme Councils to gain the desired goal: a complete and interna­
tionally recognised independent state. The existence of a direct military threat 
from Moscow created favourable conditions for making peace between the com­
peting Popular Front and Estonian Citizens' Movement. On 20 August, when 
Soviet tanks approached the centre of Tallinn, a political compromise was found. 
Agreement was reached concerning the vital issues of how to achieve interna­
tional recognition for the independence of Estonia and how to establish a new 
democratic constitutional order. On the night of 20 August, the Supreme Council 
of Estonia passed a resolution demanding restoration of the pre-war independ­
ent Estonian Republic, and asked all United Nations members to recognise this 
fact and to restore the rights of an independent Estonia as a member of the inter­
national community. The same document included a decision to establish a Con­
stitutional Assembly, comprising members of both competing movements, in 
order to create a new text of an Estonian constitution. 
The "happy end" of the struggle for independence did not resolve the conflict 
between the two wings of the liberation movement. Besides differences in theo­
retical approaches and legal models, the two movements differed in their social 
and political background. While the Popular Front was an open, grass-roots 
movement which accepted in its ranks everybody supporting democracy and 
Estonian independence, including previously active Communists (with exclusion 
of high-ranking officials, the nomenklatura), the Citizens' Movement accepted 
only those who registered their pre-war Estonian citizenship and viewed the 
majority of post-war Russian immigrants as occupants and illegal aliens (with the 
exception of those who supported the ideas of the Citizens' Movement and who 
registered themselves as applicants for Estonian citizenship). 
The Citizens' Movement was established and lead by dissidents who had suf­
fered from arrests and persecutions in the 1970s and 1980s, whereas leading posi­
tions in the Popular Front were held by intellectuals who, despite their cultural 
opposition to the system, were still able to publish their works and teach in uni­
versities. The Popular Front represented this part of the nation (about one third 
of the population of Soviet Estonia; see Hion, Lauristin & Vihalemm, 1988) who 
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had been more or less socially adjusted to the "double life" in Soviet system. 
Many of them had even found ways to be active in various fields of culture, sci­
ence, education, health care and the economy. The ideological platform of the 
Popular Front had a social democratic flavour and was influenced by the ideas of 
the "sixties generation." 
The ideology of the Citizens' Movement was clearly anti-socialist and conser­
vative. Its active core was formed by people who did not cooperate (or regretted 
and negated their cooperation) with the official system, who had experienced 
marginalisation and repression because they did not adapt to the demands of the 
Soviet system of education, cultural production and economic organisation. A 
substantial number of the Estonian Citizens' Movement activists were people 
who had lost their families' positions and properties after the Soviet invasion. 
Among these people, however, could also be found some Soviet-era leaders of the 
cultural opposition and well-known intellectuals, especially in the non-political 
fields such as music, science, technology and medicine. These people had tried to 
avoid political positions inside the Soviet establishment. 
Thus, two movements created two wings of a new national establishment, 
which started to compete in the restored Estonian state even before independ­
ence. This competition formed the main axis of Estonian political development 
throughout the entire transition. This picture is also not very different from the 
political scenery in the other Baltic countries and the post-Communist countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe. 
The political compromise achieved on the eve of independence bridged the gap 
between these two groups, but the premise for this compromise was created ear­
lier: the two wings overlapped and formed mixed memberships in the two deci­
sion-making bodies elected in February-March 1990. The Estonian Supreme 
Council (the earlier Supreme Soviet was renamed after the elections of March 
1990 ended with the victory of the Popular Front) was elected by the entire pop­
ulation, including Soviet-era immigrants. The Estonian Congress was elected by 
people who had registered themselves as citizens of the occupied Estonian 
Republic. Representatives of both bodies participated in the design of the two 
most important legislative steps, which predestined the course of reforms after 
the restoration of independence. These two fundamental pieces of legislation 
were the decree on the privatisation via restoration of pre-war property rights, 
and the restoration of the Citizenship Law of pre-war Estonia. 
Despite the rhetorically expressed controversies and ideological conflicts, in all 
critical situations both wings demonstrated their ability to achieve pragmatic 
compromises concerning key issues of national development. The most impor­
tant compromise was achieved during the crucial events of August 1991, which 
led to the national consensus concerning restoration of independence and the 
simultaneous creation of a new constitutional order different from the pre-war 
one. Pragmatism should be recognised as an important feature of Estonian poli­
tics, which sometimes has helped to resolve extremely difficult controversies. 
Table 1.1 characterises the predominant processes and their content during this 
first stage of transformation. 
Table 1.1. Main characteristics of the period 1987-1991 
Subperiod Dominant processes Content 
February 1987 -
May 1988 
• re-emergence of a political public sphere 
within the framework of the Glasnost 
policy announced by Gorbachev 
• organised protest, articulation of oppositional public opinion 
• restoration of historical truth 
• formulation of national policy for political liberation and for autonomy from the Soviet centralised 
command economy 
June 1988 -
December 1989 
• takeover of social and political control 
on events in Estonia by national 
liberation movements 
• radicalisation of political demands 
to the full political and economical 
independence from Soviet empire. 
• rapid political activation of the whole population 
• broadening the limits of freedom in the general framework of the changes in the Soviet Union 
• participation in the liberalisation of the Soviet Union and pushing towards reconstruction of the 
Soviet Union into a democratic confederation of free nations 
• split of the national liberation movement in Estonia into two wings: the reformist Popular Front 
and the radical Estonian Citizens' Movement 
• ethnic polarisation of the mass political movements along with the radicalisation of national 
demands of Estonians 
January 1990 -
August 1991 
• loss of political control in Estonia 
by the Communist Party and by official 
Soviet institutions 
• institutionalised struggle for restoration 
of independence and international 
recognition of Estonia 
• competition between radical and 
moderate liberation movements 
• resigning of the Communist Party from political arena 
• victory of pro-independence forces in the elections to the Supreme Council 
• formation of a Popular Front government 
• formation of new parties 
• political competition between two elected bodies, the Supreme Council and the Estonian Congress 
• overt conflict between pro-Soviet Russians and pro-independence government of Estonia 
• international support for Baltic independence 
• agreement between Estonia and Russia about mutual support 
• restoration of independence and compromise between competing national movements about 
principles of constitutional reform 
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2.3. The media during the political breakthrough 
In the beginning of the glasnost policy, the Estonian media were slow to change. 
Only in 1987 did Estonian journalists start to trust that the new, more open and 
sincere style of political discourse initiated by Gorbachev was not just a political 
game, but that it provided an opportunity to disclose facts and ideas which were 
oppressed and forbidden during previous decades. The ambiguous nature of the 
period is exemplified by the strict censorship still applied to the media coverage 
of the first massive protest meeting organised by the dissident groups in Tallinn 
in August 1987 on the anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The speed of 
change during the following two years was striking: the two-million-person 
demonstration "Baltic chain," organised two years later on the same occasion, 
was not only directly broadcast on all radio and TV channels in Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania, but it was also organised and managed with the assistance of the 
media. 
The ability of the broadcast media, with their direct online access to the mass 
audience, to mobilise people and to stimulate protest movements was fully 
utilised by the Baltic opposition politicians. Among them were many prominent 
intellectuals and journalists. Environmental issues which were in the focus of 
public agenda in 1987 served as a test case to prove the growing inability of the 
Communist Party to exercise control over the Estonian (as well Latvian and 
Lithuanian) media. 
The growing freedom of expression in all the media channels during the initial 
stage of transition in 1987-1988 can be illustrated with the following examples: 
• Beginning in February 1987, the programme of Estonian Radio included week­
ly direct broadcasts of the Council of the Artist Unions, which became popular 
public discussions about the hottest political issues. In the spring of 1988, other 
direct uncensored debates and commentaries were also allowed. 
• Estonian TV started to broadcast in October 1987 a two-hour, prime-time direct 
public discussion programme about the tactics and strategies of democratic 
changes, "Let's Think Again." 
• The Tartu newspaper Edasi in September 1987 published the project of Eston­
ian economic autonomy (the so-called Four-Man Proposal). After April 1988, all 
newspapers regularly published appeals and resolutions of the rapidly emerg­
ing political movements. 
In the months from April to June 1988, a political public sphere was reborn in 
Estonia in the form of grass-roots national movements. Soviet political and ideo­
logical taboos weakened rapidly after April 1988 and were practically abolished 
one-and-a-half years later by the end of 1989. Although censorship as an institu­
tion was not formally dissolved until September 1990, it did not interfere with the 
media's activities. 
The media became a network through which the growing political activity of 
the nation functioned. Liberation movements used the media for coverage of 
meetings, publication of the manifestos and declarations, and disclosure of the 
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atrocities committed by the Communist regime. The years 1988-1990 saw a peri­
od of restoration of the national memory. For the first time in Estonian post-war 
history, the historical truths about the Liberation War in 1918-1920, Soviet annex­
ation and occupation of Estonia, World War II and Stalinist repressions were pub­
lished and publicly discussed. All the media channels gave this much attention. 
A characteristic feature of the time orientation in the media content during this 
period was that much more attention was given to the past than to the future 
(Vihalemm, 2001: 114-115). 
The changed nature of the media created enthusiasm among the population. 
Surveys of these years show an astonishing level of media exposure: according to 
a survey by the Department of Journalism at Tartu University, an average Eston­
ian in 1990 read 12 newspapers and magazines regularly. The 1989-1990 period 
was the peak of press circulation in all Estonian history. Three national dailies 
with circulations of 150,000-200,000 each, a cultural weekly with a circulation of 
90,000, a women's magazine of 225,000, etc., were published for a market of less 
than one million Estonians (see Table 20 in Appendix; also Hoyer, Lauk & 
Vihalemm, 1993: 343-347). In three years, 1988-1990, the total number of period­
icals increased three times and their total circulation doubled. Many new period­
icals were started. According to data from the Estonian National Library, 65 new 
periodicals were launched in 1988. However, most of them were irregular, small 
publications published by different NGOs and local communities. 
Along with the traditional network of cultural associations, the media was the 
most important social mechanism used for the political breakthrough in the Baltic 
societies. Ironically enough, the Leninist concept of the media as a "collective 
propagandist and organiser of masses" was implemented in full against the 
regime created by the Communist Party. During the period of glasnost when the 
multi-party system did not yet exist and the underground centres were weak, the 
media was the main mechanism of mass mobilisation (see Lauristin & Vihalemm, 
1993a; Lauristin, 1998; Tapinas, 1998). 
The "movements press" replaced the old Soviet model of the "Party press," but 
both presumed the active involvement of journalists as advocates of the politi­
cally dominating forces. Towards the end of the period, at the beginning of 1990, 
the political plurality of the media grew remarkably. With the emergence of the 
second powerful movement, Estonian Citizens' Committees, the Estonian media 
were no longer influenced and controlled by a single oppositional political force, 
the Popular Front, as it was during the Singing Revolution in 1988-1989. Com­
petition between the two models of liberation movements created for the first 
time a space for making political choices not only on the red and white scale, "for 
or against Soviet rule," but by rationally calculating the pluses and minuses of 
the two alternative policies, one more radical and the other more moderate. This 
situation of choice between equally popular and legitimate alternatives gave also 
more freedom to the media. In order to avoid direct political engagement by the 
competing movements, the major newspapers declared their political autonomy 
in 1990. 
Journalistic forms changed gradually, especially after the autumn of 1989. Sovi­
et-era traditions receded and Western journalistic patterns emerged. In particular 
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a new non-partisan style journalism was represented by the independent politi­
cal and cultural weekly Eesti Ekspress, established in September 1989, and the 
business weekly Äripäev, established in October 1989. 
3. The period of radical reforms: 1991-1994 
3.1. Political and economic development 
During the week of 21-27 August 1991, twenty-eight states recognised Estonia; 
by 17 September 1991 the number had risen to 86, and on that day Estonia (as 
well Latvia and Lithuania) gained membership in the United Nations. 
Achievement of this goal created an immense historical challenge for Estoni­
ans: they had to build up their state and its legal and economic structures virtu­
ally from scratch (see Lieven, 1993: 316-373; Clemens, 2001: 1-2). 
The first task after the break with the Soviet Empire was to establish democratic 
constitutional order. The second task was to achieve financial sustainability for 
Estonia. The third task was to gain control over Estonian territory. Fulfilment of 
all three tasks required immediate action, but could not be completed without 
thorough preparation. During the first year of formal independence, therefore, 
the transitional parliamentary and governmental bodies continued to function, 
Soviet legislation remained mostly intact, the economy was still dependent on the 
unconvertible Soviet rouble, and Estonia's eastern border with Russia was mere­
ly symbolic. For Estonians, it was clear that their future depended on clear and 
decisive steps away from the Soviet past, towards the West. 
On 28 June 1992, the new Constitution of Estonia was approved in a referen­
dum. The weekend prior, the new Estonian currency, the kroon (EEK), was creat­
ed to replace the completely inflated Russian rouble. From its earliest days, the 
kroon was fully convertible, with its exchange rate pegged to the German mark 
at a fixed rate of 1 DEM = 8 EEK, which has remained ever since. 
The first free, democratic Estonian parliamentary elections were held on 20 
September 1992. The elections were won by the political forces that supported 
radical marketisation and Westernisation of Estonia's economy. The right-of-cen-
tre coalition, led by the Christian-Democratic-oriented Pro Patria Party, formed 
the first democratically elected government of newly independent Estonia. 
The new Estonian government chose the path of maximum liberalisation: no 
subsidies, no regulated prices (with the exception of government price con­
straints on energy, water, health services and postal services), no progressive 
taxes, no quotas and no extensive transfers of income. The liberal "shock thera­
py" model of reforms, which had already been tried in revitalising the Polish and 
Czech economies, was implemented in Estonia with unprecedented rigour. The 
state was declared to be "the worst of owners." The private sector boomed, with 
about 15,000 new enterprises registered annually. Foreign investments grew 
rapidly, reaching one of the highest levels in Eastern Europe. The essential goals 
of the governmental project for economic development adopted in 1992 were 
Table 1.2. Main characteristics of the period 1991-1994 
Subperiod Dominant processes Content 
August 1991 -
September 1992 
• international recognition of Estonian 
independence 
• transition to the new constitutional order 
• juridical and financial break with the Soviet system 
• rapid turn to the Westernisation 
in all spheres of economy and public life 
• establishment of international relations 
• drafting of the new Constitution 
• monetary reform 
• economic crisis, hyperinflation 
• liberalisation of prices and first wave of social depression 
• restitution of property rights 
• beginning of privatisation 
• regulation of citizenship and residency 
• escalation of conflict between political forces concerning status of Russians in Estonia 
• introduction of the border regime with Russia 
• preparations for the first free multi-party elections 
October 1992 -
end of 1994 
• radical economical and political reforms 
(shock therapy) 
• continuing Westernisation 
• de-Sovietisation of state structures and forms of public life 
• implementation of constitutional principles, creating legislative and administrative 
infrastructure for marketisation and démocratisation 
• implementation of free trade, liberalisation of taxes 
• privatisation and restitution of state properties 
• rebirth of a national banking system 
• implementation of strict monetary and budget policy, elimination of subsidies for 
agriculture and domestic industries 
• social differentiation, growing inequality, rising social tensions 
• creation of a new social safety net 
• bankruptcies and banking crises 
• ethnic tensions caused by the Law on Aliens 
• implementation of regular border control between Estonia and Russia 
• withdrawal of Russian troops 
• development of Estonian armed forces 
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realised in two years. After falling living standards bottomed out in 1992-1993, 
they began to rise in 1994. There were the first signs of a growing GDP and steadi­
ly decreasing inflation. According to a World Bank analysis, Estonia in 1994 
belonged among countries that had made a "clear break with the previous 
regime" and reached high levels of political freedom and economic stabilisation 
(De Melo, Denzier & Gelb, 1996: 420). 
Despite the international recognition of the results achieved by Estonia's liber­
al economic policy, they appeared alien and incomprehensible to many people 
and did not receive unanimous public support at home. After the currency 
reform, people expected a rapid improvement in their living standards. They 
believed in a market economy and privatisation, but they were not prepared for 
growing inequality. Similarly, they were not aware of the efforts required to 
achieve improvement nor did they imagine the risks of failure. The readiness of 
the population to make sacrifices for the common good started to decrease. 
The main reasons for the emotional backlash in the end of 1994 were not pure­
ly psychological. They were also created by the inevitable growth of social dif­
ferences during the course of radical marketisation of the economy, followed by 
a modification of cultural and social relations. People were put under enormous 
pressure by uncertainties in the labour market, by rising costs of housing, food, 
and everyday services, and by the striking inequality of incomes. As Estonian 
sociologist Anu Narusk noted, "For most of the population the reforms have 
meant the end of the customary way of life" (1996: 13). 
Still, the presence of Soviet (later Russian) troops on Estonian soil reminded 
them that freedom was still vulnerable. The continuing Russian military presence 
served to promote national unity and legitimised the harshness of the reforms. 
People understood that full economic and political independence required con­
tinuous effort and even sacrifices. 
In July 1994, a treaty on the final withdrawal of the remaining Russian troops 
from Estonia was signed in Moscow. In August 1994, three years after the formal 
restoration of independence, the foreign troops were finally removed. On 31 
August 1994, Estonia celebrated the end of military occupation. Only from that 
moment on did Estonians start to feel that they again lived in a free and inde­
pendent country. They were ready to proceed further in national efforts to join 
the Western economic and political structures, including the EU and NATO. 
However, after a short celebration, the suppressed dissatisfaction with the diffi­
culties of everyday life burst forth. Public criticism of government policy, as well 
as tensions between different political groups inside the coalition brought down 
the first reformist government of Estonia in October 1994. The positive results of 
the radical reforms initiated by this government became fully apparent a year 
later when the Estonian economy began a steady climb. 
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3.2. Political emancipation and commercialisation of the media: 
1991-1994 
The main feature of Estonian media development in 1991-1994 was a rapid shift 
towards the liberal model. Looking at developments in the Estonian media, the 
authoritarian concept of a media-state relationship was gradually replaced dur­
ing the process of transition by the concept of a completely free media. During 
the second stage of transition in 1991-1994, liberalisation of the press was close­
ly related to the abolition of state ownership and subsidies for the print media. 
Most of the newspapers were privatised and hundreds of new periodicals estab­
lished. At the same time, a rapid generational replacement of journalists occurred 
(see Lauk, 1996, 1997). The new generation of journalists did not share the expe­
riences of their older colleagues, who took for granted an important political role 
for journalists in society. The new journalists quickly accepted an Anglo-Saxon 
model of news journalism and took marketisation of journalism as a natural 
process. The media in this period tried to become free of social commitments. 
They were indeed creating an open and "neutral" public space, where different 
interests and viewpoints could be publicly expressed and negotiated. After years 
of political involvement, however, the Estonian media above all feared new polit­
ical entanglements. 
After the important role the media played during the struggle for independ­
ence, one should expect that the media would actively participate in creating the 
new democratic public sphere, giving "voice" to all new forces in society. How­
ever, the real development was not so simple. Besides the young and entrepre­
neurial urban youth, the new political élite and the Soviet-era managers rapidly 
grasping new business opportunities, almost all people felt confusion. Rapid 
social differentiation created by "shock therapy" divided the Estonian population 
into "losers" and "winners." Finding themselves among the losers were people 
who actively participated in the restoration of independent Estonia: intellectuals, 
the older generation, survivors of the Stalinist repressions, people in the villages 
and small towns far from the rapidly prospering capital city. People expected that 
the media would accept a socially active role and defend their interests or at least 
help to understand what was going on in society. These expectations were not 
fulfilled. The media, driven by market forces, clearly took the side of the "win­
ners." The main obstacle to the démocratisation of society in this stage was the 
slow development and weakness of the new civic society. The voice of the social 
actors who were on the side of the "losers" had to be reinforced in order to 
achieve a balanced democratic representation in the media of society. 
As several scholars have repeatedly pointed out (see e.g., Jakubowicz, 1994, 
1995; Sparks & Reading, 1994; Paletz, Jakubowicz & Novosel, 1995; Downing, 
1996; O'Neil, 1997; Aumente et al, 1999; Coman, 2000), in many post-Communist 
countries the media has become pluralistic but not politically independent. It is 
often characterised as an "Italianisation of the media," described by Slavko 
Splichal (1993,1994) as partisan and state-controlled media interwoven with pol­
itics. 
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This "Italianisation" effect has not been the case in Estonia, where the media 
have been relatively successful in separating themselves from state structures 
and obtaining political autonomy. For instance, an attempt by the government in 
1993 to privatise the previous Communist Party daily Rahva Hääl to a politically 
friendly private company resulted in scandalous failure: the journalists of Rahva 
Hääl refused to work with the new owners and established a new daily. The polit­
ical emancipation of the Estonian media to a large extent was the result of the pre­
viously mentioned rapid generational replacement among journalists. The 
attachment of the young generation of journalists to the liberal model of journal­
ism changed the previously co-operative relationships between the political élite 
and the media, which had been based on memories about common participation 
in national liberation movements. 
The failure of attempts to apply direct pressure on the media does not mean 
that the Estonian media are never influenced by politicians, or that there are no 
attempts at indirect pressure from state authorities; rather, it is done using public 
relations. Politicians who are used as sources, or invited to write columns by 
leading newspapers, could influence the interpretation of political events in the 
media. Journalists wrote (and are continuously writing) many articles based only 
on official information (press conferences, press releases and police or court 
records, etc.), and often they have had neither the possibility nor desire to check 
the facts or use different sources. The agenda is often not set by journalists them­
selves, but by the people owning information and wishing some interpretation to 
be published. Journalists are also too often mentally dependent on different 
stereotypes, prejudices and emotions. The lack of critical analysis of sources and 
poor self-reflection are presumably a common problem for the professional cul­
ture of journalists in all post-Communist countries. 
The media did not prioritise the creation of a participatory political culture, or 
did not set the promotion of a rational debate as a target. The defence of public 
interests was reduced to the position of an aggressive "watchdog," often barking 
in all political directions and sniffing for all possible scandals. While functioning 
effectively as a watchdog of democracy, the Estonian media paid much less atten­
tion to the reliable and unbiased analysis of change. 
Rapid privatisation of the media created a situation where regulation of the 
media shifted almost completely from the political and cultural field towards the 
economic field (Vihalemm, Lauk & Lauristin, 1997; Lauk, 1999). When the main 
goal of the media was to become economically viable, the ideology of the media 
as a marketplace seemed more and more attractive to journalists. The transition 
of the media to a market-driven industry has made the attraction of a solvent 
audience the main criteria of a successful functioning of the media. As advertis­
ing became the main source of income for most media channels, the content was 
adapted more to market principles than to social and cultural values. The results 
of journalistic activities are increasingly evaluated as profitable products, not as 
socially and culturally valuable texts. Competition for the attention of the audi­
ence has brought about changes in the content and functions of the media. Infor­
mation and entertainment have intertwined, superseding analysis, enlighten­
ment and social integration. 
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On the other hand, increasing living costs and a rise in the prices of newspa­
pers and magazines (they rose in 1991-1996 about three times more than the 
prices of other goods and services) led to a dramatic decrease in circulation and 
subscription of Estonian press publications. In comparison with the peak year of 
1990, by 1995 the circulation of the national dailies fell over 3.5 times, the local 
press fell 2.5 times, weeklies 2 times, magazines 3 times and cultural publications 
19 times (see Table 1.7 and Table 22 in Appendix). The pattern of media usage 
among Estonians also changed: reading newspapers became a more élitist habit; 
many people were not able to subscribe to even one newspaper. The shrinking 
circulation, however, was not directly related to similar level of decrease in read­
ing: reading newspapers in public libraries or at work became more common, as 
did borrowing them from neighbours, friends and, lately, reading newspapers on 
the Internet. Ultimately, the main outcome of the growing cost of the press was 
the rapid increase in television viewing. 
With the ongoing privatisation of the newspaper media, new magazines, pri­
vate radio and TV channels were also launched (see Tables 1.7 and 1.8). There was 
a growing diversification and fragmentation of the media in the 1990s: instead of 
a few channels followed by a majority of the people, there were a growing num­
ber of channels followed by specific, smaller audiences. Along with the diversifi­
cation of the media consumption, the media lost its culturally and socially unify­
ing role. Instead of political mobilisation, the main functions of the media in the 
middle of the 1990s were news and entertainment. Compared to the situation in 
1988-1989, if the media were to attempt to call into action a major new movement 
in 1994 or 1999, it would not be possible because of the changed nature of the 
media and the fragmentation of the media audience. 
Having seen that the media had lost its seriousness and involvement in the 
political process, the media still had an important socialising role in the new sit­
uation of the open society. The uncontrolled and unpredictable diversity of opin­
ions represented in the media, along with the changes in contents, formats, styles 
and language used by media were the most powerful source of social learning for 
the entire population. 
The important social role of the media during the second and to a great extent 
also during the third stage of transition can be seen in resocialisation - in adap­
tation of people to a new social situation, new understandings, possibilities and 
demands (Beck, Giddens & Lash, 1994). In the processes requiring social relearn-
ing, resocialisation and adaptation, which occur in all post-Communist societies, 
the media have played a more active role than the relatively inert educational 
system. Through the media people get access to a new symbolic environment, to 
a globalising and commercialising world. The media offers opportunities to 
adapt to rapidly changing conditions, providing information about the new 
opportunities and new rules in society. Via the media, people become rapidly 
acquainted with everyday reforms, with the new faces on the public scene. The 
media was teaching people the new discourses of the new society. 
The difference in media use amongst the population thus becomes an impor­
tant indicator of more or less successful adaptation to the new social, political and 
economic environment. The media could reduce the social and cultural distance 
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between inhabitants in urban and rural areas, in the capital and in the distant 
regions. Greater media activity could help to compensate for growing differences 
in consumer opportunities (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 1998). 
4. Stabilisation period: 1995-1999 
4.1. General development 
The governmental coalition changed twice during 1995-1999. The protest votes 
against the "shock therapy" policy of the first government coalition helped the 
left-of-centre bloc of the Coalition Party and rural parties win parliamentary elec­
tions in 1995; however, the governments formed by the Coalition Party and its 
partners were not stable. Due to various political scandals they changed four 
times in two years from April 1995 to March 1997. Nevertheless, none of these 
governments altered the main political course of liberal economic policy and 
rapid integration into European political and economic structures initiated by the 
first government in 1992. After four years of unsuccessful governance by the left-
centre coalition, it lost the parliamentary elections in 1999. The same right-of-cen-
tre coalition of the conservative Pro Patria Party, liberal Reform Party and the 
social-democratic Moderates, which together had formed the first government in 
1992, regained a majority in Parliament in 1999 and again formed the govern­
ment. 
The economic results of the course of radical economic reforms and rapid de-
Sovietisation have largely been good - after several years of decrease, Estonia's 
GDP increased 4.6% in 1995, by 4% in 1996 and by 10.4% in 1997. The economic 
and social crisis in Russia in the summer of 1998 slowed the pace of Estonian eco­
nomic development, but the GDP increase was still 5% in 1998. The GDP real 
change for 1999 was negative, -0.7%, but since autumn 1999 economic progress 
was visible again (see Table 1.4, Figure 1 in Appendix). 
Due to strong economic ties with Finland and Sweden, the Russian economic 
crisis had less of an influence on Estonian development than on Latvian and 
Lithuanian development. The role of Sweden in the Estonian economy has grown 
remarkably during 1998-2001, primarily due to continually increasing invest­
ments (see Table 1.6). The role of Russia in the Estonian economy has rapidly 
diminished after the crisis of 1998: the share of Russian exports decreased from 
19% in 1997 to 3% in 2001, the share of imports fell from 14% to 8%, respectively 
(see Table 1.5, also Table 11 in Appendix). 
Estonia's favourable economic climate for foreign investors is characterised by 
the fact that it placed 4th among 161 countries on the 2002 Index of Economic 
Freedom, compiled by the Heritage Foundation. Latvia's and Lithuania's posi­
tions are more modest (see Table 9 in Appendix) but have improved remarkably 
during last several years (see www.heritage.org/index). The Corruption Percep­
tion Index of Transparency International in 2001 rated Estonia as less corrupted 
among post-Communist countries (see Table 10 in Appendix, also www.trans-
parency.org). 
Table 1.3. Main characteristics of the period 1995-1999 
Subperiod Dominant processes Content 
1995-1997 • economic growth 
• inhibition of reforms 
• efforts to join EU and NATO 
• continuation of economic liberalisation 
• stabilisation and expanding of financial markets 
• increasing economic growth 
• completion of small- and medium-scale privatisation and progress in large-scale privatisation 
• banking crisis 
• accomplishment of legislative reform 
• political and economic steps toward the European Union 
• cooperation with NATO according to the "Partnership for Peace" program 
• bureaucratisation of administration 
• deepening regional and social inequality 
• decentralisation of social policy and weakening of state functions 
• demographic crisis 
• political scandals, loss of legitimacy by political institutions 
1998-1999 • preparations for joining the 
European Union and NATO 
• consolidation of the political 
landscape 
• rapid development of the new 
communication technology 
• economic slowdown in 1998-1999 (in connection with the Russian crisis), new growth since autumn 1999 
• continuing inflow of foreign direct investments, growing share of foreign-owned enterprices 
• privatisation of large-scale companies 
• negotiations with the EU, harmonisation of the Estonian legislation, 
reconstruction of industrial infrastructure according to EU standards 
• progress in integration of the Russophone population into Estonian society 
• computerisation of schools and offices, intemetisation of banking and organisational communication 
• continuing social and cultural stratification, deepening gap between generations and regions, 
winners and losers of transition 
• continuing delegitimation of political institutions 
• merge of political parties, formation of coalitions in connection with elections 1999 
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Table 1.4. Economic indicators of Estonian development, 1991-2000 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Nominal GDP (bil USD) 0.6 1.0 1.7 2.3 3.6 4.4 4.7 5.3 5.2 5.8 
Change in GDP (%) 
-14.0 
-15.0 -8.5 -2.0 4.6 4.0 10.4 5.0 -0.7 6.9 
Industrial sales (yearly change, %) 
-9.5 -38.7 -18.7 -3.0 2.0 3.5 15.2 3.2 -1.7 12.9 
Exports (bil USD) na 0.5 0.8 1.3 1.9 1.8 2.8 3.2 2.4 3.2 
Imports (bil USD) na 0.6 1.0 1.7 2.5 2.8 4.3 4.8 3.4 4.3 
Foreign direct investments 
(mil USD) na 75 157 215 198 99 130 559 306 468 
Current account balance 
(% of GDP) na 3.3 1.3 -7.3 -4.4 -9.2 -12.2 -9.2 -4.7 -6.4 
Consumer price index (%) 302 1,076 90 48 29 23 11 8 3 4 
Average monthly wage (USD) na na 81 134 207 248 258 293 305 339 
Unemployment (%) na na 6.5 7.6 9.7 10.0 9.7 9.9 12.3 13.7 
Sources: Statistical Office of Estonia, Business Central Europe (EBRD; Economist Intelligence Service) 
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Table 1.5. Main trading partners of Estonia, 1997 and 2001 
Country 
Percentage of exports 
Country 
Percentage of imports 
1997 2001 
(nine months) 
1997 2001 
(nine months) 
1. Finland 15.7 35.7 1. Finland 23.4 18.5 
2. Sweden 13.5 13.8 2. Sweden 10.0 10.6 
3. Latvia 8.7 6.8 3. China 0.5 9.9 
4. Germany 5.6 6.5 4. Germany 9.1 9.0 
5. UK 3.7 4.2 5. Russia 14.4 8.1 
6. Denmark 3.2 3.4 6. Japan 3.4 4.7 
7. Lithuania 6.1 2.8 7. Italy 3.0 3.0 
8. Norway 1.6 2.7 8. Lithuania 1.5 2.5 
9. Netherlands 3.4 2.7 9. Denmark 2.6 2.5 
10. USA 1.8 2.6 10. France 0.7 2.4 
11. Russia 18.8 2.6 11. UK 3.1 2.3 
Source: Statistical Office of Estonia 
Table 1.6. Main foreign direct investors in Estonia, 1997 and 2001 
Percentage of cumulative investments 
As of 31 December 1997 As of 30 September 2001 
1. Finland 26.9 1. Sweden 36.1 
2. Sweden 20.7 2. Finland 29.1 
3. USA 7.1 3. Netherlands 5.7 
4. Russia 6.0 4. USA 5.6 
5. Norway 4.2 5. Denmark 3.9 
6. Denmark 4.0 6. UK 3.8 
7. UK 4.0 7. Norway 3.3 
8. Germany 2.7 8. Germany 2.8 
Source: Bank of Estonia 
The Freedom House (Nations in Transit) ratings for démocratisation, the rule of 
law and economic liberalisation are relatively high for all three Baltic states (Table 
2 in Appendix) and according to the cumulative scores of démocratisation and 
market-orientation the Baltics belong to the group of most-advanced post-Com­
munist countries (Table 3 in Appendix). The main economic indicators of Estonia 
are on the same level with other post-Communist countries forming the first 
group to engage in negotiations about joining the European Union: the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland (Tables 5 and 7 in Appendix). In contrast to Latvia 
and Lithuania, the living standard in Estonia and the household assessment of 
one's personal economic situation were remarkably better. According to the 1999 
surveys of living condition developments in Baltic countries, 46% of the house­
holds in Latvia and 47% in Lithuania said that they were on the verge of poverty 
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or were poor. In Estonia, this was the case in 33% of the households (Aasland & 
Tyldum, 2000: 5). 
Like all other post-Communist countries, Estonia has paid a high social price 
for its reforms (see Figures 3-6 in Appendix). The birth rate has declined by a fac­
tor of two during 1990-1999, while rates of crime and drug addiction have 
increased. Among the European post-Communist countries, Estonia has one of 
the highest values of the Gini coefficient, showing a high level of economic 
inequality (see Table 15 in Appendix). 
The new social situation creates problems of coping with everyday life. Accord­
ing to a nation-wide survey in 1996,44% of the Estonian population had great dif­
ficulties adapting to the market economy (Pettai, 1998). Since 1997 the situation 
has improved a bit; the Estonian human development index in 1998 and 1999 was 
higher than in the neighbouring Baltic countries, but still lower than in the Cen­
tral European post-Communist countries (see Table 12 in Appendix). 
Compared to the other post-Communist countries, the Estonian and Latvian 
transitions were more complicated because of the large Russophone minorities 
(Estonia's and Latvia's share of the non-titular ethnic groups in population 
among post-Communist countries is only exceeded by Bosnia-Herzegovina - see 
Table 13 in Appendix). According to the census of 1989, the share of Russian-
speaking minorities in the population comprised 48% in Latvia and 39% in Esto­
nia. In 2000 the ratio of Russophones in both countries was 6-7% smaller because 
of intensive re-emigration, especially in 1992-1993, connected mainly with the 
departure of the Russian Army (see Tables 1 and 14 in Appendix). The task of cul­
turally and politically integrating such a large immigrant population with the 
native population in a short period of time made the situation in Estonia and 
Latvia extremely difficult. 
The data from many surveys show a gradual fall of interethnic tensions and 
diminishment of the social and cultural distances between Estonians and Russo­
phones (see T. Vihalemm & Lauristin, 1997; Vetik, 1999; Lauristin & Vetik, 2000; 
also Chapter 7 in this volume). In 1998 a state programme was established for the 
integration of the Russophone population into Estonian society. The implemen­
tation of the large programme of different institutional and nongovernmental 
activities as well the results of economic and political reforms have brought about 
many remarkable, positive changes in interrelations between different ethnic 
communities in Estonia. 
4.2. Media in the stabilisation period: 
Concentration of the media market 
The main features of the media development in Estonia in 1995-1999 were: 
• Continued diversification and fragmentation of the media system, the launch­
ing of new magazines, the establishment of new radio and TV channels, and 
growth in the duration of broadcasts. During 1990-1999, the number of news­
papers increased 38%, the number of magazines 33% (see Table 1.7). Instead of 
two programmes on state radio in 1990, 27 radio programmes were broadcast 
Table 1.7. Print media in Estonia, 1987-2000 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Number of newspapers 
(titles)1 32 45 48 52 58 60 68 86 86 74 73 76 72 70 
Number of dailies (titles) 10 10 10 10 10 10 12 15 15 15 17 16 16 13 
Average circulation 
of one daily (in thousands) 63 68 76 83 64 31 23 19 16 17 15 16 18 20 
Circulation of dailies 
per 1,000 inhabitants 406 433 486 528 411 199 183 186 162 173 178 175 189 182 
Number of non-daily 
newspapers (titles) 22 35 38 42 48 50 56 71 71 59 56 60 56 57 
Circulation of non-dailies 
per 1,000 inhabitants 338 380 446 549 709 518 613 590 419 361 343 325 290 231 
Number of magazines 
and other periodicals (titles) 130 115 161 434 351 250 312 470 501 517 572 578 557 662 
Published books (titles) 2,250 2,115 2,070 1,628 1,654 1,557 1,965 2,291 2,635 2,628 3,317 3,090 3,265 3,468 
Average circulation 
of one book (in thousands) 7.4 8.1 8.8 11.6 14.1 10.3 6.3 3.8 3.0 2.5 2.2 1.9 2.2 1.7 
1 There are major differences between the data of the Estonian Newspaper Association and the National Library, depending on the definition of a newspaper. 
The Newspaper Association is using a stricter definition, according to which at least 50 issues should be published a year. The National Library is using a 
milder definition of a newspaper and according to their database 109 newspapers and 294 newsletters were published in Estonia in 2000. This table uses the 
data of the Estonian Association of Newspapers, while Table 19 in Appendix uses the data of the National Library. 
Sources: Estonian Newspaper Association; Estonian National Library 
Table 1.8. Broadcasting in Estonia, 1990-2000 
Radio 1990 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Number of broadcasters 1 16 21 24 26 25 27 27 30 
Total annual duration of broadcasting (thous. hours) 14 66 106 126 155 214 235 251 276 
Share of entertainment in radio programs 
Estonian Radio (public service) na 29 34 40 54 62 63 55 57 
Private broadcasters 
-
45 42 68 73 72 72 72 73 
Weekly share of Estonian Radio for Estonians 97 77 73 69 60 50 41 32 32 
Television 
Number of broadcasters 1 8 7 9 7 7 7 7 5 
Total annual duration of broadcasting (thous. hours) 4.0 3.3 6.5 8.8 8.8 20.6 23.5 25.3 32.4 
Share of films and serials in TV programs 
Estonian TV (public service) na 3 22 22 28 30 28 20 14 
Private broadcasters 
-
41 52 62 63 56 59 54 38 
Weekly share of Estonian TV for Estonians 75 52 43 43 40 37 33 28 25 
Sources: Statistical Office of Estonia; BMF Gallup Media 
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in 1999 (4 public and 23 private); instead of one state TV station, there were four 
nation-wide TV stations broadcasting (one public and three commercial sta­
tions) (see Table 1.8). 
• Continued commercialisation changed the media into a market-driven indus­
try and has led to the increasing importance of the entertainment function of 
the media, along with a continued increase in TV viewing. 
• Increased competition in the advertising market resulted in a concentration of 
the media. The second half of the 1990s is characterised by mergers of newspa­
pers and the formation of two big media corporations with dominating Nor­
wegian and Swedish capital. Inflow of foreign capital (Finnish, Swedish, Nor­
wegian, American) was also significant in other media channels. 
• Growth in the social polarisation of audiences and the cultural polarisation of 
media contents. 
• Increased use of new media technologies, in particular the Internet and mobile 
phones. E-business and e-export continue to develop rapidly. According to dif­
ferent estimates Estonia is the leading online country in Central and Eastern 
Europe (see Tables 26, 27 and 28 in Appendix). 
The dominating features of Estonian media development during the third period 
of transition are the continuing commercialisation and consolidation of the 
media, and the rapid spread of new communication technologies. 
Commercialisation is connected with the emerging advertising market 
(amounting to 9 million USD in 1994 and 51 million in 1998 - Baltic Media Book 
2000: 54; alßo www.mediafacts.com). It has brought about fierce competition for 
audiences between media channels and the infiltration of market criteria into the 
all aspects of journalistic work - planning and programming, reporting, editing, 
design, etc. 
The commercial interests of a privatised media separated from the public inter­
est to such a degree that it prevented the fair representation of all publicly rele­
vant issues in the Estonian media. Many politicians and social scientists became 
quite critical of the media, accusing journalists of being too driven by commercial 
interests. 
Growing commercialisation led to further changes in social and psychological 
functions of the media. Cultural integration was one of the leading functions of 
the Estonian media during the Soviet era (see Hoyer, Lauk & Vihalemm, 1993: 
199-215), as were social integration and mobilisation during the liberation move­
ment. As stated previously, the importance of both rapidly declined after the 
restoration of Estonian independence. Economic growth after 1994 increased the 
access to new electronic channels. Three commercial TV stations, a growing net­
work of cable services and the rapid penetration of the Internet changed the 
Estonian media-landscape from the print-dominated into the electronic age. The 
importance of the entertainment function of the media increased significantly, 
along with the increasing role of electronic media. The average television view­
ing time was two hours per day in 1985, three hours in January 1994 and four 
hours forty minutes in January 2000 (data from Baltic Media Facts). The viewing 
of foreign films and serials, a major portion of the programmes on the three com­
mercial stations, has grown especially quickly. 
Table 1.9. Media use in Estonia, 1993-1999 
Estonians Non-Estonians 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Number surveyed (N) 918 1,016 1,026 1,016 1,051 965 972 613 579 585 557 516 529 521 
Average number of 
newspapers regularly read 4.7 4.3 4.0 3.5 3.6 3.3 3.2 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.3 1.9 1.9 
Does not read 
any newspaper (%) 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 10 15 8 9 13 10 12 
Average number 
of magazines regularly read 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.8 2.3 3.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6 
Does not read 
any magazine (%) 21 28 24 19 16 18 16 65 74 79 74 55 67 70 
Average number 
of press subscriptions 2.7 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.9 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Average number 
of TV channels watched 3.4 3.8 4.1 3.5 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.2 3.8 4.5 3.4 4.8 3.8 4.1 
Does not watch any TV (%) 7 6 5 4 4 3 5 5 10 5 6 5 5 6 
Average time per day spent 
watching TV (min.) 183 176 190 214 215 211 220 239 218 244 262 261 257 280 
Average number 
of radio stations tuned into 2.6 2.6 2.8 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.3 2.9 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.9 3.0 
Does not listen to the radio 
(%) 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 8 6 8 10 9 11 7 
Average time per day spent 
listening to the radio (min.) 265 269 282 243 230 222 225 174 193 197 162 162 185 177 
Source: BMF Gallup Media 
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The Estonian media market in the years 1995-1999 is characterised by the con­
tinuing concentration of the media. As examples, there were the mergers of three 
national dailies in 1995, two national TV stations in 1996, and the formation of 
two large press companies in 1998, which together own more than twenty news­
papers and magazines, among them four out of the five national Estonian dailies 
(see Table 21 in Appendix). In both of these companies, which compete fiercely 
with each other, foreign capital had the leading position in 1998-2001 (in one case 
from the Swedish firm Marieberg, a member of Bonnier Group, and in the other 
from the Norwegian firm Schibsted). 
The ownership situation changed in the autumn of 2001. In November, Eston­
ian businessman Hans H. Luik became the owner of one of these companies, Eks­
press Grupp, buying 50% of the shares which belonged to the Bonnier Group. 
Both Eesti Meedia as well as Ekspress Grupp published about 20-25% of all 
Estonian print media in early 2001. 
In October 2001, TV 1, one of the three national commercial TV channels, went 
bankrupt, and the Ministry of Culture decided not to announce a competition to 
the licence for a new national TV channel, arguing that three national channels 
(one public and two commercial ones) were enough for a country with a popula­
tion of 1.4 million. 
Despite conscentration, there has been no large reduction in the number of 
media channels except TV - in fact, the opposite happened, with several new 
magazines and radio channels being established every year. Some of them were 
able to survive for only a short period, but some continue to develop successful­
ly. The diversification process in the Estonian media, especially in the area of 
magazines, looks likely to continue in the years to come, with concentration and 
diversification taking place simultaneously. 
New communication technologies are rapidly pervading the media and every­
day life in Estonia due to the computerisation of schools and workplaces, and an 
affiliation with global networks. By December 1999, 16 electronic news services 
were functioning in Estonia (among them 4 portals in Estonian); 31 Estonian 
newspapers and 50 magazines were distributing electronic versions of their pub­
lications; and 7 radio stations functioned in the real-time regime of the Internet 
(Baltic Media Book 2000: 200-206). 
During 2000-2001 the development in this area continued at the same fast pace. 
In September 2000, 35% of Estonia's adult population used the Internet. There 
were 238 Internet-connected hosts per 10,000 inhabitants, the same level as 
France and Germany (www.vm.ee/eng/estoday/2000/infosoc.htm). Ninety-five 
percent of public employees had a computerised workplace. Nineteen percent of 
the population owned a computer at home and 53% of them had an Internet con­
nection. 
About 25% of the Estonian population used Internet banking in the autumn of 
2001 (www.vm.ee/eng/estoday/2002/infosociety.htm), over 80% of banking oper­
ations were performed by use of electronic channels and a number of local bank­
ing offices were closed (www.zzz.ee/tbr/issues/voll9/e-banking.htm). Mobile 
telephone transmission networks cover more than 99% of Estonia's populated area 
and 52% of the population have mobile phones, the same level as Germany. 
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The government supported the rapid development of the new media technol­
ogy. The Estonian government in the autumn of 1996 launched the popular 
national "Tiger Leap Programme" with the aim of computerising all Estonian 
schools in 3-4 years. The success of this programme was demonstrated by the fact 
that in November 1999, 94% of the Estonian population aged 15-19 used com­
puters, 58% used the Internet (www.mediafacts.com), and all Estonian schools 
were connected to the Internet (www.vm.ee/eng/estoday/2000/infosoc.htm). 
The government itself has changed the Cabinet meetings to paperless sessions by 
using a Web-based document system. In December 2000, the Digital Signature 
Act was adopted, opening new opportunities for Internet-based services. 
5. Development crisis: 2000-2001 
After the 1999 elections, developments in Estonian society reached a new stage 
characterised by intense preparations to achieve EU accession and integration 
with NATO. After relatively stable developments in 1995-1998, sometimes even 
labelled as "stagnation," the political forces known as radical reformers came 
back to government. Expectations towards the new government were high. 
Responding to them, the newly elected right-centre coalition promised to speed 
up reforms in several areas: public administration, health care, pension insur­
ance, family policy and higher education. As one of its main tasks, the new gov­
ernment announced it would bridge the gap of alienation between the people 
and the government. 
The economic results of the year 2000 were relatively good: the GDP growth 
was 6.9%. The path of economic development in 2001 was a bit slower due to the 
impact of world economic trends. According to preliminary data, the GDP 
growth was 5.3% in the first nine months of 2001. The Baltic countries (especial­
ly Latvia) were economically the most successful among the EU-candidate coun­
tries in the first half of 2001 (see Table 6 in Appendix). 
At the end of 2000, these developments were unexpectedly fused with a sud­
den and sharp decline in public support for all governmental institutions. The 
last and biggest governmental privatisation projects concerning energy plants 
and railways were met with strong public criticism. The unwillingness of public 
opinion to support further reforms expanded even to Estonian integration with 
the EU. Due to the attempts of the government to protect its own positions with 
the shield of "EU standards and demands," and with TV images of the European 
cattle fires as a background, public opinion during the first months of 2001 turned 
clearly against the EU (see Figure 1.1). It was connected with the remarkable fall 
of public trust in government and parliament and with negative assessments of 
democratic development in general (see Figure 1.2 and Table 1.10). 
The crisis that emerged in the autumn of 2000 was not caused by economic but 
by social reasons. The strong backlash in public opinion was caused by many 
mutually reinforcing circumstances. First, growing income inequality and 
expanding unemployment raised expectations among the majority of ordinary 
people that the government would focus on measures to increase incomes and 
Table 1.10. Trust in public institutions, 1995-2001 
Complete + general trust, % of population aged 15-74 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
November November December September May May November April September 
Estonian President 69 67 65 74 73 71 58 62 64 
Estonian Army 46 46 50 58 56 55 na na 63 
Estonian Bank 55 56 64 43 48 48 na 51 68 
Local governments 49 56 51 49 50 52 45 461 53 
Mass media 63 58 56 53 49 48 na 521 53 
Courts 48 52 44 48 44 44 na na 50 
Police 33 48 44 44 43 44 na 461 43 
Parliament 46 47 42 45 50 44 32 31 36 
Government 47 52 48 49 53 49 34 28 36 
Prime Minister 47 58 52 46 47 47 31 22 27 
1 Data from May 2001. Source: Saar Poll 
4^ 
9 
гъ 
у 
а 
з 
% 
о 
з 
m 
s 
сл 
s 
El 
(-О 
cx 
К 
о 
о 
The Transformation of Estonian Society and Media: 1987-2001 45 
Figure 1.1. Public opinion about Estonia's accession to the EU, 
2000-2001 (%) 
Population aged 15-74 
60 
52 c-3 54 / 
£ 
y 
43^4. ^/43 
—-"-30 до 
38 39 38 
36 
13 -)2 ^ 11 , -ч 10 
4 ^ ' - >  
2000 
Jan March May Sept 
2001 
Jan Apr June Aug Oct 
50-
40-
30-
2 0 -
10-
1 Supporting Opposed Do not know + no answer Source: Emor 
Figure 1.2. Evaluation of democratic development, 1995-2001 
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provide everyday security and stability. The large scale of the new reforms with­
out any visible improvement of living conditions did not correspond to their 
understanding of good and democratic governance. 
Second, influential Estonian business circles no longer supported privatisation 
through international open bids, which had been one of the engines of rapid mar-
ketisation in the early 1990s. The new Estonian economic élite felt strong enough 
to compete for leading positions vis-à-vis the Western investors who had step-by-
step taken over Estonian banking and other key branches of the economy. Busi­
ness people demanded that the government, which up until this time had been 
promoting the policy of open doors for foreign capital, change this policy in 
favour of more protection for domestic investors. Responding to these expecta­
tions, the government abolished the corporate income tax. This step, extremely 
unpopular among the population, did not satisfy the entrepreneurial circles 
either. In 2000, pointing at the troubles in the privatisation of the railways, Eston­
ian business circles started a public campaign against "selling out the country's 
strategic resources to the foreigners." 
In this atmosphere of general discomfort, the media took a leading role in cre­
ating an overall atmosphere of distrust in public institutions, in the parliament 
and in the government. The gloomy picture of failures in domestic policy con­
structed in the media was in stark contrast with the external image of Estonia's 
success story. Using the rhetoric of the governmental parties in their coalition 
agreement, the opposition attacked the government on the grounds of unfulfilled 
promises. 
In March-April 2001, the situation in the print media started to recall the days 
of the mass movements, when journalists were directly involved in politics. The 
media were used once again as an active agency of civic protest; however, this 
time not manipulated by political forces but by the new economic élite trying to 
use the Fourth Estate to put government decisions under their control. Along 
with the investigative stories disclosing linkages between groups behind differ­
ent privatisation projects, newspapers published columns with appeals to change 
the government. A business paper owned by the Swedish Bonnier Group pro­
claimed itself as an advocate of the anti-EU movement. 
Figure 1.1 shows that attitudes concerning the EU swung to the positive side 
several months later, but this was not reflected in evaluations of the government 
and parliament (Table 1.10). 
In April 2001, the media published a memorandum signed by leading social 
scientists, blaming politicians for the marginalisation of ordinary people and for 
neglecting urgent social problems. Social scientists coined the concept of "two 
Estonias," expressing the unsolvable contradictions between the political élite 
and the masses. The memorandum called for a new participatory and balanced 
policy. 
The legitimition crisis on the surface indicated that the readiness for a new turn 
towards public participation had matured inside Estonian society. It also indicat­
ed the growth of reflexivity. Public debate openly challenged the established 
political project of "Westernisation and marketisation," set as a common goal in 
the beginning of post-Communist transition. The restoration of the public trust 
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was proclaimed as the most urgent need. Demands to re-estimate the validity of 
political decisions and to rely more on the internal criteria of human and social 
development, compared to the external criteria of economic success, were voiced 
not only by the political opposition but also by the business and cultural élites. 
Interventions by intellectuals and representatives of business people revealed 
that externally initiated transition models had exhausted their legitimacy in 
Estonian society, and the new élite, formed during the decade of transition, 
demanded changes in the policy-making process. 
These demands found their unexpected and ironic realisation during the pres­
idential elections of September 2001. After a severe campaign between five can­
didates, the former Communist Party high official and previous Chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet, Arnold Rüütel, representing the Rural Union, became the Presi­
dent. He replaced Lennart Meri, who was internationally and internally recog­
nised as the most effective spokesman of the new, succesfully Westernised Esto­
nia. The election of a former Communist as a president was initially viewed by 
many as a serious blow to the further successful development of Estonia. Quick­
ly enough, however, the post-electoral debate in the media acquired more relaxed 
tones. The results of the presidential elections were interpreted by the opposition 
as the re-establishment of a balance of power. The new president was called to 
become a "peacemaker" between "winners" and "losers," urban and rural, 
advanced and lagging parts of Estonian society. Fears that the post-Communist 
figure of the new president would damage the international mage of Estonia as a 
"champion of transition" appeared to be irrelevant. 
The crisis of 2001 appears to mark an end of the post-Communist transition in 
Estonia. Estonian society had achieved the maturity needed by a stable democ­
racy and switched to internally regulated capitalist transformation. The break­
through from the old (communist) political and economic order to the new (cap­
italist) one, which was the main content of the reforms of 1990-2000, seems com­
pleted. Estonia had stepped into the new millennium as a "normal" free-market 
society, albeit still poor and full of internal contradictions and unsolved prob­
lems. 
6. Role of the media in the reform process 
The fact that economic and political changes had liberalised and commercialised 
the media is far from a surprise. Estonia may seem more special among other 
post-Communist countries because the changes in society had been so rapid and 
radical, and the liberalisation of the media so far-reaching. Even the attempts by 
the more moderate "managerial" politicians after their victory in the 1995 elec­
tions to change the course of reforms did not succeed. The political climate of the 
1990s in Estonia was formed by expectations of success, and even the growing 
disappointment and dissatisfaction with the outcomes of reforms among sizeable 
portions of the population (farmers, pensioners, tenants of de-nationalised hous­
es, Russian-speakers, unemployed, etc.) could not deflate the general atmosphere 
of optimism (see Rose, 2000). 
Table 1.11. Mutual relationships between reform policies and changes in the media, 1987-2001 
Period Impact of the reforms on the media Influences of the media to reform process 
Political 
breakthrough 
1987-1991 
• abolishment of censorship and ideological control from 
Communist Party 
• partisanship of journalists on the side of liberation movements 
• peak of media exposure 
• creating a new public space 
• mobilisation 
• legitimation of the radical demands 
Radical political 
and 
economic reforms 
1991-1994 
• unlimited freedom of speech 
• privatisation of the press 
• establishment of private broadcasting 
• expansion of the new magazines and other periodicals 
• decrease and segmentation of audiences 
• support by media to radical economic reforms 
• support by media of policy of generational replacement in public offices 
(policy of "cleaning the place") 
• young generation of journalists sympathised with "winners" of the liberal 
reforms, as a result media contributed to marginalisation of "losers" 
• dominating liberal discourse lead to delegitimation of the critical voices 
concerning "shock therapy" and created spiral of silence around social 
problems of transition 
Stabilisation 
1995-1999 
• growth of the advertising market 
• commercialisation of media production 
• foreign capital flow to Estonian media market, concentration 
and monopolisation of the media 
• expansion of public relations business 
• mergers of the national dailies 
• growing TV consumption and entertainment usage 
• realisation of the national computerisation programme 
• expansion of the new media 
• growing tension between public and private broadcasting 
• "watchdog" role of media focused on political scandals supported 
delegitimation of government 
• sensationalism of commercialised media lead to growing alienation of 
audiences from political life and growing anomie 
• division of target audiences of national dailies and main weeklies 
between "winners" and "losers" contributed to the deepening of social 
cleavages and legitimation of the social diffeences 
• media reproduced ethnic separation and political alienation between 
Estonian and Russian-speaking population 
• neglect of social and moral values by commercialised mainstream media 
contributed to weakness of civil society and decreasing influence 
of humanistic intellectuals 
• "Américanisation" of mediated politics during 1999 election campaign 
• emancipation of the journalistic coverage of elections from the direct 
campaigning helped to rise the critical awareness among the electorate 
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CONTINUATION. Table 1.11. Mutual relationships between reform policies and changes in the media, 1987-2001 
Period Impact of the reforms on the media Influences of the media to reform process 
Development 
crisis 
2000-2001 
• growth of infotainment 
• diversification of channels 
• fragmentation of audiences 
• continuing expansion of the new media 
• rise of self-criticism in the media 
• division of functions between private and public broadcasting 
• critical attitudes of the media toward the privatisation policies 
of the government 
• continuing delegitimation of political institutions 
• media start to set new social agenda of political debate: gender equality, 
poverty, drug problems, HIV, human rights 
• more balanced picture of reality, growing attention to the social problems 
and life of the "average citizen" 
• growing tolerance in minority-issues 
• political scandals - "watchdog media" continue with greater vigour 
to prosecute cases of corrupt and greedy behaviour of public officials 
and politicians 
• media start to support more actively development of the civil society 
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What was the role of media in these changes? During the first period of transi­
tion, the media played an important, even decisive role in formation of the 
national mass movements. This was a result of political choices made by journal­
ists who felt themselves responsible for the future of the nation. When the Eston­
ian media deliberately distanced themselves from active participation in politics 
after the restoration of independence, did they still play an active role in sup­
porting reforms? Or conversely, did the commercialised media contribute to the 
alienation of the people from politics and thus in the end be responsible for the 
failures of démocratisation? 
Table 1.11 presents a hypothetical picture of interrelationships between differ­
ent stages of the reform process and the activities of the media. Some of these con­
clusions require further evaluation through content analysis and discourse analy­
sis, while other conclusions are quite obvious and documented in the previous 
paragraphs. 
The main conclusion emerging from this overview is that the Estonian media 
in general helped to create a climate of opinion which supported the politics of 
shock therapy launched by the first reformist government (with the exception of 
Russian-language newspapers, which had definitely opposed political reforms as 
being nationalist, and a rural weekly, which was constantly critical towards agri­
cultural policy and agricultural reforms). Even more, without this supportive cli­
mate of opinion, the reforms could not be managed. The extremely liberal eco­
nomic policy of the first government also opened the way to foreign capital for 
the media itself, and the media supported this policy for obvious reasons. 
Another strong factor emerged which made the media an ally of the reformists 
in government even if the journalists did not support one or another concrete 
decision: the policy of the government elected in 1992 was strongly favourable to 
the younger generation. The "clean the place" slogan of the Isamaa (Pro Patria) 
Party, the winner of the 1992 elections, did not call for repressions but for the gen­
erational replacement and abolition of the "old guard" of the Communist bureau­
cracy. Using the typology of modes of transition proposed by Munck and Leff 
(1999:197), Estonia belonged with countries like Hungary, where the "negotiated 
revolution" took place. After 1991 the old establishment left office without an 
overt struggle, and almost overnight new and often very young people become 
decision-makers in various fields. 
Similar to the quiet disappearance of the Estonian Communist Party from the 
political scene, the older generations of journalists retired after the privatisation 
of their channel, or left to work in other areas. Soon the majority of journalists 
jobs were filled with young people representing the generation of "winners" 
(Lauk, 1997). As a result, Estonian journalists overwhelmingly supported radical 
reforms (at least until 1999) not because they were controlled or manipulated by 
right-wing politicians (like some think), but because this liberal policy corre­
sponded to their own interests and convictions. 
Media channels were independent from the new political parties, but their ide­
ological preferences were clearly distinguishable - the more qualitative dailies 
and the most influential new weekly, Eesti Ekspress, openly supported right-wing 
policies. The same was true about commercial radio stations. Voices from below 
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were represented in the yellow press. Dissatisfaction with agricultural reforms 
and attitudes of the rural population were published mostly in the weekly Maa­
leht (Countryside Paper), but despite high circulation numbers in the countryside 
and small towns, this paper was hardly visible in cities. Protest voices of the 
Russian minority were expressed in the Russian-language papers and did not 
reach the Estonian-speaking audience. 
In this way, segmentation of the audiences inhibited mobilisation against the 
radical reforms. 
From the viewpoint of participatory democracy, the picture in the media dur­
ing the initial period of radical reforms did not seem nice. The "losers" were not 
given much "voice"; in fact, they were marginalised as unable to manage their 
own lives, or who for personal reasons opposed rapid changes. With Russian 
troops still remaining on Estonian territory, the political opposition was also easy 
to stigmatise as a "danger to independence" and a supporter of the pro-Moscow 
policies. The majority accepted shock therapy as the only safe way to get out of 
Russia's economic influence and achieve economic sustainability. 
Commercialisation of the media created high interest in scandals. The news cri­
teria changed rapidly after 1991: politics lost its appeal, and journalists tried to 
find any conflicts and "skeletons in the closet" of politicians in order to catch the 
audience's attention. In a paradoxical way, commercialisation supported the 
watchdog position of the media, even if journalists themselves politically sym­
pathised with the new political élite. This watchdog attitude helped to keep polit­
ical balance in news coverage. At the end of 1994, media scandals brought down 
successful reformer Mart Laar from the Prime Minister's office. The fate of his 
political opponents was no different: the media severely attacked the leader of 
the opposition, Edgar Savisaar, for the illegal secret recording of other politicians' 
talks and conversations. This pushed him out of the Interior Minister's position 
in October 1995. The media also accused Prime Minister Tiit Vähi of corruption, 
which caused his resignation in February 1997. When in 1998 and subsequent 
years Estonia was listed among the least corrupt post-Communist countries (see 
Table 10 in Appendix), this achievement is clearly connected with the effects of 
the "watchdog media." 
During the second half of the 1990s, the position of the media became general­
ly more critical towards the political system and politicians. The high political 
expectations of the first years of transition were replaced by more pragmatic atti­
tudes; politics was represented by press as a game of the élites pursuing their 
group interests. The election campaign of 1999 was greatly influenced by profes­
sional public relations and advertising companies. Political debate between the 
parties was designed according to principles of political marketing. The person­
alisation of the elections, using "image selling strategies" was in contrast with the 
principles of proportional representation built into the election law. The election 
law was meant to support consolidation of the party system with clear, political­
ly defined content, but the logic of political marketing pushed the parties to hunt 
for popular names in their lists from outside the political field, like sportsmen, TV 
stars or millionaires. As a result, the public attitude towards politics became even 
more alienated and cynical. 
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The end of the 1990s brought a new feature in Estonian political communica­
tion field: the rapid growth of Internet usage. This contributed to the further frag­
mentation of the audiences but also stimulated a rebirth of political debate. 
Online comments concerning political news, online EU debate and online polls 
on hot topics brought back in the political field young people who were not eager 
to participate in elections. The availability of banking services through the Inter­
net and the development of e-commerce soon involved hundreds of thousands of 
customers. This new media environment inspired politicians to supply active 
information via websites of the parties and government institutions. The Law on 
Public Information in 2000 made a significant contribution to the development of 
the electronic public sphere. According to this law, all public institutions were 
obliged to publicise on their websites all relevant information about forthcoming 
legislative acts and other decisions, information about the usage of public funds, 
etc. The requirement for an active information supply opened new perspectives 
for the participation of citizens in decision-making processes and gave new impe­
tus for more qualified media debates based on this common stock of knowledge. 
Towards the end of 1999, the Estonian media landscape stabilised. Even if some 
further mergers or bankruptcies occur, the appearance of new dailies or national 
TV channels is hardly imaginable. After the initial confusion created by liberali­
sation and marketisation of the media, Estonian society became more familiar 
with the new media environment and expressed critical demands concerning the 
quality of media content. While the media watched the politicians, politicians 
themselves became concerned that the media should not favour some political 
parties over others. Tensions between the media and politicians stimulated the 
media to draw grim pictures of politics in general. The growing disillusionment 
created fruitful soil for negative representations of government, political parties 
and politicians. Complaints about alienation between politicians and "ordinary 
people" expressed by the media deepened the feelings of disappointment and 
helped to create a vicious circle of public mistrust. 
The presidential elections of 2001 raised the debates about the principal values 
and alternatives for Estonia. The media responded to the shock created by the 
result of the elections, calling politicians to reflect on the causes and meaning of 
the unexpected outcome. Young generations of journalists could not hide their 
anger and despair, accusing the government coalition of a lack of unanimity and 
the failed implementation of reforms. Others were openly satisfied with the 
opportunity for political retaliation on behalf of the "oppressed part of society." 
Deep contradictions hidden under the cover of Estonian success story needed 
explanation and resolution. 
7. Social and cultural contradictions of the transition process 
The Estonian crisis of 2000-2001 is not exceptional. Almost all successfully 
reformed countries have gone through similar backlashes. Although the vast 
majority of people would not support a return to the Socialist past (Table 17 in 
Appendix), surveys recently conducted in Central European countries demon­
strate a growing dissatisfaction of the population (see Munro, 2001: 18-23). Trust 
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in political institutions is lower in many other post-Communist countries than in 
Estonia (Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer, 1998; Mishler & Rose, 2001). Alienation and 
distrust characterises the relationships between people and political institutions. 
In many successfully reformed countries, elections had brought back to power 
former Communist functionaries. Most striking is the example of the Polish elec­
tions in 2001, where half the population did not participate at all (turnout 
dropped to 46%), remnants of previously glorious Solidarity did not even pass 
the threshold, and the former Communists won a clear victory. 
Investigating the reasons for these backlashes, Jörg Jacobs (2001) found that 
two sets of causes are relevant. First, in all countries investigated (the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and the former East Germany), structural reforms in 
the economy had led to serious social problems; a notable part of the population 
suffered from poverty and the lack of everyday security; and the gap between the 
rich and poor parts of the population was growing. Second were cultural factors, 
especially socialisation in times of the Socialist regime. The revolutions of 1989 
created high expectations of a coming "free and fair society," different from the 
miserable existence inside the closed and repressive socialist camp. Ironically, the 
content of those expectations of a "bright future" was deeply influenced by 
socialist and communist ideology: hostility towards the market, fairness under­
stood as the equal distribution of goods, and a leading role for the state in pro­
viding for the welfare and employment of everyone. These ideas are still wide­
spread among people who were socialised under communist regimes, but people 
themselves often fail to recognise traces of socialism in their expectations and 
assessments. 
Even if there are similar patterns of social and political developments in almost 
all post-Communist countries of Europe, the processes in each country differ in 
the details and in the timetable of events. In each country, questions can also be 
asked about possible alternative choices. 
To fully assess the more complicated reasons for political failures and social 
tensions in a post-Communist country like Estonia, it is necessary to understand 
the gains and losses of different groups in society during the decade of reforms, 
their economic, social and political status in society now compared to the social­
ist past, and how they perceive and interpret changes in society and in their own 
lives. 
7.1. Evaluation of changes 
The post-Communist development of the three Baltic countries in general is seen 
in international social science literature as a success story. Among the topics fre­
quently analysed are the external and internal factors of this success (see Smith, 
1999:176-182; Clemens, 2001). In several recent cases, the analysis is focused pri­
marily on the factors of Estonia's success (Feldmann, 2000; Norgaard, 2000: 
174-179; Panagiotou, 2001). 
Comparing evaluations given by representative surveys to the past, present 
and future of a country, two patterns of attitudes can be distinguished: the 
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Figure 1.3. Attitudes towards past, present and future in the Baltics (%) 
Positive evaluation 
of the economic system 
Positive evaluation 
of the political system 
Estonians 
48 69 86 44 79 92 
1996 2000 
22 69 89 48 70 87 
1996 2000 
Latvians 
59 21 72 74 22 54 76 37 60 
1993 1996 2000 
36 46 81 41 37 69 52 49 74 
1993 1996 2000 
Lithuanians 
75 22 67 76 25 60 83 25 47 
1993 1996 2000 
Щ economic system before independence 
I I economic system at present 
H economic system in the next five years 
46 46 81 43 37 70 56 45 61 
1993 1996 2000 
I Communist regime 
П present system of governing 
Ш system of governing in next five years 
Source. Rose & Maley, 1994; Rose, 1997; Rose, 2000 
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"Central European" optimistic pattern, where people are more satisfied with 
their present situation compared to the Communist past and expect even more 
improvement in the future; and the "East European" pessimistic pattern, where 
the past of the Soviet era is evaluated to be better than the present "transitional" 
situation and people are not sure the future could be any better than the pre-tran-
sitional past (see Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer, 1998). Despite social difficulties, 
changes in Estonia are evaluated positively by the majority of the population. 
In 1993, all Baltic nations, including Estonia, thought that the state of the econ­
omy before independence was better than the present-day condition. After eco­
nomic stabilisation in 1994, opinions changed: according to the results of the 
Baltic Barometer from April 1995, the present economic system in Estonia was 
rated equally with the past. In November 1996, evaluations given to the present 
state of the economy had risen higher than that of the past level (see Lauristin & 
P. Vihalemm, 1997:122-124). Results of the survey from March 2000 demonstrate 
even more clearly the overwhelming positive evaluation of changes towards the 
market economy in Estonia but not in Latvia and Lithuania (see Figure 1.3, Table 
16 in Appendix). 
The differences among the attitudes of the people in the three Baltic countries, 
which had quite similar starting positions at the beginning of economic reforms, 
are remarkable. They clearly contradict a widespread assumption that slower 
and softer reforms would help avoid social tensions, which are inevitable in the 
countries that have chosen "shock therapy" for the stabilisation of their 
economies. Estonia is a clear case of the "shock" version; Lithuania, on the other 
hand, an example of the desire to avoid social tensions by postponing radical 
changes. 
Optimistic expectations towards the future, despite the difficulties of the pres­
ent situation, are a sign of the post-Communist "economy of patience" (Offe, 
1996). Patience, however, is not an infinite resource. Comparing the optimistic 
answers of the questionnaires with the content of media discourses and with 
severe political debates between pro-reform government and critical opposition, 
it is possible to identify significant differences. 
In the Estonian media, the pessimistic interpretation of changes has dominated 
throughout the entire decade of reforms. It is related mainly to the social unfair­
ness created by changes in society: rising inequality; new unfairness caused by 
privatisation; destruction of the previous economic and social structures; grow­
ing insecurity; egoism and élitism of the politicians; and lost unanimity of people 
(Lauristin, 2000). In the declaration by the social scientists in April 2001, the con­
cept of "two Estonias" was coined to designate the growing gap between the suc­
cessful and deprived parts of society. 
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7.2. Social contradictions 
The older generation felt especially deprived of security earned during their life­
long work in socialist times. There were concrete reasons for such complaints: 
currency reform devaluated their savings, pension reform abolished Soviet-era 
guarantees and dropped the replacement rate of pensions compared to previous 
salaries from 70% to less than 40%; and previously cheap costs of living in apart­
ments skyrocketed, after water, heating and electricity were priced according to 
their real costs. Feeling themselves deprived of their best hopes, representatives 
of the older generation started to blame not only politicians but the Estonian state 
in general, refusing to recognize it as a country of their dreams, the "real Esto­
nia." 
Additional conflicts were created by restoration of ownership of pre-war real 
estate. While those who were living in the newly built houses in Soviet-era sub­
urbs could privatise their flats using privatisation vouchers, the inhabitants of old 
houses in better parts of cities suddenly discovered that their houses were to be 
given back to the previous owners and they could not freely privatise their flat. It 
was one thing to protest against Soviet nationalisation of private ownership in 
general, quite another to find out that you have a nice flat as a result of this 
nationalisation and must now recognize the rights of the previous owner. The 
state tried to protect the rights of renters, by requiring owners to continue rent 
contracts and providing loans for the purchase of new flats, but these measures 
did not solve the conflicts. Dwellers in the returned houses were among the most 
furious critics of reforms, speaking about the "new repressions against people." 
A third group of worried and dissatisfied people was the rural population of 
Estonia. After decades of fighting against the Sovietisation of rural life and con­
demnation of kolkhozes and sovkhozes as results of Soviet repressive agricultural 
politics, dissolution of these collective farms should have been welcomed by 
everyone. The reality of agricultural reform turned out to be much more compli­
cated. Kolkhozes and sovkhozes were dissolved and all members could reclaim 
their properties according to the unanimous resolution of the Supreme Council. 
This happened in the spring of 1991, before the restoration of independence, but 
land reform took much more time and is still not fully complete. Farmers who 
reclaimed their modest properties were usually unable to survive in free-market 
competition. Instead of the idyllic rural life of pre-war agrarian Estonia preserved 
in memory, modern reality demanded a different scale of production and differ­
ent farming skills. Unemployment in rural Estonia is extremely high. Polarisation 
is growing between cities and the countryside, and inside the rural areas between 
smaller number of strong new farms successfully exporting their production and 
the majority of village people trying to preserve their little farms, scarcely living 
at a subsistence level and working several additional seasonal jobs. Structural 
reforms in agriculture not only created social problems for many families in vil­
lages, but they have also had a strong cultural and political impact on the whole 
population, as even urbanised Estonians identify themselves very strongly with 
the home villages of their grandparents. "Destruction of the Estonian country­
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side" became one of the most angry accusations directed by the opposition 
against the reformist government. The protest votes of villagers brought victory 
to the opposition's presidential candidate in 2001. 
All the above-mentioned social problems and many others could be included 
in the often-used concept of "social costs of transition." One of the most wide­
spread complaints posits that the costs and the gains of transition are not distrib­
uted fairly: when one part of society enjoys all new freedoms, the other bears all 
new troubles. This means that interpretations of changes by different social actors 
are becoming increasingly controversial. 
7.3. Cultural contradictions of transition 
The controversial meaning of transition is related to differences in values. The 
first and foremost difference is in the value of freedom. It is not the same for all. 
The transition of Eastern Europe from Communist regime to capitalist market 
economy had clearly revealed the fundamental cultural contradiction of Western 
civilisation: conflict between freedom and equality (Bell, 1976). 
Confusion in post-Communist minds, created by disillusionment with nostal­
gic expectations and by the new contradictions of society, was very difficult to 
resolve. Media discourses reflect deep confusion during the first years of inde­
pendence. Besides the real difficulties inevitable in a situation of rapid change in 
a relatively poor country, the reason for being confused lies in the cultural con­
tradiction of a transitional period. Piotr Sztompka called the state of minds in 
post-Communist society "a transitional trauma" or "cultural trauma" (Sztompka, 
2000). Using phenomenological approach (Schutz & Luckmann, 1974), this trau­
ma meant that for the majority of people, adapted to life in a closed totalitarian 
society, the collapse of the main structures of the individual life-world started 
with the spacial and temporal dimensions and spread to social categorisation 
schemes, basic values and the accent of reality. 
The better one had adapted to the Orwellian Soviet reality, the harder it was to 
understand the new world. For the young it was not a problem, as they were 
already socialised in the new system. For people who were actively communi­
cating with the outside world through formal or informal channels, the change of 
mind was not crucial either. But even for them, and for dissidents, for Western-
minded intellectuals, for economic managers who by the end of Soviet era were 
involved in different joint ventures, adaptation to the new environment at home 
demanded mental and emotional efforts. Among the main deficiencies were: a 
lack of understanding how the modern capitalist society works as a system; a 
lack of experience to participate in market relations not only in business but also 
in the so-called humanitarian sphere; a lack of skills to behave as a citizen in a 
democratic society; a lack of readiness to take personal risks and accept respon­
sibilities; and a lack of tolerance concerning "others." 
After the decade of efforts, "return to the West" (see Lauristin & P. Vihalemm, 
1997; Lagerspetz, 1999) seems still to be disputable. After the jubilation of the ini­
tial years, the West did not sincerely recognize Eastern Europe, including Estonia, 
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Latvia and Lithuania, as a part of the common past. The border between East and 
West was culturally constructed deep in European history, and breaking through 
this border seemed even more difficult than breaking with the Soviet Union. The 
concept of transition itself blurred, as people did not understand where they real­
ly were and where they should proceed. 
In this situation of confusion, the state of anomia was aggravated. The nation­
al values preserved through the Soviet era lost their validity, while those used to 
justify reforms were not viewed as the interests of the people, but were perceived 
as the interests of the government and the élite. An attitude of collective readiness 
for patience and scarcity for the sake of the nation's future was widespread dur­
ing the Singing Revolution, but now it seemed to be a deal for "losers," while 
"winners" hurried to enjoy the pleasures of consumerism. 
The contemporary post-modern cultural environment does not help in under­
standing transition processes, but rather creates further confusion, applying 
often-irrelevant standards and schemes of interpretation. Post-Communist coun­
tries still have to develop modern political and economic structures that belong 
by their nature to industrial society, i.e., to the past, but the world is already shift­
ing culturally towards the post-industrial network society. Many tasks yet to be 
fulfilled in Estonia, like creating strong political parties, or establishing effective 
systems of social insurance, were accomplished in Western countries more than 
half a century ago. In order to be perceived as a relevant partner in international 
dialogue, post-Communist societies have to move further in two different time 
scales, modern and post-modern. The media and the entire sphere of cultural 
production acts in the post-modern context, in the rapidly expanding virtual uni­
verse of new communications. The processes of economic recovery, political con­
solidation and social stabilisation seem from this perspective to belong to a dif­
ferent reality. 
When culture is not able to give sense to the life experiences of people, the feel­
ings of alienation and frustration are hard to overcome. 
7.4. Concluding remarks 
A comparative analysis of developments in different post-Communist countries 
revealed similar factors that influenced the decline of support for reforms and the 
growing criticism towards the new political and economic system not only in 
Estonia, but all over the previous Socialist world. Those with negative attitudes 
concerning post-Communist development are characterised by dissatisfaction 
with their economic situation coupled with high expectations concerning the 
ability of the state to provide economic guarantees (Jacobs, 2001). 
Compared to the stable Western democracies, these expectations seem to be too 
high, revealing the inability of people to adapt to market conditions and to accept 
the liberal concept of the state. Looking at the figures characterising the level of 
economic performance and available financial resources, even in the most suc­
cessful post-Communist countries, the forecasts show that "even with the fast 
economic growth, it will be decades before the southern side of the Baltic Sea 
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catches up with the countries on its northern and western shores" (The Economist, 
1 September 2001: 25). That also means the impossibility of implementing gener­
ous policies of social support, well known to the Baltic people from their Nordic 
neighbours and often taken as an ideal model for alleviating the social cost of 
transition. 
Reviewing the decade of transition, praise can be lavished on Estonia's eco­
nomic and political achievements, which have provided access to the EU and 
NATO. On the other hand, one also can also focus only on the disappointments 
and unsolved problems. Both perspectives, one too optimistic, the other too pes­
simistic, have the same flaw: they concentrate on policies, on governmental activ­
ities and do not say much about society as a whole. 
Transition can be tackled as an élitist project, for better or worse in its imple­
mentation. An examination of transformation requires a look at processes that are 
deeply changing all societal structures. Estonian society changed during these 
years in all dimensions. The closed society dominated by the totalitarian East is 
now turned to the West and open to all global winds. An economy based on a 
state planning system and dependent upon agriculture and industry had become 
an open-market economy dominated by the service sector. Technological interi-
ority had turned into competitiveness in the most advanced areas of information 
technology and biotechnology. A culturally homogeneous ethnic community had 
become a multicultural modern nation. An orientation to the common national 
values was replaced by cultural fragmentation and individualism. A "classless" 
Soviet society had developed into a capitalist class society. 
Even if establishing Estonia's economic equivalence with its Nordic neighbours 
takes decades, the transformation of its society has progressed so far that there is 
no way to turn the clock back. When material resources are scarce, the appropri­
ate use of social and symbolic capital could help to overcome mistrust and 
despair. Estonia has experience in developing an effective national integration 
programme for the Russian minority. An analysis of the social and cultural 
processes that created the crisis of 2001 should help to develop a comprehensive 
integration programme for the entire nation. It cannot be based on nostalgic 
dreams, Utopian expectations or populist promises. It presumes not only a criti­
cal analysis of the policies applied thus far, but also a growing capacity for criti­
cal self-reflection across the whole of society. 
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2. Development of the Media in Latvia 
in the 1990s 
Inta Brikše, Ojärs Skudra, Rolands Tjarve 
Since the beginning of the period of perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union, 
trends and characteristics in the development of the media in Latvia, as well as 
in the other Baltic States and countries of Eastern Europe, have traditionally been 
analysed in the context of the overall political and economic processes. In the 
1990s, however, this approach was questionable, because media transformation 
was decreasingly related to and comparable with political changes that occurred. 
The analytical technique, though, is both useful and fundamental in evaluating 
general processes, so the first step is a review of the political and economic 
processes that took place in the 1990s. 
1. The main periods of systemic transformations 
in Latvia between 1985 and 2001: The state and the media 
1.1. Stages of societal development 
The process of systemic transformations in Latvia between 1985 and 2001 can be 
divided into several major stages: 
Stage 1. The collapse of the political and economic structure of the authori­
tarian Communist regime (1985-1991). This period ended in August 1991, when 
the Republic of Latvia regained its independence and won international recogni­
tion, and the process of democracy was gradually institutionalised. 
Stage 2. The institutionalisation of the democratic Latvian state (1991-1995). 
On 10 December 1991, the Supreme Council passed a constitutional law, "The 
Rights and Obligations of Individuals and Citizens," but it refused to make the 
law a part of the national constitution. 
The process, which came to be known as "small privatisation," began towards 
the end of 1991 and prices were liberalised. This led to hyperinflation, which was 
further fuelled by the continuing circulation of the Russian rouble. The Latvian 
rouble was only introduced in May 1992, and in March of the following year 
Latvia began to issue the national currency, the lat. Latvia's domestic policies dur­
ing this period developed in various contradictory ways. The local government 
elections held on 29 May 1994 were part of a systemic democratic structure, but 
there was much less success in the establishment of government institutions and 
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related laws needed for a successful market economy. A number of vast financial 
scandals resulted - the one best-known internationally was the collapse of 
the Baltija Bank on 22 May 1995. This caused serious problems for many Latvian 
companies and for huge numbers of residents. It also had a significant effect on 
the development of the mass media. 
The next election and the ability of the political elite to agree on ways in which 
to avoid a deeper political crisis in the country showed that at the level of consti­
tutional organs, the systemic democratic structure was established quite success­
fully. The processes were far weaker in the areas of territorial and functional rep­
resentation. This is indicated by the weakness of the system of political parties 
and of local governments, as well as by the emergence of a two-community soci­
ety in Latvia - problems which can at least in part be attributed to the imple­
mentation of a strategy of "exclusive democracy" in Latvia. 
Stage 3. The consolidation of the democratic political regime (1996-2001). 
The move towards processes of democratic consolidation in Latvia occurred 
slowly and not without contradictions. One reason for this was the instability of 
coalition governments that were formed as the result of fairly radical shifts in the 
system of political parties in Latvia. 
Two large factions from the session of the Saeima which took place from 1995 
until 1998 disintegrated after the 1998 elections, while major successes were 
gained by the newly founded and conservative People's Party, as well as by the 
Social Democrats. There was something of an overlap between the conclusion of 
the democratic system restructuring, which took place in Latvia on the one hand 
and the initial processes of consolidating democracy on the other. Latvia passed 
through a period of negative consolidation of democracy because the elite's atti­
tudes towards it were positive, and democracy did not have to face any serious 
political alternative. One can predict that in the next parliamentary election, 
scheduled in 2002, there will once again be a fairly significant shift in the politi­
cal party system. This was observed in the local government elections in 2001; in 
the capital city of Riga, the Social Democrats, along with leftist party alliances, 
posted significant gains. 
During this period Latvia also engaged in further liberalisation of its citizen­
ship law - something demanded quite actively by the OSCE, the European Union 
and Russia. At the level of the individual, this made it possible to overcome the 
boundaries that were set up by the model of "exclusive democracy." Something 
similar has happened in the practical implementation of Latvia's language law. 
The Latvian economy overcame the consequences of the Russian financial cri­
sis quite successfully, and Latvia has persuaded the European Union to begin 
accession negotiations with it. 
Latvia, like Estonia and Lithuania, however, has not managed to regain the 
level of gross domestic product that existed in the country in 1990, nor has it 
returned to other pre-independence indicators that attest to economic develop­
ment. The indicators that are in place, though, demonstrate that if political sta­
bility and sustainable growth rates in the national economy are preserved, the sit­
uation might well improve in the foreseeable future. 
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1.2. Phases of media development 
The development of the mass media during this period only partially coincided 
with the aforementioned systemic transformations, and it is also true that the fac­
tors that determined the changes in these two areas differed. Between 1985 and 
2001, there were several phases in media development, along with certain factors 
that had an impact on the process. 
1. Démocratisation of media content during the period of perestroika and 
glasnost as a form of liberalisation in the Soviet totalitarian ideology 
(1985-1987). The media began to write about subjects that had previously been 
taboo. Criticisms were launched against the government's thinking, and there 
were open debates in the press that allowed people to express their views. It must 
be remembered, however, that this took place under the full auspices of Soviet-
era media regulations and laws. 
2. Media system and individual media outlets increasingly served as proper 
communications channels with the relevant functions (1987-1990). Of impor­
tance here was the emergence of newspapers and newsletters from the Latvian 
People's Front and other new organisations. As government controls over the 
press were relaxed, the popularity of all of the press increased sharply. The media 
became a place for public debate over the emergence of a new public sphere in 
society. The media also were active participants in what has come to be known as 
the Latvian national renaissance that led to the restoration of the country's inde­
pendence. 
3. Cardinal transformations in the national press system, and the state radio 
and television stations in particular (January-August 1991). These emerged as 
a representation of the image and functions of the national media. Development 
of the print press market was severely hindered during this period by the fact 
that in January 1991 Soviet special OMON troops took over the building in Riga 
that housed Latvia's largest newspaper printing presses. It is also true that for the 
first time in 50 years, the media were facing true competition amongst them­
selves, a situation that was exacerbated by economic collapse, severe inflation 
and deteriorating purchasing power. Television and radio communications took 
on a special role for people because they were nationally available, free of charge, 
and active in their support for the restoration of Latvia's independence. 
4. Stagnation and narrowing in the media market (1991-1992). Newspaper 
circulation dropped, and the market for books diminished in terms of the num­
ber of titles, the size of print runs, etc. This was dictated by the overall economic 
situation in Latvia, but also by the fact that many media outlets were simply 
being run by people who had no experience working in a proper market envi­
ronment. 
5. New media market emerged - involving commercialisation and consoli­
dation in the media (1993 - late 1990s). Throughout the latter part of the 1990s, 
new printed and electronic media outlets appeared, circulation and consumption 
increased, the advertising market developed, and foreign capital entered the 
industry. 
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6. National market for mass communications stabilises, global communica­
tions industry strengthenes local market presence (late 1990s - early 21st cen­
tury). This phase resulted from four factors: (a) stabilisation of the economic sit­
uation, underpinning an expansion in the consumer market; (b) professionalisa-
tion of journalism and media management as global experience was accessed; 
(c) rapid development and professionalisation of the public relations and adver­
tising industries; (d) the arrival of Western skills and practices in the media, pub­
lic relations and advertising business. 
2. Transformation of media content and the media system 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s: Facts and consequences 
This period is usually described on the basis of the explosive growth in the num­
bers and circulation of newspapers. Some 500 periodicals appeared in Latvia 
between 1988 and 1991. Most were A3-format newspapers, between four and 
eight pages in length, and issued on anything from a bi-weekly to monthly basis. 
The emergence of radio and television as part of the electronic media system in 
Latvia was a slower and narrower process than with the printed press. There 
were several reasons for this. During the Soviet period and the national awaken­
ing in Latvia, there was fairly free (albeit illegal) access to various copying and 
printing equipment. By contrast, telecommunications were under extremely 
strict controls and were not accessible to transmit information in opposition to 
the existing centers of power. All television and radio frequencies belonged to the 
state, and until August 1991, use of these frequencies was strictly supervised by 
the security structures of the Latvian SSR. 
The programme of Latvian Television was harmonised with the programme of 
the central Soviet television station, and many broadcasts were very popular (and 
not only among Russians). Negative attitudes toward central broadcasts, and 
especially toward the news programme Vremja, appeared only after central tele­
vision began to broadcast false and tendentious information about events in the 
Baltic States and Latvia. Many other programmes, however, have maintained 
their popularity to this very day: e.g., Itogi, which is rebroadcast on Latvian Inde­
pendent Television. 
Latvian Radio and Latvian Television were neither ready for nor interested in 
any major changes in the electronic media system. In the press system, albeit 
within the confines of Soviet structures, there were various newspapers and mag­
azines, among which there was at least professional, if not actual competition. In 
the electronic media, by contrast, there was a complete monopoly. The State 
Radio and Television Committee governed radio and television procedures in 
Latvia. Latvian Radio and Latvian Television were only split off as independent 
structures in 1990. 
This situation was not only a factor that structurally hindered the formation of 
a system of electronic mass media, but it also had a very important psychological 
influence. During the Soviet period, both broadcast organisations were very 
effective instruments for disseminating propaganda, and at the beginning of the 
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national awakening they, far more than the press, transformed into media that 
were oriented toward the Latvian People's Front. They also changed their content 
much more quickly. The electronic media, especially radio, earned enormous 
public trust. That was partly because of the specifics of the radio station in terms 
of its work as a medium - live broadcasts from various meetings and demon­
strations allowed people to enjoy the effect of feeling that they were present at 
these events. 
The slow pace of legislative changes hindered the development of the media 
system. The mass media only started to operate in accordance with the law "On 
the Press and Other Mass Information Resources" in 1991. The law contained 
declarative phrases about press freedom but in fact did not provide any legal 
foundation for the emergence of the electronic media and specific resources for 
communications; in fact, the law actually hindered private initiative in the elec­
tronic media business in several ways. It was also adopted too late for the devel­
opment of private business operations in the press market because in the late 
1980s, when quite a few people had enough money to launch press operations, 
there was no law to allow them to do so. 
When analysing radio and television in the early 1990s in Latvia, it is important 
to note that they enjoyed enormous trust and even love from the audience. They 
really were "people's media," even though each had different development 
trends - both because the media themselves were different and because there 
were differences in the way in which they were perceived. 
Radio Latvia provided widespread reflection of the social and political mood 
of society, and it served to promote a more public nature of debate. For the first 
time various groups and individuals were given an opportunity to express their 
views publicly. People actively listened to the radio to learn what was going on 
in the country. 
Latvian Television, by contrast, produced mostly TV magazine programmes 
and talk shows. This was partly because during Soviet times shows of this type 
were among the most popular programmes on television, with the result that the 
genre developed in a more professional way. Social reality could be interpreted 
rather freely, and journalists could avoid politically undesirable issues and sub­
jects. TV discussions that provided audiences with the effect of being present at 
events allowed journalists to avoid stating their own positions directly while still 
leading the audience to see them as serious fighters against the Soviet system. 
From the perspective of journalism standards and democratic traditions, these 
radio and television programmes in the late 1980s and early 1990s seem rather 
absurd today, but the fact remains that one of the most typical trends in the devel­
opment of journalism of the time was the co-opting of Soviet propaganda meth­
ods in order to reach new goals diametrically opposed to the Soviet system. This 
was particularly typical in the electronic mass media. 
All of this was seen most clearly in the TV programme that was by far the most 
popular in Latvia at that time - Labvakar (Good Evening), which was similar in 
concept to a Soviet programme from the period of perestroika that was called 
Vzglad (View). On both broadcasts, journalists implemented the ideas of pere­
stroika and glasnost with great energy. They were not neutral journalists who 
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questioned others, nor were they commentators who analysed and criticised 
processes and phenomena in society. At the same time, they managed to maintain 
a distance from the events and people that they were discussing, but they were 
clear promoters of perestroika and glasnost and, in Latvia, of the ideas of national 
independence. 
The hosts of Labvakar were attractive in terms of their personality, and they 
developed a very detailed system of images, discussions and interviews. Once 
again, the issue here was that people were given the sense of being participants 
in the process, and this was something conceptually new in (Soviet) Latvian tel­
evision. 
This is a period that might symbolically be called an "information banquet." 
People "consumed" the mass media without any critical approach to content and 
professionalism. Information that had not been available because of Soviet cen­
sorship was automatically assumed now to be true and objective. Journalists 
emerged as heroes of the era. Nobody wanted them to present serious arguments 
and constructive ideas. Rather, they were expected to embody opposition to the 
Soviet system and faith in Latvia's future. 
The role of journalists and the media in terms of mass communications content 
and the perception of this content by the public were influenced by several 
groups of factors. 
First, the local population was hungry for information, and the low price of 
newspapers allowed some press outlets to achieve unbelievably high circulation 
figures. Because there was very limited choice in terms of radio and television 
channels, the Latvian population came together around Latvian State Television 
and Latvian State Radio (except, of course, for those who could not understand 
the Latvian language and/or were opposed to the restoration of Latvia's inde­
pendence). 
Media content was disseminated throughout society at the level of personal 
communications, and various types of communications supported one another. 
Public opinion leaders (including a sizeable number of journalists) were of criti­
cal importance in developing content perception and in providing interpretations 
of events and processes that had a fairly direct influence on the audience. 
Journalists attended national demonstrations and meetings at which they 
received immediate, direct and varied audience reactions to media content. 
Accordingly, they could react to communications effects based on their experi­
ence and knowledge of communications processes (Brikse, 1997: 105). 
Communications processes in Latvia and in the Baltics during this period can 
be seen as unique because "it is practically imposible for a large population in 
contemporary societies to participate fully in public business" (Splichal, 1994: 6). 
It is also true that as the number of media outlets increased, the job market in 
the field of journalism expanded very rapidly. This led to a unique synergy in 
terms of a lack of professionalism. Journalists and the media continued to oper­
ate under the influence of Soviet-era traditions - no separation between facts and 
opinions, and a reflection of the journalist's own views about events. Further­
more, many of the new media outlets had an absolute lack of professional and 
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experienced people who could evaluate the needs and interests of their audience. 
This was seen in many of the publications that were issued by the Latvian Peo­
ple's Front, for example. The editors of these publications felt that advertising 
was nothing more than a waste of space that limited the ability of people to 
receive information and viewpoints. The media began to employ young people 
who had insufficient education and social experience to allow them to evaluate 
events and to ensure that media content was in line with the level of education 
and information in society. 
The effects of these factors in the mass communications environment in Latvia 
receded only in the latter half of the 1990s, and they are still present today 
because "the majority of the media in Latvia became increasingly iconoslastic and 
broadened the scope of their coverage" (Dreifelds, 1996: 68). 
3. A challenge to the media: Shifting from propaganda 
and inexperience to a market economy under conditions of crisis 
The early 1990s were a time when Latvia's periodicals and book-publishing 
industry faced a serious crisis. Publishers, editors and journalists had to over­
come the euphoria that was a part of the late 1980s, both because of the influence 
of the Latvian People's Front newspaper Atmoda, and because it was suddenly 
possible to offer various print media products that had not been available during 
the Soviet period. There were significant changes in public attitudes at the same 
time, however. If during the national awakening people had been focused on pol­
itics - something that increases interest in the mass media - then after the restora­
tion of Latvian independence people were forced to devote more attention to 
everyday economic problems. People who purchased books became far more 
selective for financial reasons, and also because the "trash literature" that flood­
ed the market became tiresome due to its primitive content and the poor pro­
duction qualities that were allowed. 
Newspapers, magazines and books were the first media to encounter the real­
ities of a market economy. 
3.1. Newspapers: The search for readers 
Although economic indicators in the first half of the 1990s showed that the stan­
dard of living in Latvia was deteriorating, the number of published newspapers 
actually increased. In 1990 there were 172 newspapers in Latvia, while in 1995 
there were 286. The number then declined, with only 235 newspapers published 
in 1999. Of these, only 27 were published four to six times per week, while anoth­
er 36 were published two or three times per week. In 1990 there were 103 news­
papers in the Latvian language, and in 1995 there were 193 such newspapers. 
Afterward, in line with the overall decline in the number of titles, the number of 
Latvian newspapers also declined. Economic circumstances forced a correspon­
ding decline in circulation numbers. If in 1990 people were buying 4,396,000 
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copies of newspapers, then in 1995 circulation was down to 2,915,000, and in 1999 
to 2,105,000. 
The development of newspapers in Latvia involved the idea that one could 
start a newspaper in the hope that a new product would attract people. Others 
published digests of information in newspaper form, hoping that people would 
be interested in the "white pages" of history and the like. Processes in the daily 
newspapers sector were different. Daily newspapers, which are published six 
times a week, grew in number from seven in 1990 to eighteen in 1995. This sug­
gested there were quality-related transformations in the content and form of 
newspapers, as well as an audience that was starting to form new habits in terms 
of media choice. Unlike local and other newspapers, which sought market nich­
es in a fairly chaotic way, the dailies tried to firm up their existing audiences and 
only then examine secondary target audiences (family members, students, etc.). 
There are several factors that must be considered in analysing the development 
of the media, especially the development of newspapers in the 1990s. First, the 
potential audience for the daily press in Latvia is small, both because Latvia has 
a small population and because that population is divided into separate language 
groups. Secondly, although the welfare level of the residents has developed and 
improved, it has not yet reached the point at which the average family can afford 
to subscribe to more than one daily newspaper. Third, Latvia's dailies have not 
reached a level of journalism quality and thematic variety that would encourage 
people to subscribe to or even to buy two or more daily newspapers. 
All of this means that trends in the daily press market involved nothing more 
than the move of the audience from one newspaper to another. The first distri­
bution of the audience took place in the early 1990s, when the newspaper Diena 
was established as a state-issued newspaper. In 1991 and 1992, Diena was trans­
formed from a state-owned enterprise into a stock company with foreign capital 
(Hoyer, Lauk & Vihalemm, 1993: 243-244). 
The newspaper attracted an audience not only by being something new in the 
market - a Western-quality morning newspaper with a wide variety of news, a 
commentary page, the separation of facts from viewpoints, pages devoted to the 
interests of various groups and, later, special sections and inserts - but also by 
producing the structure and style of the newspaper very successfully so as to 
attract those audience groups which had previously read the newspapers of the 
Communist Party and its youth organisation. These two Communist newspapers 
had shifted their political attitudes and orientations beyond recognition between 
1989 and 1991 - the paper of the Communist youth organisation was a leading 
mouthpiece for the ideas of the Latvian People's Front, in point of fact - and they 
had also changed their structures. Diena launched an active marketing pro­
gramme and a series of successful attempts at self-promotion. 
The structure of the Latvian daily newspaper market became one in which 
Diena was the largest daily in Latvia, while NeatkarTgä Rita Avïze was the second 
largest. The next distribution of the audience involved a battle for readers 
between NeatkarTgä Rîta Avïze and the semi-weekly Lauku Avïze. The latter news­
paper, which is focused on rural concerns, was long the dominant market leader, 
but in 1996 it began to lose subscribers very rapidly - from 127,000 at the begin-
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ning of the year to just 85,000 at year's end. These processes are continuing today, 
and the competition is based on the fact that NeatkarTgä Rita Avïze is growing 
stronger and pursues the same readers (farmers, small-town residents) as Lauku 
Avïze. It is also true that Lauku Avïze has lost the faith of many readers because it 
has frequently changed its political platform. 
Latvia's first "yellow newspaper," Vakara Zujas, appeared in 1993 and is pub­
lished six times a week. Initially it had ambitions of competing with the morning 
newspapers, and it had a morning edition for a while. The paper was enormous­
ly popular at first, especially among young people. It had a laconic style, used 
simple language, sought to form a friendly dialogue with readers and opposed 
those who were in power. The paper began to lose its market position in the late 
1990s, especially because of the appearance of a new weekly magazine, Privätä 
Dzïve (Private Life), which took over some of the newspaper's market niche. 
Compared to the dynamic market of the national press, local newspapers have 
seen no radical developments since their idea-based crisis in the late 1980s and 
their financial crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. There are only two cities in 
which there is a real local press market and competition therein - Liepaja and 
Daugavpils. The circulation of local newspapers is rising slowly but steadily. One 
very important change is that since the mid-1990s, the national daily Diena has 
purposefully and gradually become involved in the local newspaper business. 
Eleven local newspapers were subsidiaries of the stock company Diena in 2001. 
The design and structure of these newspapers have improved rapidly, and there 
are also positive changes to be observed in content and style. 
3.2. Magazines: Women's magazines as market leaders 
The development of magazines in Latvia has taken place in two separate phases. 
The system of magazines from the Soviet period was transformed: some maga­
zines shut down; others changed their content and their economic activities. This 
transformation continued until the mid-1990s. Secondly, a new system of maga­
zines emerged in line with audience interests and demand, as well as in accor­
dance with the specifics of the advertising market and its development. 
The collapse of the Soviet system of magazines was greatly influenced by the 
Soviet military takeover in 1991 of the building in Latvia that housed the only 
printing presses that could produce magazines. It is also true that magazines 
were influenced far more than newspapers by other economic and political fac­
tors (inflation, the crisis in economic and political relations with Russia, which 
affected the availability of raw materials for newspaper production, etc.). In 1991 
none of the magazines that had been previously published in Latvia was able to 
maintain its output (publication once or twice per month), and only one maga­
zine managed to deliver the promised number of issues to its subscribers by the 
end of the year. 
Magazines had traditionally been distributed in Latvia through subscriptions. 
The events of 1991, of course, influenced the trust of readers, and many people 
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were no longer ready to pay in advance for an annual subscription. Skyrocketing 
inflation in Latvia also meant that people had less money to spend on periodicals. 
It is furthermore true that the magazine system itself could not continue to 
exist. Magazines in the Soviet press system were not interest-based or entertain­
ment media. Rather, they were aimed at specific and broad audiences, and their 
content was positioned for age groups (children, adolescents, teenagers and 
adults) and for gender groups (there was only one women's magazine). The 
interests of people such as rural residents, gardeners, chess players or literature 
fans were reflected only in a fragmentary way. 
The system of magazines in each Soviet republic was one in which there were 
no opportunities whatsoever to launch a new publication. In Latvia, among other 
things, this meant a serious shortage of magazines in Russian - even though 
many people did not speak Latvian, there were only two propaganda magazines 
in Russian, joined by a literary journal in 1990. This system kept people from sat­
isfying their informational, educational and entertainment needs in Latvia, and 
provided an indirect stimulus for ethnic Latvians to read primarily magazines 
that were published in Moscow and Leningrad, which led to increased use of the 
Russian language. This system hindered or even excluded non-Latvians from 
integration into Latvian society. They may have lived in Latvia, but they received 
all of their information and entertainment from media that spoke not about 
Latvia and its residents, but rather about the Soviet Union as a unified country in 
which the "Soviet nation" resided. These factors had a deleterious effect on the 
emergence of a market for Russian-language periodicals in Latvia for a number 
of years after the restoration of Latvia's independence. 
The changes in the magazine market in Latvia in the first half of the 1990s can 
be compared to those which occurred in the global market in the 1960s, when the 
rapid spread of television meant that advertising of mass consumption products 
shifted from general interest magazines to television. In Latvia, the advertising 
market only partially affected these processes because that market was only just 
developing. Rather, people rejected magazines because they were too general in 
content. They did not satisfy requirements related to different interests, and they 
could not keep up with local television channels in terms of the variety of infor­
mation and entertainment on offer. 
Women's magazines represent the largest share of the magazine market in 
Latvia, and the emergence of new women's magazines at the beginning of the 
1990s heralded transformations in the entire system. The journals are all fairly 
similar in terms of subject matter, and the orientation of magazines toward vari­
ous target audiences is based mostly on the self-image of a woman that the rele­
vant magazine seeks to project, as well as on the discourses "woman-man" and 
"woman-family" which each magazine seeks to position. 
The system of women's magazines began to emerge with the magazines Santa, 
which appeared in 1990, and Zeltene (in 1991). Each magazine separated itself 
quite radically from the only previously existing women's magazine, Sieviete, 
which began publication in 1952. The magazines split the women's audience 
until 1996. 
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Sieviete positioned itself as a magazine for middle-aged working women with 
an average income who could handle the difficulties of life and who have been 
forced by life to be independent and responsible for themselves and their fami­
lies. These women love their husbands, and they would give up their work and 
career in favor of the family if this were necessary. This magazine, like other 
women's magazines, is a typical editor's magazine - one in which the image of 
the editor and her staff are positioned in a distinctive way. 
Zeltene chose to focus on values that were popular among Latvians at the time 
when it appeared - Latvian traditions; a Latvian family; the establishment of a 
stylistically Latvian environment and home; housekeeping and handicrafts as a 
value in and of themselves; etc. The magazine reflected the typical nostalgia for 
prewar values that existed in society at that time, and it sought to continue the 
traditions of a magazine that had been published under the same title from 1926 
until 1940. The content, structure and style of the 50-year-old magazine were put 
into place. This was not the only attempt to bring popular Latvian magazines 
from the prewar period back to life, but it was comparatively the most success­
ful. The editors of Zeltene did not copy the model and design in toto, choosing 
instead to select specific elements of style. 
Santa positioned itself as the local version of traditional Western women's mag­
azines. The heroines and other women in Santa have usually been young women 
who are shaping their lives and careers, who know what they want and who 
know how to get it in their personal and working lives. They are oriented 
towards an urban or Western lifestyle. The magazine offered something more 
than Burda, which Latvian women used to a certain extent to brighten up the 
shabbiness of Soviet life and the difficult period of the national awakening. Santa 
was different in terms of design and print quality, and it had a strict conceptual 
orientation towards entertainment. Not for Santa are the negations of society and 
life; the magazine does not care about economic and social problems. Santa quick­
ly became popular and found lots of readers. Later it began to publish an edition 
in Russian with the same title and, in part, the same content. Overall, however, 
the Russian edition is not a translated magazine; rather, it is an independent pub­
lication for non-Latvian women. 
3.3. The book-publishing industry: Between culture and business 
The book-publishing industry in the Soviet Union was organised largely along 
the same lines as the radio and television industry. There were several large pub­
lishing houses; each specialised in a different area. In the late 1980s and early 
1990s, many companies without any experience or professional skills threw 
themselves into the book-publishing business, taking advantage of the literature 
not yet protected by the Bern Convention and reissuing books from the prewar 
period. It is important to note that neither the economic crisis of the early 1990s 
nor the economic upheavals of subsequent years (the collapse of Baltija Bank, the 
Russian financial crisis) have caused the number of book publishers in Latvia to 
decline. On the contrary - there were 40 new publishers in 1990,140 in 1991, 200 
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in 1994, 382 in 1995, and today there are some 400 companies that publish books. 
Only some 50 of these, however, can really be seen as professional publishers. 
The same trends can be seen in the number of titles published each year - 1,387 
in 1991,1,677 in 1994,1,968 in 1995, 2,320 in 1997, 2,652 in 1999 (of these, 2,191 in 
Latvian), etc. (see Table 19 in Appendix). The print run of books, however, is 
declining. The average print run of a book published in 1991, for example, was 
20,500, while in 1997 the number was down to 3,200. The overall print run of all 
books has also declined. In 1991 a record number of books - 28.5 million copies -
were published in Latvia, but by 1997 the number had declined to 7.5 million. The 
per capita number of books declined between the early and late 1990s - from 10.6 
books at the beginning of the decade to approximately 3.6 now - but the fact 
remains that book-publishing is a part of the Latvian national culture. 
Only a few Soviet-era publishing houses have survived, and only one has real­
ly developed successfully. The Zvaigzne ABC publishing house specialised in 
educational literature, and it is now one of the largest publishers in Latvia - in 
2000 it released 317 titles with a total print run of 1,531,000 copies. Ranked behind 
Zvaigzne are the Jumava publishing house, which also publishes magazines (89 
titles, 238,000 copies), Egmonts Latvija (73 and 231,000), and Kontinents (62 and 
163,000). 
International companies have been active in book publishing in other Eastern 
European countries, but in Latvia the business is mostly based on local capital. 
Most of the publishing houses, moreover, have accumulated capital through the 
publishing industry in particular. Book prices remain comparatively low. 
A serious problem in Latvia is the publishing of original literature, because few 
original books promise any profit to their publishers. Most books of Latvian lit­
erature are published with the financial support of the Latvian Cultural Capital 
Fund. 
The print run of all books in Latvia reached its highest level in 1991, both 
because people were highly interested in all kinds of information, and because 
book-publishing at that time was comparatively inexpensive. Political books, 
original literature and religious books reached the largest print runs in 1991. In 
all three areas, print runs plummeted in subsequent years. A countertrend has 
been seen in educational literature - if in 1991 the overall print run in this sector 
was smallest of all sectors, then in future years both the print runs and the num­
ber of titles expanded. That is because schools have changed their curricula, and 
there is a need for new textbooks. Educational literature in 2000 accounted for 
20% of all published books, ahead of reference literature (18%), fiction (15%) and 
children's literature (10%). 
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3.4. The electronic media: Economic and political considerations 
Changes in the environment of the electronic media in Latvia in the 1990s 
occurred in a much more active way than was the case with the press, and these 
changes have involved much greater political and economic tensions. 
Between 1990 and 1992, the mass media operated in accordance with the law 
"On the Press and Other Mass Information Resources," which had declarative 
phrases about press freedom but which did not provide any legal foundation for 
the emergence of the electronic media and specific resources for communications; 
in fact, the law actually hindered private initiative in the electronic media busi­
ness in several ways. 
In 1992, a new law, "On Radio and Television," was adopted, and it, more than 
the previous law, ensured guarantees for private business in the electronic media. 
From the very beginning, however, it was out of date in terms of the actual level 
of development in the electronic media sector. 
First, the 1992 law did not contain sufficient legal guarantees for the private 
electronic media as business enterprises. There were no clearly defined principles 
on the issuance of broadcasting licenses. 
Secondly, there was no advertising market for the electronic media, and the 
work of radio and television could be based on nothing more than approximate 
income calculations. This is partly because broadcasting companies initially were 
seen as economic and political lobbies to defend the economic and political inter­
ests of their founders. They largely operated on the basis of subsidies and spon­
sorship from these founders. 
Third, professional equipment is very expensive, and many broadcasting com­
panies worked with amateur video and audio equipment. This, of course, affect­
ed the quality of broadcasts, and also limited the reception area of the commer­
cial media - most could be received only in Riga and in Latvia's other major cities 
and their environs. 
Most companies during this period ignored copyright issues, but radio and tel­
evision stations still had to pay substantial sums for audio and video recordings. 
Initially, therefore, many programmes were rebroadcast from other entities, with 
a bit of locally produced news and other programmes added into the mix. 
The first private electronic medium in Latvia was Radio 2A, which was estab­
lished by the Riga Independent Broadcasting Company (RNR) and went on-air 
on the 102.7 FM frequency on 10 August 1991. Prior to 1991 there were no private 
radio stations in the Soviet Union, although the "Europe Plus" radio station in 
Moscow was a joint venture with France. Most radio frequencies were used for 
military purposes, and it was practically impossible to find airwaves for private 
radio programmes. Towards the end of 1990, several FM frequencies were vacat­
ed, and RNR leased one of them from the National Radio and Television Centre. 
In April 1991 the company concluded an agreement with the Russian company 
"Radio Rock" to rebroadcast the latter enterprise's musical programmes in 
Latvia. The Radio Rock signal was received by satellite from Oslo, Norway, and 
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RNR had the right to put seven minutes of its own content in each hour of pro­
gramming. RNR produced news, advertising, classified advertisements and orig­
inal programming. In terms of format, it was essentially an Adult Contemporary 
station. 
The first professional radio station was Radio Rigai (106.2), along with Christ­
ian Radio and Radio Skonto (all three began regular broadcasts in December 
1993). 
Another station, Radio SWH, which launched regular broadcasts in May 1993, 
appeared a bit before Radio Rigai but it cannot be seen as a purely industrial mar­
ket radio station, because it was established by a rapidly growing software com­
pany called SWH, with the aim of increasing the company's popularity by 
attracting popular Latvian musicians. The radio as a medium was subordinated 
to various events such as discotheques hosted by popular individuals. Further­
more, the Radio SWH programme had nothing to do with global standards in the 
area of radio formats; rather, it sought to be a radio station that provided "every­
thing for everyone" - i.e., it tried to become a copy of Radio Latvia. The schedule 
included children's programmes, broadcasts for teenagers and the elderly, fre­
quent news broadcasts (including live reports every third hour), etc. Radio SWH 
was fundamentally an amateur attempt to copy the Latvian Radio programme 
and to compete with the state radio station in the advertising market. 
The effort to find the largest possible audience by including a wide variety of 
formats and topics in broadcasts - starting with music for teenagers and ending 
with classical music - was typical of the new commercial stations in Latvia. The 
idea was that children and their grandparents coexist happily with just one radio 
in the house. It must also be noted that the audience at this period was not used 
to the radio as a source of music: instead, people considered the radio as a medi­
um allowing them to follow events through frequent news broadcasts and live 
reports. Another factor was the audience's had a major psychological need to par­
ticipate in radio debates. For a long time Latvian Radio had nighttime interviews 
of popular people, airing live between 1 a.m. and 6 a.m. The large number of tele­
phone calls to these programmes showed they were very popular. 
The structure and traditions of the electronic media audience gradually began 
to change in 1993 and 1994, thanks in part to changes in employment structures 
and lifestyles. People became more active in business and they needed to receive 
information quickly and concisely. Only radio could respond to this need. Com­
puters were increasingly used for various kinds of work, and the number of peo­
ple who could listen to the radio at work also increased. Furthermore, Western-
made automobiles appeared in Latvia in greater numbers. These had FM radios 
installed in them, and this also served to expand the audience. 
One complex issue was the fact that radios in Latvia had both an FM 1 and an 
FM 2 dial. In the 1960s the Soviet Union adopted standards on the use of ultra-
short-wave radio that differed from the standards in the rest of the world. Radio 
broadcasts were aired in the range between 66 and 74 MHz, and all radio sets that 
were manufactured in the Soviet Union received only this range. When import­
ed radios with the FM 2 dial began to appear in Latvia around 1990, they could 
not be used to full effect. A survey conducted by the Latvian Sociological 
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Research Center in the fall of 1994 found that 71.7% of respondents could hear 
broadcasts on the FM 1 dial, while only 44.9% could listen to programmes on the 
FM 2 dial. Radio Rigai, which broadcast on both dials, tried an interesting 
approach in overcoming this difficulty. 
True competition in the radio market began only when Radio Rigai and Radio 
Skonto entered the media business. Radio stations had to prove to advertisers 
that they had an audience, and also provide evidence about the type of audience. 
Radio stations thus had to adopt specific programming formats. 
The greatest competition among commercial radio stations was initially over 
the audience segment in the 25-35-year-old age range - active people with pur­
chasing power. Radio Super FM went on air regularly in November 1994, play­
ing only dance music and offering absolutely no news or spoken broadcasts. The 
radio station was reminiscent of a CD-player. The audience found this pro­
gramme attractive for two reasons - dance music was a new phenomenon 
throughout the world, and a complete rejection of any spoken programmes 
meant that people could listen to the station irrespective of their language skills. 
Television developed far more actively than radio during this period in two 
respects. Latvian Television began to offer new programmes that were more 
interesting than radio programmes, and it also began to air movies that had pre­
viously been available only (and rarely) on vidéocassette. People also flocked to 
watch soap operas, which were something new in the Soviet Union. The result 
was that initial advertising investments were concentrated more in television 
than in radio and the printed press. 
The television system began to develop actively in 1992, when the private tele­
vision stations NTV-5 and IGE were founded, and other broadcasters began to air 
programmes on the free channels of the country's television networks. These 
included the television companies KS-VIDEO, Prizma Prim and IK Baltika. 
The first private television studio, NTV-5, went on air on 4 May 1992. IGE-TV 
also launched regular broadcasts in May. Between 6.00 and 9.00 a.m., IGE-TV7 
broadcast music videos and cartoons for children, while between 6.00 and 9.00 
p.m. it aired movies and soap operas - something new in Latvian television pro­
grammes. 
NTV-5 was initially on-air for only one hour each day, from 9.00 to 10.00 p.m., 
and the output was mostly based on news - the first news programme on a non­
government medium. The journalists and news anchors were young individuals 
without any previous television experience. NTV-5 used amateur equipment, 
and so it began to look for new broadcasting opportunities. 
On 18 February 1993, the NTV-5 news programme was broadcast for the first 
time on the second channel of Latvian Television, thus reaching an audience 
throughout the country but also increasing broadcasting costs several times over. 
Advertising had to be attracted to cover these expenditures, and the broadcast­
ing time had to be expanded. This was not possible, however, because Ostankino 
TV already occupied the best times on LTV-2 from Russia and on LTV-2 itself. 
NTV-5 was offered a chance to lease broadcasting time before 09.00 a.m. and after 
11.00 p.m., but if a commercial television station wants to attract advertising 
money, there is no sense in airing programmes at a time when nobody watches 
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TV. Latvian Television, as a monopoly that controlled both national broadcast 
networks, thus hindered the emergence of the electronic media market. The main 
reason for this attitude was that the NTV-5 news programme developed as an 
increasingly serious competitor to the LTV news programme Panoräma. Initially, 
it must be added, the fight was not over advertisers, but rather over prestige and 
audience numbers. It was more a matter of psychological and professional com­
petition than a real market problem. 
Private activities on television were weak when compared to what was hap­
pening on the radio. The studios tried to establish programming that was based 
only on entertainment and advertising (although the advertising appeared most­
ly in the form of something that can be compared to classified ads). There were 
several reasons behind this. First, airing a movie required less in the way of pro­
fessional qualifications and work among personnel than news broadcasts and 
original broadcasts. Secondly, the LTV news programmes and original program­
ming (including shows such as Labvakar and Savai zemïtei) were so popular that it 
was hard to compete with them. Third, if radio stations had a relatively easy time 
in accessing the experience of foreign radio operations and then putting that 
experience into practice, professional ideas about broadcasting genres and pro­
gramming in television were still largely based on the powerful influence of 
Russian television stations, while Western TV standards were both an innovation 
and something that could not be implemented for reasons of technology and the 
professional level of employees. 
The programming orientation of the first television stations was also influ­
enced by the fact that Latvian Television had relatively few entertainment-based 
programmes. Private stations sought to fill this niche in order to win an audience. 
This was a completely different process than in the radio world, where commer­
cial radio stations initially sought to copy the format of Latvian Radio. 
The print and electronic media developed in different ways in the early 1990s, 
but until the middle part of that decade there were increasing numbers of trends 
that they had in common. These, in turn, were based on similar conditions and 
causes. 
First, there was the emergence of the private media market in the early 1990s, 
stimulating a more rapid development of know-how and Western management 
skills, first in the press and then in the electronic media. 
Second, expanded contacts with Western journalists allowed commonly 
accepted global journalism standards to take hold in Latvia. 
Third, the search for an audience led, and continues to lead, to increasing com­
mercialisation in the mass media. 
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4. Latvia's media environment: 
Results of development and future trends 
4.1. Transformation of the Latvian information environment 
under the influence of globalisation and new technologies 
The influence of information technologies has increased in all spheres of life, 
resulting in considerable changes in the information environment. Unlike writing 
and printing, the introduction of digital technologies applies to the whole of soci­
ety and radically changes the real possibility for an individual to seek out, store, 
use and transmit information freely without being controlled. 
Hyper-reality carries with it several drawbacks. First, there is a "knowledge 
gap" created and deepened by the different technological and economic oppor­
tunities for acquiring and participating in an information environment (the lan­
guage barrier in Latvia makes these problems even more difficult). Second, there 
is the individual's inability to control access to one's private data, because it is 
accumulated and used by various institutions: military, financial, educational, 
medical service, police, government, etc. 
When evaluating the information environment in Latvia, two assumptions can 
be made. First, the beginning of a transition towards the Information Society has 
already occurred, and several related social phenomena can be traced from it: 
information exchanged as an economic commodity; a large information work­
force; enhanced interconnections among information technologies and institu­
tions; a special status for scientific knowledge; social environments increasingly 
becoming creatures of the mass media; and the diffusion of information tech­
nologies in society. The transition is underway, despite the fact that the present 
level of economic development in Latvia, along with insufficient coherence in 
related legislation, has prevented these phenomena from developing in a rapid 
and complex way. 
Secondly, Latvia (on an individual, group, organisation and state level) has 
joined the global electronic communications process known as the Internet. This 
has created a solid basis for substituting a new understanding of the information 
environment for trends of localism, as well as for increasing each individual's 
opportunity to take part in public debates and to gain a right to access informa­
tion from different sources. Present trends show that participation in global 
processes is becoming more intensive and solid (Brikse & Vasiljevs, 1999: 87-88). 
The number of Internet users in Latvia has been increasing by 45-50% annual­
ly over the last several years, reaching 13% of the population in 2001. 
Indications that characterise a crisis in traditional mass communication envi­
ronment in the world are also seen in the Latvian mass media. The most typical 
indications are (1) the commercialisation of news as commodity, along with 
dramatisation and sensationalism; (2) a loss of diversity in public interest and 
cultural identity in media content; (3) the repetition and imitation of stereotypi­
cal methods to raise programme ratings. 
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Any understanding of the new information environment must thus include far 
more than the "new media," "new technologies" or "new communications chan­
nels" which are now available. Modernity has involved an age of intensified 
communications, shaping new communities, but also spreading diversity. 
The new media have moved away from a highly asymmetrical and centralist 
power structure, instead preferring a broader distribution of influence and choice 
(i.e., power). Compared with mass communications, these new media are pro­
viding various forms of input and information flow from users. The press, along 
with radio and television outlets, has increasingly sought to provide content on 
the Internet, although in terms of user numbers, the new Internet portals have 
proven more successful than the homepages of traditional media outlets. 
Compared with press, radio, television, sound recordings and films, the new 
media also don't provide their audiences with a clear-cut, well-defined order of 
usage. It is true, however, that the Internet portals contain more in the way of 
controversial views in their discussion groups than is common in the press and 
on radio and television. 
The new technologies have also brought to the fore a variety of issues relating 
to the media environment and audience under circumstances of globalisation. 
Latvia spent many decades in the information and cultural environment of the 
Russian language, as defined by the cultural imperialism of the Soviet system. 
People in Latvia had an information environment very different from their indi­
vidual and community environments. In Soviet Latvia, there was no such thing 
as an interest-based press or broadcasting process in Russian, and so there were 
no traditions to promote the emergence of high-quality traditional media in Russ­
ian - ones which could have competed with the vast media offers that were com­
ing from Russia itself by relating their content to the everyday lives of people. It 
was only in the latter half of the 1990s that a system of magazines in Russian 
began to appear in Latvia - primarily (as was the case with Latvian-language 
magazines, too) through the publishing of women's magazines. When the Soviet 
Union collapsed, an orientation towards the Russian information environment 
was preserved for many people - not because of any ideological considerations, 
but rather because the Russian information and cultural environment was simply 
so large and varied. In the early 1990s these links were upheld largely through 
television, while in the latter half of the 1990s the process increasingly began to 
involve books, periodicals and the Internet. 
Many people in Latvia have long since become involved in processes of glob­
alisation, where subjects presented by the mass media have nothing to do with 
the environment in which people actually live. The segment of Latvia's society 
that basically speaks Russian, and is thus set apart as a separate community, lives 
partly in the "global village" in terms of information, but also partly lives in the 
local information environment in the Russian language. This environment differs 
greatly from the Latvian-language information environment, both in terms of the 
selection of events that are presented and in terms of the way they are interpret­
ed (Kruks, 2000). 
The differences in content in the Russian and the Latvian traditional media 
(principally in terms of newspapers) mean there are two different information 
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environments in Latvia, and each has its own cultural and value orientation. The 
Russian-speaking society in many respects 
can be described as a "mass society" with few linkages between thr primary 
family and friendship levels and élites. There is a very little solidarity and 
only a vestigial ethnic consciousness among various groups that make up 
this society whose main links are those of Russian language and of Soviet 
culture (Dreifelds, 1996: 101). 
Government policy, for that reason, should be aimed at promoting the emer­
gence of a high-quality information environment in the Russian language, as well 
as integrating the existing media channels. 
People are increasingly becoming involved in the processes of global informa­
tion circulation, as well as in global mass communications. They use the Internet 
and cable television, which, on the one hand, deepens the inclusion of the Latvian 
audience into the global information and cultural environment of the Russian 
language, but on the other hand also opens up access to new and global infor­
mation and culture communities in German, English and other languages. 
This process is not without its threats for Latvia and the Latvians - a very small 
nation and a very small language. Latvians wanting to participate in the global 
information space, or even just exist in it, must at least be bilingual. Help-want­
ed ads in Latvia usually list foreign language skills (especially English) as the sec­
ond or third-most important requirement for potential applicants. Eventually, the 
lack of language skills can lead to a stratification of society in terms of these skills. 
People find that their professional and other choices are limited, and that the 
information processes available to them are narrowed. Communities emerge that 
receive different or even contradictory data, facts and interpretations. 
The further development of these processes may be facilitated by the fact that 
foreign language skills are improving throughout society. This improvement will 
serve to promote greater dispersion of the Latvian audience in the global com­
munications field. It also means that the consumption of global media will 
increase in individual lives, while the consumption of local media (both Russian 
and Latvian) will decline. This, in turn, will cause a decrease in the audience for 
the Latvian media - an audience that is already small in the context of modern 
media and advertising markets and which is made even smaller because it is 
divided up between Russian and Latvian media outlets. The segment of the audi­
ence most likely to flow away from the Latvian media is the one that is of the 
highest quality - people who no longer feel that media oriented towards mass 
audience interests are providing them with sufficient information for analysis 
and evaluation. 
To an ever-increasing extent, globalisation means that people no longer focus 
only on Latvia's processes in their work; rather, they are becoming part of the 
global circulation of information (finances, economics, education, etc.), and in 
their professional interests they seek out interest communities (real or virtual) 
outside Latvia. 
Market pressures in Latvia have resulted in the content of the media becoming 
increasingly simplified, and mass communications are thus dealing less with con­
ceptual issues and analysis, and more with the idea that information is a process 
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of entertainment. The traditional media are losing their reputation as trustworthy 
sources of information and as entities that can have a serious influence on deci­
sion-making processes. Individuals and society at large are becoming less 
involved in the discussions and decisions concerning political, economic and 
social issues in the country. 
The information space in Latvia is also broken up into geographical areas. Most 
of the audience for the national dailies is concentrated in Riga, local newspapers 
dominate local markets, and information technologies are available to a very dif­
ferent extent in various parts of Latvia. Latvia is being segmented into those areas 
in which people are "information rich" (in Riga and, to a lesser extent, in Latvia's 
other cities) and "information poor" (those who live in the countryside). 
The Latvian national "Informatics" programme, which covers the period 
between 1999 and 2005, is predicated on the idea that information users still pre­
fer traditional and tested sources - books, magazines and personal contacts. 
However, electronic information sources, together with the development of the 
technological infrastructure - computer technologies, telecommunications and 
data networks - are assuredly entering the information services market. Seventy 
percent of all respondents report using one or more electronic information 
sources. The wider use of electronic information sources is hindered by various 
financial and technological problems. Society has realised the advantages of 
modern technologies and services, and it is psychologically and practically ready 
to use them. 
The processes in the Latvian mass media suggest that a crisis in the traditional 
mass communications environment is fast approaching. The most typical indica­
tors are that the news is being commercialised as a commodity, involving drama­
tisation and sensationalism; that there has been a loss of diversity in public inter­
est and cultural identity in media content; and that the mass media have turned 
to an imitation of stereotypical methods in order to raise their ratings. 
4.2. The advertising market and media development in Latvia 
Latvia's first professional advertising agencies emerged in 1993, and people came 
to understand both that advertising is an inviolable part of any media environ­
ment and that there is no point in nurturing bias against advertising as a waste 
of media time and space. As the market economy developed and consumer 
behaviour changed, the advertising market could not help but expand, and this 
process was abetted by the emergence of increasing numbers of advertising pro­
fessionals. 
A banking crisis occurred in 1995, and along with a high rate of inflation, cre­
ated new obstacles to the development of the mass media in Latvia. Latvia's lead­
ing national newspapers increased the single copy price several times over, and 
the number of subscribers declined. Lauku Avïze, for example, lost 11,000 sub­
scribers in one year's time, Neatkarlgä Rïta Avïze lost 19,000, and Diena lost 9,000. 
Similar trends were seen among regional newspapers. 
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Socio-economic and political factors began to have a more powerful influence 
on the main guarantee of media independence - income. The achievements dur­
ing the previous phase of development, however, allowed the media to enjoy not 
only a certain level of stability, but also opportunities for development. 
In 1998, the previously rapid growth rate in the Latvian advertising market 
diminished primarily because of the financial crises in Russia, Central America 
and Asia. To some extent, however, these losses were minimised because of polit­
ical party advertising prior to the Parliamentary election in the fall of 1998. For 
the first time, newspapers took the largest share of the advertising market. The 
regional newspapers in particular were seen as an effective channel for commu­
nications. Political parties used the regional newspapers to promote candidates 
who were well known to local audiences. 
The advertising market in 1999 shrank by 11% because the Russian financial 
crisis had a seriously deleterious effect on Latvian businesses, including a large 
number of international companies that had previously represented a major 
share of turnover in the advertising market. Newspapers continued to dominate 
the market, receiving nearly one-half of all media advertising. Advertisers chose 
to focus on the less expensive forms of advertising. Regional newspapers with 
low circulation figures could offer flexible and relatively low advertising prices, 
and so were in high demand for domestic and foreign manufacturers and retail­
ers. 
The advertising market grew by 17% in 2000 to a sum of Ls 30 million (about 
49 million USD). Market growth in 2001 had reached a level of 13%. The Internet 
advertising market expanded with particular vigour - a growth rate of 387%. 
This was mostly true because of the increasing number of Internet portals and 
media outlets, as well as because of a growing number of Internet users. Both fac­
tors served to attract greater advertising interest. Newspapers continued to lead 
the field, however, with 36.5% of the market. Television took a 34.1% share in the 
market, while radio, magazine, outdoor, cinema and Internet advertising repre­
sented a lower share. Cinema and Internet advertising, taken together, made up 
less than 1% of the market, but trends indicate that advertising volumes in these 
media outlets will increase in the future (BMF data). 
4.3. The electronic media: Economic and political considerations 
Changes in the electronic media have occurred in the context of the systemic 
transformation to a far greater extent than with the development of the Internet 
and the press, because the changes have led directly to changes in existing law. 
From 1995 until the present, the electronic mass media have worked under the 
auspices of the law "On Radio and Television," which was adopted in 1995 and 
amended in 2001 in accordance with EU requirements; the National Radio and 
Television Council is responsible for supervising the implementation of this law. 
This division sets out the main phases of development in the electronic mass 
media in Latvia. Both laws that were adopted in 1992 and 1995 were the result of 
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considerable pressure from society and from private business. Shortcommgs m 
the previous laws had hindered the normal work of the electronic mass media. 
In all the countries of Eastern Europe, television was the first medium into 
which the products of Western mass culture flowed freely. These products were 
relatively cheap in the context of the financial strengths of Eastern European tel­
evision stations, and were, consequently, not of high quality. Commercialisation 
in the electronic mass media appeared not only in the traditional sense - adver­
tising, movies and soap operas - but also in terms of the simplification and even 
primitivisation of other content. Both journalists and leaders of the electronic 
mass media had the populist conviction that complex issues were boring to the 
audience. Producers of media content had weak financial abilities, and people 
sought to save money at any cost. 
Prior to 1995, the emergence of radio and television as a system, even after the 
first private broadcasting organisations appeared, was hindered. 
Of all the private television stations that emerged prior to 1995, when the new 
Radio and Television Law was adopted, only three can be seen both as profes­
sional and as innovative in content in comparison to Latvian Television - NTV-5, 
PICCA-TV (went on-air in April 1994) and RBS-TV (October 1994). NTV-5 was 
the station that not only produced the first private news programme, but also 
ensured that the content and quality of that programme significantly influenced 
the professional development of the LTV news programme. PICCA-TV was the 
first station in Latvia to use professional video equipment - a modern, comput­
er-based system that offered many kinds of information. The audio was not much 
different from a radio programme, however - uninterrupted music, news, classi­
fied advertisements and interviews with interesting individuals - and so PICCA-
TV became known as "radio with pictures." PICCA-TV, however, promoted the 
introduction of computer technologies in the production of television shows, and 
also led to changes in the programming of Latvian Television - it was in response 
to PICCA-TV that LTV developed its first morning show. RBS-TV had its own 
transmitter, which allowed it to develop its programming independently at a 
time when other private companies were still using the state television network's 
channels. RBS-TV was also the first station to offer many movies on the basis of 
licensed purchases of programming, but after a year of broadcasting it collapsed 
because of financial problems. 
Local radio and television stations began to emerge very rapidly after 1993. In 
1991 and 1992 there were 11 TV and 9 radio stations that requested broadcasting 
permits, while in 1993 the numbers were 24 and 12, respectively. Not all of these 
stations actually went on-air, but these numbers clearly demonstrate the interest 
of private businesspeople in becoming involved in the electronic media business. 
This development was also unquestionably promoted by the 1992 law, which 
ensured certain clarity and guarantees in the electronic media business. 
Both in radio and television, there was significant localisation of content 
because audience reach was limited. This was true both in Riga and in the rest of 
Latvia. The first commercial radio stations in Riga could be heard only in the city 
and out to a distance of between 10 and 70 kilometers (depending on the strength 
of the transmitter and the station's broadcast frequency). Television stations 
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in Riga such as NTV-5 were just as local, and they focused on events in Riga 
exactly to the same extent as stations in Latvia's other cities and villages focused 
on their surroundings. 
The essentially spontaneous emergence of radio and television stations in 1993 
led to something of a crisis in the electronic media. The Latvian audience, already 
small, was divided up even further, because audience members did not yet have 
stable information interests and needs. People easily changed their listening and 
viewing habits, which kept radio and television stations from solidifying their 
structure of advertisers. The leaders of the new and private radio and television 
stations lacked experience and knowledge about the economy of the media. 
Radio and TV were still seen as weapons in political and ideological battles, as 
had been the case in Soviet times, and new media owners relied on sponsors who 
were interested in supporting radio or television stations for ideological or eco­
nomic reasons. 
This media crisis was also enhanced by the Latvian Radio and Television 
Council, which, when making decisions on the issuance of broadcasting licenses, 
viewed ideological considerations as very important while completely ignoring 
market reality. 
The new Radio and Television Law adopted in 1995 introduced many new 
norms and definitions necessary for the steady, ongoing development of the elec­
tronic media. There were nine major aspects in this law. 
1. The law set out a procedure for the establishment, registration, operation and 
supervision of all kinds of electronic mass media outlets: radio, television, cable 
television, cable radio (radio broadcasting), satellite radio, satellite television, 
computer television, teletext, radio data systems, etc. 
2. The electronic mass media were divided according to property form, opera­
tional goals and territorial coverage: "In terms of property form and operational 
goals, the mass media shall be divided among public and commercial media, 
while in terms of territorial coverage, they shall be divided into national, region­
al, local and transfrontier broadcasting organisations." 
Public broadcasting organisations in Latvia are organised through the investment 
of state property in the equity capital of the relevant organisations. There are two 
public broadcasting organisations in Latvia: the state-owned non-profit compa­
nies Latvian Television and Latvian Radio. The law states they cannot be subject 
to the direct influence of state and local government institutions, political organ­
isations (parties), religious denominations or financial and economic entities. 
Public institutions supervise the operations of the organisations, and they are 
financially independent, with financing from the national budget, as well as from 
commercial operations, donations, gifts and sponsorship. 
The National Radio and Television Council controls the state's capital share in 
Latvian Radio and Latvian Television, approves the statutes of the two organisa­
tions, appoints general directors, sets up auditing commissions and approves the 
membership of the boards of the structures. Through this, the Council serves as 
the general meeting of shareholders of the two institutions. 
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Commercial broadcasting organisations can be set up by individuals, compa­
nies and groups thereof. The equity capital of the broadcast organisations is made 
up investments from individuals, companies, as well as state and local govern­
ment institutions. Income is provided through commercial activities and spon­
sorship. 
3. Limitations on the concentration and monopolisation of the electronic mass 
media were set forth: no political organisation, public organisation, company, 
group of individuals or single individual may monopolise an electronic mass 
medium; programme development is an independent process; each broadcast 
organisation (except for the state broadcasting companies) is allowed to have no 
more than three channels; an individual who has established a broadcasting 
organisation or who has the controlling investment in a broadcasting organisa­
tion and that individual's spouse may not hold more than 25% of shares in other 
broadcasting organisations; and people who hold elected positions in political 
organisations or government institutions and who are the founders of, partici­
pants in or controlling shareholders in broadcasting organisations may not hold 
voting rights in the decision-making institutions of the relevant organisations. 
4. The law defined broadcasting rights and licensing principles. The National 
Radio and Television Council issue licenses to Latvian Television and Latvian 
Radio, while commercial broadcasting organisations are licensed for operations 
on a competitive basis. Latvian Radio and Latvian Television have non-expiring 
licenses, while commercial radio stations receive licenses for five years and com­
mercial television stations for seven years. Cable television and cable radio 
organisations are licensed for ten years. Licensing rights may not be transferred 
to a third party. 
5. The law introduced norms in regulating the structure and content of broad­
casting programmes. The programme of each broadcasting organisation must 
correspond to the programme concept on the basis for which it received a broad­
casting license from the National Radio and Television Council. Broadcasting 
organisations must ensure that facts and events are reflected honestly, objective­
ly and in an all-encompassing way, working on the basis of generally accepted 
principles of journalism and ethics. Programmes may not include elements that 
unnecessarily emphasize violence, pornography, encouragement of national or 
race-based hatred or intolerance, offense against national honour and respect, 
calls for war or military conflict, calls for the violent overthrow of the govern­
ment or alteration of the country's system, destruction of the territorial unity of 
the state, or other criminal activity. 
There are also special norms related to such subjects as language, the content 
and placement of advertising, and sponsorship. 
6. The Radio and Television Law sets out important principles in ensuring the 
democratic nature of broadcasting organisation operations: the right to receive 
information from state and local government institutions, public organisations 
and state and local government companies. 
7. The law introduced the new concept of the "national commission," which is 
made up of a list of programmes and broadcasts approved by the National Radio 
and Television Council. The national commission covers the requirements of the 
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Radio and Television Law, and programmes that are listed within the commis­
sion must receive financing. The national commission is aimed at ensuring that 
all-encompassing information is disseminated about events in Latvia and abroad; 
that the Latvian language and culture are developed; that the strengthening of a 
one-community country is ensured; that the needs of society in the areas of edu­
cational, cultural, scientific, entertainment, children's interests, sports and other 
broadcasts are met; that broadcasts are produced about the life and culture of 
minority ethnic groups in Latvia; and that political parties are given free air time 
during election campaigns in accordance with the law. 
8. The law provided for the establishment of the National Radio and Television 
Council itself as an institution to supervise the electronic media. The Council is 
appointed by Parliament and has nine members. Its duties are to ensure obser­
vation of the interests of the public and protection of the electronic media in 
accordance with the law; fulfilment of the national commission; and supervision 
of the professional, organisational and financial operations of the public broad­
casting organisations. 
9. The law set out a legal foundation for the work of cable television and cable 
radio operations. The regulation of these issues has involved a lack of previous 
experience, and there have been various ways in which the relevant norms have 
been applied and implemented. The norms have been interpreted in various 
ways over the course of time. 
An important law that influenced the development of the Latvian system of 
electronic mass media was the Law on Copyright and Ancillary Rights, which 
was adopted on 15 May 1993. Prior to 15 November 1993, there was a transition 
period during which organisations had to amend or end their contractual obliga­
tions insofar as these were in violation of the copyright law. On 11 August 1995, 
the Bern Convention on the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works took effect 
in Latvia, while on 31 December 1998, the Rome Convention on Protecting the 
Rights of Performers, Producers and Broadcasting Organisations went into effect. 
On 28 November 1997, Latvia signed another important international docu­
ment - the European Convention on Transfrontier Television. Latvia is small and 
has many neighboring countries, and the placement of broadcasting organisa­
tions and their coverage means that many television stations in Latvia are 
defined as transfrontier electronic media. 
4.4. Radio and television: State versus private media 
In accordance with the Law on Radio and Television, the National Radio and 
Television Council began to structure the electronic media system, re-registering 
broadcast organisations in accordance with the new law. It was found that there 
were 31 radio stations in Latvia. In 1995, the council received another 30 applica­
tions for the establishment of new radio stations. After the re-registration process, 
broadcasting licenses were issued to 26 radio organisations, and 28 bids for ten­
der were announced for the right to broadcast using free radio and television fre­
quencies. 
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In 2000 Latvia had one state radio station (Latvian Radio, which has three chan­
nels), two national commercial stations (Mix FM with one national channel, and 
Radio SWH with one national and two regional programmes), 27 regional com­
mercial stations (six of which are in Riga), and six local radio stations. All told, 
Latvia has 23 commercial radio stations on 25 channels. The most popular in 
terms of ratings are Latvian Radio I (24%), Latvian Radio 2 (13%), and local radio 
stations (11%), followed by Radio SWH (10%) and Radio SWH+ (8%, broadcast­
ing in Russian). 
This radio system in Latvia has emerged since the adoption of the Radio and 
Television Law in 1995. Several radio stations have subsequently suspended 
operations because of a lack of money. 
After a bid for tenders, two broadcasting organisations in Riga won the right to 
broadcast on the national network in 1995 - Radio SWH did so in April and Radio 
Riga in June. SIA Kurzemes Radio won the right to become the first truly region­
al radio station, with the right to broadcast in the entire western Latvian region 
of Kurzeme. Several other radio stations moved from the FM 1 to the FM 2 dial 
after bids for tender. 
When evaluating the development of radio in various locations in Latvia, Riga 
retains the best conditions for the operation of commercial radio stations and for 
the emergence of a system of commercial radio stations. In Latvia's other regions, 
the greatest development in the radio sphere has taken place in Kurzeme, where 
there is the aforementioned regional station, as well as two stations in Liepaja and 
one each in Ventspils, Kuldiga and Saldus. The emergence of regional and local 
radio stations and related systems is proceeding far more slowly in eastern 
Latvia. 
This diversity in the development of local radio systems involves not only 
financial conditions, but also the technical ability to place transmitters. The situ­
ation is worst in the southern Latvian region of Zemgale, where the number of 
frequencies is limited by the frequencies used by neighbouring Lithuania. Also of 
importance are population densities, the availability of journalists and radio spe­
cialists, etc. 
The emergence of the system of radio stations in Latvia has also been signifi­
cantly influenced by the nationality makeup of the country - something that is by 
no means evenly distributed in Latvia. The 1995 Radio and Television Law said 
that at least 70% of programming on each radio station must be in Latvian. This 
has caused problems for radio stations in Latvia's largest cities and that used to 
broadcast only in Russian. There have been serious debates about this issue at the 
Radio and Television Council, as well as among the public at large. The main 
arguments against this norm relate to audience interests and private business 
rights. In cities such as Riga, Daugavpils and Rëzekne, more than half the resi­
dents are native Russian speakers, and forcing these commercial radio stations to 
broadcast in Latvian does not serve the interests of the relevant audiences. Pri­
vate radio organisations thus face less favourable conditions in local media mar­
kets than do private publishers of the press, because they face no laws concern­
ing the language of their output. 
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Latvian commercial radio stations today have fairly typical ratios between 
music and spoken material - around 80:20 in most stations. There are more infor­
mational and educational programmes on Kurzeme Radio, where music takes up 
only 45% of airtime. On Christian radio, music takes up 60% of airtime. 
A programme with many spoken elements is not economically advantageous 
for commercial radio stations, and the existence of such stations in the media 
market is tenuous. Practice has shown, however, that commercial radio stations 
with a great deal of spoken material can exist in small cities, where journalists are 
paid less than in Riga and where audiences want to hear interviews with well-
known people, even if the broadcast quality is poor. In many cases these broad­
casts are equal to the level of programming at Latvian Radio. 
Many commercial stations form direct contacts with their audiences in order to 
earn more money. Radio Super FM, for example, regularly organises dances, ath­
letic events and other events. 
The Latvian radio system also involves direct relationships between coverage 
and the regularity of news. Regional radio stations broadcast the news every 
hour, providing between 15 and 20 news broadcasts in each 24-hour period. Local 
radio stations offer between 4 and 10 news broadcasts in the same period. 
The main source of information for nearly all commercial radio stations is the 
BNS news agency, as well as information taken from Latvian Radio and newspa­
pers. Only a few radio stations - Kurzemes Radio is one example - rely primari­
ly on information collected by their own correspondents. 
In terms of music, all the major radio stations in Latvia are Adult Contempo­
rary format, while others play Euro Hit and rock programming. One exception to 
this rule was Radio SWH, which had a classical music channel, Amadeus. It 
broadcast not only classical music but also jazz and related formats; however, it 
closed in 2001 for financial reasons. Christian Radio, of course, plays Christian 
music. Two others that differ from the norm are Radio PIK and Radio Maksiums, 
both of which mostly play Russian songs. 
Private radio stations in Latvia are developing very quickly, and several have 
been granted the right to broadcast across all of Latvia, but Latvian Radio, espe­
cially on its first programme, continues to maintain high ratings (three times 
higher than the highest rating of a commercial radio station). In recent years Lat­
vian Radio has introduced many innovations to attract an audience: new pro­
grammes, live discussions on the air and an energetic attempt to improve the 
quality of journalism at the station. 
All of the 40 most popular radio broadcasts in Latvia are on Latvian Radio. The 
station has no competition among older listeners. When commercial radio sta­
tions appeared, Latvian Radio lost part of its younger audience, but some of them 
have returned now that the station is focusing more on youth-oriented program­
ming. 
The popularity of Latvian Radio and its first programme, however, is to a cer­
tain extent a matter of habit. It is also true that Latvian Radio is by far the easiest 
radio station to receive on one's radio because it broadcasts on several frequen­
cies. In Riga, where all radio stations can be received equally well, the audience 
of the first channel has declined to 27% of the total audience. 
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The programme on Latvian Radio I is divided into several blocs - programmes 
which air at a specific time, are aimed at specific audiences and have their own 
hosts. A wide variety of subjects are covered on these shows, and there is plenty 
of music, especially Latvian music. Latvian Radio II airs original programmes, 
entertainment shows and music. The goal appears to be to compete with com­
mercial radio stations, and it seems Latvian Radio is succeeding in this attempt. 
The station is developing a style previously used mostly by private channels. The 
largest audience is attracted by the morning programme Labrit (Good Morning) 
because it provides a wide range of professionally produced news and analytical 
materials. 
There are several reasons why Latvian Radio remains the most popular radio 
station in Latvia. First, no private radio station really covers the entire country. 
Secondly, not everyone has a radio that can receive FM 2 stations. Third, listen­
ing to Latvian Radio is a matter of habit for many people. 
In the mid-1990s there were 17 commercial television stations that either were 
broadcasting in all of Latvia or in the Riga region or which wanted to do so. As 
the economic situation in the country deteriorated and Latvian Television became 
increasingly commercial, however, many of the commercial stations encountered 
problems just surviving. At the beginning of 1996, representatives of broadcast­
ing organisations met to discuss a national concept for the development of the 
electronic mass media, and it was decided that each channel should belong to one 
entity so that programme concepts could be implemented more effectively, 
resources could be attracted, and an advertising market could be shaped. Com­
mercial televisions were categorically opposed to the rebroadcasting of Russian 
Public Television programmes in Latvia's public networks because Russian TV 
always managed to attract the most advertising, thus keeping local programmes 
from developing. This was a problem on Channels 31 and 7 in Riga and its envi­
rons until 1995. Both channels aired programming from a number of small pro­
duction companies or broadcasting organisations. In October 1995, there were 
three broadcasting organisations on Channel 31, one (RBS-TV) on Channel 38, 
and fully 11 organisations on Channel 7. In addition, there were two commercial 
organisations - PICCA TV and NTV-5 - which were broadcasting in all of Latvia 
on LTV's second channel. 
"The National Concept for the Development of the Electronic Mass Media" 
specified that commercial television stations would be allowed to compete for the 
right to broadcast on the 3rd national channel in Latvia, as well as on Channels 7 
and 31 in Riga. The basic principle: one channel, one broadcasting organisation. 
The average broadcaster at this time was airing programmes for one or two 
hours a day, and much of the programming consisted of advertising, praise for 
local stores, and interviews paid for by the interviewee. The style and language 
of each broadcaster was very different. The smaller companies proved unable to 
join together, and, as the practice of Channel 31 demonstrated, there was no 
financial advantage to any such merger anyway. The cost of one hour of broad­
casting was very low - Channel 7, which potentially reached 50% of the Latvian 
audience, cost only 6 lats (10 USD) per hour, while the cost of one hour of pro­
gramming on Latvian Television П, which reached 70% of the audience, was 160 
lats (261 USD) per hour. As the cost of airtime increased, market relations began 
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on Channels 7 and 31 too, and the cost increased to Ls 18-31 per hour (29-51 
USD). This led to deterioration in the quality of programmes and the ratings 
dropped. 
On 9 May 1996, a bid for tenders was announced for the right to broadcast pro­
gramming on Channel 31. It should be noted that after the results of a competi­
tion for the right to broadcast on Latvia's 3rd national channel were announced, 
two companies - TV 3 and Kanals 2 - withdrew from the Latvian television mar­
ket altogether. They had been airing their programmes on Channel 31, alternate­
ly on various days, and had not managed to attract a stable audience due to the 
fact that neither was broadcasting steadily. There were five companies that 
applied for the right to broadcast on Channel 31 - IGE, Baltcom, WNA, BIK-TV 
and Kanals 2. WNA won the bid, but each broadcast on the channel was pro­
duced separately, there was no unified advertising policy, and the company 
ended up exceeding its credit lines. Eventually a foreign company represented by 
Latvia's Parex Bank bought WNA in January 1997. In June 1998,51% of the shares 
in the structure were bought by the Swedish media concern MTG, which also 
owns TV 3. This brought TV 3 back into the Latvian media market. In 2001 the 
company was licensed to broadcast in all of Latvia. 
The television system in Latvia has developed quite differently from the radio 
system. One of the most important differences is that during Soviet times the Lat­
vian radio system was not greatly influenced by Russian radio, while the influ­
ence of Russian television stations was great. When the Latvian electronic media 
system was structured anew, therefore, it was very important to specify the coun­
try's attitude toward the distribution of programmes from other countries 
through Latvia's national networks. 
Until 1996, Russian Public TV (KST) broadcast on the 3rd national network, 
and it had the highest rating in Latvia. KST also took most of the advertising mar­
ket in Latvia. The BIK company, which rebroadcast KST, could put Latvian adver­
tising in the KST programme at below-cost prices, completely deformed the 
advertising market. The cost of rebroadcasting KST, of course, was negligible. 
The Radio and Television Council decided that in the interest of promoting the 
development of local television stations, the 3rd channel must be turned over to 
Latvian-made television programmes. 
The bid for tenders for the right to broadcast on the 3rd channel was 
announced on 1 February 1996, and three companies applied - TV 2 (an enter­
tainment channel), TV 3 (a family channel dominated with entertainment and 
children's programming), and LNT (seven news programmes a day, a pro­
gramme of films for the family, original programmes and programmes developed 
in cooperation with local producers). 
LNT's promise to produce news shows and to air locally produced program­
ming was the decisive factor in winning the bid. LNT was established through a 
merger of PICCA TV and NTV-5, both of which had already proven themselves 
in Latvia. 
Market analysis shows that LNT successfully took over and held the Russian 
TV audience. The audience basically moved to LNT en masse, because initially 
LNT aired many popular programmes from Russian TV, including soap operas 
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that people were used to viewing. The audience was also enlarged thanks to the 
decision by LNT to air the old but globally famous American television serial 
"Dallas." 
In the first month of its operation, LNT posted ratings nearly two times higher 
than those of Latvian Television. The situation stabilised after a month and has 
not changed much since then - LNT is still the market leader, with approximate­
ly a 30% share of the audience. 
When LNT entered the market, the audience of Latvian Television II declined 
by 2-3%, and that remains the case today. The viewers of NTV-5 news and the 
programming of PICCA TV moved to the 3rd channel, while LTV II kept those 
viewers who watch the channel's Russian-language news broadcasts. 
LNT is the first professional television company in Latvia. The stations that had 
existed prior to that were small and chaotic, with no distinct programme concept 
of structure. LNT set up a network of programming in a professional way, with 
each period of the broadcast day devoted to a specific target audience, and the 
entire day divided up into hour and half-hour segments so that audiences could 
always know what to expect. 
LNT consistently stayed on the knife's edge when it came to the language 
issue. It aired movies for the Russian audience with Latvian subtitles, although 
gradually, over the course of time, the station has aired more movies in Latvian 
with Russian subtitles. 
In 1996 and 1997 the number of cable and satellite television viewers expand­
ed very rapidly. Some of those people who were distraught at the loss of Russian 
Public Television chose alternative methods to receive that station. The number 
of cable television viewers tripled in three months, stabilising at a level of approx­
imately 25% of all television viewers. Most of these were KST viewers, of course. 
In March 1997, rating agencies began to list KST separately, and the research 
showed that KST is still popular in Latvia, occasionally exceeding the rating of 
LTV I. 
The entrance of LNT into the market also stabilised the advertising system, 
because advertisers could now place their ads on competing domestic television 
stations with adequately high ratings - Latvian Television and LNT. 
In 1996 Latvian Television established a programme concept that was based on 
the experience of European public television companies in terms of programme 
planning. The principles of this concept were influenced by the informational 
needs of the Latvian public, as well as by the fact that in 1994 Latvian Television 
joined the European Broadcasting Union. 
Latvian Television now airs programmes on two channels. The first channel is 
the national channel and broadcasts only in Latvian. It is charged with ensuring 
as much broadcasting of local, national and foreign news as possible, along with 
commentary, popularisation of cultural values, programmes for various groups 
in society (children, teenagers, etc.), and entertainment programmes. The priori­
ty for LTV II, by contrast, is to produce educational shows and programmes for 
minority groups and various social groups. 
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The coexistence of LTV and LNT has led to bitter competition for viewers and, 
by extension, the advertising market. One negative aspect of this competition is 
that Latvian Television, which is supposed to be a public television station in 
terms of its status, receives too little government money and has been forced to 
become an active player in the commercial television market. 
The LNT programme is divided up as follows: 32% of the programme is made 
up of television serials, 28% are films, 14% is news, 12% are original programmes 
and sports, 8% are children's broadcasts, 3% are game shows, and 3% is music. 
The structure of Latvian Television, which is charged with informing, educating 
and entertaining viewers, is understandably different: 45% of the programmes 
are entertainment shows, of which twelve percent are games, competitions, talk 
shows and humor programmes while twenty-six percent are dramas; 25% are 
informational shows, of which nine percent are news broadcasts; 23% are educa­
tional shows; and 7% are programmes for children. 
The prime-time programme on LTV and LNT is mostly made up of news and 
movies, and news programmes have traditionally attracted the largest audience. 
The LTV news programme Panoräma is more analytical and oriented toward 
older viewers, while the LNT news show is more dynamic, more in line with 
modern requirements, and better in covering lots of information. Generally 
speaking, however, the LNT show is aimed at the residents and events of the cap­
ital city. 
The programme purchasing policy of Latvian TV is aimed at offering as many 
films, serials and other programmes that are current in terms of their interest, not 
several years old. It is also important for Latvian TV to maintain a balance not 
only between American and European programming, but also a balance among 
programmes that are produced in various European regions: Scandinavia, Great 
Britain, France, Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Russia, etc. 
As commercial television stations have developed, there has been increasing 
demand for producers and production companies. At least two thirds of the pro­
grammes on commercial televisions today are produced separately. The job of 
producer was something new in the Latvian television market, and everyone 
who tried to produce television broadcasts at the beginning of the process was 
without professional experience and education and as a result, few broadcasts 
rose above mediocrity in terms of their quality. 
Today there are some 40 producers in Latvia, and their work is limited by the 
fact that the law allows only 30% of the programme on Latvian Television to be 
produced by external producers. Commercial television, in turn, does not have 
the money to produce original broadcasts, because the advertising market is still 
developing, and they spend their own money only on a few programmes, prin­
cipally news. The producers of the shows, who conclude agreements with com­
panies, provide financing for original programming. So-called "advertising sto­
ries" used to be sold to clients. These stories included all kinds of TV advertising, 
beginning with full advertising clips and ending with slides and text. A step for­
ward was the right to put advertising within broadcasts so as to cover production 
costs. This freed broadcasts from the necessity of providing paid information. 
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The system that exists in Latvia in this area, however, ultimately works against 
the production of original programming - producers pay the television company 
for the right to broadcast their shows. This is unquestionably advantageous for 
the stations, which get ready-made programmes that have entirely been financed 
by the producers. This is why there are frequent changes in the list of producers 
and production companies. Without sufficient knowledge and equipment, it is no 
longer possible to compete in the Latvian television market. 
The next step forward in the development of produced broadcasts was spe­
cialisation. Programmes were produced with the aim of finding a successful 
niche. All the independently produced programmes that have been on the air for 
more than one year have found their audience, and many have very good ratings. 
Joint productions in which producers are commissioned by TV stations to pro­
duce programmes are becoming more common. The TV station provides airtime 
and, in some cases, equipment. Copyright in these instances belongs to both par­
ties. Production companies in Latvia also produce various kinds of advertising. 
A few also engage in advertising placement in the media. 
Regional and local television stations in Latvia emerged similarly to radio sta­
tions - when amateur video equipment became easily available. The emergence 
and development of these stations has almost inevitably been a fairly amateurish 
process, because the stations do not have professional journalists or technical 
people at their disposal. When the National Radio and Television Council did its 
re-registration of licenses, there were no fewer than 57 television stations in 
Latvia, most of them very small. The Radio and Television Law, in setting out 
technological standards, took no account of such categories as "large," "small," 
"strong" or "weak." The standards are the same for everyone, and small studios 
are basically unable to meet the requirements of the law (subtitling of all films, 
for example). 
The programme structure for all small local stations is very similar, although 
there are some different themes. Most of the stations simply rebroadcast someone 
else's signal, interrupting it for locally produced news programmes at specific 
times. 
One of the key problems for these local stations is that economic difficulties 
have caused many to become directly dependent on local governments that pro­
vide sponsorship. These stations thus cannot serve the proper functions of an 
independent television station in a democratic society. 
The issue of regional television stations in Latvia emerged only in April 1998, 
when the LTS Company in eastern Latvia and TV Dzintare in western Latvia 
began to air a half hour of programming each weekday on the LTV II network. 
This is the only way in which small companies focused on a regional audience 
can develop, because Latvia is too small to have any real regional stations. 
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4.5. The press market: Strong competition 
In the latter half of the 1990s, there was intensive competition and comparative 
stability in the national press market in Latvia. Major publishers took hold in the 
market, segmenting it on the bases of language and spheres of influence. The 
Russian-language media market, which involved just a few daily newspapers 
and no magazines at all in the early 1990s, underwent extensive strengthening 
and development. 
Although there is bitter competition in the daily newspaper market in Latvia, 
there have been no major surprises or unexpected events in the market. The mar­
ket for dailies produced in the Russian language has been much more dynamic, 
and several new newspapers appeared in the latter half of the 1990s. In 1996 the 
newspaper SM Segodnja split up; in 1997 the newspaper Chas was published for 
the first time (it now has the largest audience of all Russian-language newspapers 
in Riga); Respublika appeared in 1998 in an attempt to produce a high-quality 
daily newspaper; and Vest j i Segodnja, comparable to Chas in terms of its content, 
joined in the fray in 1999. Still alive is Panorama Latvii, the successor to the Russ­
ian-language newspaper of the Latvian Communist Party that was shut down 
after the Soviet coup in 1991. Panorama Latvii focuses on older readers who were 
active during the Soviet period. Diena published a Russian edition until 1999. The 
Riga city newspaper Rigas Balss, an afternoon newspaper, continues to publish in 
both languages. 
The Russian-language newspapers all have a far lower circulation than do Lat­
vian newspapers. None has the kinds of thematic inserts that are the source of 
active competition between Diena and Neatkarigä Rita Avïze. There are several rea­
sons for this. First, the Russian-language media were poorly developed even dur­
ing Soviet times because most people read newspapers from Moscow and 
Leningrad. Secondly, there is an even more acute lack of professionals in the 
Russian media market in Latvia than is the case in Latvian journalism. It is also 
true that the non-Latvian audience in the latter half of the 1990s became increas­
ingly interested in events in Latvia. These are processes that illustrate the close 
relationship of journalism and the mass media to the cultural environment in 
which they exist. Bilingual newspapers are not very popular in the non-Latvian 
audience in Latvia. 
These rapid developments in the latter half of the 1990s occurred not only 
among Russian-language dailies, but also in the whole press system, including 
the regional press. 
In 1992, a subsidiary of the Swedish conglomerate Bonnier AB, the major 
Swedish business newspaper Dagens Industri, joined together with Diena to pub­
lish the business newspaper Dienas Bizness in Latvia. Russian-speaking audiences 
have access to Biznes & Baltija. The two newspapers differ in terms of their 
approach. Dienas Bizness focuses exclusively on the business environment and 
especially on small and medium businesses. Biznes & Baltija, by contrast, prints 
other kinds of news, cultural information, etc., thus positioning itself as a com­
petitor in the market for Russian-language dailies in Latvia. 
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The activities of the media concern AS Diena have been of increasing impor­
tance in the media market. The company set up a distribution center as an alter­
native to the delivery of newspapers and magazines by the Latvian Postal Ser­
vice, thereby establishing true competition in what had previously been a 
monopoly in the press subscription market. A second key step was the establish­
ment of a printing facility to compete with what had previously been the only 
high-volume printing press in Latvia - the national press building. The new 
printing facility allowed for the printing of colour pages, opening up new oppor­
tunities for both editorial content and advertising. 
The number of publications in Latvia's regions declined in the latter part of the 
1990s, and the situation that existed during the four to five decades after World 
War II was reinstated. Most of Latvia's administrative districts and towns have 
only one newspaper, while several have two. 
Compared to the dynamic market of the national press, local newspapers have 
seen no radical developments since their idea-based crisis in the late 1980s and 
their financial crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. There are only two cities in 
which there is a real local press market and competition therein - Liepaja and 
Daugavpils. The circulation of local newspapers is rising slowly but steadily. 
In the latter half of the 1990s, AS Diena became active in the regional press mar­
ket. As of 2001, it publishes 13 newspapers in 12 of Latvia's geographic districts. 
The design and structure of these newspapers have improved rapidly, and there 
are also positive changes to be observed in content and style. 
Local newspaper monopoly, different by origin, has led to less vertical diversi­
ty and horizontal diversity (Croteau & Hoynes, 2000: 52-56). 
Of all of the magazines in the Soviet period that could conditionally be called 
consumer magazines, only seven survive in 2001. These are the children's maga­
zines Ezis and Zïlïte; the literary journals Karogs and Daugava (both of which are 
subsidised by the Culture Ministry and the Culture Capital Fund [a state-sup­
ported foundation] and are published in Latvian and Russian); the gardening 
magazine Därzs un Drava; the general interest rural magazine Lauku Dzïve; and 
the women's magazine Sieviete. 
The most successful market segment that of women's magazines. Three new 
magazines - Una, Sievietes Pasaule and leva - joined the mix in 1997. leva was the 
first women's weekly and, in fact, the first weekly magazine in all of Latvia. 
Women's magazines appeared rapidly in the latter half of the 1990s in the Russ­
ian-speaking market. For a long time the only women's magazine in Russian was 
Lilit (based on Cosmopolitan), but then it was joined by Lublu (I Love!) and the 
monthly Eva. 
The fact that women's magazines have played such a large role in the magazine 
market in Latvia can be attributed to the fact that they are in the greatest demand 
in the Latvian advertising market. 
The next largest segment in the magazine market belongs to magazines for chil­
dren and teenagers. The children's magazine market was influenced greatly by 
the arrival of the Egmont International Holding Company in the mid-1990s. 
Within two years, the Latvian market was literally flooded with comic books, 
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forcing Latvia's own children's magazines out of the market. This is a dangerous 
process that has not yet been fully evaluated in Latvia, because children's maga­
zines, far more than the other media in Latvia, bring mass culture into society and 
get children accustomed to that mass culture. 
4.6. The media market and media content: 
Communication problems 
As the number of media outlets in Latvia has increased, journalism has continued 
to be a very popular profession. The labour market is very dynamic. There are, 
however, several problems in the market when it comes to the professionalism of 
those who participate. Journalism standards have been strengthened, but there 
are still times when universal journalistic norms are not applied. 
Journalists in Latvia have tried to accept and adopt global professional norms: 
objectivity, neutrality, no statement of the journalist's own views in a news arti­
cle, etc. Elsewhere in the world, these norms emerged in the context of ongoing 
media development, but in Latvia they were adopted quickly and without any 
real understanding or analysis of the norms in concrete situations. Professional 
ethical norms can be seen as abstract, and they are established on the basis of 
experience and choice in various specific instances. 
As journalism has changed rapidly along with the values held by society, jour­
nalists in Latvia have found themselves without sufficient cultural traditions. The 
public is only just now developing the criteria that allow for criticism and analy­
sis of journalism. But the mass media organisations (as in the capitalist system) 
must focus on one underlying goal - the creation of products that will earn finan­
cial profit - and the strategies of Latvian media are the same as anywhere else: 
decrease the number of journalists; cut back on long-term investigative reporting; 
use a large persentage of wire service products; use public relations materials; 
rely on a small number of elites as regular news sources; focus the news on pre­
planned official events; focus coverage on a limited number of institutions in the 
city, etc. (see Croteau & Hoynes, 2000: 58-63). 
The content and professional quality of television broadcasts have been the 
subject of particularly active discussions. Comparatively significant attention has 
been devoted to this process by the daily press. Although many news stories are 
prepared in an outstanding way, the commercialisation of mass communications 
has meant that these stories frequently do not reach a sufficiently large audience. 
Readers, listeners and viewers cannot or do not want to interpret the stories and 
seek out new importance in them. Films, articles, broadcasts and programmes 
which are the subject of little more than an ironic attitude on the part of profes­
sional and intellectual circles, meanwhile, enjoy major audience attention (Berg­
er, 1995: 28-31). 
Any society - even one as small as Latvia's - cannot be seen as a monolithic 
mass audience because each society includes individuals, groups and sub-cul­
tures with a different perspective. These groups have different levels of education 
and varying systems of values, and this has an obvious effect on the process of 
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decoding information. Explosive mass media development under conditions of 
an economic crisis and related increases in the cost of press publications during a 
period of reduced purchasing power - this led to a rapid segmentation of the 
audience in terms of a user's belonging to a group or sub-culture. These process­
es have not yet been overcome. 
Latvia's society is significantly segmented in terms of media audiences, and 
there is negligible overlap among the various groups. Media choices in the coun­
tryside are still affected by economic conditions, and people usually limit their 
media consumption to television and radio, along with one local newspaper and 
perhaps one or two consumer magazines. The net results are serious communi­
cations problems in this society. 
When people access a limited number of media outlets, they cannot compare 
various sources of information in order to develop a critical attitude towards the 
information being presented. Many people, especially those less active in society, 
rely on the reality that the media create. This often has more to do with public 
relations and advertising than with journalism. During election campaigns, for 
example, paid advertising materials have comprised as much as 75-90% of news­
paper space in some newspapers. 
These trends are not only typical for "developing" countries, such as new states 
from the former Soviet Union, because "problems of nation building, political 
apathy, lack of voter participation, and political manipulation plague new and 
old democracies throught the world" (Mowlana, 1997: 198). 
Latvia's media content is dominated by news and entertainment. This is not 
typical of the overall processes of commercialisation in the media, nor is it hap­
pening in Latvia alone. Editors change content in order to hold on to their audi­
ence and to expand it. A vivid example of this was seen in the newspaper Diena, 
which shifted from a high-quality press outlet to a mass interest newspaper so as 
to preserve a significant share of the audience. 
Communications processes between the communicator and the audience in 
Latvia can be described as a diffuse flow of information. Editors see communica­
tions as the transmission of information to the audience, not as a process that cre­
ates meaning. The most important goal for editors - and especially for publish­
ers and media owners - is to reach as many people as possible, not to think about 
the way in which individuals receive and interpret media content. One can 
understand the effort of editors to attract and preserve an audience, but in Latvia, 
where the overall potential audience is small (especially in the eyes of advertis­
ers), this has led to a situation where bland information about everything and 
nothing at all is the dominant aspect of content. The media are losing their indi­
viduality, because a specific position that attracts supporters also risks the loss of 
those in the audience who disagree. 
The mass media in Latvia, therefore, fulfill the communicative function largely 
in the quantitative aspect alone. Processes of democracy in any society, however, 
are underpinned not by the number of news items that are transmitted, but rather 
by the volume of information that is properly decoded. This is not a problem that 
can be defined narrowly in terms of Latvia alone, because democracy requires 
public debate, not information. Of course, it also needs information, but the 
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necessary information can be created only by active discussions. Information, 
which is usually seen as a prerequisite for debate, is better understood as the 
result of discussions. When we receive arguments that concentrate and attract 
our attention, we become active searchers for information. In the opposite case, 
we receive information passively, if at all (Lash, 1995: 81). 
The media in Latvia have become more professional over the last decade, but this 
has also meant that media work has become more routine. Irrespective of 
whether content is evaluated as being good or bad, it is increasingly being shaped 
by people who think mostly about strict time limits and obligations, not about 
any sense of mission or challenge in terms of providing information to people 
about issues that can be important to others. 
When it comes to democracy, however, it is no less important to ensure that the 
media use their freedom to provide services to every member of society in terms 
of an open forum for debates among people of varying views. From the perspec­
tive of media owners and advertisers, society can be seen as a cohort of target 
groups. Modern societies, by contrast, tend to see themselves as communities of 
individuals with different ideas. 
Concluding remarks 
The development of mass communications in Latvia in the 1990s can be charac­
terised through several basic phases. 
A quantitative expansion in the media market took place under conditions of a 
government media monopoly, thus ensuring rapid and extensive circulation of 
information in the public sector. The level of information openness and accessi­
bility expanded significantly, but the typical discourse of a totalitarian society 
was preserved (the government, the media and the public did not see themselves 
as interacting actors, and any discussions concerning the government's discourse 
were received by the government exclusively in the external context, i.e., as being 
waged against the Soviet Union, Soviet ideology, etc.). 
The whole media system was transformed, as the sphere of mass communica­
tions expanded to include public relations and advertising as identified areas of 
professional activity in addition to journalism. This happened during a period 
when the principles of the market economy were being implemented, but Latvia 
was also going through a severe economic crisis. Media organisations operated 
within this context and the content was partially shaped by economic and politi­
cal forces. 
The mass communications industry stabilised and became part of the global 
mass communications. The commercalisation of journalism and the consolida­
tion of the media appeared, but the public is only now developing the criteria 
that allow for criticism and analysis of journalism. The fear emerged that the 
globalisation of the media (especially television and the Internet) will influence 
the national culture and language. Computers are still the most recognised sym­
bol of the information society and the disparity between the information-poor 
and information-rich inhabitants is observed in Latvia. People have not 
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developed new media usage habits corresponding with the radical changes that 
have occurred in the media over the last decade. 
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3. Lithuanian Media: A Question of Change 
Aukše Balcytiene 
Introduction 
In many Central and East European countries, the fall of the totalitarian system 
was a starting point for fundamental transformations in all spheres of life. The 
most important challenges are the development of democratic institutions, eco­
nomic recovery, and ensuring social stability. 
There is both good and bad news about transformation in Lithuania. The opti­
mistic news is that much has been achieved in the past ten-year period. Scholars 
have predicted that transformation will be a long and time-consuming process. 
Today they conclude that a certain kind of "normalcy" has been reached, with 
patterns of political stability and a market-based economy. Lithuania has made 
strong and irreversible progress towards the establishment of a democratic state. 
An appropriate institutional framework was built to ensure political stability, 
which is manifested through the development of institutions of participation 
(such as political parties, NGOs and citizens' movements) and institutions of rep­
resentation (such as regular elections and Parliament) (Mintchev, 1999; Krupavi-
cius, 1999). Price liberalisation and privatisation have ensured economic stability 
and a market economy (Starkeviciute & Tabor, 1999). 
The less optimistic news is that in Lithuania, as well as in many post-Commu-
nist countries, the high hopes of quick transition have been disproved. Scholars 
claim that transformation of the social consciousness (peoples' mentality) plays 
an enormous role in the development of attitudes, acceptance of new lifestyles, 
and the ability to cope with the challenges of a post-modern society (Balcerow-
icz, 1995; Taljunaite, 1997). Democratic reforms that took many hundreds of years 
in the West had to occur in an instant in post-Communist countries; therefore, it 
is no surprise that this entire process was highly emotional. Devaluation of the 
common norms of behaviour and the weakening of social relations indicate that 
many people have a hard time coping with the psychological pressures caused by 
transformation (Degutis, 2000). 
Concerning changes in the media, the collapse of the Communist regime has 
brought an end to censorship. The role of the media has shifted from being an 
organ of the state and the political elites to being an intermediary between state 
and citizenry, facilitating public discourse and policy issues. The end of the Com­
munist regime has also brought challenges of re-shaping the economic basis of 
the media and adjusting to rapidly changing market demands. 
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A closer look at the media market, however, reveals tendencies that are less 
positive. The media is being blamed for increased concentration, a down-market 
tabloid trend, sensationalism and negativism. A kind of vicious circle can be at 
play here: because the media firms are in fierce competition, increased sensation­
alism proliferates. The proliferation undermines the very effectiveness of news 
quality. Therefore one may pose the question: What kind of media is being built 
in the transforming societies? Should it necessarily go through the moneymaking 
model? What is the role of the public media? 
The role of the Lithuanian media did not remain the same during the entire 
process of transition. Although certain similarities can be observed in the media 
developments of many Central and East European countries, each country's 
media landscape and functions are unique. Indeed, a closer look at the develop­
ment of the media shows that it follows its own path of transformation in which 
both political and economic factors have contributed. Also, the media's distinc­
tiveness correlates with many cultural factors like national identity, as reflected 
in the way the public receives and distributes the news. 
There is no doubt that the media, as a socialising agent, fulfils different expec­
tations and plays different roles at the various stages of transition. It can be said 
that the particular role of the media becomes an indicator of society's maturity. 
The role of the media has been inadequately analysed in Lithuania. In the past ten 
years, few analyses were made to assess structural changes, developments and 
impacts of the mass media. Most studies are descriptive and concentrate on 
changes in the media landscape: the new numbers of newspapers and magazines, 
commercial radio and television stations (see individual articles in Dirvonaite & 
Urbonas, 2000). 
The pages that follow will shed light on the internal (national and local) and 
external (global) tensions that have shaped the Lithuanian media in different 
stages of its post-Communist transition. 
1. Stages of development 
The liberation of the mass media from state control was quickly accompanied by 
rapid changes in media content. More foreign media products appeared on TV 
screens. Also, the print media market has rapidly segmented to take into consid­
eration the various interests of potential readers. According to some studies, 
changes in television programming indicate the "Westernisation" of society: not 
only more popular films and entertainment programmes were shown, but the 
first signs of rivalry between national television and commercial stations were 
observed as early as 1993 (see individual articles in Dirvonaite & Urbonas, 2000). 
Scholars have roughly defined the most essential stages of post-Communist 
transformation as 
1) the breakthrough, which takes the form of revolution because it is initiated 
from "above" and goes to the "bottom;" 
2) the disintegration of structures of the previous regime: major political and eco­
nomic reforms take place; 
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3) the emergence of a stable democratic order: new democratic institutions are 
constructed and former institutions reshape themselves into new structures 
(Jakubowicz, 1995; Staniszkis, 1994). 
The transition in Lithuania has mostly been analysed from the perspective of 
political science; therefore, scholars tend to emphasize major political achieve­
ments such as the institutionalisation of parties, legislative Parliamentary elec­
tions, political socialisation and developments of political culture (e.g., see Kru-
pavicius, 2000; Matonyte, 2001). Bearing in mind that each country's path of 
development is unique, in the Lithuanian post-Communist transition two major 
periods can be distinguished. The so-called "breakthrough period" took place 
from 1987 to 1990. This period covers the years of the Singing Revolution and 
constitutes public awakening. The second major period, from 1991 to 2001, may 
be called a period of growth and stability. 
The breakthrough stage is associated with high ideals, cultural and national 
values, definitions of nationhood and independence. The typical developments 
of the media in this phase are associated with the first wave of political pluralism 
and public debate about many previously restricted topics, such as Soviet depor­
tations and questions of national identity. 
The major objective of the period of growth is to reach political, economic and 
social stability in the country. Because of political cycles and major economic 
reforms that were initiated and took place during this ten-year stage 
(1990/1991-2001), several political milestones must be emphasised that divide 
the period of growth into four sub-periods. 
• Declaration of Independence on 11 March 1990. The declaration was soon 
followed by severe challenges, first of all the Soviet military invasion of Vilnius 
in January 1991. 
In 1990-1992, the first attempts to liberalise prices were made; micro and medi­
um privatisation started, and land reform was introduced. The beginning of press 
privatisation dates back to 1991; at that time, major newspapers started operating 
on semi-private business models. Soon thereafter, the enormous process of mass 
media "capitalisation" began: the newly established media firms started to oper­
ate on a fragile but money-making model. 
Concerning the economic sphere, scholars tend to call this stage of privatisation 
"a period of shadow economy," which manifests the search for rapid gain, coop­
erative movement and liberal experimentation (Matonyte, 2001). Characteristic of 
this period was a sharp dichotomy between declared values and expressed opin­
ions on various issues. The economic elite professed liberal ideas, but systemati­
cally expressed less liberal opinions when concrete questions were asked. They 
pointed to market liberty but severely blamed the state for the insufficiencies. At 
this stage, the democracy was considered as a given and unproblematic. 
• First legislative Parliamentary elections (won by the former Communists, 
the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party) in October 1992. The most important 
achievement that followed afterwards was the approval of the Constitution. Soon 
the national currency the Utas, was introduced. 
The period of 1994-1996 was a time when the first major economic drawbacks 
took place. The political normalisation in the country was shaken by the 
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economic collapse of 1994, which was due to the breakdown of traditional trade 
relations with the CIS and the bankruptcy scandals in several commercial 
Lithuanian banks in the spring of 1996. In the period 1993-1996, state interven­
tion is understood as instrumental and necessary, the market as not totally bene­
ficial, and democracy starts to be considered as a complex and only relatively 
independent variable. 
• 1996 Parliamentary elections won by the Conservatives (Home Land Party) 
and the Christian Democrats. An important political change was the Presiden­
tial election of 1998, which were won by US resident Valdas Adamkus. In 1997, 
the macro-privatisation of 16 major state enterprises was begun: Lithuanian Tele­
com was sold to Scandinavian investors in 1997; the refinery and oil transport 
system Mazeikiai Nafta was partly purchased by the US company Williams Inter­
national in 1999. Also, plans were made for the privatisation of some of the coun­
try's banks and to sell off other state-owned monopolies such as Lithuanian Rail­
ways, Lithuanian Airlines (LAL), Lithuanian Gas, Lithuanian Energy and 
Lithuanian Shipping Company (LISCO). Generally speaking, since 1997, major 
reforms were concentrated on property restitution, compensations of lost savings 
and on foreign investment. 
An important achievement that took place during this time was the official 
negotiations for entrance into the EU (the decision was passed by the European 
Council in December 1999). The promising economic stability achieved in the 
first quarter of 2001 also indicated that the slight economic recession associated 
with the Russian crash of 1998 had ended. The two issues - the Russian crisis and 
EU integration policies - were considered as two salient variables in Lithuanian 
political and economic life. Because of economic hardships, the pro-market ori­
entations have begun anew, but this time the market is understood as necessari­
ly related to and dependent on democracy. The state starts to be perceived as 
being shaped by both the market and democracy. 
• Parliamentary elections of 2000. These elections are an important event 
because they mark the political entrance of two new parties: the Social Liberals 
and Liberals. However, due to continuous disagreements, June 2001 marks the 
end of the coalition: the New Union Party (Social Liberals) forms yet another 
alliance with the Social Democratic coalition. 
Although these milestones coincide with political cycles (Parliamentary elec­
tions), it is hard to establish sharp lines in the stages of transformation and to 
compare these to the developments that took place in other post-Communist 
countries. Ziolkowski (1998), for example, identified four distinct systems of nor­
mative order formed by interests and values under transformation. According to 
him, the first system characterises a specific and usually rather brief period of 
social revolution arising from the grassroots level of the society. The second sys­
tem is defined by values that focus on the desirable political order and the con­
struction of new political and legal institutions. The third system is defined by the 
predominance of materialist values and interests, and the fourth by the advance 
of post-materialist values. Current changes in the country, according to such cat­
egorisation, coincide with increased commercialisation. Thus, no matter which 
political parties are in power, the materialist values dominate in the country. 
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Concerning political development, the continuity of policy issues is evident as 
well. For example, the last five years (1996-2001) manifest different political peri­
ods; however, taking into consideration other indicators (such as foreign policy 
directives), it becomes obvious that major political policies overlap. Both cabinets 
(of 1996 and the new alliance of 2001) stress that Lithuania's integration into the 
EU and NATO is the essence of foreign policy. 
The major argument for the structuring of transition into the two major stages 
and for the emphasis on certain political and economic achievements is the belief 
that there is a high correlation between political culture and the evolution of 
media. 
1.1. The breakthrough period (1987-1990) 
The years 1987/1988-1990 are described as the grassroots of the transition. From 
the political point of view, this period of the birth of the political culture may be 
called a "mythological stage" (Vihalemm, Lauristin & Tallo, 1997). The essential 
features of the political culture of this period are active participation in mass 
movements, open discourse on cultural identity, collective memories of the 
unique history, the country's identification with the Western culture and the dis­
tinctiveness of the Lithuanian language. During the mythological stage of the 
formation of political culture, "teleological political consciousness" becomes 
dominant. This kind of consciousness is characteristic of most enslaved nations. 
It shares common political aims (no matter how realistic), such as seeking inde­
pendence, whereby cultural values, national traditions and political freedoms 
(the freedom of speech, the freedom of association) will be granted (Stromas, 
1991). According to several authors, the political discourse of the mythological 
stage was saturated with optimism and romanticism (Senn, 1991). It was based 
on the myths created in glory of the previously independent Lithuania in the first 
half of the 20th century and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania stretching from the 
Baltic to the Black Seas during much earlier centuries (as described in Pali-
dauskaite, 1997). The public discourse was full of declarations that the only 
choice for end-of-20th-century Lithuania was peaceful resistance to the aggressor, 
which was exhibited on the bloody Sunday of 13 January 1991. 
During the mythological stage, the society shows clear signs of readiness and 
willingness to solve political problems. It is important to notice that in this phase, 
the public turns from a political object (which it used to be during the years of the 
totalitarian regime) into a political agent. Also, new facets of public activity and 
political participation (apart from the so-called parade performances) come to 
light. No matter how active (in a political sense) the public is, the concepts such 
as "nation" and "state" are loaded with mythological power, and the individual 
is respected on the basis of how loyal he or she can be to the ideals of the nation. 
The unique national and moral values are promoted not only by individuals, but 
also by some of the emerging political parties, e.g., the Tautininkai (Krupavicius, 
2000). The public polls of that time show the values that Lithuanians were proud 
of: Lithuanian history (60%), Lithuanian architecture (30%), unique spiritual 
qualities of Lithuanian people (30%), Lithuanian people (22%), achievement 
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in art and science (10%), court (3%), government (2%) and Parliament (1%). The 
mythological stage of political culture is often described as the first step in the 
process of political transformation and is called "demonstrating democracy" 
(Palidauskaite, 1997). This, according to Ziolkowski (1998), constitutes a first sys­
tem and a specific period of social revolution, which arises from the grassroots 
level of the society. It is the "transformation honeymoon" - the time dominated 
by political, ethical and symbolic values shared by the majority of society. Elites 
and masses do not diverge in their excitement, optimism, hope and revolution­
ary enthusiasm. Typical of the phase are visions of independence, which is open­
ly reflected through the content of all kinds of media. 
With the public activity expanding, the mass media plays a crucial role in 
mobilising the masses. Scholars from the Baltic States argue that the media was 
an important mechanism used for the political breakthrough in the Baltic soci­
eties from the Soviet period in 1987 to the transition into independence in 1990 
(Serin, 1990; Vihalemm, Lauk & Lauristin, 1997). During the Soviet era, there was 
no political pluralism, political parties did not exist and civil centres were weak. 
Therefore, during the breakthrough period, the media served as a network 
through which a relatively democratic political dialogue started in radio, televi­
sion and the press. The mass media had become a source of encouragement to 
public action, the apogee of which was on 23 August 1989, when about two mil­
lion people formed a human chain from Vilnius through Riga to Tallinn. 
What was the Lithuanian media like at that time? In 1987-1988 there were 
eleven national newspapers. They appeared from five to six times per week. All 
of them were partisan papers. Due to the growing prestige of the mass media in 
this phase, the circulation of major newspapers increased considerably: for 
instance, the circulation of the Communist Party newspaper Komjaunimo Tiesa 
had grown from 108,000 copies in 1988 to 522,000 in 1989. Such a rapid growth in 
circulation indicated that the public ideals and visions of independence were 
increasing in the public discourse, so journalists and editors reacted reflexively. 
On 16 September 1989, the first independent newspaper, Respublika, was 
launched. Established as a partisan newspaper for the Lithuanian Independence 
Movement "Sajudis," Respublika declared itself non-partisan in 1990. Since then it 
has been one of the leading national dailies (Table 3.1). 
To summarise, the mythological stage of political culture can be described as 
lacking in rational thinking and the ability to calculate the steps of action, and as 
showing increased trust in new national leaders and accepting illusionary myths 
rather than reality. The media was saturated with feelings of romanticism and 
nationalism, which on the one hand revealed the absence of democratic con­
sciousness. On the other hand, the media served as a herald in the creation of the 
yet-unknown and entirely new public structures that emerged in connection with 
the massive popular movements and which were mediated through the mass 
media. 
Table 3.1. Leading Lithuanian dailies and their online characteristics 
Title Type Ownership 
Circulation (thous) Beginning 
of online 
service 
Characteristics of online edition Online readership 1 1990 1995 2001 
Lietuvos rytas National daily National 
shareholders 523 
70 
(140)2 
49 
(183) 1997 
Conventional paper texts transferred to the Internet; 
opportunity to write commentaries; classifieds; 
banner advertising; search services; 
archives for registered users only 
35,000 
-50,000 
Respublika National daily National 
shareholders 122 
48 
(68) 42 - - -
Kauno diena Regional daily Orkla Media (Norway) 113 57 
42 
(49) 1999 
Conventional paper texts transferred to the Internet; 
opportunity to write e-mail messages; search 
services; archives (free up to 3 months) 
650 
Lietuvos žinios 3 National tabloid Private person - - 25 1999 
Conventional paper texts; opportunity to write e-mail 
messages; banner exchange; search; archives 500 
Verslo žinios Business daily 
Bonnier 
Media Group 
(Sweden) 
14 9 8 1997 
Conventional and online texts; hourly updates; 
e-mail contacts with journalists; banner advertising; 
archives for registered readers 
1,700 
1 Average number of users with unique address per day, fall 2001. 
2 In brackets circulation on weekends. 
3 Re-established in 1996. 
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1.2. The growth period (1990/1991-2001) 
The moods and attitudes of the mythological phase were followed by the second 
stage of Lithuania's transformation period. At this stage, however, the main prob­
lems of the mythological political culture become evident: emotions fade, myths 
die, high ideals fall short of hopes and pessimism creeps in. The previously com­
mon values start to vanish and differentiate. This phase constitutes what 
Ziolkowski (1998) calls the second system - desires to gain political order. 
Although independence is achieved and democratic grounds are established, the 
political, economic and social structures essentially remain bureaucratic, inflexi­
ble and conservative. As a result, the fragile process of political pluralism and 
party formations is accepted with great scepticism. 
The tendency towards disappointment in the ideals is not only symptomatic of 
Lithuania, but was also extensively reported in other Eastern European countries 
(Balcerowicz, 1995). In the case of Lithuania, public disappointment resulted in a 
major reluctance to support any political party. By the beginning of 1995, more 
than half (52%) of the total population could not name a party that could best rep­
resent their interests. Scholars have also noted that reluctance to vote in party 
elections varied from 40-50% (e.g., see Palidauskaite, 1997). The answer to this 
phenomenon can be twofold. On the one hand, it can be the consequence of the 
totalitarian system where people feared expressing their opinion publicly. On the 
other hand, this may simply be an expression of the public reaction to an unsat­
isfactory situation: the loss of romantic ideals and unsatisfactory changes in the 
economic and social spheres. 
Economic instability is typical of the opening phase of this stage. Lithuania 
began the decade with a severe economic crisis rather than economic growth: in 
1990-1994, GDP declined by 45%, and it was the steepest decline of any of the 
transition economies. The principle reason was the breakdown of trading rela­
tions with the CIS states and the consumer shock over prices climbing to world 
market levels. Starting in 1994, the economy began to recover: real wages recov­
ered modestly in 1994-1996 and then accelerated sharply in 1997-1998. Conse­
quently, higher domestic consumption was recorded in 1997-1998 (Starkeviciute 
& Tabor, 1999). 
What was the role of the media during this period of rapid change? The author­
itarian concept of media-state relationship was gradually replaced by the concept 
of a completely free media. The liberalisation of the media manifested itself 
through the privatisation of newspapers and the fast growth of titles (especially 
during 1990-1992). The liberalisation of the press meant, first of all, rejection of 
state ownership and subsidies to the print media. 
During this period of rapid political and economic change, the media went 
through several stages of transformation. The most radical among these were 
fundamental structural changes. Most media outlets were privatised by 1993, 
which also indicates that the media had to learn to operate in a competitive mar­
ket. Although slowly, but nevertheless quite steadily, the mass media was creat­
ing a more open and neutral public space where different interests and 
Lithuanian Media: A Question of Change 111 
viewpoints could be publicly expressed and negotiated. An important indication 
of démocratisation was the adoption of the Mass Media Law in 1996. 
The economic growth of the country, however, was not as smooth as had been 
expected: at the end of 1998 the economy experienced a serious downturn. The 
period of 1999-2000 is mostly associated with the crisis in Russia. The economic 
crash in Russia in 1998 significantly changed the established trade pattern in 
Lithuania. The foreign trade links of the three Baltic States with the EU and CIS 
countries had been considerably different (see Table 11 in Appendix). Lithuania's 
greater share of exports was directed to the Eastern rather than the Western mar­
kets: 50% went to CIS markets compared to 40% going to EU markets. The share 
of Estonia's exports to the CIS, on the contrary, did not exceed 20% (Terk, 1999). 
Consequently, the harm done to the Lithuanian economy was much greater than 
in the other Baltic States. Economic stabilisation started in Lithuania at the end of 
2000 (see Table 6 and Figure 1 in Appendix). 
The fundamental changes in the political culture became evident in the Parlia­
mentary elections of 2000. These elections can be described as a new step in 
Lithuania's démocratisation and formation of political culture. Typically for the 
political context, the ideological discourse of the Parliamentary elections of 2000 
was constructed through the programmes of several (in the Lithuanian case, fif­
teen) political parties. A number of factors indicate the birth of a new political 
professionalism: the economic elite sought political power, resources were chan­
nelled to political image building and multi-party elections became a reality 
(Matonyte, 2000; Clark & Prekevicius, 2000). 
The most notable feature of the elections in October 2000 was that, for the first 
time since 1990, elections in Lithuania did not produce a majority party. Neither 
the Conservatives (the Homeland Union) nor the Democratic Labour Party 
gained enough seats in the Parliament to enter the governing coalition. Actually, 
the most interesting phenomenon of the elections was the emergence of new par­
ties, the New Union (Social Liberals) and the Liberal Union among them, which 
won the highest number of seats and together formed a new governing alliance. 
Soon the New Policy bloc was formed. 
The performance of the democratic system depends on many factors, such as 
the capacity of leaders to solve problems, the efficiency of the government and 
the economic situation. Indeed, the political development did not proceed as suc­
cessfully as had been expected with the New Policy bloc. In reality, the fragile 
coalition found it difficult to reach a consensus on introducing major economic 
reforms. The continuing confrontation brought about the break-up of the newly 
formed partnership. The Liberal Union resigned and the Social Liberals created a 
new alliance with the Social Democratic coalition (Clark & Prekevicius, 2000). 
The Parliament approved former President Algirdas Brazauskas as Prime Minis­
ter, and his cabinet was sworn on 12 July 2001. 
In summary, one of the facts indicative of the period of growth is an increased 
interest in society's political behaviour. The public discourse is highly politicised 
and two thirds of the population admit political preferences. According to polit­
ical scientists, these are signs of a participatory political culture that also indicate 
a sufficient political maturity of the country (Krupavicius, 1999). Other 
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researchers emphasize the shift from the mono-party to the multi-party system, 
as well as the focus of international politics on integration with the EU and 
NATO, which shows social modernisation and the formation of a global culture 
(Vitkus, 1999; Miklovaite & Vareikis, 1999). The media, in turn, plays an active 
role in political communication. As a result of several disclosures of political 
wrongdoing, the media has matured and journalists have learned how to be true 
"watchdogs" of a society. 
The key elements of Lithuanian transition during the past decade can be 
summed up in the following steps: 
1) a shift from a totalitarian political system into a democratic one; 
2) the successful diversion of a structural economic crisis through the building of 
free-market economies; 
3) political and economic modernisation and the adjustment to global changes. 
Applying Ziokowski's (1998) argument about the four systems, the present-
day developments in Lithuania constitute a third system (materialistic) with 
some signs indicating post-materialistic development. 
2. Assessing the mass media 
The media play a fundamental role in all phases of transition. The most essential 
trends evident in the media in the beginning of 2001 are as follows. 
• The media has entered the concentration and stabilisation period, which is 
characterised by a limited number of major media firms competing for audience 
attention. According to SIC Gallup Media (www.sgm.lt), a national readership 
survey carried out from June to September 2001 revealed the top five dailies and 
their audience share: Lietuvos rytas (23.7%), Respublika (6.8%), Kauno diena (7.5%), 
Lietuvos žinios (5.8%) and Siauliu krastas (4.4%). Three of them circulate national­
ly (except for Kauno diena and Siauliu krastas, which are Kaunas and Šiauliai city 
newspapers, respectively). A typical characteristic of the Lithuanian press is that, 
on the one hand, circulation numbers of the existing newspapers and journals 
decreases further. On the other hand, the decrease in printed copies is (together 
with the growth of new titles of popular magazines) also indicative of a rapid 
segmentation of the mass audience. For example, a feature indicative to the 
Lithuanian magazine market is that among the top five magazines all are 
women's monthlies: Panele (7.7%), Laima (7.5%), Moteris (6.8%), Cosmopolitan 
(Lithuanian version, 5.2%) and Ji (4.2%). Concerning television, the SIC Gallup 
Media television meters survey of August 2001 shows that the audience share of 
the different television companies is as follows: LRT (8.9%), LNK (22.3%), TV3 
(25.9%) and BTV (15.8%). The LRT is a public television station while the other 
three are commercial stations. Two of channels, LNK and TV3, compete fiercely 
for audience attention. 
• The Lithuanian media is privately owned, and there are no restrictions on for­
eign investment in national, regional or local media. Foreign investments have 
thus increased in recent years: Kauno diena was bought by Orkla Media AS from 
Norway in 1998; in 2001, the Norwegian investors were in the process of 
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examining opportunities to acquire a significant part of the second-biggest 
national daily Respublika and smaller newspapers. 
• In the field of electronic media, commercial broadcasting stations are 
strengthening their positions in the market. The impact of increased competition 
is evident in the homogenisation of the content of the commercial TV pro­
grammes. The new season of 2001 is marked by the fact that public service broad­
casting (the national radio and television, LRT) is shaping its future through rad­
ical reforms such as generational replacements of journalists and editors, licence 
fees and other "unpopular" social reforms, which are inevitable, and, therefore, 
emotionally laden. 
• Declining journalistic standards stems from the fact that the media is highly 
commercialised. However, the public response to the media content has a duali­
ty. On the one hand, the media is blamed for increased sensationalism, con­
sumerism and low standards of customisation. On the other hand, the public 
shows high confidence in the media because the media is actively participating 
in the course of important political, economic and social reforms. 
• In 2000, through the application of technological innovations, online media 
developments gathered speed. The year 2001 is marked with greater Internet 
penetration and experts predict that soon the Internet usage in Lithuania may 
reach the level of use in Estonia. The increasing numbers of Internet users have 
ensured the growth of online periodicals. However, optimism is scarce on the 
Internet. The traditional media has noticed the impact of the Internet: too few 
online experiments have produced stable revenue, therefore, major media firms 
have resisted online business. 
The above trends are fairly similar to the challenges confronting many global 
media organisations. A closer look at the news market reveals tendencies such as 
increasing concentration, a down-market tabloid trend, a decrease in sales figures 
and advertising revenues. The most important acknowledgement is the fact that 
the media is privately owned, and there are few restrictions to the freedom of the 
press. 
The following analysis looks briefly at the main trends of recent media devel­
opment: (1) further concentration of media, (2) increased competition of media 
firms, (3) rapid commercialisation of media content, (4) distinct patterns of media 
consumption, and (5) media quality and media regulation. In addition to these 
trends, the growth of online periodicals as well as the impact of the Internet will 
also be considered. 
2.1. Concentration and commercialisation of the media 
The most evident characteristic of the present-day Lithuanian media is its private 
nature. The change in political order in 1990 has provoked a wave of capitalism. 
The old media system fragmented quickly and was replaced by a market-orient­
ed system that rapidly began to integrate itself into the world media market. This 
process involved the transition from socialist to capitalist property forms and 
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production relations. In recent years, another trend - a trend towards monopoli­
sation (or concentration) of the local market - has been observed in the country. 
The best illustration of horizontal (or mono-media) concentration is the case of 
several commercial radio stations (M-l, Ml Plius, Lietus and Laluna) fully con­
trolled by one owner. 
As a result of the continuing media concentration, the number of national daily 
newspapers as well as regional ones has gradually declined. Many researchers 
point out that the diversity of media is a necessary condition to ensure political 
and cultural pluralism and the effective participation of citizens in the democrat­
ic decision-making process (Meier & Trappel, 1998). They claim that the process 
of concentration of the ownership of media and foreign privatisation may end up 
with a handful of owners - a situation where healthy competition will hardly 
take place. This is especially dangerous from the political point of view, as con­
centration distorts competition and allows existing media corporations to deny 
market access to new, independent arrivals. The result is the creation of a 
monopoly of information, which is undesirable for social and economic reasons. 
In Baltic media investments, the capital from Scandinavian media companies 
predominate: Orkla Media (Norway), Schibsted (Norway), Bonnier Media (Swe­
den). Schibsted and Bonnier Media have a strong presence in Estonia. Orkla fully 
owns Kauno diena in Lithuania. Bonnier Media partly owns Verslo žinios (Business 
News) in Lithuania, Äripäev in Estonia, and partly owns the national Latvian 
daily Diena (49%). The case of the Lithuanian newspaper Kauno diena can be used 
as an example of a successful foreign investment. Kauno diena is a newspaper in 
Kaunas (the second-largest city, with a population of 400,000). It is also the third-
largest daily in the country. Its circulation is close to 45,000. The newspaper is 
popular in the region: 93% of the population read it once a week and 76% are 
daily readers. The proportion between the amount of commercials and articles 
varies during the week; the average is 45%. Since 1999, Kauno diena has had an 
electronic version on the Internet. The primary goal of the new owners was to re­
shape the content and the format of the newspaper. Although Kauno diena is a 
regional paper, it has an ambitious goal: it is struggling to go national despite 
being published outside the capital. 
The case of Kauno diena is an extraordinary phenomenon (especially if analysed 
from a socio-cultural point of view). The newspaper operates on a subscription 
basis and has a readership that has shown extreme loyalty during the last decade. 
The recent data indicate that 36% of readers subscribe to the paper, whereas 
respectively 16% and 12% of readers subscribe to the major national daily Lietu­
vos rytas and the second-largest daily Respublika. There can be several explana­
tions for such devotion. It is likely that such an attachment to the newspaper can 
be attributed to the unique mentality of its readers, who simply stick to their for­
mer habit of reading the same paper. This explanation may hold true because the 
newspaper has avoided the generational replacement of journalists, and recent 
media statistics indicate that the paper is most popular among senior citizens (in 
the 50-74 year age group). 
On a positive note, it is assumed that foreign investment ensures financial sta­
bility, which creates favourable conditions for more balanced reporting. One 
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recent study (with the goal of analysing the major Lithuanian dailies during the 
Parliamentary pre-election period) shows that Kauno diena has given the most 
balanced picture of the different political parties. The same study has shown that 
the other three major dailies (all of them national) have demonstrated certain 
party preferences despite claiming independence from any political links (Skrip-
kaite, 2001). 
Generally speaking, media concentration can be regarded as a threat to plural­
ism. In Europe, there exist cases that can be viewed as typical in the process of 
media concentration: first, a major media group buys several newspapers, then 
the amalgamation process follows; in the end, editorial identity disappears (Bens 
& Ostbye, 1998). The obvious result is that the arrival of large media firms push­
es small newspapers out of the market. This is exactly what happened in Kaunas. 
The other two dailies of the city (Kauno žinios and Laikinoji sostine, both estab­
lished after the restoration of independence) were not able to compete with Kauno 
diena. Both papers closed because of various reasons, but the strengthening of 
Kauno diena through foreign capital is one of the most important factors. Alterna­
tively, some researchers argue that small newspapers can only survive when they 
are taken over by large holdings. This is the case of the largest national daily, 
Lietuvos rytas: the same joint venture controlling Lietuvos rytas also publishes the 
major national pro-liberal daily and a regional paper Panevezio rytas, and supple­
ments for Vilnius and Kaunas named Sostine and Laikinoji sostine, respectively. 
The effect of concentration on the editorial content is another interesting topic 
for communications research. There are two opposing views concerning the 
influence of concentration on the quality of the newspaper. Some claim that while 
quality journalism requires resources, the general quality of newspapers benefits 
from the concentration processes in newspaper markets. Others argue that con­
centration and commercialisation are directly linked. In other words, concentra­
tion causes commercialisation and triggers a down-market trend: more human 
interest, more trivialisation and more sensationalism. 
As far as another trend - media competition - is concerned, two opposing 
developments are observed in the country. With media aiming at the mass mar­
ket (commercial radio and television channels, some magazines and popular 
newspapers), there is a trend towards the homogenisation of content. At the same 
time, however, there is a tendency towards specialisation in the radio, magazine, 
and television markets. 
The national newspaper market consists of a limited number of newspaper 
titles. At present, there are four major dailies in Lithuania: three of them are 
national (Lietuvos rytas, Respublika and Lietuvos žinios) and one is regional (Kauno 
diena), the latter also showing ambitions to go national. The competition is strong 
and it seems that the Lithuanian newspaper market is no longer open for new 
arrivals. 
The commercial television stations TV3 and LNK are the main competitors for 
the television market share in Lithuania. Both of them, at present, have an aver­
age of 25% of the audience share. It was observed that in the first quarter of 2001, 
the TV3 and LNK competition ended up with the homogenisation of television 
content, i.e., both companies included popular talk shows and crime news in 
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their programmes. This result is reflected in the lists of the top five television pro­
grammes (Table 26 in Appendix). 
Strong competition in the media market (among national newspapers and com­
mercial television stations) makes the media dependent on advertising, which in 
turn depends on the audience share. The obvious result of the severe competition 
among various media firms is the growing commercialisation of media content, 
whereby analytical discussions with a plurality of opinions are replaced by pop­
ular themes and general interest texts. 
On a positive note, it is important to mention that the commercialisation of the 
media is an economic event, which brings about new components, such as open-
market forces and new forms of ownership. This indicates that the media is 
shaped by new factors rather than by dependence on the political regime, and 
this is an important prerequisite of démocratisation. It is expected that in the near 
future an obvious outcome of this will be a critical evaluation of mass media. 
At the moment, skilled criticism of the media is effectively unavailable in 
Lithuania. An exception to this was in April 2001, when a number of leading 
artists, writers and scholars signed a memorandum blaming the mass media for 
increased negativism. The memorandum was addressed to the president. Such 
an action performed by a group of well-known people is an obvious example of 
a reaction to the repercussions of media commercialisation, where media firms, 
trying to expand their market share, neglect certain socially relevant issues and 
concentrate mainly on the issues that ensure fast profits. According to the text of 
the memorandum, the focus of the mass media on political gossip and scandal 
and the ascendancy of the "bold-and-beautiful" economic and political elite gave 
too little attention to a balanced and critical analysis of the difficulties of the 
developing democratic state. 
The above example can also be discussed in a much wider context and from a 
socio-cultural point of view. In communications studies, a phenomenon (when 
the mass media fail to give a fair account of all publicly relevant issues) is 
described as a "spiral of silence" (Noelle-Neuman, 1993). The effect of the spiral 
of silence becomes all the more evident at times when the differentiation and 
stratification of society increases. According to several studies carried out in a 
number of post-Communist countries, positive - yet radical - economic reforms 
are followed by a "transitional stress" that comes about as a result of rapidly 
changing conditions (Lauristin, 1997; Taljunaite, 1997). According to Staniszkis 
(1991), communism had destroyed the structure of "intermediary organisations" 
and left the post-transition societies with atomised publics incapable of articulat­
ing and defending their interests. Extreme changes in the economic and social 
conditions, as well as the arrival of the market economy, resulted in the failure to 
adjust to the new requirements; therefore, certain groups of society found them­
selves underprivileged. With the social differences becoming deeper and the 
media aggravating these differences, the situation became increasingly stressful. 
This proves that, in the process of stabilisation, public mood and social con­
sciousness (apart from economic and political factors) are of particular impor­
tance for the identification of society's maturity. 
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In addition to public requests to the media, emerging information consumption 
patterns show that the psychological and social functions of the media are chang­
ing. At the first stage of the post-Communist transformation, the major function 
of the media was to mobilise people. Indeed, the number of newspaper titles 
reached its peak in the period between 1990 and 1992. At later stages, when the 
Lithuanian media moved from the system of planned economy to free market, 
the function of the media transformed radically. The new function can be 
described as a new form of media socialisation that is significantly affected by the 
rapidly changing economic and political conditions in the country. Scholars have 
noted that this function can be associated with the increase in the density of 
entertainment issues in the media. The rapid growth in hours of television con­
sumption can be an index of the rapidly changing economic situation: at present, 
Lithuanians watch television an average of four hours per day (see Table 18 in 
Appendix). 
The radical changes in media development also show changes in the readers' 
and viewers' tastes. Lithuanian newspapers have invested extensively in product 
improvement, differentiation and customisation. Most newspapers have had a 
face-lift and a new layout, while extra supplements and inserts have grown 
increasingly trendy (especially in the biggest national daily, Lietuvos rytas). The 
commercial television stations are also fighting for audience attention, and this 
can be seen by the increase in the number of popular television talk shows, week­
ly lotteries and games. 
2.2. Problems of media quality 
The debate on media quality is a two-sided subject, but the two sides are closely 
related. On the one hand, journalistic quality is related to the content and details 
of media management. On the other, it is also a question of standards of journal­
istic education. 
In recent years, the standards of analytical journalism in Lithuania have fallen. 
The major dailies (including the most influential national daily, Lietuvos rytas) 
seem to be trying to maintain their share of the market through increasing sensa­
tionalism and through general human-interest stories. When asked about such a 
policy, the editors express a belief that crime and scandal are the topics that sell 
while, for example, those of domestic culture receive minimal interest. 
Several reasons can be put forth to account for the emphasis on the topics of 
crime, sensation and political gossip. One is the general tendency towards glob­
al commercialisation of the media. This is because newspapers operate in two 
markets - the market of advertisers and the market of readers. Obviously, when 
reader interest declines, the newspaper's revenue from advertising suffers. 
Newspapers use several strategies to retain a high share of the advertising mar­
ket by creating special pages and supplements (lifestyle, sports), and by provid­
ing many kinds of inserts. Also, as is the case with many papers, severe competi­
tion for advertising money is driven by the attempts of the media to achieve con­
sumer attention through such primitive means as political gossip, life-style 
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interests, and topics of crime. Another rationale for the increasing amount of 
political gossip and malice-type journalism in recent years is that media people 
themselves have a significant influence on the content. It is important to remem­
ber that in the first years of transition, the growth of media firms and publications 
was followed by an increase in the numbers of journalists. Many of these jour­
nalists and editors had no special education and more often than not worked by 
imitating the worst models. Therefore, it is a mistake to believe that the number 
of professional journalists has increased significantly during the past years. 
It would be more precise to simply say that the number of people working in the 
media has increased with the birth of new publications and broadcast stations. 
Taking the argument of media quality further, it is worth noting the poor man­
agement of Lithuanian Radio and Television (LRT). As has been the case with 
most former Soviet media firms, the most striking feature of the public broad­
caster is the degree of continuity in the system. Although the name of the station 
was changed from governmental television to national and then to public, in the 
essence the old organisational structure remained unchanged (Juraite, 1999). 
Under such conditions, the failure of the functioning of the structure was much 
worse than that of media content. The public broadcaster simply adopted the 
state-subsidised pattern of functioning and declared its responsibility as educat­
ing and informing the national audience. Concerning professional training, the 
image of the public broadcaster as a school of journalism has remained strong. It 
was believed that young journalists could learn the skills of the profession only 
under the supervision of the experienced professionals who worked for LRT. 
However, higher salaries in the new commercial stations that were expanding 
rapidly were a strong temptation to many young journalists who fled from the 
public broadcaster for the other stations. Holding 12% of the Lithuanian televi­
sion market, LRT fell into grave financial difficulty in January 2000. Because of 
large debts and frozen bank accounts, the station was forced to suspend many of 
its television programmes as well as broadcasts from its two radio stations, 
Radio 2 (culture and education) and Radio 3 (classical music and jazz). In 2001, 
the debate on the role and functions of the public broadcaster continued. 
Although the company has a new managing director, the station's financial loss­
es have reached USD 5 million while company staff amounts to 1,200 (over­
staffed by one third, according to foreign experts). However, some radical 
changes in structure are on the way: in the autumn of 2001, the company adopt­
ed a new market-oriented producer system, and radical social reforms are being 
implemented (the station is planning to lay off 200 journalists and technicians). 
Licence fees will be introduced in 2002. 
This case shows that the quality of the media and the existence of general pro­
fessional standards (such as professionalism in reporting, news writing, or man­
aging a media firm) are affected by a number of factors. At present, Lithuanian 
media gives the impression of a watchdog of society that "barks" at anything and 
functions as an unlimited power; the Fourth Estate. The worst thing about the 
real situation is that there is no general awareness of what the Fourth Estate 
should represent, with journalists believing criticism is their only responsibility. 
The most dangerous path of the watchdog role of the media is that the sudden 
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growth of journalistic power may be easily misused, thus turning the media into 
a bearer of sensationalism, political gossip, superficial attitudes and banality. 
Journalists, however, have a trusted institution to protect themselves: the pub­
lic polls. The polls often indicate the high confidence that Lithuanians continue 
to show towards the media. This confidence is high indeed. Compared to that of 
other institutions, the Lithuanian media has always been near the top of the list 
(63.7% in the public poll of June 2001). It was only surpassed by the Church 
(64.7%), while the other institutions earned less public confidence the president 
(50.0%), the Lithuanian bank (43.2%), Lithuanian army (42.2%), the government 
(17.5%), the legal system (15.2%), commercial banks (12.3%), Parliament (12%) 
and political parties (6.8%). 
Through the entire period of transition, from 1987 to the present, the Lithuan­
ian media was rated in public confidence either first or second (after the Church) 
with a variation from 59% to 72%. Although the trust rates are striking, the inter­
pretation can be twofold. On the one hand, the public trust of the media shows 
that society is highly politicised. Such a process of political maturation, of the 
public in particular, encourages the media to function as a watchdog, expecting 
it to give prompt reports on various political actions, and this request is fully sat­
isfied by the media. On the other hand, the enduring high confidence of the pub­
lic in media can be a symptom of the public's failure to be critical. 
Although about two thirds of the audience respect the media in Lithuania, 
there are risks that an uncritical audience will not contribute to the further matu­
ration of the media. Therefore, the situation in the country is rather dubious. On 
the one hand, the media has developed its role. The function of the media as a 
"public eye" shows that the public assigns high symbolic power to the media. 
This results partly because, institutionally speaking, the media, as well as the 
Church, is not directly responsible for economic difficulties, lost hopes and other 
kinds of disappointments. On the other hand, because of its symbolic function 
and high public confidence, the media does not receive demands that would be 
normal for its own maturation. 
2.3. Legal regulation 
High public confidence in the media is one indicator (among many others) that 
after a decade of independence, Lithuanian society is still undergoing a rapid 
process of démocratisation, and the media takes an active role in this process. 
Scholars argue that if freedom of expression were to be a reality in a new state, 
then it is necessary that it should be preserved in a properly established frame­
work of legal regulations. 
The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania has several articles that deal with 
the freedom of expression in the mass media. Article 25 says that Lithuanian peo­
ple are free to obtain, share and express information and ideas, and this right can­
not be restricted "in any way other than as established by law, when it is neces­
sary for the safeguard of the health, honour and dignity, private life, or morals of 
a person or for the protection of constitutional order." Article 44 states: "The 
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censorship of mass media shall be prohibited by law. The state, political parties 
and public organisations and other institutions or persons may not monopolise 
the means of mass media." 
Apart from the Constitution, the media is regulated by the Mass Media Law. 
Adopted in 1996, the Law regulates both print and electronic media sectors. The 
essence of the Law is that journalists are to observe the provisions of the Code of 
Conduct, and that an Ethics Commission must be set up which will give recom­
mendations to the Parliament on the candidacy of the Inspector of Journalist 
Ethics (Ombudsman). The Ethics Commission consists of 12 members that are 
appointed for three years by different civil organisations — the Human Rights 
Centre of Lithuania, the Lithuanian Psychiatrists' Association, the Lithuanian 
Bishops' Conference, the Lithuanian Association of Periodical Press Publishers, 
the Lithuanian Radio and Television Association, the Lithuanian Cable Television 
Association, the Regional Television Association, the Lithuanian Journalists' 
Union, the Lithuanian Society of Journalists, the Lithuanian Centre of Journalism, 
Lithuanian National Radio and Television, and the Lithuanian Branch of the 
International Association of Advertising. The Commission grants the media the 
freedom of self-regulation: when a journalist or media outlet is the subject of 
a complaint from an individual or an organisation, the ethics inspector weighs 
the nature of the complaint, basing his judgement on the 63-item Code of Ethics. 
The inspector may reject the complaint or he may call on the editors or owners of 
the media organisation either to make a retraction or offer the wronged party 
a chance to respond. If the media organisation refuses to do this, the case pro­
ceeds to the full Ethics Commission, which will make a final decision with which 
the media organisation must comply. Although this body protects media freedom 
without applying direct pressure, the decision on self-regulation results in 
a twofold struggle; it implements the principles of free expression and of media 
freedom, while also establishing an inclination to protect the public from unde-
sired influences. 
The Lithuanian media have many possibilities for manipulation while mediat­
ing in the public discourse, but the means to prevent them from drifting into mal­
practice are scarce. There were cases where the media violated the Code on 
a daily basis, but such violations rarely lead to sanctions because the Press Coun­
cil and the Ombudsman did not examine the violations on their own initiative -
they only examined those cases in which that they actually received complaints. 
This is why the Lithuanian mass media not only exercise their power as a watch­
dog, but also as "the Fourth Estate." Furthermore, according to Tapinas (2000), 
some media practitioners apparently interpret the transfer of control as an invi­
tation to unrestrained and yellow journalism. The obvious result of such power 
is that journalistic conduct does not meet the requirements of the Code. 
At the beginning of 2000, the government (the coalition of the right-of-centre 
cabinet of the Conservatives and the Christian-Democratic Party) was ready to 
reconsider the full self-regulative right of the media and made a proposal to intro­
duce much stronger protection for the freedom of expression and the freedom of 
information. As a mean of preventing undesirable content and corruption, the 
Parliament proposed the so-called "Media Protection Commission," a group of 
non-media personnel, to oversee and uphold the free press standards. This 
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attempt was followed by a number of protests, and journalists objected to the 
proposed new institution of mass media control that would have been financed 
from the state budget. The protesters believed that acceptance of the proposal for 
mass media control would have led to changes in other areas of legislation (film 
censorship, etc.). Due to the number of protests, the proposal was eventually 
rejected and the self-regulative right of the press was not reconsidered. 
This example gives a picture of the process that is called the "Italianisation of 
the media" (Splichal, 1994), where different political parties tend to define the 
media as their political battleground. Although the major intention of the pro­
posal was to control the moral aspects of media content (to reduce the unrestrict­
ed sexism and negativism in the media), the form of how this was to be achieved 
coincided with direct control of media content. 
3. Uses and misuses of the Internet 
The first network of computers of governmental and educational institutions in 
Lithuania, LITNET, was established in 1991. By 1994 it had become a full mem­
ber of the Internet. In 1995 various institutions, organisations and commercial 
companies started spreading information through Web homepages. In 1996 two 
electronic periodicals started in Lithuania, and in 2001 this number had increased 
to 138 (Sarlauskiene, 2001). Among these, 33 items are electronic newspapers, 25 
electronic magazines, and 64 are news portals offering news, television sched­
ules, thematic archives and chats, as well as providing other interactive services. 
The rest are science publications and news bulletins. 
A few years ago the Internet was considered to be a phenomenon of interest 
only to specific audiences, either in the telecommunications business or some 
particular academic groups. Increasing Internet access has generated yet another 
plethora of interests: people started talking about the moral dilemmas of the new 
medium. According to contemporary Lithuanian language corpus, the word 
"Internet" is used relatively often in official as well as in colloquial Lithuanian. 
Since 1995, the term "Internet" was mentioned 372 times in two national news­
papers (Lietuvos rytas and Kauno diena). The most frequent Internet collocates are 
with nouns describing actors (e.g., user, client, buyer), actions (e.g., service, 
expansion, chat), functionality (e.g., channel, connection, speed, data base), 
places (e.g., café, class, page, world) and dilemma (e.g., illness, problem, sex). 
This analysis shows that the word "Internet" is most frequently used with terms 
describing services. 
Witnessing the origins and enduring transformations of the national online 
media is both an interesting and a challenging process. It is attractive because of 
the new media's potential. It is challenging because of internal and external ten­
sions. The tension between tradition and innovation is most evident in electron­
ic publications of traditional newspapers. Should traditional newspapers move 
online and if so, how? How should fact and opinion be separated on the World 
Wide Web? Should electronic newspapers' staff edit commentaries sent by their 
readers? Who is responsible for the online content? 
122 Lithuanian Media: A Question of Change 
The rapid growth of the electronic portals manifests yet another tension - the 
tension between the national characteristics of news writing and global media 
fashions. Who is the audience of news portals? What is the role of regional news? 
Will the local news disappear because of international readers? 
At the beginning of 2001, a survey from SIC Gallup Media found that 10% of 
Lithuanians used the Internet at least once a month (Figure 3.1). Statistics indicate 
that the Internet is most popular among Lithuanians aged 15-54 who make up 
43.5% of the nation's users. Those least likely to use the Internet are aged 60-74, 
who account for just 6% of Lithuania's online population. Over a quarter of the 
total online population are users aged 25-34. According to the study results, 15% 
of city inhabitants used the Internet, and only 4.9% of Internet users live in the 
countryside and small towns. The largest share (30.9%) among Internet users are 
educated managers and professionals. The Internet is mainly accessed at work 
places (54.3%), and only one third of respondents use the Internet at home. When 
questioned about the purpose of Internet usage, respondents indicated such pur­
poses as a deliberate search for information (over 50%), work information search 
(40%), e-mail (34%), educational information search (25%), reading Lithuanian 
periodicals (20%), browsing without clear purpose (15%), play games (12%), chat 
(10%), read non-Lithuanian periodicals (8%), music listening or downloading 
(7%), Internet banking (4%), TV programmes (2%) and radio listening (2%). 
Although in recent years the Internet usage numbers have significantly 
increased, many important questions are unanswered and conceptions still 
unclear. What is the speed of development of the Lithuanian Internet? How wide 
is the Lithuanian online panorama? What do the traditional mass media think of 
the Internet? 
3.1. Trends of online media development 
Although newspapers, radio and television are doing fairly well economically, 
the arrival of the Internet has challenged the traditionally dominant position of 
the mainstream media (Balcytiene, 2000b). As a response to a rapidly changing 
situation, the largest national newspapers were the first to establish an online 
presence. Radio and broadcast companies joined the Internet later. 
Online editions of traditional newspapers illustrate the online dynamics (Table 
3.1). Five national dailies presently compete for audience attention in Lithuania: 
Lietuvos rytas, Respublika, Kauno diena, Lietuvos žinios and to some extent the busi­
ness paper Verslo žinios. 
The number of daily visits by original users to the newspapers' Internet edi­
tions varies from several hundred to several thousand. The website of the news­
paper Lietuvos rytas attracts the highest number of users, which averages 35,000 
readers per day. According to the editors, a noteworthy share of the online audi­
ence comes from Lithuanians living abroad. Traffic is most intensive during the 
weekdays, and drops significantly on the weekends. This is because only the Sat­
urday edition of the paper is published on the website during the weekend. 
Lithuanian Media: A Question of Change 123 
Figure 3.1. Internet audience reach in Lithuania, 2000-2001 (%) 
I I Weekly reach 
I Monthly reach 
I 6-month reach 
Source: 
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Online versions of monthlies - women's and general interest magazines - do 
not suggest economically successful applications either. The websites publish 
selected texts and add a few interactive features, but this is not sufficient to attract 
substantial reader traffic. 
Contemporary developments of online newspapers in neighbouring countries 
(in Scandinavian countries as well as in Estonia) suggest that to become success­
ful, the online newspaper has to make maximum use of the Internet's potential. 
E-mail, mobile phone services, radio and TV webcasts, database information 
services, community networks and other services continue to evolve, and the 
newspaper websites should adopt them as they become popular. 
Lithuanian newspaper firms have already made a first step by creating their 
websites with multiple media services. Many offer e-mail and other services such 
as fast search and rich information archives. The typical Lithuanian online news­
paper reproduces traditional paper texts and provides a few additional interac­
tive features such as the possibility for readers to respond via e-mail or to search 
archives. Lietuvos rytas and Verslo žinios (Business News) are the online leaders in 
providing the most advanced interactive facilities. Verslo žinios also uses e-mail 
services to send the hottest news to registered readers. 
It took a few years for broadcast companies to make themselves known on the 
Internet. If newspapers' websites are entirely autonomous, the broadcast compa­
nies seek interconnections with external Internet publications. For example, the 
commercial television station BTV is interconnected with the commercial radio 
site Ziniu radijas (News Radio); the commercial radio M-l's website is intercon­
nected with news portal Sala; and the TV3 television site has a link to the "TV" 
television portal, which provides a direct link to news agency BNS (Baltic News 
Service). 
No matter when and how the traditional media firms have made themselves 
known on the Internet, several drawbacks are evident in their experiments. It 
seems that a media firm thinks of a traditional newspaper and an electronic peri­
odical as two distinct services provided by the same company. The inevitable 
convergence of multiple media formats suggests the trend for further integration 
of the online service with the newspaper company itself. Today, in most cases, 
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editorial and content activities are still specialised by media. The established 
ways of thinking in traditional media terms, existing newsroom cultures and edi­
torial staff skills are not sufficient to take advantage of the new systems. Maga­
zines and broadcast media's online sites are no more far-reaching than newspa­
per websites. Most of the magazines (except Cosmopolitan and to some extent the 
general interest weekly Veidas) use their websites to publish selected texts from 
printed publications; therefore, the reader traffic is practically nonexistent. Radio 
and television websites are treated primarily as virtual bulletin boards with some 
extra features, such as the online broadcast of radio or television programmes. 
Apart from the traditional media's experiments, several unique electronic peri­
odicals have received considerable attention by the Internet users. Among the top 
five websites of Lithuanian origin are three sites called news portals: Delfi, Omni-
tel, and Takas. Eleven unique periodicals currently fall into the category of news 
portal, which provides selected news on daily affairs. 
In 2000 the Estonian telecommunications company MicroLink established a 
Lithuanian news portal: Delfi.lt. For some time, Delfi has been the first and the 
only professional news portal, and soon achieved an average of 20,000 visits per 
day. In the autumn of 2001, Delfi claimed an average of 140,000 page views. The 
high reader traffic ensures that Delfi is among the top five Internet information 
resources in Lithuania. Delfi republishes selected texts from several of the largest 
newspapers and newswire services (it has an agreement with BNS). A significant 
part of Delfi's texts comes from tabloid newspapers such as Lietuvos žinios and 
VL: Vakaro žinios (the tabloid newspaper for the Vilnius region). The quality week­
ly Veidas adds its own share towards making Delfi an attractive discussion forum 
- two to three short texts written by Veidas' journalists are published online daily. 
Delfi has sister portals in Latvia and Estonia. Despite the intensive reader traffic, 
the Lithuanian branch is not able yet to make a profit. 
Although Delfi claims that it has no rivals in the online media field, there are 
storm clouds on the horizon for the online publisher. In the autumn of 2001, three 
new online projects were launched by different companies: the commercial radio 
station M-l was first, introducing the news portal Sala.lt; the telecommunications 
company Omnitel followed with a new concept of an integrated portal, Omni.lt; 
and the quality business newspaper Verslo žinios has reshaped its older Internet 
publication to better serve the interests of the business community (the latter 
project is a joint production of the newspaper and the mobile telecommunications 
company Bite). 
The other most popular news portals provide a combined service - news and 
video clips of television programmes. TVnet.lt was launched in August 2000. In 
December 2000, the pan-Baltic IT company Tilde Group launched the portal 
"TV," which is dedicated entirely to television. Both portals have sister portals in 
Latvia and Estonia. In the summer of 2001, the TV portal has had an average of 
500 users per day. This number significantly increases during the autumn-win­
ter-spring seasons and it sometimes reaches one thousand original users. TV por­
tal usage increases during live television shows. Bearing in mind that Internet tel­
evision service requires a high-speed connection, the current access numbers are 
fairly satisfactory. The highest numbers of users are expected in the afternoon 
hours between 11 a.m. and 4 p.m., and in the late evening hours when users from 
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abroad (mostly from the U.S.) connect to the portal. The TV portal provides an 
average of thirty television programmes, all of them updated daily. The focus is 
on video material; texts are scarce, only as much as it is required to introduce the 
television programme. Aside from webcasting the television programmes, the TV 
portal runs two exclusive projects - one with the cinema theatre "Lietuva," and 
with the BNS news agency. The most popular programmes are still the ones 
which are most often viewed on traditional television: the political satire pro­
gramme Dviracio zynios (LNK commercial television), a news and entertainment 
programme Be tabu (TV3 commercial television), and a television documentary 
project between TV3 and the national daily Lietuvos rytas called Lietuvos ryto tele-
vizija. It has been noticed, however, that some programmes that are not so popu­
lar among regular television viewers are used increasingly on the Net. The aver­
age user of the TV portal is male, educated, with a higher-than-average income, 
and who also connects to the site in working hours, which provokes a hypothe­
sis that the average user works in the telecommunications business. The portal 
TVnet attracts approximately 700 original users per day, but its editors claim that 
their users are mature and better educated than, for example, users of Delfi. 
TVnet publishes original texts as well as providing archives of television pro­
grammes. Moreover, TVnet runs several original satellite websites: F-l (the For-
mula-1 racing website), a website of the Eurovision competition, and a site of 
Lithuanian men's basketball league. 
The Takas, Banga and Omnitel portals are dedicated mostly to telecommunica­
tions news, as is Hot. The other portals have narrow fields of specialisation: the 
portal Mama attracts young mothers, E-biz publishes business news and Rinko-
dara deals with public relations issues. 
3.2. Problems and prospects for online media 
Scholars define several qualities of the Internet media that empower the public to 
communicate in entirely new ways. Unique characteristics are grouped into sev­
eral concepts, each starting with the letter "c": content and convergence, canni-
balisation and commercialisation, consumerism and commodification. 
The most obvious innovation is the change in the cycles of production, deliv­
ery and usage of digital information (Slevin, 1999). In contrast to the traditional 
mass media, the Internet allows the online distribution of content that is enriched 
by the new medium's capacity for interactivity and personalisation. Thus, the 
most obvious characteristic of online publication is the radical change in its for­
mat and content. The traditional media is able to offer limited possibilities of 
working with diverse mediums: in print publications one sees texts and illustra­
tions; in television there are sounds and moving images. The Internet is an obvi­
ous leader in competing with the traditional media because all mediums - texts, 
sounds, images, videos and animations - converge due to the digital nature of the 
information, making all information available in a user-preferred fashion. Digi-
talisation leads to new forms of publishing: information reaches the public in a 
bewildering number of ways - newspapers, mobile telephones, and radio and 
television publish their information on the Web that appears on computer 
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screens. Indeed, many acknowledge that the immediacy of news distribution and 
the potential for interactivity make it an attractive news service (Deuze, 1997; 
Trench, 1997). 
Bearing in mind such characteristics, it seems safe to assume that online pub­
lishing could easily be profitable. The costs of digital production and distribution 
are low compared with the costs of print production. Also, there is a constant 
growth in the potential online audience. Statistics show that in Lithuania in 1999, 
only 5% of the audience used the Internet weekly. In two years, in the summer of 
2001, these numbers had rapidly increased to 10.7%. 
Despite the positive claims, current experience provides several cautions. No 
matter how many qualitatively new features the new medium offers or how 
many traditional media firms have moved online, few Lithuanian projects claim 
to be making a profit from their online services. This is vividly indicated in one 
of the recent studies researching the business models of online media (Sabaite, 
2001). Of the five largest Lithuanian national newspapers, only one paper has 
admitted to making a profit online. This is the business daily Verslo žinios, which 
publishes five times per week and has been active online since 1998. Other tradi­
tional newspapers' online experiments may be considered to be an experiments 
en vogue. It seems that their philosophy may be described as: "to be respected, the 
online presence is inevitable, sadly, but still loss-making." 
As a matter of fact, this situation is nothing new - the Web is a challenging 
environment, and few traditional media firms are competent enough to deal with 
its unique qualities and to make use of its unique requirements. As a marketing 
medium, the Web combines elements from different traditional media formats. It 
offers a relatively short-term exposure along with the concise information content 
and impact of the broadcast media, as well as the long-term exposure with high 
information content of the print media. One may assume that because of this 
challenge the online media panorama is rather ordinary. Some electronic news­
papers re-publish the traditional paper's texts (Kauno diena), others add a few 
banner advertisements (Lietuvos žinios) or give away entirely its unique content 
such as texts and classifieds (Lietuvos rytas). 
Unrestricted delivery of the traditional newspaper's information on the Web 
has its own dangers. In such conditions, the traditional newspaper may slowly 
turn into a cannibal, eating its own market. This danger exists because of the 
business model used. Traditional newspapers operate in two markets - the mar­
ket of advertisers and the market of readers. When reader interest declines, the 
newspaper's revenue from advertising suffers. If the audience moves to reading 
texts online, they stop subscribing to paper versions, and thus the newspaper's 
circulation declines and revenue suffers. Such is the history of Lietuvos rytas. The 
newspaper claims today that in average 35,000 readers read the paper on the 
Web. The newspaper's circulation numbers have significantly decreased in the 
last few years: from 75,000 printed copies in 1998 to 49,000 in 2001. 
The situation with the electronic media - those online periodicals that do not 
have conventional paper publications - is entirely different. The character of 
online news varies depending upon whether the online news provider is an 
Internet-original source, the product of a broadcast, or the product of print 
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media. Internet-original sources such as 5ci Online are the most creative in their 
use of new media storytelling tools. Different degrees of interactivity, content cus­
tomisation, and multiple media formats permit news reports to provide layers of 
content that can include diverse storytelling techniques with or without audio or 
video (TVnet, TV). Moreover, the electronic media are not concerned with pro­
tecting any existing area monopoly. In contrast, online information offerings pub­
lished by print or broadcast media firms often proceed rather cautiously on the 
Internet because they do not want to give away their content for free (Respublika). 
The commercial character is yet another feature which describes an electronic 
publication. Only a few Internet sites are able to sell their content. Indeed, the 
information has to be of tremendous value for users to pay for the access. Even 
internationally known companies are seldom able to charge for access to their 
content. The reason for this situation is that so much information is published on 
the Internet for free, and the numbers of sites tend to grow each day. 
But is the information on offer as free as it seems? What kinds of business mod­
els do the electronic periodicals use to make themselves successful? With more 
users accessing the Internet, the users "buy" information with their attention, 
focussing it on advertisements, offerings, e-mail messages and intermercials 
(interactive commercials). This means that because of the "all content for free on 
the Web" philosophy, the Internet has turned the user into a valuable commodi­
ty. The new media firms use various techniques to get to know more about their 
readers. If readers provide data about their preferences and interests, they may 
get more privileges. They may be rewarded by membership in a "readers' club," 
free individualised information, or get access to professionally selected news 
archives (Verslo žinios). As more information becomes available than anyone 
could possibly need or absorb, the problem is no longer getting the message out, 
but keeping the attention of the customer. With an overload of information, 
access to the user becomes a new and valuable commodity. It is expected that 
with dropping costs of distribution, the battle for access to the user will be 
increasingly severe. Luckily, it may lead to a more professional content. 
As much as it concerns patterns of information consumption, early research has 
concentrated on the question of whether there is a sustainable demand for online 
media. Most questions also depend on the "critical mass" of potential consumers. 
The Lithuanian Internet audience appears to be rather small - it has overcome the 
critical mass level of 10% and is securely climbing up towards more intensive 
usage. Nevertheless, the Internet usage has revealed several patterns which may 
indicate changes in previously established ways of consuming traditional media: 
reading newspapers in the morning, watching television with the family or lis­
tening to the radio with friends. 
Novel consumption patterns have to be taken into consideration: whether the 
Internet will pull away people from newspapers and television is yet unknown. 
The Internet has mixed patterns of news consumption. Studies show that news is 
being read throughout the entire day - sometimes accessed from work, other 
times from home (Cepulkauskaite, 2000). 
In the near future, the competition for user attention will increase rapidly. The 
tendency is clear - traditional media rates are decreasing, while Internet usage is 
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increasing. Since the arrival of the Internet in 1995, the circulation numbers of 
Lithuanian newspapers have significantly decreased, some of them even twofold. 
Internet usage of the online publications, however, is increasing daily. It is rather 
doubtful that those people who read the paper would also read the same news 
on the website (on those sites where only identical texts to the print copy are 
offered). Therefore, newspapers must use both mediums (print and electronic) to 
attract readers, but it is necessary to define each medium's functions. Statistics 
from Scandinavian countries show that the numbers of Internet users are level­
ling off: when the upper critical mass is reached (approximately 70% of users of 
the active population), some readers stick to online editions, others stay loyal to 
print papers, but the largest group of people switch between the traditional and 
virtual mediums. 
As with any achievement, the effect is never one-sided. Sometimes new tech­
nology gives more (freedom, democracy, self-expressiveness) than it takes. Other 
times it requires more from users than it initially provides in advantages; there­
fore, the users have to face a new set of dilemmas. 
The Internet demonstrates the best and the worst characteristics of an emerg­
ing culture. The immediacy of the medium and the need to attract users may be 
a reason for a different kind of reporting. The model of online publishing brings 
some of the forces of commercial television to all of the content publishers: the 
drive to attract audiences, the short attention span of readers, the need to produce 
captivating material. According to Postman (1985), the television has taught an 
essential lesson: whoever wants attention needs to be as direct as possible, or 
strange, or odd or different - as long as the message stands out. Anecdotes get 
more attention than analyses. Sensationalism is less the consequence of bad taste 
than the need to shake up tired consumers. 
It is easy to notice that these practices flourish on the Internet. Are online sites 
responsible legally or ethically for the content of the interactive elements of their 
websites? With the traditional media, one way to protect editorial independence 
has been through voluntary regulation. New questions arise over how the regu­
lations apply to online context. 
The ethical challenges of digital publishing deal with both the technical 
advancements of new media and moral dilemmas. In most cases these are inter­
twined. For example, the speed of technology pushes the journalist to make an 
immediate decision of what to publish and what not to publish, to take responsi­
bility for information and links to other sites. Defining a link from one's home­
page to external information is especially problematic: it requires only seconds to 
change innocent data on the external site into text that contains libellous, racist, 
and otherwise illegal material. Journalists therefore have to think twice before 
including hypertext links in their reports. The dilemmas that journalists and edi­
tors face show that journalistic codes of conduct have to be edited and new 
options cn Internet behaviour must be added. For example, in Norway, some 
options of the code of journalistic conduct were modified to emphasize that the 
online newspaper is responsible for an initial link to an external site, but it takes 
no obligations and responsibility for follow-on links. 
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The overview of online media development in Lithuania may be summarised 
into a thesis and a policy question. The thesis describes the state-of-the art situa­
tion and deals with the traditional media's experiments on the Web. The policy 
highlights what the online media has ignored so far. 
The fear of loosing readers is the major explanation of why traditional media 
firms are hesitant to move online. Giving away their content for free, the elec­
tronic newspapers risk losing their main revenue generators and run the risk of 
becoming less profitable. Unexpected competitors in the form of news portals 
(Delfi, 5ci Online, TVnet) now fight in the same arena for users' attentions and the 
limited advertising money available. 
The Internet is yet another competition area for traditional newspapers. New 
services such as interactive features, guides to information sources and commu­
nity building are new to the newspapers. Also, the continuous production cycle 
of the Internet is a challenge that traditional newspapers are not always compe­
tent to deal with. 
Nevertheless, the future of the traditional press is bright. Contemporary stud­
ies indicate that although newspapers will loose a certain amount of their audi­
ence, there is no danger that newspapers will disappear. The press analysis has 
shown that readers do not simply want information, but they have certain expec­
tations of what can be found in a newspaper (Balcytiene, 2000a; Trench 1997). 
Newspapers have always been an inherent part of the community and readers 
expect some "natural" ties to connect various news stories there. In contrast, 
recent studies show that the Internet is becoming a news source in self-serving 
terms: people go online to satisfy their appetite for some specific news (finance, 
travel, leisure, weather forecasts, horoscopes, etc.). The online medium provides 
excellent means for this: it offers speed, interactivity and (literary) rich archives. 
In addition, the general public needs something else. Most news portals today 
provide news items collected from news agencies or other external Web 
resources. Although this is a well-timed reaction to what is happening, few read­
ers can satisfy their appetite with that. The public wants a professional view. In 
fact, there seems to be an unfilled niche on the Internet to provide timely, analyt­
ic examination of news. Online professional journalists can fulfil this need. 
Research in online reading shows that two things bring people together on the 
Web and make them loyal: geography and affinity (common hobbies and inter­
ests). The regional context of the working and living sphere provides a common 
anchor that makes it easier to launch interactive and lively services. Up until now, 
smaller groups with special interests have not been interesting to the major media 
in economic terms. But before moving to niche areas, the traditional newspapers 
must change their thinking from being present on the Web to becoming success­
ful on the Web (not only in terms of page visits, but also in terms of a financial 
return on investment). 
As a policy issue, contemporary online periodicals are in a transitional phase. 
Initially, the transition involves two distinct points - the point of departure and 
the imagined destination. The point of departure is well discussed and the con­
sequences are fairly transparent. Traditional newspaper firms have found them­
selves in a vicious circle. Because newspapers are afraid of losing readers and 
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extra money, they do not want to deliver their content on the Internet for free. If 
newspapers publish their content (texts and classifieds) on the Web, they end up 
cannibalising their own markets. The destination of electronic transition, howev­
er, is largely unclear. What kind of business models should online media use to 
make profit? How will the move to the Internet affect traditional newsroom 
structures? What kind of impact will new technologies have on professional 
journalism? 
It is well understood that commercial success on the Internet depends upon the 
readiness of the recipients to pay. The readiness will only exist if two major 
options are fulfilled: adequate and reasonable telecommunications prices, and 
reliable content that grabs the attention of the user. 
The first of the two requirements - a reliable Internet infrastructure - defines a 
geographic economy of the national Internet (Patelis, 2000). The geographic econ­
omy constitutes inequalities that determine not only who uses the Internet, but 
above all, the way in which the Internet is used. Not all connections to the Inter­
net cost the same or share the same speed. Not all subscriptions allow the same 
activity. Not all content has the same chance of being viewed. Therefore, geo­
graphic economy determines electronic activity. 
The other requirement - a qualitatively different online content - is no less 
important, but so far has been undervalued by the media firms. Lithuanian 
media firms think in terms of being present on the Internet, but not in terms of 
being successful. This is because the move to the Internet is a harsh period of 
transition for any established media firm. The introduction of new media ele­
ments requires adaptations, rearrangements and reconfigurations of existing 
organisational forms. Instead of switching smoothly from a printed version to a 
qualitatively different virtual publication, the media firm has to deal with sever­
al transformations, such as introducing new content, building new user commu­
nities and changing the newsroom structure. The arrival of the Internet has sud­
denly caught the majority of the traditional media firms unprepared to re-think 
and re-shape their fragile organisational structures. Today it seems that the online 
future of many media firms is being shaped by the pragmatics of the present. 
These pragmatics - finding resources to survive in the off-line world - may yet 
result in a resistance to devoting resources to the Internet. The outcome of such 
resistance is the general inexpressiveness of the Lithuanian online panorama. 
Summary 
The post-Communist transition is a subtle process that has certain distinct fea­
tures apart from those related to the multi-dimensional and complex transforma­
tion that has so far taken place. Although Lithuania has its own path of démoc­
ratisation, it seems impossible to separate this process from such transformations 
as: 
1) political stabilisation as indicated by the presence of democratic structures 
(political parties and elections); 
Lithuanian Media: A Question of Change 131 
2) dramatic and radical changes in the economic system (a shift from a planned 
economy to a free-market system); 
3) rapid stratification of society (with the winners and losers from the fast politi­
cal, economic and social changes); 
4) the fading of values due to increased consumerism. 
As mentioned repeatedly throughout this chapter, mass media plays a crucial 
role as an active socialising agent in the changing post-Communist society. Mass 
media has important political functions. All forms of media - newspapers, radio 
and television, the Internet - serve as channels for general information as well as 
arenas for public debate. Therefore, the mass media is an important agenda-set-
ter for big political issues and is considered to be a watchdog of democracy. The 
Internet publications also add their own share in bringing distinct public groups 
together. 
Through the different stages of transition, the social functions of the media 
have changed several times. In the first stage (1987-1990), the Lithuanian media 
performed the role of a mediator in the socio-cultural mobilisation. The second 
stage (1991-2001) involved the emancipation and maturation of the media 
through increased marketisation, concentration, commercialisation and customi­
sation. 
Looking at current media developments in Lithuania, as well as in other post-
Communist countries, a dual impression arises. On the one hand, after more than 
ten years of independence, people still find it difficult to adjust to the rapid 
growth and positive development of the media. On the other hand, they are dis­
appointed by increased consumerism (which is salient in the media's content, sat­
urated with sensationalism, negativism and sexism) and by vague standards of 
quality. 
The lack of a strong tradition of a free press and civil society has shown its 
results. After a first decade of transition, in Lithuania, as in many post-Commu­
nist societies, it is possible to talk about systemic changes that only affected some 
parts of society rather than immediately transforming the whole. Current media 
developments show that they are far from total transformation. Some develop­
ments are revolutionary. One radical reform is the transformation of the region's 
press into non-partisan instruments of civil society. Concerning public broad­
casting, the change is less far-reaching. Many signs of continuity from the previ­
ous regime are still present, and some hypothesise that the process of broadcast 
media reform may reflect the ongoing struggle to define the political culture in 
the region. 
The scarce online panorama (such as an underdeveloped Internet infrastruc­
ture, among other things) reflects that the traditional media are competing fierce­
ly for reader attention. Therefore, it is no wonder that the arrival of the Internet 
(with content on offer for free) is most commonly understood as a threat to the 
still fragile business model of the traditional media. During just a few years of a 
market economy, traditional newspapers were able to develop a sustainable busi­
ness model. This may be a reason why the traditional media is unfriendly and 
hesitant to accept the fact that cohabitation with the Internet is increasingly 
inevitable. 
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In summary, the magic words of Lithuania's transformation are liberalisation, 
privatisation and stabilisation. The year 2001 is marked with yet another word, 
"openness," meaning that the media has to acquire new functions for public 
socialisation in a new - market-driven - society. In order to become mature, jour­
nalism has to progress from a purely commercial and political endeavour into 
one that is societal in scope. 
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4. Development Trends of Public Television 
in Estonia: 1991-2001 
Hagi Shein 
Introduction 
The television landscape in Estonia has faced substantial changes since 1991, 
when Estonia again became an independent state. It is not only the penetration 
of different forms of television media that has substantially changed (see Table 23 
in Appendix). To paint a full picture of the evolution of the television sector one 
should take into consideration all the integrated parts of the television landscape. 
There is no doubt that all of them have passed an extensive period of consider­
able structural and conceptual changes. These changes have been influenced by 
the general political environment, the state of the Estonian economy, the structure 
of the TV market, the nature of media policies and implemented media legisla­
tion, the principles of administration and funding of television, as well as the 
social functions of TV programming, the content of the programmes and the pro­
fessional standards of broadcasting itself. 
The main aim of the following comments is to concentrate attention on the 
most decisive, often dramatic and controversial tendencies in the development of 
public broadcast television in Estonia during the last decade. Obviously one can 
find many similarities in patterns, challenges and problems which reflect the 
changes in the television sectors of other East-European and Baltic countries (see 
EBU 1993; Paulins & Liepna, 1998; Jacubowicz, 1998; Alisauskiene, Bajarunas & 
Sukyte, 1998; Audiovisual Eureka 2000). Most of the processes, trends and chal­
lenges the audio-visual sector is experiencing in Europe today - deregulation, 
privatisation, internationalisation, globalisation and the convergence of different 
media (Moragas Spa, 1999: 1) - are to a greater or lesser extent currently influ­
encing the broadcasting development in the Baltic States as well. In spite of that 
Estonian broadcasting has its own uniqueness and peculiarities. 
It should especially be underlined that the development of public broadcasting 
in Estonia cannot fully be described and understood in isolation from the devel­
opment of the Estonian television sector as a whole. Both sides of the dual model 
of the contemporary television landscape, public and private (commercial) tele­
vision, have been involved in a process of mutual influence and quite often of 
severe opposition. 
The development of public television also cannot be described as a continuous 
linear stream. The political, economic, legal, organisational and professional fac­
tors, which have influenced public broadcasting during the decade, have 
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emerged in different combinations with different intensities. The most significant 
factors have certainly been the solutions made by Estonian media legislators, in 
terms of economic policies and (de)regulation of the TV-market. We have made 
an attempt to reveal the key tendencies of alterations in public television in terms 
of their dynamics and moments of most decisive influence. Hopefully the reader 
will not be disturbed by the fact that this approach has led us to the descriptions 
of several processes in terms of their mutual relationships and overlapping dura­
tions. 
The last decade in the development of public TV-broadcasting in Estonia can be 
divided into four periods: 
• Period I: 1991-1994 - implementation of public remits on Estonian Television 
(ETV); 
• Period II: 1995-1997 - establishment of ETV as a public broadcaster; 
• Period III: 1998 - spring 2000 - rearrangement and unpredicted deep financial 
and organisational crisis of ETV; 
• Period IV: spring 2000-2001 - attempts at stabilisation and seeking new meth­
ods for further development of ETV. 
1. First period (1991-1994): 
Implementation of public broadcasting remits on ETV 
The first period of the development of public television in Estonia can be charac­
terised by the following features: 
• implementation of the principles of public broadcasting; 
• restructuring of the Soviet-formed TV landscape; 
• launch of commercial television; 
• emergence of serious opposing views and controversies concerning the dual 
TV-model; 
• legal regulation of public broadcasting - the Broadcasting Act. 
1.1. ETV's move towards the principles of public broadcasting 
The ideas and principles of public broadcasting were first introduced in Estonia 
in 1990 when it became possible for broadcast personnel to participate in Euro­
pean media discussions. The socialist countries' TV and Radio organisation, 
OIRT, of which ETV was a member, was drawing its final breath. The privatisa­
tion of newspapers in Estonia started in 1989. A new entity - Estonian Broad­
casting - was formed in 1990 to replace the Estonian SSR State TV and Radio 
Committee; on 1 October, ETV and Estonian Radio (ER) became two different 
organisations. The ETV statute from 1990 already laid down some of the pro­
gramme requirements for public broadcasting. 
After the Baltic States regained their independence in 1991, ETV actively 
entered into the accession process to join the European Broadcasting Union 
(EBU). Already on 3 July 1992 ETV and Estonian Radio had become associated 
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members of the EBU. ETV was admitted as a full member of the EBU from 1 Jan­
uary 1993. For a short period of time between 1990-1993, the main state broad­
caster, Estonian Television, was continuously modified to fulfil the general remits 
of a public broadcaster. 
The EBU defined public broadcasting first of all as a system of certain pro­
gramme obligations. The traditional public broadcasting requirements consisted 
of ensuring programme accessibility for the majority of the population, pro­
gramme quality and variety, objectiveness and balance, considering the majori­
ty's and minorities' interests, and taking a dominant share of one's own pro­
gramme production. The emphasis was put on support of local languages, cul­
tures and national identities, and openness (EBU 1992: 3). ETV's transition peri­
od from Soviet television to a European public broadcasting organisation can be 
characterised by the implementation of these principles. New programme 
requirements were set up while the obligations to maintain editorial independ­
ence, objectivity and impartiality of the programming, and to cover controversial 
political, economical and cultural issues, were introduced (Šein, 1992). 
The process itself was somewhat controversial. The sudden freedom enhanced 
ETV's strongest professional aspects but at the same time revealed its weakness­
es as well. It was time to redefine both political and professional values, and it 
just could not take place very smoothly. The lack of necessary financial means, 
and, the need, whatever it took, to hold onto a majority audience, and to move 
ahead the emerging private television that appealed first of all to mass tastes, 
coupled with an insufficient understanding of the nature of public TV program­
ming, created insecurity and forced commercial tendencies in public broadcast­
ing in the first-stage development. The intensive selling of foreign TV commer­
cials that started at that time raised further controversies. 
In spite of that, the programme structure and professional level of ETV corre­
sponded already in 1993-1995 to the main requirements of public broadcasting 
programming (see Table 4.4 and Figure 4.1). This period is also marked by draft­
ing the Broadcasting Act, which started in 1993 and which led in the middle of 
1994 to the legal establishment of public broadcasting television in Estonia. 
Alongside ETV's turn to public broadcasting remits, the TV landscape was fac­
ing considerable changes brought by the restructuring of the TV landscape, 
emerging private terrestrial and cable television and the growth of the advertis­
ing market (see Tables 4.1 and 4.3). 
1.2. From monopoly to open media competition 
- emerging of commercial television (1992-1994) 
Estonia has turned from a Soviet country into an independent democratic state 
with a free market economy. The audio-visual sector mirrored this process of 
shifting from monopolies to open competition. "The former communist ideology 
was replaced by freedom of speech and the opportunity to choose among com­
peting media channels." (Veskimägi & Susi, 1996: 136). As ETV turned to the 
public broadcaster model, the first private television broadcasting firms were 
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launched. In Estonia commercial television has been operating since 1992. The 
launch of the first private TV firms was speeded up by a very fast-growing adver­
tising market (see Table 4.3) and was based on former professional experience in 
this field. Reklaamitelevisioon (Advertising Television, RTV), which separated 
from ETV, and BED Reklaamiklubi (Advertising Club), which was formed out of 
a well-known advertising company started to broadcast on ETV's channel in 
1992. Foreign investors backed the launch of Estonian Christian Television. 
Another decisive reason for this active formation of private TV organisations 
was the appearance of free transmission networks and the Broadcast Transmis­
sion Centre's economic interest to exploit those. During the Soviet period Estonia 
had three terrestrial television networks, which were transmitting two TV pro­
grammes from Moscow - Ostankino and Russian TV, and one from St. Peters­
burg. Ostankino and Russian TV were nationwide channels while Sankt-Peters-
burg TV was seen in Tallinn and Northeast of Estonia. During 1993-1994 the 
Estonian government gradually fazed out the transmission of Russian television 
channels and the Ministry of Culture started to distribute the available frequen­
cies. The new private broadcasters got temporary licences to disseminate their 
programmes on these free frequencies. 
The general approach of Estonian media policies and politicians at the begin­
ning of 1990 can be characterised as very open and liberal. The television market 
was gradually opened to domestic operators in 1992-1994, following the end of 
the retransmission of the former Soviet channels through Estonian transmitter's 
networks. Although a shortage of resources would have been expected, most of 
the private firms that applied for TV broadcasting licences in fact received them. 
Altogether 9 private television firms received licences and started their broadcast 
operations - Estonian Christian Television, Alo TV, Reklaamitelevisioon (RTV), 
AS Eesti Video (further EVTV), AS Taska (Kanal 2), Narva Kommertstelevisioon, 
AS BED Reklaamiklubi, AS Orsent, Eesti Sõltumatu Televisiooni AS (TV1) and 
Tipp TV. Most of them were launched by Estonian firms, based on Estonian finan­
cial resources and began recruiting broadcasting professionals mainly from 
Estonian Television, which had about 1,000 employees at the beginning of the 
decade. As a result, a large number of television broadcasters emerged in the 
1990s (see Table 4.1). 
1.3. Peculiar processes 
of Estonian television market reconstruction: "TV wars" (1993-1994) 
Since the production and transmission of the programming is expensive, the 
competition to grasp revenues in TV marketplaces became tough. It took some 
years to recognise that the limited TV market in Estonia could not sustain all 
those who had begun their TV businesses. The distribution and redistribution of 
terrestrial transmitters and available frequencies, and the fight for more 
favourable positions among the private channels, led to a ruthless rivalry 
between the three strongest private operators - RTV, Eesti Video and AS Taska, 
a situation which the press pertinently labelled as "TV wars". 
Table 4.1. Development of television landscape in Estonia, 1993-2000 
1993 1 1994 2 1995 3 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Broadcasting stations 8 7 9 7 7 7 7 5 
Public 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Private 7 6 8 6 6 6 6 4 
National 1 1 1 2 3 4 4 4 
Regional 4 3 5 2 1 1 1 -
Local 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 
Total broadcasting hours 3,315 6,457 8,800 8,767 20,640 23,489 25,311 32,463 
in Estonian (%) 71.3 87.9 89.5 93.0 87.7 92.5 95.9 98.9 
in Russian (%) 12.9 7.9 12.0 10.8 6.6 5.6 8.5 4.1 
Share of advertising 11.6 4.5 3.2 5.1 19.1 4.8 9.6 6.6 
Text-TV (hours) 4,935 2,741 12,456 13,634 21,393 15,695 10,510 15,518 
Total TV expenditure (thousands EEK) 50,616 124,124 136,812 178,962 254,169 396,224 399,652 391,989 
Total adspend (thousands EEK) 14,039 43,442 37,720 71,735 120,478 172,681 143,415 164,302 
Foreign terrestrial channels na na na 6 6 7 7 7 
Number of employees na na 892 857 829 754 814 545 
Programme staff na na 327 310 299 307 319 200 
Technical staff na na 363 317 315 291 285 197 
1 In 1993 3 of 8 active broadcasters (EVTV, RTV and Tartu TV) did not submit the report. 
2 In 1994 1 of 7 active broadcasters (Tartu TV) did not submit the report. 
3 In 1995 2 of 7 active broadcasters (EVTV and RTV) did not submit the report. Sources: Estonian Statistical Office, ETV, EBU, BMF 
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Table 4.2. Income and expenditures of TV broadcasters in Estonia, 1992-2000 
All TV-broadcasters 1992 1993 1 1994 2 1995 3 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Total income 21,221 48,225 108,517 123,905 163,388 228,197 353,369 288,049 298,141 
% of state financing 73.5 39.6 38.5 45.8 41.3 31.1 23.0 33.0 30.2 
% of ad revenues 6.8 29.1 40.0 30.4 43.9 52.8 48.9 50.0 55.1 
Expenditures 20,554 50,616 12,4124 136,812 178,962 254,169 396,224 399,652 391,989 
Labour cost na na na na na 77,332 92,220 102,957 89,316 
Estonian Television 
Total income 21,221 38,241 80,503 99,427 113,900 136,881 143,281 124,221 154,409 
% of state financing 73.5 50.0 52.0 57.0 59.2 51.9 56.7 75.0 58.4 
% of ad revenues 6.8 17.4 25.2 28.1 33.5 38.0 30.7 4 7.8 25.9 
Expenditures 20,554 38,767 75,798 99,985 114,275 144,410 152,901 154,157 160,378 
Net result 667 -526 4,705 -558 
-375 
-7,529 -9,620 -29,936 
-5,969 
Labour cost na na na na na 60,011 66,075 62,997 55,641 
Private broadcasters 
Total income 
-
9,984 28,014 24,478 49,488 91,316 210,088 162,828 143,732 
From advertising 
-
7,365 23,132 9,792 33,526 68,489 128,581 133,781 124,339 
Expenditures 
-
11,848 48,326 36,827 64,687 109,759 243,323 245,495 231,611 
Net result 
-
na na na na -18,443 -33,235 -82,667 -87,879 
Labour cost 
-
na na na na 17,321 26,145 39,960 33,675 
Share of adspend 
ETV 
-
47.6 46.8 74.0 5 53.3 43.1 25.5 6.3 24.3 
Private television 
-
52.4 53.2 25.9 46.7 56.8 74.5 93.3 75.7 
1 In 1993 3 of 8 active broadcasters (EVTV, RTV and Tartu TV) did not submit the report. 2 In 1994 1 of 7 active broadcasters (Tartu TV) did not submit the 
report. 3 In 1995 2 of 7 active broadcasters (EVTV and RTV) did not submit the report. 4 Paid by private channels in accordance with 1997 agreement. 
5 Two major private channels did not present their statements this year and the division does not show the real stand of advertising share. ETV's share of 
advertising income according to BMF was 43.2% Source: Estonian Statistical Yearbooks 
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Table 4.3. Media and television advertising expenditures in Estonia, 
1992-2000 
All media 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
EEK (million) na na 117 281 409 585 710 639 675 
USD (million) na na 9 25 33 41 51 43.5 40.1 
Newspapers (%) na na 60 55 47 48 47 47.8 45.5 
Magazines (%) na na 7 9 9 8 12 12.7 13.6 
TV (%) na na 33 23 27 27 26 20.4 23.0 
Radio (%) na na na 8 12 10 10 12.0 11.3 
Outdoor (%) 
- - -
5 6.9 8 6 6.5 4.5 
Internet (%) 
- - - - - - -
0.7 2.1 
Television 
EEK (million)1 
- -
38.6 64.6 110.4 135.4 181.8 130.3 155.3 
EEK (million) 2 1.5 14.0 43.4 37.7 71.7 120.5 172.7 143.4 164.3 
ETV (million) 1.5 6.7 20.3 28.0 38.2 52.0 44.1 9.6 40.0 
Share of ETV 100 47.9 52.5 43.2 34.6 34.8 23.8 7.4 24.7 
% of total ETV 
income 6.8 17.4 25.2 28.1 33.5 38.0 30.8 7.7 25.9 
1 Data of BMF. 2 Data of Estonian Statistical Office. Sources: BMF; Baltic Media Books; 
ETV/EBU; Estonian Statistical Office 
The first TV war started in the spring of 1993. An attempt to create a strong 
commercial channel with RTV, Eesti Video and Television International, a sub­
sidiary of the Swedish company Kinnevik AD failed. As a result a new entity, 
EVTV, was launched by Eesti Video and Kinnevik, and the rivalry for the distri­
bution of free transmission networks became dramatic and political. Finally, 
EVTV got permission to transmit their programmes on the former Russian chan­
nel's frequency during weekdays and RTV could do so on weekends. AS Taska 
got the Sankt-Petersburg transmission network that was technically in bad shape 
(Sembach-Sakkias, 1999: 9). 
The second TV war started after a year had passed, in spring 1994, when the 
transmission of Ostankino TV was finished in Estonia. This channel was techni­
cally of the highest quality and boasted the largest penetration area. The Ministry 
of Culture decided to give this channel to AS Taska, without any competition. 
EVTV and RTV protested. The audience complained as well, because they feared 
losing their favourite soap operas. The biggest problem arose when, as a result of 
channel changes the Mexican soap opera Tahmanägu (A Grimy Face) disappeared 
from Southern Estonian TV screens. Finally the Ostankino channel was given to 
EVTV and RTV, who started to transmit their programmes every other day; the 
Russian transmission network went to AS Taska. In fact, the private channels 
were the eventual winners of this TV war because, in order to equalise their pen­
etration areas, the government decided to finance the building of an additional 
transmitter for South Estonia to transmit Kanal 2's programme. During the sec­
ond TV war the government and the governing party Isamaa lost a remarkable 
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deal of its political prestige, a situation which probably had some impact also on 
the results of the 1995 parliamentary elections. 
The TV wars were most of all caused by the inadequate number of private TV 
channels and limited economic possibilities. (These circumstances would cause 
the third TV war in 1999, see below.) As a result of the two "TV wars" in 
1993-1994, and also in the wake of disappointments, extensive lobbying, bank­
ruptcies and mergers, the Estonian TV landscape developed its current structure. 
From 1996 until the end of 2001, when TV1 lost its licence, Estonia had four 
national channels with approximately 85-99% of audience penetration. The TV 
market consisted of ETV, the public broadcaster, and three private stations - TV 1 
(AS Sõltumatu Televisiooni AS), Kanal 2 (AS Taska), TV 3 (the product of EVTV, 
RTV and Kinnevik's merger in 1996), plus some local channels in Narva and 
Tartu (see Table 4.1). Private channels act under the requirements of the Broad­
casting Act (1994); their licences are granted for a period of 5 years. 
1.4. Basic legal regulation of public and private broadcasting (1994) 
The first broadcasting legislation act - the Broadcasting Act - was passed by the 
Parliament in May 1994, half a year after ETV became a full member of the EBU. 
The Broadcasting Act met the basic European remits of public broadcasting. 
According to the Broadcasting Act, ETV was to be run by a Broadcasting Coun­
cil appointed by the Parliament, a Director General appointed by the Broadcast­
ing Council, and a board of executives appointed by the Director General. The 
Law stated ETV's main programme obligations: to transmit at least 51% of its 
own programming; to produce varied, balanced and impartial programming 
(mainly informational, cultural, educational and entertainment programmes) of 
the highest journalistic and technical quality; to meet the information needs of all 
sectors of the population, including minorities' needs; to protect and develop the 
Estonian language and the national cultural heritage; to support and assist in the 
development of the Estonian state and of its international recognition. 
ETV was granted a mixed financing scheme and has been financed by subsi­
dies from the state budget on an annual basis, by advertising revenues and by 
income from sponsorship and technical services. ETV was allowed to sell adver­
tising time, which represented no more than 5% of its daily programme hours 
and 12 minutes per hour. 
The Broadcasting Act also fixed the procedure for granting operating licences 
to private broadcasters. According to the law, private broadcasters would be sub­
ject to some minor programming obligations, limit upon sold advertising time 
and an obligation to allocate 5% of the daily programming time to news. Limits 
on commercial time for private channels were set at 20% of daily programming 
hours for advertising and teleshopping and on 12 minutes per hour, while pure 
advertising time was limited to 15% of daily programming. Some years later, the 
minimum duration of a single teleshopping broadcast was set at 15 minutes, 
while the total teleshopping broadcast time was limited to a maximum of 8 
broadcasts and 3 hours per day. 
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The 1994 Broadcasting Act represented a compromise between different inter­
est groups and politicians' views upon and understanding of the role, organisa­
tional form, management and financing schemes of public broadcasting. This 
was why discussions about improving and amending the law started immedi­
ately after it had passed through Parliament. 
2. Second period (1995-1997): Establishing public television 
The following features can characterise the second period of the development of 
public television in Estonia: 
• sustainable remodelling of ETV to a sufficient public broadcasting organisa­
tion; 
• keeping the highest audience shares and the position of leading channel by 
ETV; 
• firm keeping of political independence, balance and impartiality of the ETV's 
programming; 
• keeping the leading position on the Estonian TV-advertising market by ETV 
and the controversies caused by that; 
• unsuccessful public debate on the role and future of the public broadcasting in 
the society and culture; 
• continuing strong rivalry and tensions between public and private broadcast­
ers; 
• insufficient financing of ETV to meet the needs of programming quality and 
technical development; 
• constant failure to improve the Broadcasting Act. 
2.1. Establishing public television 
ETV's transition to an organisation that was able to fulfil the basic public broad­
casters' obligations and to produce a full scope of public broadcasting production 
took place in accordance with the development plan and with natural evolution­
ary trends in the years 1995-1997 (Šein, 1997a). Plans to reform and manage ETV 
included a democratic and accountable management scheme, and the repair and 
restructuring of the organisation within a public broadcasting institution's regu­
latory system. Plans were established to develop an internal self-sustaining eco­
nomic model and a system of producers' accountability, and to create an organi­
sation with a clear vision of itself. The goal to decrease the number of employees 
while enlarging programme capacity and increasing quality was set up (see Fig­
ure 4.2). The priority was to satisfy audiences' interests while producing diverse 
and quality programming along public service broadcasting lines. The philo­
sophical requirements included participating in the establishment of a national 
cultural identity and self-consciousness, and maintaining the high credibility of 
the information provided and openness to the world and the Estonian society. 
The priorities of ETV's programming were news, information, sport, culture and 
education. Social awareness, common sense and knowledge were highly valued 
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cornerstones of the general factual programming as well as the objectivity and 
impartiality of the general journalistic standards. The programmes were bal­
anced on a ratio of two-thirds factual programming alongside one third comedy, 
drama and entertainment. (Rannu, 1997: 24-26). 
The main goals set by the ETV management were, in practical terms, achieved. 
ETV's audience share was constantly between 35 and 40% during 1995-1997 (see 
Figure 4.3), which represented one of the highest rates achieved by any public 
broadcasting organisation in Europe at that time. According to national surveys, 
ETV' s credibility and objectivity were highly rated by 73% of the adult popula­
tion: a figure that was many times higher than that achieved by Estonia's private 
TV channels. This should be judged one of the most outstanding achievements of 
Estonian public television during this period, especially when one considers the 
great importance of media objectivity and impartiality in the new post-Soviet 
democracies (Mathe, 1993: 39). The number of ETV employees was reduced by 
35% during 1993-1997 (see Figure 4.2), while the amount of programme produc­
tion rose by more than 1,300 hours during the same period (see Figure 4.1). ETV 
managed to keep its political independence. It should be considered that Eston­
ian public broadcasting had managed to establish itself and had attained a cer­
tain maturity by the end of 1997 (Šein, 1997b: 4—6). 
2.2. Tough competition on the restricted advertising market 
When talking about Estonia's total TV market value (about 22 million USD in 
2000), the size of the population (1.4 million people), the limited amount of TV-
adspend (about 9 million USD in 2000) and the large number of TV channels 
available, an insensitive question quite often arises - "Maybe there are too many 
fish in the pond?" (see Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3). 
The competition between private television channels and between the public 
and private sectors has been tough. The main bone of contention has certainly 
been the advertising revenue, which is the primary source of financing for the 
private sector and an important supplement to the public broadcasters' budgets. 
During 1995-1997, ETV received between 35-40% of TV's annual advertising rev­
enue, which caused serious difficulties for the private sector (see Table 4.3). After 
the weakest private channels failed and the number of national private channels 
was reduced to three, opposing interests within the restricted TV-market pushed 
the public and private sectors into a constant rivalry. 
2.3. Controversial role of advertising 
Using advertising to finance public service television has been the source of seri­
ous if not crucial controversies in attitudes towards ETV. The insufficiency of 
state support, unavoidable investment requirements and the need to ensure the 
competitive salary for employees were the main reasons for ETV's needs for 
intensive increases in advertising incomes. The 1994 Broadcasting Act provided 
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a legislative basis for these. It is certain that ETV would have not managed to 
accomplish its programme obligations and technical development needs without 
advertising: advertising income comprised up to 25-35% of the ETV budget 
between 1995 and 1997 (see Table 4.3). As will be shown below, the results of the 
considerable drop in ETV's advertising revenues in 1998-1999 were dramatic. 
However, advertising sales did influence ETV's programming and changed the 
programme policies into an ambivalent attempt to balance public broadcasting 
and commercial principles. The need to get additional revenues from advertising 
brought with it a larger share of mass interest and lower quality programming 
than had been wished. 
Intensive TV advertising was a new socio-cultural phenomenon in Estonia in 
the beginning of 1990s that, among other things, also aroused social tensions 
(unfamiliar pet food and women's hygiene commercials at the time when most 
people did not have enough money to buy food for themselves) and sharp accu­
sations of ETV's commercialisation. In addition, ETV, by acting in the advertising 
market and gaining a big share of it, was hounded by severe criticism from pri­
vate television organisations. ETV was accused of dishonest competition in using 
both state support and advertising income to produce its programmes. During 
1995-1997, ETV was frequently accused of selling advertising time too cheaply; 
and even of dumping - an accusation that was proved groundless after several 
investigations by the State Audit Office and the Estonian Competition Board. 
The controversies and attitudes which arose at that time are the main reasons 
for the suspicious, and even negative, political attitudes towards ETV, in spite of 
the fact that ETV's programming has, in its general nature and structure, been in 
accordance with Estonia's main public broadcasting requirements. 
2.4. Weaknesses of the financing model of the public television 
By 1995 the first stage of the formation of private television companies and of the 
redistribution of the market had almost come to an end. United private channels 
confronted Estonian Television. The pressure concentrated on ad sales because 
ETV's market share of the total advertising turnover was constantly high. The 
other area of dispute was the fact that the financing of ETV, based on regular and 
reliable state subsidies and advertising revenues, was publicly labelled by private 
television companies as unfair. 
The discussion has heated up periodically every year during the fixing of the 
state budget and of the amount of financial support for ETV. Liberal politicians 
started to speak about privatising ETV; about open competition for state subsi­
dies on public broadcasting programmes, in which the private channels could 
also participate; about changing ETV into merely a commissioning transmission 
organisation with only ten employees and without its own production facilities. 
The lobby groups were successful in influencing political decisions, which led 
again and again to a shortage and insufficiency of the state subsidies allotted by 
Parliament to ETV. By the end of this period only 51% of ETV's revenues came 
from the state budget, the rest was earned from advertising revenue, the rental of 
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its facilities and other commercial sources. Since the appreciation rate of the cost 
of its technical facilities was close to 70%, ETV constantly felt considerable invest­
ment deficiencies and was seriously restricted in its plans for technical renewal. 
2.5. Public discussion on the fundamental principles 
of public broadcasting in 1996 
Under these circumstances ETV made an attempt to provoke a public discussion 
on public broadcasting issues. In 1996, assisted by the Broadcasting Council and 
the Ministry of Culture, ETV published a "green paper" on the future of public 
broadcasting in Estonia and on television in particular. The key questions of the 
discussions were formulated as follows (Sein, 1996: 2): 
• What are the state's responsibilities towards public broadcasting? 
• Should the state guarantee accomplishing the goals of public broadcasting, and 
how? 
• What are the basic requirements to ensure the balance within the dual broad­
casting model and the opposition between public and private broadcasters? 
• What would be the best model for financing public broadcasting in Estonia? 
• What are the most effective organisational forms for public broadcasting serv­
ices? 
• How can high professional standards of programming be guaranteed, and how 
can programming goals be accomplished most effectively? 
• How can editorial independence, unbiased be maintained and protected, in 
terms of the balanced and impartial treatment of important issues? 
• How can a consensus be achieved among politicians and in society in terms of 
understanding the fundamental ideas of public broadcasting, its programme 
principles? How can public opinion supportive towards public broadcasting be 
evoked? 
Most of these questions were similar to those asked at that time in different 
forums on public broadcasting matters by different media professionals, admin­
istrators and academics all over the world. Public broadcasting institutions were 
in deep trouble not only in Estonia, the Baltic States and Eastern Europe, but 
globally (Mathe, 1993; BBC 1992). 
ETV viewed public broadcasting as an inseparable and natural part of Euro­
pean democratic society. In spite of the vast variety of different views, at decisive 
moments the answer to the main question as to the importance of public broad­
casting in Estonia has been a resounding "yes." The Estonian Broadcasting Act 
gave public broadcasting institutions the responsibility for the sustainable 
accomplishment of the goals of public broadcasting services. On the state level 
the question has primarily been about the guarantees the state should give to 
support the fulfilment of these public broadcasting obligations. It would be hard 
to imagine that the private sector should ever volunteer for the task of accom­
plishing these public broadcasting goals, in view of that sector's lack of self-reg­
ulatory economic, political or socio-cultural incentives and motivations. Most 
European countries are convinced that, without the support of legislation, 
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without the creation of public broadcasting entities, without defining rules and 
goals, protecting editorial freedom and ensuring democratic accountability it 
cannot be guaranteed that the aims of public broadcasting will be accomplished. 
Nevertheless, those principles have often been dismissed by some of Estonia's 
political parties. 
It is not possible to produce the whole scope of public broadcasting program­
ming in the private sector. It is not worthwhile in economical terms, and it would 
also cause a drop in audience shares. Required programme variety will definite­
ly suffer. Even if the state were to finance the production of public programming 
in the private sector, there would always be a danger that the production would 
become commercialised, include hidden advertising, present direct or hidden 
interests, or would not be impartial and balanced. It is hard to believe that Esto­
nia will find a substantially different alternative to Western European broadcast­
ing traditions and principles. In spite of that the possibility that Estonia may 
finally find its own original model for the provision of public broadcasting serv­
ices cannot be excluded. 
The discussion on the basic principles of broadcasting started in 1996 after the 
"green paper" was published. Many Estonian journalists, researchers, politicians 
and people from different cultural circles were supposed to take part in the delib­
erations. Unfortunately, the conference that was supposed to conclude the debate 
proved much less useful and much less effective than it had been expected. The 
tensions between ETV and the private channels were too bitter. The Broadcasters' 
Association, the representative body of the private broadcasters, gave up on sub­
stantial discussion (Šein, 1997a). 
During these years neither the government nor the political parties were able 
to see real alternatives and new solutions in Estonian media policies, indeed nor 
have they actively tried to solve the public broadcasting problems. Continual 
attempts made by the Ministry of Culture to resolve the tensions by means of a 
new draft of the Broadcasting Act were not successful. By the end of the year 2001 
the Broadcasting Act had not been substantially amended in spite of these efforts. 
2.6. Defining new programme structures 
- a shift toward attraction and entertainment 
In the 1990s, the content of television channel programming reflected view­
er demand. From the end of 1980s until 1993, people were very interested in 
politics and in taking part in the process of changing society, so there was a 
demand for news and political/current affair programmes. After the eco­
nomic recession and the period of political stabilisation, people increasingly 
turned to entertainment programs. (Veskimägi & Susi, 1996: 136) 
Television programming practices mirrored these new needs, and turned the 
emphasis towards entertainment. Since 1994-1995, Estonian people and audi­
ences have enjoyed very varied television offerings due to the large number of 
and the competition between Estonian-language channels. Most of the best and 
most popular soap operas, TV series and serials from the United States, Australia, 
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Canada and the UK are running on Estonian TV screens while a good selection 
of movies and documentaries is also provided. 
Audiences became more interested in entertainment, serials and game 
shows as opposed to current affairs and news. The highest ratings no longer 
went to the main ETV news broadcasts, but to game shows and serials. 
(Veskimägi & Susi, 1996: 129) 
Step by step, relying on comprehensive data about audience behaviour, based on 
continuous diary panel surveys, the audience measurement system, implement­
ed by Baltic Media Facts (see http://www.mediafacts.com) in the fall of 1995, TV 
channels moved to more and more precise orientations around viewers' 
demands. The active seeking of target audience groups led to the further seg­
mentation of audiences. All TV channels experimented at this time with different 
programming structures and models, strategies and policies that proved a fruit­
ful pursuit of new solutions, professional growth and knowledge. 
However, ETV faced serious difficulties in maintaining and following the prin­
ciples of pure public broadcasting. As a result of the insufficiency of state subsi­
dies and the constant need to get additional income from advertising sales, ETV 
was constrained to implement some elements of commercial programming, and 
was sometimes unable to avoid a decline in programme standards. This was 
probably unavoidable during the period of deep structural change and the 
strengthening of the competition in the struggle to attract large audiences. The 
lack of proper financial and even of the appropriate professional resources nec­
essary to produce a substantial amount of high quality in-house programming 
was certainly one of the main reasons for this commercialism. It was also a peri­
od of generational change in terms of television's journalists and directors. This 
period also witnessed the introduction of Western, primarily American produc­
tions which first of all served to shift audience preferences towards entertainment 
programmes. The tensions between public broadcasting remits and the need to 
keep the organisation functioning became substantial at this time. 
In spite of all this, the programme structure which the public broadcaster prac­
ticed during the second period can be characterised as general public program­
ming with a slight inclination towards commercial programming. ETV remained 
the largest producer of the most varied home-produced programming in the 
Estonian language and in cultural programming as well (see Table 4.4 and Fig­
ures 7 and 8 in Appendix). The average of home-produced programming on ETV 
was constantly over 60%, while commercial channels could not manage more 
than 30% of in-house production. This situation was inevitable for the private 
sector, as home-grown productions were lucky if they could attract sponsors' 
money. 
During this period, commercial channels made serious attempts to emulate the 
functions and programming of public broadcasting. During 1993-1997, this was 
mainly caused by the ultimate need to prove the competitiveness of the private 
institutions. Quite quickly it became obvious that they would loose the fight. At 
the end of this period, commercial programming strategies were shaped to seek 
specific options, a precise orientation and adjustment of the programming to suit 
Table 4.4. The structure of Estonian Television (ETV) programme output, 1993-2000 (%) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
News 10.2 10.1 9.1 8.3 8.9 8.9 8.7 7.6 
Information 10.4 12.3 18.0 8.4 6.6 11.6 16.0 9.2 
Human interest na na na 7.0 6.4 5.8 7.4 7.1 
Sport 9.1 14.0 10.3 14.0 8.2 12.2 8.2 9.4 
Education 5.5 2.0 2.5 2.3 1.7 0.8 0.9 2.6 
Infotainment na na na 3.0 6.0 10.5 9.4 3.9 
Arts, humanities, sciences 10.6 9.7 11.1 9.8 10.5 6.3 4.0 3.6 
Religion 1.5 1.6 1.3 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.9 
Music 7.3 6.8 5.6 4.6 5.6 2.8 2.2 4.1 
Light entertainment 10.1 10.2 8.0 6.0 5.5 4.6 5.0 6.7 
Fiction 26.2 19.0 23.7 26.1 28.9 30.2 22.1 28.8 
Other, not attributable 
-
2.4 0.5 0.3 1.4 0.2 6.1 1.7 
Presentation and promotion 5.9 5.5 3.7 5.1 6.1 5.4 5.0 5.4 
Advertising 2.9 3.2 4.1 3.7 3.4 
-
1.4 3.8 
TV-shop 
- - - - - -
2.7 5.2 
Text news 0.2 3.2 2.1 0.6 
- - - -
Own production first-run 49.7 48.6 45.6 42.8 41.7 50.9 48.3 35.2 
Own production 55.7 58.0 61.2 56.8 50.7 71.2 65.1 66.2 
Purchases and exchanges 27.2 26.7 29.3 32.6 23.6 27.6 30.7 33.8 
Total first transmissions 76.9 75.2 75.0 75.5 60.0 79.1 78.4 70.3 
Repeats 10.1 12.8 15.0 15.3 12.8 20.8 21.6 29.6 
Total hours 2,529 2,741 2,856 3,391 4,012 5,117 5,057 4,849 
Sources: ETV, EBU, Estonian Statistical Office 
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the needs, interests and preferences of thoroughly defined target groups in order 
to maximise revenues from advertising. 
It should be said that television programming fully reflected the controversies 
of real life at the time. The functions of the media were changing (Vihalemm, 
Lauk & Lauristin, 1997). News and information programmes remained impor­
tant, but at the same time more and more programming time was devoted to fic­
tion and entertainment. One third of the Estonian population was living below 
the poverty line and this fact may possibly explain the huge audiences gleaned 
by more than twenty different soap operas which ran daily on Estonian screens. 
Different games and game shows remained at the top of the ratings lists. Estoni­
ans love to play, but they even more love to watch other people playing. Life in 
the wild capitalism was like a game in which you never knew when would you 
get or lose your chance of wealth and success. The audiences became more and 
more differentiated. In spite of that, people liked to gather in front of ETV to 
watch public events and national occasions, which gave them an opportunity to 
feel a sense of belonging to a larger community, to their nation and culture. These 
were the glorious moments of national public television. 
Strong competition and the ultimate need to grasp and keep audiences even­
tually also resulted in the rise of the professional quality of television, changes in 
the structure, style and attractiveness of the programming. The average profes­
sional level of television direction has been comparatively high in Estonia, and 
the artistic perspective and style have been impressive. Interesting and attractive 
broadcasts could be seen in different programme fields and genres. At the same 
time, a general shift towards entertainment programming caused a gradual 
diminishing of the role and importance of journalists and the growing populari­
ty of different kinds of hosts, anchors, entertainers and actors. 
Since 1995 the stations have more or less succeeded in compiling their specific 
programming structures to satisfy the needs of various target audiences, by the 
distinctive selection of movies, series and serials, sport events and game shows 
and of original programmes in the Estonian language. This has led to a restriction 
of the size of audiences and an equalisation of the channels' audience shares. An 
outstanding achievement of Estonian Television was (and it is important to stress 
the uncommonness of that achievement within Eastern European and Baltic 
broadcasting), that the public broadcaster succeeded in keeping its leading posi­
tion in the ratings during this entire period, maintaining a share of about 35^10% 
of the Estonian-speaking audience (see Figure 4.3). 
3. Third period (1998 - spring 2000): rearrangement 
and unpredicted deep financial and organisational crisis of ETV 
The main features of the third period in the development of public television in 
Estonia are: 
• radical changes in ETV financing as a result of an agreement with private tele­
vision stations for ETV to abandon advertising shares; 
Development Trends of Public Television in Estonia: 1991-2001 151 
• considerable reduction of the tensions between public and private broadcast­
ers, as a result of the end of advertising in ETV; 
• unpredictable and nervous management of ETV; 
• substantial growth of ETV programme output and the emergence of consider­
able financial losses as a result of an uncontrolled rise in expenditures; 
• considerable growth of ETV's financial obligations and its sinking into deeper 
debt; 
• move towards equalisation of the audience shares of public and private televi­
sion stations; 
• collapse of the non-advertising agreement between ETV and the private chan­
nels; 
• increase in foreign ownership and foreign control of private TV channels; 
• increase in private televisions' financial losses; 
• crucial shift in audience shares - public television loses its lead; 
• drop in the output of domestic production as a result of a decrease in advertis­
ing revenues and general economic recession; 
• continuing and luckless attempts to improve the Broadcasting Act. 
• deep financial and organisational crisis of ETV. 
3.1. New solution for advertising (end of 1997) 
At the end of 1997, the contracts of the ETV management appointed in 1995 
expired. The new executive management started work on 1 November and 
immediately made a radical decision - ETV initiated an agreement with the pri­
vate television stations (TV 3, Kanal 2 and TV 1) to abandon advertising and 
stopped advertising sales from 1 January 1998. According to the terms of the 
agreement ETV received in return a certain proportion of the private channels' 
revenues: which worked out as a sum of 36 million EEK for 1998. This was much 
less than ETV had earned from advertising in 1997 (51.9 million EEK). The deci­
sion was obviously influenced by undisclosed political factors, and was forced as 
a result of extensive lobbing by private broadcasters who faced considerable 
financial disadvantages in the TV market. The net financial losses of the private 
channels had been grown from year to year and had reached 18,4 million EEK by 
1997 (see Table 4.2). 
At the same time, ETV joined the Broadcasters' Association, which had previ­
ously been an association made up exclusively of private broadcasters. The ten­
sions between public and private television were temporarily defused. Private 
channels definitely improved their economic standing and gained considerable 
advantages from the fact that ETV had left the advertising market. It should be 
emphasized that the new solution to the problems of TV financing was not direct­
ly proposed by the state institutions but had been brought about as a result of the 
initiative of broadcasters themselves. This was one of the most serious weak­
nesses of this agreement, which eventually caused substantial difficulties for 
ETV. 
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3.2. Extensive growth of the programming output of ETV 
and its organisational reforms 
ETV's new board resolved to abandon their predecessors' plan of evolutional 
development in line with its actual resources, and took risk for a decisive accel­
eration in both programme production capacity and expenditure. At the same 
time, with the agreement to stop advertising, the decision was made to enlarge 
programme capacity by 30% - in 1998 ETV's programme production grew to 
5,117 hours, in 1999 to 5,057 hours. A growth by 80% was made in amount of in-
house production - from 2,034 hours in 1997 to 3,643 in 1998 and 3,292 in 1999 
(see Figure 4.1). This was a risky step because there were no guarantees against 
the possibility of a reduction in state subsidies, or a possible backlash from the 
advertising market, or the possible failure of the agreement with the private 
channels. 
At the same time ETV started serious organisational reforms. ETV gave up on 
many internal services and started to obtain those from the free market (trans­
port, cleaning, security, performance services). In spite of its already high level of 
debt, a new loan was needed to improve the studios' technical facilities. The tran­
sition to a system of producers' accountability was planned with the purpose of 
making the use of resources more flexible and more easily controlled, and to raise 
production effectiveness and quality. The number of employees decreased to 523 
in 1999, that was 20% less than at the end of 1997 (see Figure 4.2). 
Unfortunately not all limitations and dangers of these fast changes were taken 
into consideration. Already at the end of the year 1998 ETV faced serious insta­
bility. First of all ETV's income in 1998 was reduced by 10-15% (comparing to 
1997) as a result of the agreement to call off advertising. Despite the growth of 
programme output and the amount of in-house production ETV also started to 
lose its leading position in audience ratings (see Figure 4.3). In addition, ETV 
started to lose the image of indisputable leader on the domestic television land­
scape, especially among the younger audience. These processes were certainly 
enforced by considerable investments the owners of the private channels (espe­
cially of TV3 and Kanal 2) decided to devote into popular programming in order 
to attract the audiences. That would restructure the TV broadcasting market and 
weaken ETV's hope to make a breakthrough in politicians' ignorance and mis­
understanding of the needs and functions of public broadcasting and ETV in par­
ticular (see Table 4.2). 
3.3. Enforcement of foreign ownership 
and growth of supplied TV services 
Eventually Estonian companies and Estonian money failed in their attempts to 
compete in the TV market. Every one of the Estonian-owned private TV-broad­
casters sold the majority of their shares or went bankrupt. In fact, the regulation 
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Figure 4.1. ETV programming hours, 1990-2000 
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Figure 4.2. Number of ETV employees, 1990-2000 
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established by the Broadcasting Act in 1994, which required a minimum 51% of 
domestic ownership of private broadcasting organisations did not prevent the 
shift in control to foreign owners. (The requirement for 51% of domestic owner­
ship was abandoned in 1999). First, the two biggest private television companies 
in Estonia came under the control of TV companies from Scandinavian countries. 
The Norwegian Schibsted owns Kanal 2; the Modern Time Group, a subsidiary 
Figure 4.3. Domestic national television channels audience share, 1995-2001. Estonians 
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Figure 4.4. Estonian and Russian television channels audience share, 1997-2001. Russophones 
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of the Swedish Kinrievik and the Finnish Mainos TV, became the main owners of 
TV 3. TV 3 also runs a chain of TV 3 channels in the Baltic States and operates in 
Latvia and Lithuania. Finally, the control of TV 1 was taken by Polsat, which also 
launched a Baltic TV chain, regrouping TV 1 (Estonia), LNT (Latvia) and Baltics 
TV (Lithuania). 
As a result of open and liberal media policies, a lack of thorough control of how 
the broadcasters meet the requirements set up by the law and their operating 
licences, Estonia has become a well-televised country. In addition to four nation­
wide terrestrial channels and two local channels, the TV landscape includes all 
Finnish TV stations, with penetration rates close to 40% of the Estonian popula­
tion, and Latvian TV, which can be viewed terrestrially near the border. Tallinn 
Cable Television, Starman and STV are the biggest private cable programming 
providers among about 20 smaller cable companies; more than 60 channels are 
available via cable networks, more than 30 Russian TV channels among them. 
The penetration rate of cable TV in Estonia is about 40%. When one considers that 
the nation had not any cable television at all a decade ago, the growth of cable TV 
in Estonia has been remarkable. 
3.4. Artificial economical administration 
of the Estonian television market 
Television has not been a profitable market for the whole decade. The number of 
channels and the capacity of the market have not been balanced. The annual 
expenditure of the four national TV channels in 1999 was about 400 million EEK, 
while their total income was only 288 million EEK, 298 million EEK and 391 mil­
lion EEK in 2000 respectively. While the losses of ETV had reached 30 million 
EEK by the end of 1999, the losses incurred by the private channels were much 
higher, about 82,6 million EEK in 1999 and even 87,8 million EEK in 2000 (see 
Table 4.2). Large foreign corporations have annually invested and spent millions 
of Estonian kroons above their channels' income levels, without any firm hope of 
achieving balanced budgets or profits. 
It is not easy to explain why these powerful foreign companies have shown 
such an interest in Estonian television broadcasting operations in spite of the 
insufficient capacity of the advertising market and unpredictability of Estonian 
media policies. The constant instability of the advertising market and substantial 
financial losses did not determine the owners of private channels during 
1998-2000. The foreign owners remained - and have continued to remain - inter­
ested in investing fresh sums of money in order to maintain and even enlarge the 
amount of programme output and domestic production. It is strongly believed 
that the rule of thumb for winning audiences and advertising money is to pro­
duce more programming in the Estonian language. Kanal 2, for example, started 
ten new in-house productions in September 1999 and the general manager 
explained this decision by saying that he believed that it was worth investing 
now and incurring certain losses in order to achieve the leading position among 
the TV channels. In the spring of 2000 it became clear that this strategy was not 
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working: that channel's audience share had remained practically the same as it 
had been before they had spent those vast amounts of money. In spite of that, this 
strategy has considerably influenced the condition of the Estonian television 
market and has further complicated attempts by politicians and the general pub­
lic to comprehend ETV's real problems. 
The constraints of the non-advertising agreement also emerged. As ETV's 
advertising income reached only 9.6 million EEK in 1999, ETV's share of the TV 
advertising market was only an insignificant 7-8% of the total of 145 million EEK. 
However, the relative smallness of ETV's share of the advertising market did not 
prevent the deepening losses of the private channels. We may assume that, if the 
advertising agreement had not been adopted in the fall of 1997, there would have 
probably been one fewer private channel in Estonia (actually it happened at the 
end of 2001). On the other hand, if the legislators had managed to insure a way 
to keep ETV free from advertising, it would have been possible to stabilise the TV 
sector and to avoid the financial and organisational crisis of public service televi­
sion in Estonia. 
Since the advertising market has remained unstable, it has been difficult to 
forecast possible developments. After considerable fall in 1999 (-30% compared 
to 1998), the TV-advertising market enlarged by 17% in 2000 (see Table 4.2). Def­
initely it was not enough to cover the channel's expenses and production needs. 
It became obvious during the year 2000 that the private channels had started to 
change their programming strategies, mainly by cutting the quantity of the pro­
gramming in the Estonian language. Nevertheless, the TV sector still proceeded 
on its way without any regard for rational economic arguments and was kept 
afloat by entirely artificial means. 
3.5. Emerging and growth of independent producers' sector 
Until 1995-1996, the majority of programming in the Estonian language was pro­
duced by the television organisations themselves. Thereafter, audio-visual pro­
duction schemes started to change. The independent producers' market has grad­
ually emerged, encouraged by the success of the first firms launched in 
1994-1995. More and more programming for broadcasting, especially entertain­
ment programmes, talk shows, games, serials, music, tele-shopping, police and 
sports programmes, are produced by Estonia's approximately 80 medium and 
small-sized television, film and video companies. Since 1998 when Estonian Tele­
vision, which devoted about 45-50% of its budget to producing programmes in 
the Estonian language, started to develop its system of producers' accountability 
and to manage with a smaller permanent staff, a remarkable increase in inde­
pendently produced programming has followed. 
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3.6. Implementation of new media services by public broadcasting 
Estonia has quickly become one of the world's most computerised countries, and 
is today holding its position as one of the leading computerised nations in 
Europe. In 2000, about 30% of the population were regular users of the Internet. 
These digital innovations are driving us towards a merger of broadcasting, cable 
and satellite television organisations and telecommunications firms in order to 
provide new interactive audio-visual services via the Internet. Among others, the 
public broadcasters in Estonia are also seeking new options in interactive digital 
markets. ETV started its first Internet service in 1998, when ETV news was made 
available via the Internet. The extensive use of ETV archives may be expected in 
the coming years. The main reason for that is the possible merger of telecommu­
nication and broadcasting firms in order to provide new audio-visual services on 
the Internet including a substantial amount of streaming video and multimedia. 
ETV's extensive archives are a good source of material for these services. 
Although the precise plan for transition to digital television in Estonia has not 
been developed yet, it is obvious that it cannot be postponed for much longer. 
3.7. Substantial changes in TV audience behaviour, 
and ETV's loss of its leading position 
Substantial streamlining took place in the programme structures of the TV chan­
nels between 1998 and 2000. Although public television's general programme 
structure differs from those of the private channels (see Table 25 in Appendix), 
one can find similarities in the programming principles of private and public TV 
stations, especially in prime-time programming - similarities which offer obvious 
evidence of the importance of advertising revenues for the public broadcaster. In 
fact TV executives have successfully learned the art of professional programming 
and have been very effective in targeting and attracting small interest groups and 
special segments of the audience. Audience research companies are constantly 
providing producers, programmers and advertising agencies with current infor­
mation about audience behaviour. On the basis of that information, piece by piece 
and percentage point by percentage point, the private channels have succeeded 
in taking audiences from ETV. The importance of this particular kind of profes­
sionalism is specific to a small market with large number of TV channels. 
Until the beginning of 1998, Estonian Television commanded the largest share 
of the Estonian-speaking audience, maintaining about 35-40% of that share. 
Between 1998 and 2000, the audience shares of ETV and the private channels 
changed considerably. The public broadcaster has lost a large proportion of its 
audience and the private channels have approximately equalled ETV's audience 
share. In April 1999, TV 3 beat ETV in the ratings battle for the first time (see Fig­
ure 4.3) and managed to repeat this beat several times during 1999-2001. The dis­
cussion as to whether Estonia needs public service television was strongly 
encouraged by this. As had happened several times before, new evidence of the 
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weakness of the public broadcaster prompted radical thinkers even to suggest the 
privatisation of ETV. Thus Estonia has been made to face one of the most signifi­
cant cultural problems faced by almost every European nation - the crisis of iden­
tity of public television. 
As far as television viewing hours are concerned, Estonia maintains one of the 
highest averages in Europe, of the time spent on TV viewing. The average num­
ber of hours which Estonian viewers spend watching TV has been about 30 per 
week, while Russian-speaking audiences' average hours are even higher - 32-36 
hours per week (see Figure 11 in Appendix). Television viewing is strongly influ­
enced by the nationality of the audience. One million Estonians spend more time 
watching Estonian channels. The non-Estonian audiences, about 450,000 people, 
are mainly viewers of the more than 30 Russian channels made available by cable 
companies and satellite channels. Estonian TV channels have had a marginal role 
for Russian audiences despite the fact that three out of four national channels are 
making serious attempts to attract Russian-speaking audiences (see Figure 4.4). 
Altogether Estonian channels have an average share of 10-15% of Russian view­
ers. The two communities live quite different TV-lives, just as they generally live 
separately in their everyday lives. 
3.8. Unfortunate attempts to amend the Broadcasting Act 
and failure of further balancing of the broadcasting field 
During the last third of the decade, the Estonian electronic media sector came 
under the comprehensive supervision of a number of new pieces of legislation. 
Several laws were passed by the Parliament - the Advertising Law (1997), the 
Telecommunications Law (1998), and the Cable Law (2000). Legal regulation of 
the media has been one of the most controversial processes in recent legislation 
in Estonia and has revealed substantial differences in the viewpoints, under­
standings and interests of different commercial and political groups in society. 
The most complicated aspects of the Broadcasting Act involved the instability 
of the funding of public broadcasting and its simultaneous financing both from 
state subsidies and advertising. Different ideas and proposals were made to 
achieve a better balance in the television sector. Quite often the suggestions made 
by different interest groups were controversial. Private broadcasters have for 
instance initiated, on several occasions, more or less serious attempts to stop 
advertising on ETV. An idea to merge ETV and Estonian Radio (ER) was pro­
posed. The option to draft separate laws for ETV and ER was also considered. 
Implementation of a contracting system to fix the general structures and costs of 
the separate public broadcasting services was proposed. Suggestions also to 
involve the private channels in the process of producing and disseminating "pub­
lic broadcasts" via open tenders was discussed. From time to time the question 
arose as to the need for public broadcasting at all. A lack of common under­
standing and an inability to make compromises or achieve consensus in substan­
tial matters slowed down the drafting of the new versions of the Broadcasting 
Act. 
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In spite of a continuous lack of any success in making the expected changes to 
the Broadcasting Act, work on new draft amendments was continued by the Min­
istry of Culture for several years. It was inspired by the desire to relieve the ten­
sions in the TV sector and by the conviction that public broadcasting services 
could be provided in more efficient ways, that programme requirements could be 
better defined and that the principles of funding should be changed. These activ­
ities did not achieve any remarkable results; different versions of the amended 
law did not even pass the preliminary discussions of the Estonian Parliament's 
Cultural Commission during 1998-1999. 
Some new suggestions were made in these drafts. In order to more thoroughly 
define the programme obligations of the public broadcaster a contracting system 
for different programming fields and for the maintenance of the audio-visual 
archives was proposed. A new formula to calculate the annual rate of increase of 
the state subsidy based on the expected growth of the consumer price index was 
also suggested. Special amendments concerning EU media principles were made. 
To facilitate the general EU accession process, the latter were among the few of all 
these proposals that were actually passed by the Estonian Parliament during the 
spring of 2000. 
Some new ideas were expressed in the amendments made in 1998 and 1999 
concerning the management of public television. The number of people forming 
the management boards of ETV and ER was limited to three. It has been planned 
to replace the Broadcasting Council, which has dealt both with ETV and ER, with 
two separate boards for radio and television. A less restricted composition for the 
Broadcasting Council was also suggested. In accordance with the existing Broad­
casting Act, the Broadcasting Council embodied representatives of the three 
biggest parliamentary parties, representatives of universities, cultural organisa­
tions and local governments. However, a political agreement was not achieved 
and the drafts failed to be passed by the Parliamentary Cultural Commission in 
1999. The crisis of ETV led to different solutions mentioned above. 
There are several reasons why the attempts to amend the Broadcasting Act 
have not been successful over such a long period of time. Most of the leading 
Estonian political parties lack well elaborated visions on media policies and 
appropriate ideas for the further development of the broadcasting sector. Differ­
ent lobby groups, mainly supporters of the private sector which favour a liberal 
economic approach, have proven powerful enough to slow down the process of 
decision-making, and have ensured the failure of the drafts made by the Ministry 
of Culture. Conflicting interests made it impossible to find a proper and balanced 
model for the whole TV sector, a model which would have been acceptable for 
most of the players in the TV marketplace. 
However, the problems that most urgently needed to be solved by Estonian 
media legislation at the end of the century had remained similar to those that 
arose and were discussed during the "green paper" deliberations of 1996 and 
thereafter. The answers to many relentlessly disputed questions are still to be 
found. 
• One of the basic questions which still needs a precise answer addresses an 
understanding of the role of the public media and the state's obligations 
towards public broadcasting. 
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• A financing model, which will guarantee the stability and development of 
Estonian public broadcasting, must eventually be found. 
• Still under discussion is the question as to what extent the structure of public 
broadcasting services should be regulated and how precisely the programme 
requirements should be specified. How thoroughly in particular should the law 
define the programming requirements applied to private broadcasters? 
• What means would assure the effective control of and the fulfilment of legal 
obligations on the part of the broadcasters? By what institutional means can the 
ultimate requirements for the objectivity and impartiality of disseminated 
information be guaranteed? 
• How may national culture and national identity be protected in the contexts of 
an increasingly diverse market, of shifts towards foreign ownership of media 
enterprises, of media concentration, of market-driven decision-making, and of 
the active segmentation of audiences? 
• What kinds of dangers would be posed by the possible implementation of the 
government order of programming, in relation to the ultimate requirement of 
the independence of public television? 
• To what extent should the public broadcaster take into account the needs and 
preferences of mass audiences? Should the public broadcaster simultaneously 
act as a broad- and narrowcaster? What consequences can be expected as a 
result of the inevitable fall in the public broadcaster's audience shares? 
• How possible political pressure on public broadcasting can be avoided, while 
a substantial part of the station's income - the state subsidy - depends on deci­
sions made by politicians on an annual basis? 
• How can we attempt to minimise the influence of advertising sales and to avoid 
the danger of commercialisation while satisfying mass audience interests and 
tastes? 
Many of these questions were under discussion during 1995-2000 but did not 
reach any appropriate answer or effective solution. 
3.9. Deep crisis of Estonian Television 
The period of stability, temporarily achieved in the Estonian television sector by 
the advertising agreement, lasted only one and a half years till the spring of 1999. 
The return to instability was a result of several simultaneous factors which 
occurred. 
First of all, the advertising market started to slow down in 1999. According to 
different estimates, the total TV adspend in 1999 was 17-30% lower than it was 
in 1998 (see Table 4.3). However, this fall was concurrent with a slowdown in the 
Estonian economy, which resulted in the approval of budget cuts by the Estonian 
Parliament in 1999. As a result, the state subsidy of ETV was reduced by 4% in 
1999 (see Table 4.2 and Figure 9 in Appendix). This placed additional pressure on 
ETV's budget. Since the actual losses had already reached 18 million EEK by the 
end of 1998, a financial crisis was virtually inevitable. Unfortunately, ETV's board 
and the Broadcasting Council did not reach the right conclusions in time and con­
tinued with their plans as they stared catastrophe in the face. Programme over­
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production continued - programme output of 5,057 hours (3,292 hours of its own 
production) in 1999 still did not correspond to real financial options (see Figure 
4.1). The losses of ETV as it was said above reached already 30 million EEK by the 
end of 1999. Conflicts occurred within the ETV board. The Broadcast Council did 
not act decisively in this critical situation. 
At the same time, the financial difficulties of the private channels, especially of 
TV 1, became more and more serious. ETV's warning that it would break its non-
advertising agreement was followed by the threat of TV l's impending bank­
ruptcy, which caused the beginning of the third TV war in April 1999. Eventual­
ly, in May 1999 after unsuccessful negotiations ETV broke its agreement with the 
private channels and started to sell advertising time again. It was motivated by 
the argument that the private channels had not fulfilled their obligations on time, 
had delayed their payments to ETV, and had not received the required contracts 
from the banks which would guarantee the agreement. The private channels in 
turn threatened to sue ETV in order to get back the 8 million EEK of advance pay­
ments that they had made at the end of 1998, when ETV had asked them for help 
to deal with its financial problems. This decision caused substantial difficulties 
for ETV. 
ETV returned to the advertising market in the middle of 1999, and had earned 
by the end of 1999 less than 10 million EEK in lieu of the 52 million that had been 
guaranteed by the former agreement (see Table 4.2). According to the estimate 
given by the ETV board in the fall of 2000, ETV lost 130 million EEK in income 
from advertising between 1998 and 2000, of which the actual net loss of income 
was 81 million kroons. It can be seen that the advertising agreement between ETV 
and the private channels did not significantly improve the private channels' eco­
nomic positions but resulted in a deep crisis for ETV. In the fall of 1999, ETV's 
budget deficit rose tremendously, ETV's debts made it necessary to take an addi­
tional 20 million EEK bank loan to rebalance its budget. 
ETV ended up in a serious management and financial crisis at the end of 1999. 
The main reasons for this were mismanagement, programme over-production, 
the decreased state support that accompanied the supplementary budget cuts, a 
major reduction in advertising income, and ETV's cumulative problems of under-
financing. ETV now had negative equity. Under these circumstances, the Director 
General of ETV was isolated from ETV management. The long process of firing 
the Director General began - a process, which concluded in the spring of 2000. A 
temporary management board of ETV was appointed. The aggregated financial 
obligations of ETV had reached 72 million EEK by that time. 
The temporary management of ETV applied a crisis management programme 
during the spring of 2000 to avoid any further deepening of the undesirable 
instability of the television organisation and to stop the growth of its debts. It was 
planned to reduce the amount of programme output by 15% (compared to 1999), 
in-house production was to decrease by 25% (see Table 4.1), and more than 100 
employees were fired while strict controls were applied to expenses. ETV imple­
mented a system of producers' accountability. 
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4. Fourth period (spring 2000-2001): 
Crisis management and the expected stabilisation of ETV 
The main features of the fourth period in the development of public television in 
Estonia are: 
• amendment of the Broadcasting Act in the spring of 2000 in order to change the 
composition of the Broadcasting Council, and its responsibilities and obliga­
tions; 
• dismissal of ETV's Director General; 
• attempts to defuse the crisis and to stabilise the economic and organisational 
situation of ETV; 
• increasing activity and intervention on the parts of the Broadcasting Council 
and the Government to find strategies for the further development of the pub­
lic sector; 
• new proposals for the organisational restructuring of public broadcasting; 
• emergence of an urgent need to find long-term strategies to guarantee the bal­
anced development of the broadcasting sector. 
• amendment of the Broadcasting Act in the fall of 2001 - abandonment of adver­
tising in ETV and implementation of a new financing strategy for public broad­
casting in Estonia. 
4.1. Appointment of the new Broadcasting Council 
and the ETV management board 
At this crucial moment for public service television the Estonian Parliament 
changed the Broadcasting Act and expanded the Broadcasting Council's respon­
sibility for ETV's strategic, financial and programme management. It was also 
decided to change the composition of the Broadcasting Council in order to 
enhance its political and professional accountability for the efficient functioning 
of ETV. The new members of the Broadcasting Council were appointed by Par­
liament in the spring of 2000. The new Council would consist of five Parliament 
politicians and four media experts. The new leadership took over the office in the 
worst conditions ETV had ever faced - as it was mentioned above aggregated 
financial obligations had reached 72 million EEK by that time. 
4.2. Attempts made to escape financial and organisational crisis 
The appointment of the new Broadcasting Council by Parliament in April 2000 
was followed by the election of the new executive management of ETV, which 
started work in June. The priority of these institutions was the stabilisation of 
ETV. They started to elaborate new action and development plans for ETV. There 
was an urgent need to raise the status, importance, impact and role of the 
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Broadcasting Council as a decisive body in the processes concerning public 
broadcasting and in relations with other state institutions. 
Discussions on new ideas to change the organisational structure and to imple­
ment new effective management schemes for ETV were also actively pursued. 
The management of ETV proposed changes to ETV's programme structure to bet­
ter fulfil the obligations of the public broadcaster (see Figures 12 and 13 in 
Appendix). The goal was to increase the amount of programming of news, infor­
mation, journalistic programmes, cultural, educational, children's programming 
and broadcasts for Russian audiences while decreasing the amount of entertain­
ment and series-serials. ETV was successful and finished the year 2000 with 
financial loss of "only" 6 million EEK (see Table 4.2). 
At the same time the depressed financial standing of ETV has prompted an 
extensive discussion on public broadcasting issues. The financial crisis of ETV 
was a matter of ongoing debates between the Broadcasting Council, the Ministry 
of Culture and the government during the fall of 2000 and the whole year 2001. 
Different schemes for the urgent and longrun solutions were suggested. First of 
all the government resolved to find an opportunity of assigning ETV 6 million 
EEK from its reserve to pay out redundancy monies if ETV would make efforts 
to pay its debts. The urgent need to stabilise the situation in ETV was solved by 
the amendment to the Broadcasting Act, which allowed ETV to get a state-guar­
anteed loan and refinance its financial obligations. So, ETV received a 37 million 
EEK as a state-guaranteed loan, and the financial situation stabilised by July 2001. 
In late October 2000, the Estonian government suggested merging Estonian 
Television and Estonian Radio to create a united public broadcasting institution, 
in order to alleviate ETV's debt burden. The government resolved to support the 
troubled ETV only on the condition that the Broadcasting Council reorganises the 
structure of public broadcasting. The government also recommended the Broad­
casting Council to set up a working group to prepare for a merger of ETV and ER. 
The Ministry of Culture expressed its awareness that the reorganisation of ETV 
and ER into an integrated public broadcasting structure would prove so eco­
nomical that ETV would no longer need one-off subsidies. 
The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Culture strongly argued in favour 
of signing a special agreement between the state and public television and radio 
that would outline general programme structures and specify the functions of the 
services provided. According to that idea the amount of state subsidies to the 
public broadcasters would be based on thoroughly negotiated detailed plans and 
agreements. However, the Broadcasting Council, citing the Broadcasting Act, 
argued that the Council alone is the full representative of the state on public 
broadcasting issues and the ultimate body to which the public broadcaster is 
obliged to refer. 
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4.3. Implementation of EU media policies 
Although most of Estonia's problems concerning internal media regulation still 
remained unsolved, considerable progress was achieved in unifying Estonian 
media legislation with the principles, advanced by the European Union's audio­
visual policy. Estonia endorsed the European Convention on Trans-frontier Tele­
vision (Council of Europe, 1989) in February 1999. In April 2000, a package of EU-
related amendments to the Broadcasting Act was passed by the Estonian Parlia­
ment. Requirements and regulations concerning the amount of domestic and 
European production, access to information, rules concerning advertising, tele-
shopping, sponsorship and a requirement to purchase 10% of programming from 
independent producers, were brought into accordance with the European princi­
ples. The requirements will gradually come into force in Estonia between 2001 
and 2003. 
4.4. The Broadcasting Council's suggestion 
for a new funding scheme for public broadcasting 
The attention of the Broadcasting Council during the fall of 2000 was mainly con­
centrated on financial issues and further proposals for possible changes to the 
ETV's funding model. The implementation of an appropriate financing scheme 
was considered as the key point as far as Estonian media legislation was con­
cerned. It was still highly regrettable that the legislators did not manage to 
change the practice of making the decisions about the ETV budget on an annual 
basis, which had caused continuous uncertainties over the past decade and had 
complicated the proper planning and elaboration of the reasonably firm devel­
opment strategies. For public broadcasting, "the allocation of an appropriate 
budget and a safeguard for the future existence are major conditions for a social­
ly well-balanced way of operating and responsible behaviour" (Television..., 
1995: 284). 
Since the licence fee payments for public service broadcasters cannot be intro­
duced in Estonia, the Broadcasting Council suggested in 2000 a new basis for cal­
culating the amount of state subsidies on an annual basis per TV household. 
According to the new idea, the rate per household will be fixed for a period of 2-3 
years, in order to guarantee the stability and independence of the public broad­
caster and to provide TV and radio with sufficient resources. The Broadcasting 
Council has suggested fixing the basis for subsidies at 1 EEK per household per 
day (0.06 USD), which would add up to 365 EEK per year (20 USD). As there are 
600,000 TV households in Estonia, implementation of the new model would in 
theory lead to an annual total subsidy equal to 218 million EEK, which is 30% 
higher than the public broadcasters (Estonian Television and Estonian Radio) 
received together in 1999. Although this proposal was abandoned during further 
discussions it is worth to mention it as a possible alternative to the licence fee sys­
tem. 
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4.5. On the way to consensus 
Fortunately the ongoing tensions on Estonian broadcasting market and the crisis 
of ETV intensed the search to find consent solutions in public broadcasting poli­
cies. The readiness of the Estonian government, Parliament and political parties 
as well as the broadcasting institutions to solve the problematic questions and 
find the right ways to implement a framework to stabilise public broadcasting 
and the TV sector as a whole increased considerably. 
The Ministry of Culture initiated a conference on "Broadcasting and Money" in 
January 2001. Then a working group of the representatives of the Ministry of Cul­
ture, Broadcasting Council, and Estonian Broadcasters' Association was formed 
in order to find possibilities for enabling the sustainable development and deal­
ing with the financial issues of public broadcasting. The working group agreed 
upon the financing principles of public broadcasting on 30 April, when the par­
ties signed proposals to change the Broadcasting Act. According to that agree­
ment the public broadcaster will abandon advertising; and sponsorship will be 
allowed only through non-profit organisations and foundations. The state subsi­
dies for ETV and ER will total 250-270 million EEK annually for the period of the 
next three to five years; the broadcasting licences for private channels will be 
taxed and these revenues will be directed to finance public broadcasting. 
This agreement was the basis for the Ministry of Culture to prepare a draft of 
Amendment Act to the Broadcasting Act. This draft included the change of the 
ETV's and ER's financing scheme; the idea of the agreement between the public 
broadcaster and the state; and the fee for the broadcasting licence in regional, 
state and international TV net. 
In May 2001, the government confirmed its position - on 31 May 2001 the Min­
istry of Justice, the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Finance submitted a 
draft of Estonian National Broadcasting Act for discussions. This draft envisages 
the merge of ETV and ER into a single public broadcasting organisation. It states 
that public broadcaster will abandon advertising, and the state subsidies will be 
bound to the agreement made between the public broadcaster and the state. The 
draft of Amendment Act to the Broadcasting Act and the draft of Estonian 
National Broadcasting Act were submitted to the Parliament for discussions in 
the fall of 2001. 
4.6. TV 1 dropped out 
Although the third national private channel TV1, which started its operations in 
1996 made a remarkable growth in audience shares - from 0.7% in January 1996 
to 11.6% in July 2001 (even 17.7% in Estonian speaking audience) - it was insuf­
ficient to survive in the restricted and competitive TV market. Due to the unpaid 
depts (approximately 1 million EEK) Estonian Broadcasting Transmission Centre 
(ERSK AS) switched off the TV 1 programme transmitters at the beginning of 
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October 2001. Polsat was not able to save the station and restore its financing - as 
a result to that TV1 was not able to renew the terrestrial programme transmission 
during ten days in order to improve the situation. On 22 October, the Minister of 
Culture invalidated TVl's licence. The station will most likely be modified into a 
smaller firm that will produce programming for a cable company. 
4.7. Radical changes in Estonian broadcasting policy 
Based on consensus that was achieved in preliminary discussions between the 
state, public and private broadcasters the amendment of the Broadcasting Act did 
not find any serious resistance during the deliberations in Parliament. Although 
the draft of Estonian National Broadcasting Act aiming the merger of ETV and ER 
was taken back by the government for further improvement the idea to abandon 
advertising on public television and the need for stabilisation of the financing 
model found full support of the Parliament's majority. 
The Amendment Act of the Broadcasting Act was passed by the Parliament on 
19 December 2001. According to the Amended Act, ETV will abandon spot adver­
tising, teleshopping and sponsorship (with some exclusions concerning the pro­
grammes purchased via the EBU etc.) from 1 July 2002 (ER respectively from 1 
January 2005). The broadcasting licences of the two national private TV channels 
will be taxed (30 million EEK per year) and these revenues will be directed via 
state budget to finance public broadcasting. The further financing via subsidies 
from the state budget will be based on the development plan of public broad­
casting for three years (first plan for 2003-2006) that has to be submitted by the 
Broadcasting Council and approved by the Parliament. The development plan 
has to reveal the nature and aims of the cultural, social and democratic public 
service and to reflect the structure and amount of programming according to the 
goals set up by the Broadcasting Act. Based on these foundations the plan will 
also fix the need for financing and investments for the whole three-year period 
and for each respective year in particular. 
At the same time Parliament allocated 35 million EEK to compensate the 
decrease of ETV's income by the abandonment of advertising. As a result, the 
total state subsidy of ETV and ER reached 217 million EEK for 2002. The Broad­
casting Council also applied for a second state-guaranteed loan (40 million EEK) 
for further financial stabilisation of ETV's situation. All these steps should pre­
sumably improve the situation and lead ETV out of the crisis. 
The amendment of the Broadcasting Act in 2001 should definitely be consid­
ered as a cornerstone in the history of the public broadcasting in Estonia. The 
decisions made by the Parliament brought to the end the decade-long period of 
controversial and dramatic development of the broadcasting landscape. ETV is 
definitely meeting a new challenge. The years ahead will show if these decisions 
lead to the desired stabilisation of the TV sector and enlarge the public broad­
caster's ability to meet its ultimate remits. 
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Summary 
The transformation of television in Estonia during the last decade of the 20th cen­
tury could be characterised as a period of the emergence and development of the 
dual broadcasting system. A balance between the public and private sectors and 
conditions facilitating the stable and systematic development of the TV sectors 
were not fully achieved. The most serious step towards these aims was done at 
the end of 2001, when the amendment of the Broadcasting Act prohibited adver­
tising on ETV and changed the basic financing model of the public broadcasting. 
Many features of the development of the broadcasting sector in Estonian have 
been, and still are, similar to the trends in European public service broadcasting 
(EBU 1993; McKinsey, 1999). 
Controversies in visions of the development of the broadcasting sector. Seri­
ous and sometimes dramatic discussions on the most appropriate TV model for 
Estonia are still going on. The supporters of public broadcasting tend to argue 
that public broadcasting is a guarantee of European democratic order and is able 
to protect the national cultural heritage and cultural identity. They believe that 
public broadcasting will secure the impartiality and objectivity of the information 
provided, will supply varied programming in the national language, is the best 
way to achieve a balance between different interests, and will protect minorities' 
rights and equal access to information. 
The arguments in favour of privatisation or the absolute denial of public broad­
casting are based on the economic weakness of public services. It is argued that 
the product- and market-driven services are much more important than channels 
or institutions established by the law. Some opponents of public broadcasting 
believe that only the implementation of a precisely defined government order 
system will lead to common agreement between the state and public broadcast­
ers. It is also argued that the commercial channels should be involved in the ten­
ders for government-ordered programming. The state would finance the pro­
duction of the programmes that the private channels themselves are not moti­
vated to produce for economic reasons. Those expressing the most radical opin­
ions propose that public broadcasting is not able to achieve economic effective­
ness and should therefore be stopped. 
Remarkable growth of the broadcasting sector. ETV's monopoly was broken, 
the number of national TV-channels increased from one to four and was then 
reduced to three during the last decade. The number of TV hours transmitted per 
year rose 7.6 times during 1993-2000 and reached 32,463 hours in 2000 (see Table 
4.1). The amount of original programming (in-house/co-produced/commis­
sioned productions) went up by 9.5 times between 1993 and 2000. The total 
amount of in-house production coming out of the five Estonian television chan­
nels was 16,650 hours or, 51.3% of the whole programming time in 2000. Until the 
year 2000, ETV produced about 40-60% of the total of domestic production of 
Estonian television channels in the Estonian language (as a result of the ETV cri­
sis the ratio of ETV's and private TV channels' domestic TV production was 
20 : 80 in 2000). The proportion of domestic production in ETV programming is 
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about 66%, whereas it is only 31% in the case of the commercial channels (see Fig­
ure 7 in Appendix). 
Difficulties in the proper legal regulation of the broadcasting field. The 1994 
Broadcasting Act mirrored the main principles and regulations of European pub­
lic broadcasting. In addition, between 1994 and 2000 several laws and regulations 
on media, advertising, cable television and telecommunications were introduced. 
Eventually some of the necessary basic agreements and a political consensus con­
cerning further improvement of the legislative foundations of the broadcasting 
sector were achieved. There are still considerable disagreements and controver­
sies in Estonian society; understanding of the role, purpose and remits of public 
broadcasting services and the ultimate need to secure and protect the independ­
ent and stable development of public television. This has slowed down the 
process of securing options by which the state might achieve more balanced and 
less controversial conditions for both the public and private broadcasters and for 
the TV sector as a whole. The main concerns are definitely related to the funding 
schemes for public radio and television. In spite of that, the process of the recon­
ciliation and adjustment of the Estonian media framework to fit the EU media 
regulatory principles has begun. 
Strengthening of foreign ownership and media concentration. The Estonian 
TV landscape has faced similar transformations to the TV landscapes of the most 
European countries, in particular in terms of the processes of privatisation, inter-
nationalisation and the developing convergence of different media. The period 
could be characterised as a time of drastic changes in channel ownership, and 
specifically of shifts of control from Estonian owners to major foreign media, 
publishing and telecommunications companies. Despite the fact that nine domes­
tically owned TV channels started their operations in 1993, the foreign companies 
Schibsted and Kinnevik (MTG) dominate the TV market at the end of 2001. The 
peculiarity of the TV marketplace in Estonia is the large number of TV channels 
in comparison with the size of the population, and in spite of instability, limited 
amounts of advertising income and the considerable debts of most TV channels. 
Maintaining impartiality and political independence. One of the most 
remarkable achievements of public broadcasting during this decade in Estonia 
was the ability to keep general objectivity, impartiality and a pluralistic approach 
while avoiding political pressure and biased journalistic treatment of important 
items. However, it may also be the case that public television followed the gen­
eral shape of the Estonian media and did not participate consciously in creation 
of a more developed political culture (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 2002), was not 
active enough to facilitate open debates on different matters of public interest and 
issues important to the socio-cultural and political development of Estonian soci­
ety. 
Fine-tuning of programming and commercial temptations. ETV succeeded in 
maintaining the generally recognised structure of public programming during 
this decade. It remained Estonia's biggest producer of original programmes in the 
Estonian and Russian languages and was, and still remains, the main producer of 
news, and political, educational, cultural, sport and children's programming. 
While a substantial part of ETV's income came from advertising, the commercial 
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temptations were obvious; however, for the most part, they only influenced the 
prime-time programming. The concurrent need to fulfil the programming obli­
gations of a broad- and narrowcaster caused continual controversies in the self-
concept of ETV and clouded the image and identity of the public broadcaster. 
While private broadcasters have been able to produce a lot of interesting and 
competitive news, infotainment and fiction programming, the amount of pro­
gramme output has considerably decreased during the last few years due to 
financial factors. The programme structures of ETV and the private channels are 
very different (see Table 25 in Appendix); foreign film productions and enter­
tainment dominate in the latter. This seems to provide a convincing demonstra­
tion of the importance of the programme requirements set by the law upon the 
public broadcasters. 
Funding insufficiencies and inappropriate solutions of financing schemes. 
The funding scheme of the public broadcasters has remained unstable and insuf­
ficient to guarantee fulfilment of the goals and needs of programming and tech­
nical development. Hopefully reshaping of the financing procedures according to 
the amendments to the broadcasting Act in the fall of 2001 will somewhat release 
the tensions. Obviously, most of the financial difficulties have emerged as a result 
of the "conditional smallness" of Estonia, its resources and its options. The total 
expenditure of the TV channels rose from 20 million EEK in 1992 to 400 million 
EEK in 2000. However, the entire TV industry still faces considerable financial 
difficulties: the total debt of the Estonian TV sector was about 93.8 million EEK in 
2000. There can be little doubt that the need to restructure and stabilise the TV 
landscape are urgent priorities and need to be founded upon properly conceived 
government media policies. 
Reshaping and segmentation of the audiences. The average time devoted to 
TV watching remains comparatively high in Estonia and is about 32-36 hours per 
week. Growing competition has led to audience fragmentation, caused by the 
channels' needs to refine their programme policies and a more precise orientation 
on target audiences. The popularity of public broadcasting television was not 
seriously jeopardised until the end of 1998, when the audience shares of TV chan­
nels began to equalise (see Figure 4.3). Afterwards, ETV several times lost its 
leading position in the ratings. Audience parities and low expectations for the 
growth of advertising revenues have roused further competitive tensions. 
Urgent need for a state programme on broadcasting development. A general 
understanding of the essential role of state media policies remains unspecified 
and underestimated. Whatever suggestions on public broadcasting should be 
proposed, the problems of public service television cannot be solved in isolation 
from the adjustment of the whole Estonian TV industry to a general plan of 
development. This plan should take into account the interests of the state and the 
nation, the needs of the public, and the options offered by the economic devel­
opment and professional perspectives and creative potential of the TV sector 
itself. The conditions necessary for the simultaneous development of the public 
and private TV sectors have to be implemented. In addition, several important 
issues concerning technical development, digitalisation, convergence and new 
telecommunication services provided by the public sector need to be addressed. 
The significance of proper media policies based on political consensus and 
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professional understanding appears undeniable. At the same time, the responsi­
bilities and decision-making powers of the Broadcasting Council need to be 
increased, in order that it may fulfil its role as the ultimate representative of pub­
lic broadcasting in society. 
Hopefully the television broadcasting will benefit from the most serious deci­
sions that were made to the Estonian broadcasting policies in the fall of 2001. 
Most European countries have a dual broadcasting system with a strong public 
service sector. Hopefully Estonia will accomplish the same goal. 
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5. Peaks and Crises of Estonian Radio: 1987-2001 
Maarja Lõhmus 
The radio broadcasting system in Estonia - its functions as well as broadcast con­
tent - has changed completely during the last few decades. 
In the early 1980s, under a totalitarian political system, radio was highly con­
trolled: broadcasts went through three to five different levels of censorship while 
ostensibly maintaining spontaneity (Lõhmus, 2001b). Estonian radio-journalism 
reached a new stage in 1987, when "forbidden" subjects and manners started to 
reverberate on the radio. Estonian Radio was actively involved with the political 
changes in the end of the 1980s, and in the early 1990s became a genuine public 
service broadcaster. After the collapse of the Soviet regime there was a strong 
media system that was not under the control of political or market forces. In the 
new political-economic structure of the 1990s, broadcasting became a part of a 
new system, a branch of the economy. During the last ten years the liberal model 
of journalism has risen to dominance. 
Thus, three different types of public texts distributed by the media in Estonia 
may be distinguished that correspond to the existing political-ideological situa­
tion: the totalitarian text of the closed society (from the middle 1940s until the late 
1980s), participatory public text (the late 1980s through the early 1990s) and liberal 
public text (the early 1990s until today) (Lõhmus, 2001b). 
This chapter focuses on changes that have taken place in the radio system and 
radio-journalism in the 1990s. The empirical basis relies on the results of analyses 
of radio and TV programmes and audiences carried out by the journalism stu­
dents of Tartu University. 
1. Estonian Radio in 1987-1991: 
Active participation in social change 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, radio and television were active and popular 
channels in Estonia. Radio and television broadcasts can be considered important 
factors in structural changes. Radio listening and television viewing formed a 
shared experience; people widely discussed the content of broadcasts and devel­
oped perceived viewpoints further. 
Changes in radio-journalism started in February 1987, when discussions about 
current political issues were included in Estonian Radio's weekly direct broad­
casts of the Council of the Artist Unions' programme. Estonian Radio actively 
participated in the "phosphate war" against Moscow's plans to construct huge 
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phosphate mines in northeast Estonia. The "phosphate war" started with an 
Estonian Radio broadcast discussing these plans, symbolically titled "Start Given 
in the Radio's White Hall" (aired on 26 February 1987). 
By the spring of 1988, such relatively isolated textual events became both a tex­
tual stream and a general dominant journalistic discourse that started to support, 
express, analyse and also partially guide changes in society. A characteristic fea­
ture of this period was the immediate participation of journalistic texts in social 
processes. 
Changes had taken place rapidly: journalists spoke publicly in the spring of 
1988 about problems for which they could have been fired for discussing pri­
vately in 1980. Exercising freedom of speech in the end of the 1980s was a con­
stant process, where the limits were broadened step by step. That was not a fear­
less process. Many journalists said something like these two: "When I finished 
the programme by Sunday, I was shaking inside and I was sure that something 
would happen - I would be banned from performing" or "I had no idea if that 
could be said or not, but I still did, just in case, first in subordinate clause." (Inter­
views with journalists Mari Tarand and Andrus Saar in 1994). 
The end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s was the prime time for 
Estonian radio-journalism. Skilled journalists and editors had become profes­
sionals in developing programmes and audiences. Texts had to be exact, intense 
and social - the Soviet censorship had developed journalists who were very sen­
sitive towards wording and style. Top-level journalists covered each socially 
important event, bringing it near to the audience. 
The whole journalist profession was transformed in the early 1990s. Some of 
the active radio-journalists went into politics or other fields of activity either 
because they lost interest or their programme ended; some journalists had to be 
removed because they could not adjust to new circumstances; some continued 
their work in Estonian Radio or in new private channels. The strong and unitary 
family of radio-journalists at the beginning of 1990s had dispersed by the middle 
1990s. 
According to data from audience research, in the early 1990s about 80% of Esto­
nians aged 15-74 listened to Estonian Radio on workdays. The most popular 
broadcasts were: broadcasts for countryside people (Good Morning, Farmers!: 
52% of the potential audience), news (News at Noon: 48%), family broadcasts 
(Home and Family: 47%), literary entertainment (Mind Cooler: 33%), ministra­
tions over the radio (Light of Soul: 31%), children's broadcasts (Children's Morn­
ing: 30%) (Information and Computing Centre Newsletter 1990, 8: 3^4). 
Comparing the results of surveys made in the beginning and end of the 1980s, 
there was a growing interest in politics and public affairs (Maimik, 1980; 
Kivirähk, 1986; Paulson, 1993). 
Audience interests in 1990 focused on themes such as regaining independence 
for the Baltics, Estonia's relations with other countries and the actions of Estonia's 
government (Infokanalid 1991: 7). 
The prime years for political and news broadcasts were 1989-1990, after which 
interest in them decreased. Interest in entertainment was at its highest (91% of the 
potential audience) in 1983, which can be connected with the prevailing stagna-
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Table 5.1. Public service radio audience trends in Europe, 1995-2000 
Country / public service 
broadcasting organisation 1995 1998 2000 Age basis 
Estonia / ER - Estonians 
ER - Non-Estonians 
75 
62 
40 
43 
36 
36 Age 12+ 
Poland / PR 59 39 37 Age 10+; 9+ (since 1998) 
Russia / Russian PSB 641 49 46 Age 10+ 
United Kingdom / BBC 48 48 51 Age 15+ 
Germany / ARD (Radio) 59 56 51 
Austria / ÖRF 92 83 80 Age 10+ 
Italy / RAI (Radio) 29 23 21 Age 11 + 
Greece / ERA (Athens area only) 6 8 6 Age 13-70 
Sweden / SR 69 65 65 Age 9-79 
Denmark / DR 78 70 65 Age 12+ 
Finland / YLE 69 61 60 Age 9+ 
Norway / NRK 61 60 59 Age 9+ 
1 Data from 1996. Source: Audience Trends 1990-2000 
tion and political depression. In 1988-1991, the audience's interest in entertain­
ment was relatively low (Paulson, 1993). 
2. Structural changes and marketisation of radio: 1992-2001 
2.1. New channels, emerging competition 
The transformation of ownership relations from political into economic and the 
formation of new radio channels in the early 1990s produced a market concept of 
electronic media and formed business relations in the media industry. Public 
radio had to compete with commercial radio, which was established in 1991. 
Estonian public service broadcasting, Estonian Radio, experienced significant 
audience losses in the 1990s. At the end of the decade, its market share had 
decreased by more than a factor of two. In contrast, the traditionally high-public-
service-share Nordic countries lost only five to ten percent of their audience to 
competing broadcasters during the 1990s (see Table 5.1). 
Developments in the radio market during the 1990s include the launching of 
numerous music and entertainment stations and the transition to FM waveband 
broadcasts instead of the previously used MW. The first private commercial sta­
tions in Estonia were Radio Tartu in Tartu in 1991 (spun off from the local depart­
ment of Estonian Radio) and Radio Kuku in Tallinn and Tartu in 1992. 
At the beginning of 2001, thirty-three radio programmes functioned in Estonia. 
Estonian Radio had four programmes and licensed Estonian legal entities were 
broadcasting twenty-nine programmes. With respect to coverage, the 
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Table 5.2. Share of radio programmes and broadcasters in Estonia, 
spring 2001 
Programmes 
Public or 
private 
radio 
Daily 
national 
reach 
(%) 
Audience 
(thous) 
Daily 
national 
share 
(%) 
Average 
daily 
listening 
(min) 
Vikerraadio Public 15.9 186 17.1 34 
Raadio Elmar Private 12.9 151 14.8 29 
Raadio 4 Public 11.3 133 9.8 19 
Raadio 2 Public 8.2 96 6.9 14 
Klassikaraadio Public 1.1 13 0.4 1 
Sky Plus Private 6.4 75 6.3 12 
Raadio Uuno Private 5.6 65 4.9 10 
Russkoje Radio Private 5.5 65 4.3 9 
Broadcasters 
Estonian Radio (4) Public 33.8 395 34.7 69 
Trio Group (6) Private 28.3 331 30.2 60 
Sky Group (5) Private 15.3 179 14.1 28 
Mediainvest Holding (2) Private 3.3 39,000 3.0 6 
Local stations Private 9.3 109,000 8.7 17 
Source: Emor 2001 
programmes can be divided into three groups: 6 national, 15 regional and 12 local 
(Table 5.2). 
In 2000 the government supported public radio broadcasting with 50 kroons per 
inhabitant (Kultuur 2000:104). Many foreign investors entered the Estonian radio 
market. The biggest investors in radio broadcasting are Metromedia Internation­
al, Wodlinger International, Mediainvest Holding and Schibsted. 
In the spring of 2001, the highest general ratings went to Vikerraadio (public), 
Raadio Elmar (private) and Raadio 4 (public, in Russian) (see Table 5.2). In 2000, 
the share of daily radio listening was approximately 35% for public radio stations 
and 50% for private radio stations. 
When comparing the present to the early 1990s, the size of the television audi­
ence is growing while the number of radio listeners is decreasing. The average 
time spent watching TV in the middle 1980s was 1 hour 52 minutes and listening 
to the radio was 3 hours 41 minutes. By the middle 1990s the average time for TV 
was 3 hours 17 minutes and radio listening was 4 hours 23 minutes (Baltic Media 
Book 1995); in 2000 the corresponding numbers were 4 hours 10 minutes of TV 
and 3 hours 32 minutes for radio (Baltic Media Book 2001). 
Figure 5.1. Radio programmes audience share, 1995-2001. Estonians 
Age 12-74. The share of time respondent has spent following the programme/station expressed as the percentage of total radio following 
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2.2. Changes in Estonian Radio 
With political reform beginning in the 1990s, Estonian Radio was restructured 
into a public institution and officially legalised with the Broadcasting Act (1994) 
and the new Statute of Estonian Radio (1995). Revenues increased slowly but 
decreased in 2000 (Table 5.3). 
The formation of public service institutions was slow; numerous economic and 
political differences slowed the process. The weak power of the Parliament-
appointed Broadcasting Council has also hindered the realisation of an optimal 
structure and a professional work organisation. 
There have been many changes in Estonian Radio but without strategic plan­
ning, public argument or collective discussion. In 1991, before the adoption of the 
Statute of Estonian Radio, a debate was organised with the participation of the 
majority of the employees. Unfortunately, it was the only case in independent 
Estonia when large groups of journalists have been actively involved in decision­
making in Estonian Radio. Since 1992, the atmosphere of collective debate, which 
existed in Estonian Radio even during the Soviet era, steadily disappeared. 
At the same time, the organisational structure of Estonian Radio changed con­
siderably and staff was reduced. Several programme departments (including the 
children's department and the agricultural department) and institutions (includ­
ing Estonian Radio's mixed-voice choir, light orchestra, etc.) were closed down 
and about 30% of the journalistic staff were fired (from 437 people in 1990 to 319 
in 2001). 
The most decisive changes started in period of the "innovative" Director-Gen­
eral of Estonian Radio, Herkki Haldre (1992-1994). One important change was 
the closing of the audience and programme research activities. The Department 
of Media Sociology had functioned at Estonian Radio since 1969, providing gen­
eral and special audience research as well as content analysis of radio broadcasts, 
and had participated in strategic planning. The activities of this group were 
reduced progressively in the beginning of the 1990s and stopped in 1994. In 2001 
only one person was working on audience and programme analysis at Estonian 
Radio, while audience research was conducted by Emor, the largest opinion and 
market research company in the Baltic countries. 
During 1992-1994, the principal public service programme Vikerraadio was 
restructured, the transmission time of many broadcasts (popular for as long as 
ten to twenty years) was changed, and their production eventually stopped (e.g., 
the above mentioned Good Morning, Farmers! and Home and Family). The 
amount of original musical compositions, radio plays and other art programmes, 
as well as commentaries on sports and other events, decreased. The professional 
variety of programmes, characteristic of Estonian Radio in the 1980s, did not exist 
any more. 
On the other hand, the amount of entertainment increased, such as in May 1993 
when the Estonian Radio second programme was reorganised into the youth-ori­
ented programme Raadio 2, broadcasting mainly popular music. As this 
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Table 5.3. Revenue of Estonian Radio,1993-2000 
Total revenue 
(mil EEK) 
Support from 
state budget (%) 
Share from 
advertisements (%) 
1993 30.2 69.0 18.7 
1994 50.0 72.4 18.5 
1995 64.3 76.0 21.7 
1996 81.5 81.9 18.0 
1997 85.3 82.8 16.0 
1998 95.6 80.3 14.6 
1999 98.8 80.4 13.7 
2000 88.4 80.5 13.3 
Source: Estonian Radio 2001 
programme is open for advertising, many people consider its launching as the 
creation of a commercial programme inside the public Estonian Radio. 
Constant darkness around the reforms and the sudden waves of firing have 
strongly injured the professional staff of radio journalists, keeping up the stress 
and tension. Long and uncertain periods of change have harmed the work atmos­
phere and made actual work vague: "No-one knows what will happen tomorrow. 
There are no programme departments, no meetings, where one could discuss 
current problems together. Programmes are being created casually: 'I included 
you in that programme.' Everything is casual." (Interview with radio-journalists 
Mari Tarand and Martin Viirand in 1998). 
The instability of the programmes was caused by competition with commercial 
programmes, by weak self-identity and by the poorly defined functional role of 
public radio. 
One of the basic problems in the current development of Estonian Radio is its 
constant focus on the "outer front," in which the administration concentrates on 
economic problems instead of the content of its programmes. Systematic work 
has not been conducted in organisational structures or in programme quality and 
strategic development. The Director-General does not see the current statement 
of public radio as unsatisfactory: "The role of Estonian Radio in society reveals 
itself in crisis (for example, during the coup in 1991). The desire of some interest 
groups to undermine the role of Estonian Radio is insulting" (Interview with Ain 
Saarna, Director-General of Estonian Radio, November 2001). 
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2.3. Development of new radio stations 
Commercial stations are predominantly music stations with advertisements and 
short news bulletins. In most cases no professional journalists or editors are 
employed; DJs and commercial staff whose use of language is poor and cultural 
level are low do all the work. Interviews with the producers of local and regional 
stations revealed that many of them are experiencing a need for a professionally 
educated workforce (Interview with Marko Martin in 1999). 
Only five or six of the new stations started to work on a journalistic level and 
created their own professional programme. These include Raadio Kuku Tartu, 
whose 1992-1994 programme was characterised by a high intellectual level and 
performances; Raadio Pluss B3, characterised by intellectual humour in 
1996-1997; and Uudisteraadio (News Radio), which in 1998-1999 broadcast 
news, comments and analysis. 
The Radio Kuku programme competes with public stations, providing much 
political analysis, with greater speed and more flexible thinking than most pub­
lic programmes. Kuku, however, is a classic example of why even a professional 
and intellectual private station usually does not replace the public service: the 
programme includes commentaries from its owners, often influenced by their 
business interests (Berg, 2000; Rudi, 2000). 
There is too little democratic journalism and too low an aesthetical level in the 
commercial stations' programmes. Several programme directors say that, as a 
rule, talking in their channels cannot last more than 15 minutes (Luts, 2001; 
Normet, 1999). Similar types of music dominate many channels, including so-
called participatory broadcasts, which are usually limited to generally boring and 
banal studio phone calls, guessing games, song requests or matchmaking. 
Serious journalism and social problems are deliberately avoided in many chan­
nels due to personal interest or personal relations, or due to an inability to deal 
with events in a wider context. The promotion of helpful politicians can be 
noticed in various ways and contexts, especially before local elections (Teppan, 
1999; Müller, 2001). Channel owners might prohibit talking about certain sub­
jects: for example, several radio stations do not allow talking on political and 
social topics; the content of broadcasts is often regulated by the lists of "partners" 
for positive speaking (Müller, 2001; Ehand, 2001). 
The programmes of several channels (Sky Plus, Mega FM) have included sus­
picious "services" where the listeners have implicitly become a part of potential­
ly illegal acts, presuming that the listener is not a fully law-abiding citizen. That 
discourse has been typical in news about traffic circumstances (often revealing 
the locations of traffic inspectors) and crime "news" with heroes as "authorities 
of the underworld." It could become a direct threat in traffic (corresponding law 
cases in 1997), where it produces different dangerous situations. 
News is usually based on only one or two sources, mainly news agencies, and 
is often the same for many radio stations. Poor language use, incompetence and 
unprofessionalism are great problems. Although those employed should be 
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"on the pulse of life" (Kurm, 1998; Otsmaa; 1999), they quite often lack the need­
ed intellectual resources. 
In the 1990s, the owners of stations evidently valued most the fact of ownership 
itself, and less attention has been given to the quality of the programme. Pro­
gramme production at the cheapest possible cost is part of this ideology. The pro­
gramme is inexpensive and indulgent, usually aggressive and consumption-ori­
ented. Most commercial stations have for years been working without making 
a profit. 
2.4. Main radio programmes in 2001 
Vikerraadio, a public service channel targeted to the general public, had the 
highest audience share in Estonia in the spring of 2001. It is the oldest and the 
most popular station in Estonia, carrying out all the demands of public broad­
casting with thematic discussions, literary adaptations, radio drama and different 
kinds of music. News is aired every hour with longer news programmes five 
times a day. According to a programme analysis by Tartu University journalism 
students, 24% of its broadcasts were educational, including Müstiline Venemaa 
(Mysterious Russia), Tähtpäevatund (Hour of Anniversaries), Maailmapilt (World 
Picture), etc. Eighteen percent of the programme was entertainment: radio 
games, a part of the morning programme, etc. The share of informative broad­
casts (news and comments) was 16%; experience exchange broadcasts, 13%. The 
portion of broadcasts with an aesthetic function was 10% and broadcasts with a 
participatory function 9% (for example, call-in request music broadcasts) (Möller 
& Süld, 2001: 87). 
Raadio 2 (public) is a music-centred channel for young people with a primari­
ly entertainment orientation (79%). Thirty percent of its broadcasts also fulfilled 
a participatory function, 27% an informative function and 18% an educational 
function. The programme consists of news, talk shows and pop-rock music. 
Klassikaraadio (public) has a high cultural orientation covering musical gen­
res and subjects not included on other radio stations. Professional and skilled 
radio journalists discuss the world of culture in Keelekõrv (Language-Ear), Sõna­
line (Wordy), Helikaja (Echo of Sound), etc. 
Radio 4 (public) is addressed to the Russophone population of Estonia. The 
programme has a high level of radio-journalism; it is varied and rich in genres. 
The basic function is informative (40%). About 30% of Russophones in Estonia 
were listening to Radio 4, which competes with the commercial station Russko-
je Radio (19% of Russophones). 
Raadio Elmar (private, owned by Trio LSL) is a popular music programme, 
transmitting only songs sung in Estonian, with women and middle-aged people 
dominating the audience. The programme has a high rating and is the main com­
petitor to Vikerraadio. 
Radio Kuku (private, Trio LSL) is a station launched in Tallinn and Tartu in 1992 
and whose programme is the closest to public radio. Kuku owes its popularity 
mostly to celebrities: in the beginning of the 1990s, the best journalists from 
Table 5.4. Developments in radio-journalism in Estonia, 1987-2001 
Type of 
programme Before 1987 1987-1991 1992-1999 2000-2001 
Public 
programmes 
• State broadcasting as 
part of ideological state 
apparatus. 
• Culture, education, home 
and family are preferable 
topics for journalists. 
• Inner politics, 
environment problems 
are avoided. 
• Active 
participation 
in political 
breakthrough. 
• Programme 
functions 
as a political 
and social 
forum. 
• Competition with commercial programmes. 
• Lack of analytical feedback and strategies 
for professional programme development. 
• Legitimisation of institutions of a new political structure, 
formation of new public text. Social problems and 
everyday life as topics are poorly covered, there are 
no children's programmes. 
• Driving towards a politically 
and journalistically balanced 
programme. Identity crises 
in the public service broad­
casting. Crisis in radio journa­
lism, lack of professional staff. 
• Declared openness without real 
openness. 
• Council of broadcasting is more 
actively trying to solve problems. 
Commercial 
programmes 
- -
• 1992-1995: Expansion of new private stations. 
• Launching of new types of programmes and new roles 
in radio (radio as a media channel; the DJ as the basis 
of the station; commercials as content's element). 
• 1996-1999: Change of ownership, growth of foreign 
participation. Formation of radio stations as music 
and commercial stations. High competition. Orientation 
to the audience as a consumer. 
• Growth of foreign capital 
influence. Change into online 
stations, toward more cheep 
programme (Kuku, Raadio 
Tartu). 
Specialised 
programmes 
-
-
• 1992-1995: Formation of a chain of local stations 
on a commercial basis. Focus on local information 
and local problems. 
• 1996-1999: Stations with religious orientation 
emerging. Expansion of music stations. Establishment 
of experimental stations (e.g., Nõmme Radio). 
• Continuing segmentation 
of audience, formation 
of specific groups of interest 
or consumption. 
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Estonian Radio went to work at Kuku. In addition, Kuku is also uses well-known 
specialists as commentators. Informative and commentary broadcasts dominate 
Kuku's programme, like Keskpäevatund (Midday), Pressiklubi (Press Club), etc., 
some of which are politically biased. The programme also includes some serious 
analytical broadcasts where listeners can participate: Öös on inimesi (There are Peo­
ple in the Night), etc. For many years the station has been oriented towards edu­
cated, active and successful people, advertising itself as a station for "a thinking 
man." Reformation of the station in recent years has turned it into a station with 
a strong Internet presence. 
Trio LSL is the most successful private radio company, owned by Metromedia 
International (USA) and by three Estonian businessmen. Trio also owns two 
Russian-language soft hits stations and three local Kuku stations, for a total of 
nine stations. 
2.5. Trends of radio-journalism development 
The development of the radio landscape in Estonia can be viewed in three paral­
lel directions: public service, commercial programmes and specialised pro­
grammes. 
Four time periods can be distinguished: 
1) the end of the totalitarian period before the major social changes (up to 1987); 
2) the period of political change and democratic participatory media; 
3) the formation of private radio stations and public service broadcasting legisla­
tion; the lack of feedback, analyses and strategies for development; the intense 
competition between the radio stations; 
4) the current period with the universal structure of a typical radio programme 
and a practical standstill in radio-journalism development; the last high-level 
professional radio-journalists leaving radio (Table 5.4). 
A positive result of the development in the 1990s was the emergence of a variety 
of channels, different types of programmes and originality in radio-journalism. In 
practice, the situation is much more complicated, mostly due to the lack of eco­
nomic and professional resources and strategic vision. 
Conclusion 
Changes in the radio landscape of Estonia during the last fifteen years have been 
rapid and contradictory. It was a large and complicated system with numerous 
employees, which at the end of the 1980s was quickly re-oriented towards co­
operation with the mass liberation movement, social analysis and the protection 
of public interests. 
In its structure, programme quality and social orientation, Estonian Radio in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s was similar to the Nordic public service system. 
One could find similarities between the programmes in the stability of structure, 
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highly professional staff, diversity of programmes and social responsibility 
among journalists. 
In the 1990s, the centre of attention of the broadcasting leadership was on 
dividing the media market. It became a battlefield of interest groups that were 
regulating, managing, drawing budgets and attacking competitors (e.g., several 
public proposals in 2000-2001 to privatise public broadcasting). 
The tradition of Nordic public service presumes that producers are aware of 
and consider the needs of their audience. Programme production is not focused 
on ideology or profit but on the needs of the audience. This development philos­
ophy was also in force in Estonia from 1987 until 1991, as a democratic public 
broadcasting service developed that was based on feedback from the audience 
and openness. 
Estonian public radio took a step off that road in 1992-1994. An extensive 
industry was created to create and advertise new needs. The industry grew in the 
direction of propagating goods that the majority of people could not consume 
due to their high price but which worked as ideological dimensions to map the 
new world and its value system. The needs of the audience have not been the 
main priority in Estonian Radio programme development. 
The evaluation of changes during the 1990s is ambivalent. In the autumn of 
2001, the nature of public discussion about Estonia media has been mostly criti­
cal and concerned. Radio has been criticised for several points: 
• numerous programmes, a large number of which are unjustified and senseless; 
• channels are often used for political interests, not in the interests of the audi­
ence; 
• owners often inspect and regulate the content; 
• content quality is falling. 
The development of radio in the 1990s did not pay much attention to the social 
and cultural quality of broadcasts. Production-centred broadcasting was pre­
dominant. Estonian Radio journalists and their broadcasts were no longer well 
known among the audience as they had been in the 1980s; broadcasting had 
become anonymous (Ehand, 2001: 274). 
Several Estonian politicians have stressed their preference for the Nordic model 
of public broadcasting development, and the need for an intelligent and demo­
cratic media. 
There exist many manifests but few public and strategic discussions. How to 
come closer to the social environment and evaluation system of the Nordic coun­
tries? The main focus of strategic discussion seems to be quality. 
Estonia presently has good possibilities for the development of public service 
radio, but lacks qualified people to lead this process towards democracy and 
quality. Hopefully a new generation of radio-journalists, emerging in the coming 
decade from today's and tomorrow's students, will be more successful in solving 
the many difficult problems of Estonian media development. 
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6. From Soviet to Market-Oriented: 
Organisational and Product Changes 
in Estonian Newspapers, 1988-2001 
Kertu Saks 
Introduction 
The Estonian newspaper organisations as well as their products have changed 
greatly since 1988, when the first independent editions were published after the 
fall of the Soviet Union. Due to political, economic and social reasons, Estonian 
newspapers rapidly became market-oriented. Newspaper organisations have 
become correspondingly much more complex. The newspaper as a product has 
changed quantitatively and qualitatively. 
This chapter describes three interrelated phases in the development of Eston­
ian newspaper organisations and products from 1988-2001: 
1) the Soviet remnants phase, dominating in 1988-1991 until the restoration of 
independence; 
2) the phase of confusion and search, dominating in 1991-1995; 
3) the phase of stabilisation starting in 1996 and continuing today (Figure 6.1). 
As all this development was strongly influenced by foreign capital inflow and 
active use of Western organisational and journalistic patterns, special attention 
will be given in this analysis to foreign impact. The empirical analysis will focus 
on two leading national dailies: Postimees (until 1991: Edasi) and Eesti Päevaleht 
(until 1990: Noorte Hääl; 1990-1995: Päevaleht). 
Newspaper organisations and their products up to 1988 are referred to here as 
Soviet Estonian, which have by today turned into modern newspaper organisa­
tions and modern products, as this has been the aspiration of Estonian newspaper 
Figure 6.1. The interrelated phases of change in Estonian newspapers, 
1988-2001 
Soviet f Confusion 
remnants \ and search Stabilisation 
From Soviet 
1988 
to 
• 
Market-oriented 
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publishers. For example, the last conceptual change in Eesti Päevaleht took place 
(following the Marieberg examples) in September 2000 in order to make the 
newspaper "more simple, clear, functional and very modern" (Pinn, 2000). 
1. Soviet remnants phase: 1988-1991 
The changes in newspaper organisations and products started simultaneously 
with the start of the mass liberation movement in the spring of 1988. At this 
moment all Estonian press could be characterised as Soviet Estonian, although 
Gorbachev's glasnost had made ideological control much milder and the total 
character of administrative norms and Soviet journalistic traditions much weak­
er than they were during the stagnation era. 
The Soviet Estonian newspaper publishing was characterised from the organi­
sational point of view amongst other factors by the following indicators: 
• strict norms on the staff composition of the editorial office; 
• rigid hierarchical structure of the editorial board; 
• Communist Party control over employment, planning and management. 
During the Soviet period there were strict norms on all aspects of journalistic 
activities including the editorial structures of newspapers. The Communist Party 
Central Committee in Moscow directly determined the editorial office employ­
ment list, the number and payment norms of all papers, including the smallest 
ones, according to the publication's type. For example, the Estonian SSR 
belonged, together with some others, to the third category of the smallest Soviet 
republics and Moscow determined that the leading Communist Party paper 
Rahva Hääl could employ 65-70 people, with 40 being creative employees (jour­
nalists). The first category (Soviet republics) could employ up to 90 people in the 
same type of newspaper. In local newspapers, the number of staff was 12-15 peo­
ple (Uus, 1998). 
The whole media system in the Soviet Union was strictly hierarchical. There 
were the central media (at the ail-Union level); the national media (at the level of 
the Soviet republics); the regional media (at the level of larger administrative 
units called oblasts which did not exist in the smaller Soviet republics); the local 
media (at the level of cities and districts); and newspapers; sometimes there was 
also broadcasting inside large organisations (factories, kolkhozes, universities, 
etc.). There was no place for any independent media, not to mention opposition 
publications. 
The editorial office structure was also hierarchical. The newspaper manage­
ment was led by the Communist Party, i.e., the editorial office managers had to 
be politically and ideologically trustworthy; all activities were based on work 
plans which were approved and their realisation controlled by the Party com­
mittees of the appropriate level. Leading positions in editorial offices corre­
sponded to functions of ideological responsibility and control that presupposed 
Communist Party membership. 
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Table 6.1. The first new newspapers in Estonia 
at the end of the Soviet period 
Newspaper First issue Publisher 
1. Nelli Teataja October 1988 Kooperatiiv Nelli 
2. Esmaspäev May 1989 Eesti Kultuurkapital 
3. Eesti Ekspress September 1989 Cross Development FSP 
4. Äripäev October 1989 Mainor Bonnier Kirjastus 
5. Eesti Elu October 1989 Kultuur ja Elu 
Source: Paju, 1999 
Among the indicators of Soviet-era newspapers as a product are the following: 
• limited volume of each issue; 
• no segmentation of stories by devices like leads, subheadings and photo cap­
tions; 
• long stories; 
• no commercial advertising; 
• no supplements. 
Soviet Estonian national newspapers were broadsheets (A2) of four pages, local 
newspapers four pages of tabloid size (A3), and weeklies 8-16 pages of tabloid 
size. 
The Tartu local newspaper Edasi, which in fact was also a national daily both in 
content and distribution, changed the size of its page in 1979 from broadsheet to 
tabloid while retaining the same volume of published materials - the change was 
from four pages broadsheet to eight pages tabloid. Due to a lack of paper and 
printing facilities, newspapers' volumes could not increase even after the Com­
munist Party's control over the media was practically abolished in 1990. New 
papers established on a commercial basis were able to start with larger volumes 
than eight pages of tabloid size from the very beginning (mainly 1989; see Table 
6.1), but volumes of the already-existing papers began to grow only in 1992. 
The Soviet editing tradition used no illustrative segmentation of stories by 
devices such as leads, subheadings and photo captions. There was no commer­
cial advertising and correspondingly no supplements. The stories were longer in 
length. If materials important to the Communist Party had to be published (cov­
erage of congresses, plenums, public speeches of leaders, etc.), all the pages of a 
broadsheet might have been used without any subheadings or pictures. Design 
during the Soviet period depended entirely on the political orientation of the 
newspaper: long columns and pictures of workers and collective farmers. As pri­
vate enterprises did not exist, there was no commercial advertising, which is also 
one reason for not having thematic supplements. Today the supplements are usu­
ally planned in the newspaper according to the larger advertising categories 
(such as construction, cars, cosmetics, etc.). The appearance of supplements par­
allels the economic development in Estonian newspapers and the pace of adver­
tising development. 
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Despite the atmosphere of quick changes, the content of newspapers could not 
change overnight. This primarily characterises the newspapers that converted 
from Soviet Estonian to modern management, but also the entirely new ones. The 
circle of the people who started with new publications was quite small and their 
experiences in the journalistic field in the late 1980s were bound to Soviet tradi­
tion. 
Nearly 800 new periodicals were launched from 1988 to 1996 (Lauk, 2000). 
Most did not survive on the market more than two or three years. There was 
obviously a need for new journalists and media professionals. The majority of 
those hired did not have any education in this field. It was estimated in 1998 that 
only one quarter of Estonian journalists had some kind journalistic education 
(Saks, 1999). 
One of the biggest alterations in newspaper organisations was generational 
replacement (Lauk, 1996). The majority of Estonian journalists are currently 
younger than 40 years while in the Soviet era most were older than 40. Epp Lauk 
observes: 
The fact is that the nature and influence of the media in Estonian society 
today depends largely on the knowledge and attitudes of young people. 
Although they have more energy, flexible minds and are capable of finding 
relevant answers to the challenges of transitional times, they also lack 
knowledge and experience, which too often make Estonian journalists 
dependent on their sources and open to manipulation by politicians (Lauk, 
1996: 99). 
These alterations directly influence the product. 
Newspapers that were created on the basis of Soviet Estonian newspapers did 
not considerably change their design in 1989-1991. The size of the page and the 
number of pages of Päevaleht stayed the same up to 1992, though the first com­
mercial ads appeared a year earlier. 
The totally new papers (the national weekly Eesti Ekspress and the business 
paper Äripäev) started with innovative product ideas right from the beginning. 
Eesti Ekspress was first published on 22 September 1989 in nearly broadsheet size 
(35 X 50.5 cm) with 8 pages. It was a combination of a sensational tabloid and an 
investigative quality newspaper (Paju, 1999). Both these types of papers were 
new in the Estonian market and this naturally demanded a new approach to the 
product. The same was true in the case of the first Estonian business paper 
Äripäev, which was started in 1989 as a Swedish (Bonnier) and Estonian (busi­
nessman Ülo Pärnits) joint initiative. The pink-paged newspaper Äripäev resem­
bled Dagens Nyheter and differed considerably from Soviet Estonian papers. 
2. Confusion and search phase: 1991-1995 
Searching for new, specifically Estonian ways of newspaper publishing brought 
about remarkable confusion in 1990 and to some extent it continued until at least 
1999. As a dominant characteristic of Estonian press development, the confusion 
and search phase can be delineated as occurring during 1991-1995. 
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The main organisation and product indicators of this phase are the following: 
• difficult privatisation process of Estonian newspapers during the period 
1991-1995; 
• different patterns and rapid changes in creating new editorial structures and 
new journalistic functions; 
• introduction of new work routines (due to technology development and struc­
tural changes); 
• no written regulations in 1991 and the creation of the first regulations during 
the phase of confusion and search; 
• rapid product changes. 
The confusion and search phase is first characterised by the privatisation of 
Estonian newspapers in 1991-1995. A good example of the difficulties of this 
process is the case of the privatisation of Rahva Hääl. 
Until 1993, Rahva Hääl was the largest national daily in Estonia with 158,000 cir­
culation copies in 1992 (Paju, 1999). Up to 1993 it was owned by the state but due 
to the conflict between the owner and Rahva Hääl's editorial office, it was decid­
ed to privatise the paper quickly. The government decided in an open bidding 
process to give the paper to two government-loyal Estonian businessmen, 
Kivimägi and Strandberg, who together owned the company AS Maag. A com­
peting media company, AS Hommikuleht, sued over this decision and the pri­
vatisation decision was annulled by the court. The government resolved the bid­
ding procedure again in favour of AS Maag. The new owners started pressuring 
the editorial office of Rahva Hääl and fired the Editor-in-Chief Toomas Leito. Leito 
left with the entire staff of the editorial office and started a new newspaper, Eesti 
Sõnumid, in March 1994. 
Rahva Hääl was published until 5 June 1995, when three Estonian dailies, Päe­
valeht, Hommikuleht and Rahva Hääl merged into Eesti Päevaleht. Eesti Sõnumid was 
published in October 1995 under yet another title - Sõnumileht - which was 
turned from a serious quality paper into a sensational tabloid in October 1998 
when the Norwegian company Schibsted obtained partial ownership of the 
paper. The two tabloids Sõnumileht and Õhtuleht merged in July 2000 due to the 
ruthless "price war" in the small Estonian media market, and the largest Eston­
ian national tabloid, SL Õhtuleht, was born. SL Õhtuleht today has the biggest cir­
culation in Estonia (see Table 21 in Appendix). 
There was confusion in privatising local Estonian newspapers. To some extent 
it was caused by the lengthy persistence of the Soviet remnants in managing local 
newspapers. Three local newspapers (Postimees, Harju Elu and Saarte Hääl) were 
privatised in November 1991 and the rest were given by the state to the local 
municipalities. During 1992-1996, municipalities privatised all local newspapers. 
All Estonian national newspapers (except Rahva Hääl) and many local papers 
were originally privatised to their editorial staff members. The typical feature in 
the Estonian newspaper privatisation process was that neither banks nor large 
industrial corporations participated in this process and also today are not fea­
tured among newspaper owners (Paju, 1999). Journalists and other editorial staff 
as shareholders in newly established private enterprises did not have enough 
capital nor experience in the press business. Some years later the privatised 
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newspapers were usually sold to economically more effective and business-ori­
ented owners, usually large media enterprises, often with the participation of for­
eign capital. For instance, Postimees together with Sõnumileht bought up three 
local newspapers in 1997-1998: Virumaa Teataja, Järva Teataja and Pärnu Postimees 
(Uus, 1999). 
The process of privatising local newspapers occurred with various tensions 
and conflicts up to 1996. Local municipalities (the original owners) had a habit of 
meddling very actively with the newspapers' activities. In some cases a new Edi­
tor-in-Chief was appointed amongst the local power elites (as might have been 
common during Soviet times when people active in Communist politics were 
often appointed to these posts). 
The confusion and search phase is also characterised by varied patterns and 
rapid changes in creating new editorial structures and new journalistic functions. 
The employment structures of Estonian newspapers were peculiar until the sta­
bilisation phase and some might argue until the foreign owners set a clear pattern 
to them. For example, when observing the specialists who were responsible for 
language style and editing in Estonian newspapers, it came out that even in the 
late 1990s this task was done by specialists with very different titles: proof-readers, 
language editors, style editors, technical editors, senior editors, copy editors or Editors-
in-Chief(Saks, 1999). In smaller local newspapers, hiring a separate language edi­
tor was often not done due to financial considerations. This is why senior editors, 
technical editors or Editors-in-Chief have also been mentioned in the list above. 
The specialists at the tabloid Õhtuleht (now SL Õhtuleht) replied in 1998 that their 
language was edited only during the working hours of their language editor and 
that later in the evening their texts often did not go through linguistic editing at 
all (Saks, 1999). 
Changes from Soviet Estonian to modern brought along the introduction of 
totally new functions in newspaper organisations and the job titles used previ­
ously have obtained new meanings. Most signficantly, the term "editor" itself has 
changed in content. In the middle of the last decade virtually all newspaper 
employees dealing with content were called editors - there were seldom (if ever) 
any reporters on the payroll. 
The job functions of an editor were also not clear-cut in the beginning of the sta­
bilisation period. In 1996-1998, this author was the editor of the Relations pages 
in the weekend edition of Eesti Päevaleht, which meant producing all the materi­
al for these pages except photos. If the pages were illustrated with some other 
material (e.g., magazine cut-outs), it meant producing those materials as well. 
The Editor-in-Chief edited all the textual material in the paper single-handedly. 
Even today in some newspapers, an editor means a journalist fulfilling a wide 
variety of tasks while being responsible for certain sections (foreign, culture, 
domestic etc) of the publication. The editor reports, edits, chooses pictures, cre­
ates subheadings, writes captions and headings and is responsible for the layout 
of his/her section. 
While the development was rapid, the newspapers made many changes in 
work routines due to structural changes and contemporary needs. For instance 
the function of a copy-editor was first introduced in the business paper Äripäev 
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in 1996 (Saks, 1999) and also later in Eesti Päevaleht, the third-biggest daily. The 
technological change in work routines added confusion. Newsrooms worldwide 
have witnessed great technological changes over the last decade, which have 
influenced their ways of work - altering the work routines and creating new 
functions. Newsrooms in former Eastern bloc countries have thus experienced a 
dual change of huge proportions - a social-political change and a technological 
change. This confused things in the editorial offices even further. Computerisa­
tion of work processes, especially in the print media, has been very rapid since 
the mid-1990s. 
Technological developments made possible access for Estonian newspapers to 
different sources of information through several international news agencies, 
which also complicated and added routines in journalistic work. 
The confusion and search phase was also characterised by the absence of writ­
ten regulations on how to compile a newspaper. The first stylebooks were creat­
ed in 1995-1996 and the specifically Estonian feature in them, compared to their 
counterparts in Scandinavian countries or the Anglo-American tradition, was 
that amongst other topics they described and taught writing in different journal­
istic genres - guidelines for writing news, editorials and features. 
The confusion and search phase was characterised by the rapid adoption of 
Western models in newspaper publishing. The most drastic changes appeared up 
to 1996, when by then the former Soviet Estonian newspapers had changed to 
such extent that they became interesting to foreign owners (i.e., dull black-and-
white politically orientated newspapers with no advertising and text segmenta­
tion had turned into informative, special audience, group-oriented, advertising-
centred publications). The product changes continued after 1996, but were done 
mainly in order to win more clients rather than changes associated with the con­
ceptual politics and economics. 
3. Stabilisation phase since 1996 
The main indicators of the stabilisation of Estonian newspapers include: 
• the concentration of the Estonian newspaper market; 
• the rapid growth of the advertising market in 1994-1997 and its stabilisation 
from 1998; 
• the appearance of foreign owners; 
• stabilisation in the newspapers' circulation after the big decrease during 
1992-1994 (see Table 1.7 in the overview of Estonian media development in 
current book and Table 22 in Appendix); 
• more stable development of newspapers' content that followed an earlier 
period of rapid change in design and layout, principal topics and journalistic 
forms, all connected with the adoption of Western patterns of journalism and 
media production in 1992-1995. 
The concentration of the media market started in 1995. As mentioned previously, 
three national dailies merged in June 1995, and two national television channels 
194 Changes in Estonian Newspapers: 1988-2001 
Table 6.2. Media advertising expenditure, 1994-2000 
million EEK million USD 
1994 117 9 
1995 M
 
03
 
25 
1996 409 33 
1997 585 41 
1998 710 51 
1999 639 44 
2000 675 40 
Source: Emor 
Table 6.3. Media advertising expenditure 
distribution by media, 1995 and 2000 (%) 
1995 2000 
Newspapers 55 45 
Magazines 9 14 
Television 23 23 
Radio 8 11 
Outdoor 5 5 
Internet 
-
2 
Source: Emor 
established a new integrated channel in the beginning of 1996 with the participa­
tion of the Swedish firm Kinnevik. 
The rapid growth of the advertising market and the corresponding economic 
growth of the newspapers are associated with the overall economic growth in 
Estonian society in the mid-1990s. This in turn brought more advertising to the 
newspapers. The Estonian media advertising market grew 3.5 times from 1994 to 
1996 and was relatively stable in 1998-2000, with some backlash in 1999 due to 
the Russian economic crisis (see Table 6.2). The share of newspapers in the adver­
tising market in 2000 was smaller than in 1995 but newspapers were still the lead­
ing advertising medium in Estonia (see Table 6.3), similar to the advertising 
expenditure distribution in Nordic countries (Nordic Baltic Media Statistics 
1998). 
The role of advertising and advertising departments grew with the newspa­
pers, or to be more exact, the newspapers grew together with advertising rev­
enues. The role of commercial advertising was acknowledged at the very begin­
ning of the establishment of independent newspapers. In 1994-1996, the average 
share of advertising in Estonian newspapers' revenue increased from 37% to 49% 
(Nordic Baltic Media Statistics 1998: 282). 
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The appearance of foreign owners in the Estonian media market can also be 
viewed as an indicator of stabilisation. Foreign owners stabilised the situation in 
Estonian newspapers by influencing their organisation as well as the product. 
Although the period of rapid change in newspaper content and appearance 
had peaked by 1996, changes nevertheless continued. For example, the daily 
newspaper Eesti Päevaleht has changed its design three times during 1997-2000. 
The practice of written editing and other regulations has not developed much 
in Estonian newspapers. Only a few of them have stylebooks. If they do, the 
books carry either only design rules or combine language and genre and design 
rules. The weekly Eesti Ekspress' new stylebook (Viidik 2000) devotes even more 
passages to this topic, giving very detailed guidelines on how to write news, 
interviews, features and opinions, whereas very little room is devoted to ethical 
issues. 
4. Foreign impact 
The first non-Soviet newspapers in Estonia were started in 1988-1989, most of 
them as local initiatives (besides the first business paper). 
The Swedish firm Bonnier joined the Estonian firm AS Mainor in 1989 and 
formed Mainor Bonnier Publishers in order to make the Estonian pink-paged 
business paper Äripäev (an equivalent to Dagens îndustrï), which was launched in 
October 1989. 
The Scandinavian interest was obvious but it is interesting to that there almost 
was a strong French influence. In 1992, the French Hersant Corporation was 
interested in Estonia's second largest daily, Päevaleht. Päevaleht's Editor-in-Chief 
Margus Mets practised in Le Figaro in 1992. Hersant and Päevaleht signed a pro­
tocol of mutual interest to create a joint newspaper enterprise with each owning 
50%. Hersant, however, turned its eye to the Russian market and later made an 
investment in Albania instead of Estonia (Paju, 1999). 
Negotiations started in 1995 between Postimees and the Finnish magazine pub­
lisher Yhtyneet Kuvalehdet, but the merger ultimately did not take place (Paju, 
1999). 
The same year Schibsted ASA bought 24% of the shares of Kanal 2, one of the 
Estonian television channels. 
Swedish Marieberg was again active on the Estonian market in 1996, exploring 
possibilities of buying the national evening newspaper Õhtuleht. Marieberg AB 
also explored the possibilities of founding an entirely new paper in Estonia. 
These plans did not come true. 
The situation changed completely in 1998. 
Schibsted bought 92% of the Postimees shares in 1998 and a majority of shares 
of some other newspapers and magazines, establishing a large company, AS Eesti 
Meedia, which in the beginning of 2001 controlled about one third of the Eston­
ian nationwide press market. 
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AS Ekspress Grupp, another large media company, was established in 1998 and 
in which 50% of the shares belonged to Swedish Marieberg AB, a member of the 
Bonnier Group and 50% to Estonian businessman Hans H. Luik. In the beginning 
of 2001 this company controlled another third of the Estonian press market. 
Until the autumn of 2001 the foreign interest in Estonian media market was 
only growing. In November 2001, Hans H. Luik bought the other 50% of the AS 
Ekspress Grupp shares and became the sole owner of the company. 
The presence of Scandinavian owners in the Estonian newspaper market has 
influenced both the organisational and product development of Estonian news­
papers. 
This is seen by comparing the outlook of the latest issues of some of the largest 
Swedish and Norwegian dailies and their "counterparts" in Estonia. Besides the 
language, there are very few other external differences, as Äripäev resembles the 
Swedish Dagens Industri and SL Õhtuleht is influenced by western tabloids. 
The changes in product that were introduced by the foreign owners have also 
influenced the editorial structures and the demands on editing in the newspa­
pers, as the rules and regulations are very strict both in Schibsted and Marieberg 
newspapers, especially concerning journalistic ethics and style rules (design, lan­
guage). The majority of journalists and media professionals have had longer or 
shorter internships abroad, and foreign professionals have conducted many 
courses in Estonia to teach editing and reporting. Western experiences have also 
had a great direct and indirect impact on Estonian journalism training. For 
instance, one of the influential lecturers and consultants, Priit Pullerits studied in 
the beginning of the 1990s in the United States. Another well-known lecturer and 
consultant, Tiit Hennoste taught at universities of Finland and the Netherlands. 
Both have since been very active in teaching and consulting and have published 
several textbooks. 
5. Development of the leading daily Postimees 
Postimees (Postman) is the largest Estonian national daily by readership (see Table 
21 in Appendix) and was begun in 1991 based on the Tartu newspaper Edasi, 
which was nominally a local newspaper but in fact had been national in its con­
tent and distribution. Before the Soviet occupation its name was Postimees; it had 
been established in 1886 and in 1891 became the first Estonian daily. 
Organisational changes after Estonian independence. Postimees was fully pri­
vatised (with all its properties) during November 1991 - March 1992. It was ini­
tially privatised to its employees via shares, as were many other Estonian news­
papers. The majority of the shares and then ultimately all the shares were bought 
by Heldur Tõnisson, an Estonian businessman living mainly in Switzerland. He 
is the son of Jaan Tõnisson, who was a prominent Estonian politician and the pre­
war principle owner and Editor-in-Chief of Postimees. The Norwegian media con­
cern Schibsted in April 1998 bought 34% of the Postimees shares from him and in 
August of same year that number increased to 92%. 
Table 6.4. Organisational and product changes in Postimees. 1988-2001 
1988-1989 1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 
Title Edasi Postimees (Edasi 
until 1 Jan 1991) Postimees Postimees Postimees Postimees Postimees 
Owners Estonian Estonian Estonian Estonian Estonian 
Since April 1998 
foreign 
(Schibsted) 
Foreign 
Number of 
employees 
Whole staff: 
65 
Whole staff: 
65 
Editorial office: 
46 
Editorial office: 
59 
Editorial office: 
69 
Whole staff: 
144 
Whole staff: 
153 
Number of 
departments 
(editorial and 
other) 
na 9 11 12 11 15 26 
Size 
of the page Tabloid Tabloid Tabloid Tabloid Tabloid Tabloid Tabloid 
Number 
of pages 8 8 16 24 24 
16 + Extra; 
28 in 1999 2 4 / 2 8  
Changes in 
design and 
supplements 
No story segmentation 
devices used. Pictures 
of machines and 
workers often dominant 
on the front page. 
No story 
segmentation 
devices used. 
Commercial 
advertising pages 
emerging. 
Photos have 
captions. Leads 
and sub­
headings 
appearing with 
the stories. 
First separate local 
sections (in 1994 
Tartu Postimees, in 
1995 Tallinna 
Postimees). 
Weekend section 
Extra. New 
design since 
1998, done by an 
Austrian designer 
Rolf Rehe. 
Weekend 
section Kultuur. 
Weekend 
section Arter. 
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In analysing Postimees here, the emphasis is on the development of new depart­
ments and on the corresponding new sections in the paper. 
New departments. In 1991 there were nine departments in Postimees: six of them 
were editorial departments, the rest were advertising, secretaries and manage­
ment. In 1993 three new editorial departments were created: business, culture 
and sports; and one new organisational department: an Information Centre. 
A new department and a local section appeared in 1994 with separate staffs: 
opinion and Tartu Postimees. The following year, an investigative journalism 
department and Tallinna Postimees were added. Postimees established Extra, its 
weekend section, in 1996. It also installed correspondents in Viljandi, southern 
Estonia and Pärnu. By 2001 there were a total of 26 departments in Postimees: 14 
editorial departments and 12 departments responsible for layout and design, 
photos, proofreading, advertising, distribution, marketing, personnel and others. 
Changes in the structure of editorial offices. In order to understand how much 
Estonian newspapers have changed in their organisation, the staff structures of 
Postimees in January 1991 are compared with those of January 2001 (see Figures 
6.2 and 6.3). 
Changes in the structures of the editorial offices reflect new power hierarchies 
and new functions for Estonian media people, and are influenced by foreign 
examples, technological changes and economic necessity 
There is no longer any use for employees like typewriting specialists and post 
ladies. The post lady mentioned in the list of Postimees employees in 1990 was 
absent in 1992. The typewriting specialists were still on the payroll for a longer 
period because even when computers were used, the texts of some authors had 
to be re-typed to the needed computer form. From this author's personal experi­
ence, there were several typewriting specialists working in Eesti Päevaleht in 1996. 
Computerisation, though, soon made this function unnecessary and by 1997 only 
those texts that were produced in the appropriate electronic version were used. 
New functions like reporters, foreign correspondents, cartoon artists, webmas­
ters, layout specialists, graphic designers, Internet specialists and various adver­
tising and marketing functions have also found their place (functions connected 
with the start of the Internet version of Postimees in the autumn of 1995 being a 
part of the larger technological change). 
The number of employees. In ten years the number of employees in Postimees 
has more than doubled (63 in 1991 to 154 in 2001). It is fair to say that all of the 
91 new employees represent new functions in the newspaper's organisation. It is 
noteworthy that ten years ago there were no reporters on the payroll. Some mem­
bers of the staff just didn't have specific job titles. They were in fact operating as 
reporters, but the term itself was not used. 
The commercial side of producing newspapers has become much more impor­
tant, as illustrated by the 35 people currently working in advertising in Postimees 
compared to five people ten years ago. New functions have also been needed 
because of the growth in volume. Postimees currently has a twice-per-week sup­
plement for classified ads, weekend editions with a separate TV programme, 
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Figure 6.2. The staff structure of Postimees, January 1991 
Editor-in-Chief Managing Editor 
Editorial offices 
I 
Politics Foreign news News Business news Culture Sport Tallinn pages 
(2) (3) (13) (3) (5) (2) (2) 
Editorial office secretaries (4), Artist, 
Language Editor, Proofreaders (4), Typewriting specialists (2), Secretary 
Photographers (4) 
Company management: Director, Assistant Director, Chief Accountant, Accountant, 
Drivers (2) and Post Lady 
Advertising department: Manager, Designer, IT-Specialist, Language Consultant, 
Receptionist. 
Source: Postimees, 1 January 1991 
Figure 6.3. The staff structure of Postimees, January 2001 
Administration: Publisher, Editor-in-Chief, Chief Director, Managing Editor, Managing Editor 
of the Internet version, Deputy Managing Editors (2), Assistant to the Editor-in-Chief, 
Assistant to the Chief Director, Secretary of the Editorial Office 
Editorial Offices: Estonian news (15), Foreign news (4, including the correspondent 
in Moscow), Business (6), Opinion (4), Culture (4), Internet version (3), Sport (4), 
Media and TV 
• Weekend edition Arter. Senior Editor, Editors (4) 
• Monthly magazine Luup: Editor, Managing Editor 
• TV Programs: Editors (2), Language Editor / Proofreader 
• Tartu Edition: Senior Editor, Editors (2), Reporters (9) 
• Tartu Börs: Editor 
• Photo: Chief Editor, Photographers (4) 
• Realisation Group: Manager, Assistant Manager, Photo Editor 
• Language: Language Editors / Proofreaders (6) 
• Layout: Layout specialists (10) 
• Computer Design: Graphic Designers (4) 
• Advertising Department (35) 
• Distribution Department (3) 
• Marketing Department (2) 
• Personnel Department (1) 
• Information Centre (3) 
• Drivers (2) 
• Finance Department (5) Source: Postimees, 3 January 2001 
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a monthly supplement for non-governmental organisations, special sections on 
building, gardening, holidays, tourism, cars, etc. 
Product changes. The changes in design have appeared according to the growth 
of wealth and changes in the ownership of the newspaper. The first issue of the 
new Postimees in 1991 was partly printed in colour and had a special advertising 
page. 
The Postimees issued ten years ago shows obvious remnants of the Soviet news­
paper publishing philosophy: a picture of huge machines and workers on a front 
page and also inside (a typical Soviet means of illustrating articles), layout and 
design (no leads to the stories, few and random photo captions), very little adver­
tising. Postimees ten years later, on the other hand, carries traces of foreign influ­
ence in its design. 
When Eesti Päevaleht changed its design in 1997, according to the rules set by 
Estonian media specialists Tiit Hennoste and Roosmarii Kurvits, Postimees 
ordered a new design from a well-known Austrian designer Rolf Rehe. 
Number of pages and sections. While Postimees in 1991 was 8 pages, by the 
beginning of 2001 it was 28 pages, with the weekend edition running to 68 pages. 
It has also grown in quality, not to mention incorporating more varied content. 
5.1. Comparison of two specific issues of Postimees 
Changes in Postimees' content over ten years are clearly seen when comparing 
the main topics covered in first issues of Postimees from 1991 and 2001. 
The general social context has changed enormously - in 1991 people wished 
that there would be enough food for everybody in the coming year (Sports sec­
tion) and in 2001 wealthy people were cuing for new BMWs (Cars section). 
Postimees (1 January 1991) had seven sections with the following topics. 
• Politics: A chronology of the main political points in 1990. 
• Domestic: A story of a brand new printing house where Postimees is printed. 
• Economy. Postimees asks if Estonian agriculture has any future after the collapse 
of the kolchos system. 
• Cultural: The secretary of the Writers Union Tartu Department, Henn-Kaarel 
Hellat, worries in the cultural column about the fact that 50 years of the Soviet 
regime have made Estonians easy to manipulate. 
• Foreign: In the foreign column, Allan Alaküla observes that Fidel Castro is lead­
ing a sinking ship and that his regime will probably soon be overthrown by 
a 35-year-old Communist, Roberto Robaina. Kalev Vilgats writes about the 
leading ladies in contemporary world politics: Raisa Gorbachev, Nancy Rea­
gan, Hannelore Kohl and Margaret Thatcher. 
• Sports: A calendar of the birthdays (in January) of the famous sportsmen around 
the world. There were also New Year's wishes from Estonian sportsmen: for 
Changes in Estonian Newspapers: 1988-2001 201 
instance, famous sailor Toomas Tõniste wishes that all Estonians would find 
something to eat and drink in 1991. 
• Ads and announcements: Theatre, cinema, concert, exhibition and classified ads. 
Postimees (3 January 2001) had ten sections and the main topics were: 
• Domestic: Speculations on the selection of the opposition Central Party candi­
date for the President elections. Interview with a priest, Velio Salo, who sug­
gests that Estonians should observe Sunday. Higher electricity prices in the 
New Year. 
• Foreign: A New Year's tragedy in Holland claimed at least ten lives. Yassir 
Arafat went to the United States to discuss peace with Bill Clinton. A story sug­
gesting that Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson should use the Swedish 
presidency of the EU as an opportunity to correct the mistakes made in Nice, 
where the larger states made it impossible for smaller states to influence EU 
development. 
• Economy: The prognosis promises a good economic year. The Hansa Bank 
Group rises to a leading position in the Baltic market. 
• Cars: Instructions on how to keep a car on the road when it begins to slide on 
ice. Fifty people from Estonia have ordered the new BMW X5S. There is a one-
year waiting list. 
• Opinion: Kirsten Michal on the benefits of moving the Ministry of Education 
from Tallinn to Tartu. 
• Culture: Stories about the Winter Theatre Festival. Duran Duran comes to Esto­
nia. 
• Free time: Theatre, cinema, concert, exhibition and classified ads. 
• Sports: The story of legendary sports commentator Toomas Uba, who died of 
cancer. 
• Ads, Media, Variety: Ads, obituaries, announcements, media criticism, horo­
scope, comics, anniversaries, birthdays, short news from Estonia and abroad, 
weather, puzzles. 
• Last page story: Mart Kadastik, the Editor-in-Chief of Postimees in 1991, on the 
re-launch of the newspaper ten years earlier. 
Compared with the developments in other Estonian daily newspapers, the 
changes in Postimees seem to have been more stable and not so abrupt. The larg­
er organisational changes appear with the arrival of the foreign owners in 1998 
(see Table 6.4). Before that, the number of departments and employees stayed 
more or less at the same level. The editorial structural changes have occurred 
commensurately with the overall economic and technological changes. The 
tabloid size of the paper has stayed the same since 1979 but there were already 
clear product changes in the first copy of the new Postimees in 1991. 
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6. Development of Eesti Päevaleht 
Eesti Päevaleht (Estonian Daily), Estonia's third-largest daily, has its roots in the 
Soviet Estonian youth daily Noorte Hääl (Voice of the Youth), which was pub­
lished from 1940-1990 and renamed Päevaleht (Daily) on 1 February 1990. A daily 
under that name had been published from 1905-1940 in Estonia before the Sovi­
et regime. Päevaleht appeared as a successor to Noorte Hääl and at first did not dif­
fer much in content. The editorial office was the same and main changes were 
related to design. Another important difference was that Päevaleht lost the decla­
ration under the heading, which stated that Noorte Hääl was an organ of the 
Estonian Communist Youth Organisation. 
Päevaleht's privatisation process was almost easy when compared with some 
other privatisation processes (like Rahva Hääl's described above). Thus Päevaleht 
is not characterised by the difficult privatisation process indicator in the confu­
sion and search phase. Päevaleht's managers were the first to offer the state the 
possibility that an in-place editorial office staff would form a private enterprise. 
This development was hindered by the August 1991 events in Moscow and the 
Baltics. In 1992, AS Päevaleht (a stock company) rented the properties of Päevaleht 
from the state. All newspaper employees could purchase shares. When the state 
wanted to have open bidding for Päevaleht in 1993, it was impossible because all 
of the newspaper's properties had amortised and the new ones belonged to AS 
Päevaleht (Paju, 1999). 
6.1. Organisational changes 
New departments. Several new editorial departments were created in Eesti Päe­
valeht during 1992-1998. This was done corresponding to the creation of themat­
ic supplements for the paper. These vary over the years - new ones appear, oth­
ers disappear. In 1992-1993 there were three new supplements: the weekend edi­
tion Pühapäevaleht, Sports and Business. In 1995-1996 sports and business disap­
peared, and media, theatre and cinema supplement Magasin was created. New 
departments and their corresponding pages in the paper were Science and Tartu. 
In 1996 Social and Virumaa departments and pages were added, in 1997 also 
Pärnu. In 1998 there were two more new ones: Tallinn and Koduleht (Home 
Theme). 
New departments have also been created according to the economic and tech­
nological needs and opportunities. In 1993, the biggest department in Päevaleht 
was the department writing on economic topics (employing 9 people). In 1998 
a separate graphic design department was created. Other changes were made in 
2000 and a technical department was created that employs designers, reproduc­
tion editors and an Internet editor. 
Some of these changes reflect content shifts and some are associated with 
the modern production and distribution of the paper. 
Table 6.5. Organisational and product changes in Eesti Päevaleht (formerly Noorte Hääl and Päevaleht), 1988-2001 
1988-1989 1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 
Title Noorte Hääl 
Noorte Hääl, 
since 1 Feb. 1990 
Päevaleht 
Päevaleht 
Päevaleht, 
since 5 June 1995 
Eesti Päevaleht 
Eesti Päevaleht Eesti Päevaleht Eesti Päevaleht 
Owners Estonian Estonian Estonian Estonian Estonian 
Since 13 May 1998: 
50% Swedish 
Marieberg 
International, 
50% Estonian 
Foreign by 50% 
until 14 Nov. 2001, 
when it became 
100% Estonian 
Number 
of employees na ca 30 ca 30 ca 50 na Editorial office: 89 Editorial office: 92 
Number of 
departments 
(editorial only) 
na 7 9 9 12 12 10 
Size 
of the page Broadsheet Broadsheet 
Broadsheet/ 
tabloid 
Tabloid / 
broadsheet Broadsheet Broadsheet 
Broadsheet / 
tabloid 
Number 
of pages na 4 4 / 6  1 6 / 1 6  12 1 0 / 1 2  1 6 / 2 4  
Changes 
in design and 
supplements 
na 
First commercial 
ads. Stories 
became shorter. 
First segmentation 
devices were used 
(subheadings). 
All photos had 
captions. Leads 
to the stories 
appeared. 
Separate page 
for commercial 
advertising. 
First thematic 
supplements 
appeared. 
From 1995 
a broadsheet in 
colour. First and 
last page ads 
appeared. 
New design in 
November 1997 
(aggressive double 
or triple headings of 
the stories), made by 
Tiit Hennoste and 
Roosmarii Kurvits. 
New size of the 
page (38 x 60 cm 
instead of 42.5 x 60 
cm) and new 
design in March 
1999. 
In Sept. 2000, EPL 
became nearly 
tabloid size (30 x 
45 cm). The new 
look was designed 
in co-operation with 
Marieberg 
International 
specialists. 
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Figure 6.4. The staff structure of Eesti Päevaleht, September 2000 
Editor-in-Chief, Deputy Editor-in-Chief (part A), Deputy Editor-in-Chief (part B), Chief Artist, 
Internet Project Manager, Secretary 
Editorial offices: News (11, including 3 Copy-editors), Opinion (6, including a Cartoonist), 
Life (7), Foreign news (3), Culture (6), Business (3), Sport (3), City (3), 
Entertainment & TV-Programs (1), weekend edition Pluss (1) 
• Design Group: Reproduction editor, Designers (3), Graphics specialists (3) 
• Photo: Manager, Photographers (3) 
• EPL Online: Editor, Reporters (2) 
• Advertising and Marketing Department (22) 
• Finance Department (3) 
• Distribution Department (4) 
• Technology and Production Department (3) Source: Eesti Päevaleht, 18 September 2000 
In 1993, economic issues were the most important, followed later in the decade 
by sports and entertainment; and then by science and local issues (Tartu, Viru­
maa, Pärnu, Tallinn pages) are added. In the second half of the 1990s, the Inter­
net, design and graphics issues gain importance. 
Number of employees. The number of employees has grown corresponding to 
the need to establish new departments. In 1990, there were approximately thirty 
editorial office employees in Päevaleht; by 1994 there were already fifty. By 1998 
the editorial staff was 89 people and in 2001 the number had reached 92. 
6.2. Product changes 
Changes in size of the page. Noorte Hääl and Päevaleht before 1992 were broad­
sheet papers. This remained the same with the change of the name until 1992. 
In February 1992, Päevaleht changed to a tabloid size. It has changed its size of 
the page three times: in 1992 from black-and-white broadsheet to tabloid; in 1995 
from tabloid to colour broadsheet; in 2001 back to tabloid. 
Changes in design. The first changes in design appear at the beginning of 1991: 
stories become shorter and the first subheadings appear. By 1992 the text has 
been segmented by subheadings and all photos have captions. Leads appear to 
the stories. 
Tiit Hennoste and Roosmarii Kurvits created a new look to Eesti Päevaleht in 
1997. Hennoste declared that the outcome was a classic European newspaper that 
was totally new in Estonia (Vahter, 1999). 
The appearance of commercial advertising. The first commercial ads appeared 
in the paper in 1990. Päevaleht's advertising department was created in 1992, as 
was a separate page for commercial advertising. Ads had previously only been 
printed in between editorial material (except the classified ads which already had 
a separate section). In 1995 the ads as well as the rest of the paper were printed 
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in colour and the first large ads (whole-page size) appeared on the first and last 
pages of the paper. 
Number of pages. The economic growth as a stabilisation phase indicator is also 
reflected in the growing content volume of the newspapers. 
In 1990 Päevaleht was a four-page broadsheet, by 1992 it had become an eight-
page tabloid. In 1994 the tabloid had sixteen pages and in 1995, when it reverted 
to broadsheet size, the number of pages remained the same (sixteen). In 1996 the 
number of pages was cut to twelve and in 1998 reduced to ten. This reduction 
was due to the growing number of separate supplements. In 2000 the broadsheet 
had sixteen pages and in 2001 the tabloid size had twenty-four pages. 
Concluding remarks 
The strongest Soviet remnants indicator from the organisational point of view is 
state ownership. From that perspective it might be said that this phase lasted up 
until 1995, when the last local newspapers were privatised, although the domi­
nation of Soviet remnants was generally over by the time of the restoration of 
Estonian independence in August 1991. 
The segmentation of stories by devices, the appearance of advertising, the pub­
lishing of supplements and other significant changes in the newspapers' content 
and journalistic forms compared to Soviet norms and traditions started in the 
new private newspapers from the very first issues. In Päevaleht these changes 
started in 1990 and in Postimees in 1991. 
The difficult privatisation process of Estonian newspapers lasted from 1991 to 
1995. There were very different development patterns and rapid changes in cre­
ating new editorial structures and new journalistic functions in Estonian news­
papers. This period can thus be characterised as the domination of confusion and 
search indicators. 
New work routines were introduced due to technology development, editorial 
structure changes as well as economic demands. 
In the mid-1990s, newspapers started to develop regulations for design as well 
as language style and ethical issues. More specific patterns were set in this field 
by the foreign owners, who actively came to the Estonian newspaper market in 
1998 and had very strict rules and traditions about operating and editing. 
The confusion and search phase, dominant in 1991-1995, was followed by the 
stabilisation phase, characterised by the increasing concentration of the Estonian 
newspaper market, economic growth, the appearance of foreign owners and sta­
bilisation of the newspapers' circulation after the large decrease in 1993-1994. 
The foreign impact on Estonian media development throughout the entire 
period of transformation from Soviet to market-oriented was not only connected 
with foreign ownership. Western patterns of media performance and journalistic 
work were quickly adopted in Estonia, achieving dominance at the beginning of 
the stabilisation phase and intensifying throughout this phase. 
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7. The Role of the Russian-Language Media 
in Estonian Society 
Valeria Jakobson 
The main purpose of this chapter is to reveal the roles and functions of the Russ­
ian-language press in Estonian society, concentrating on the period 1991-1999. 
However, in order to get an idea about the historical roots of the present situa­
tion, the chapter also includes a brief review of the Russian-language press in 
Estonia since the second half of the 19th century. This review is based on various 
studies conducted from 1996 to 2001 (Jakobson, 1996; Jakobson & Iljina, 2000). 
The basis of this analysis is the functionalist approach to the concept of the 
"role of media," which observes it as dependent upon the type of society (De 
Fleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1989) and as a result of performing its functions (Wright, 
1974). The social role of the press is understood as a result of its interaction with 
the prevailing environment, which includes the interests of the owners/sources 
of finance, system of control (overt or latent censorship/control/regulations, 
etc.), their own workers and the mass audience. 
A fundamental issue is what the minority media role in society should be. 
Authors who have studied the role of minority media underline its importance in 
preserving minorities' ethnic and cultural identities, maintaining connections 
with the historical motherland and at the same time facilitating their integration 
into the host society and providing them with information about its institutions 
(Levkovic, 1986: 66-67; Togora, 1986: 52-54; McQuail, 1984: 204). This chapter 
also reviews how the press depicts social reality in general, and the 
minority/majority role in the state and society in particular. This is accomplished 
by assessing what qualities the press attributes to the role, what interrelations the 
press constructs, and how the press influences the socialisation of the minority in 
the host state and society. Finally, the media is often viewed as a public forum. 
This chapter assesses how effectively it performs this role in Estonia. 
1. The Russian-language press in Estonia - historical review 
1.1. 1853-1917 
Although the territories composing the present-day Estonia and Latvia were in­
corporated into the Russian Empire in 1721, until the second half of the 19th cen­
tury this region was actually governed by German landlords. The local potential 
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audience of Russian print editions was very small until the end of the 19th cen­
tury and its cultural needs were fulfilled by St. Petersburg magazines (Isakov, 
1999: 26). As a result, regular Russian-language newspapers only appeared in 
Estonia nearly 150 years after they emerged in Russia (for example, early failures 
of local Russian-language magazines in Estonia were the Raduga magazine, 
issued in Tartu in 1832-1833 with a circulation of 207-260 copies and the Ucheb-
ny matematicheski journal, issued in Reval (Tallinn) in 1833-1834 with a circulation 
of 467 copies). 
By the middle of the 19th century, the Tsarist government became interested in 
increasing the effectiveness of its administrative work and the influence of the 
central government in the peripheral districts of the Empire. It thus began a proj­
ect in which local Russian-language newsletters (Vedomosti) were launched in 
many regions. Two were launched in Estonia in 1853: Estlandskie Gubernskije 
Vedomosti and Lißandskie Gubernskije Vedomosti, both publishing information in 
both Russian and German. The structure of these editions was prescribed by law. 
They carried out mostly utilitarian functions: informing local administrators, 
gentry, traders and entrepreneurs about new laws and regulations, publishing 
official advertisements, propagating desirable norms of behaviour. They were not 
interested in feedback and did not encourage dialogue between social groups 
and institutions. Society was constructed in the texts of the newspapers as deeply 
divided on a class basis, consisting on the one side of officials, landlords and 
burghers with German and Russian names, and on the other side of peasants 
who either had Russian names or no names at all. Estonians were semiotically 
non-existent in the texts, no cultural groups were mentioned there. 
As a result of the economic and political reforms of the 1860s, industrial devel­
opment in the Russian Empire received a new impetus. Factories appeared in 
Estonia, targeting the Russian market and owned by Russian entrepreneurs. 
Agricultural production also became more Russian-oriented. Gradually the num­
ber of educated Russian administrators and entrepreneurs in Estonia increased 
and started to form a thin layer of local Russian bourgeoisie. Its informational 
needs became more diverse. Thus, in the 1870s, the first private newspapers 
appeared in Narva and Reval, providing a wide range of information including 
economic aspects (trade, prices on the markets, etc.) and local news. Both private 
and state-owned media started to inform audiences about the local cultural life, 
Estonian history, literature and culture, and to publish local private advertise­
ments. These years also saw the first appearance of translations of Estonian poet­
ry into Russian. 
In the 1890s, a political-commercial Russian press appeared in Estonia, which 
became regular and widespread. In general, its main task was to preserve admin­
istrative, cultural and economic links with the mainland, but the range of its func­
tions widened. During this period, the first translations of some articles from 
Estonian-language newspapers appeared. Essays on the local cultural, historical 
and political context were occasionally published, such as translations of Eston­
ian literature and poetry (e.g., the first translation of the Estonian epic poem 
"Kalevipoeg" into Russian). Nevertheless, Estonians as a cultural group were sel­
dom represented in this media. Russians, meanwhile, were construed not only as 
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loyal citizens, but also as a cultural group with a rich history, traditions, specific 
national culture, etc. 
As in previous years, Estonians and their interrelations with Russians were 
nearly non-existent in the Russian press. In Revelsky vestnik of 1915, a discussion 
was held about the language of municipal government (Tallinn Town Duma). 
Some contributors insisted that Russian, being the state language in the Russian 
Empire, could be the only language used in the debates at the Tallinn City Coun­
cil. Others opposed this, saying that for decades both Russian and Estonian had 
been used. The newspaper did not take a particular side, but it is important to 
note that the latent tensions became overt and that the language of conflict is 
rooted here. Also, a very visible image of an enemy appears - it is Germany, the 
German army and the local Germans, who sometimes have to pay penalties for 
"demonstratively speaking German in public." 
The local Russian press in the Empire period mostly socialised local Russians 
within an all-Russian cultural, political and economic context and only to some 
degree in the Estonian social and cultural context, providing very superficial 
knowledge of Estonia and Estonians. The role of the press as a public forum was 
bounded on one side by Tsarist censorship, and on the other side by a limited set 
of sources of information and the composition of the audience (Russian nobility, 
merchants and intellectuals). 
1.2. 1918-1940 
Before 1940 non-Estonians accounted for 12% of the population of Estonia. Two 
thirds of these (91,000) were Russians of two definite groups: 73,000 peasants 
who had lived in Estonia since 1915, and 18,000 political emigrants. The majority 
of them belonged to the poorest part of the Estonian population. Russians were 
disassociated, mainly passive and estranged from politics. They were poorly rep­
resented in the administrative and power structures (Isakov, 1996: 7-9, 52-55). 
Estonian foreign trade re-oriented to Western Europe, such that Russians did not 
play an important role in economic life. The majority of them belonged to the 
poorest part of the Estonian population and were interested in personal survival 
and preserving their cultural identity. 
In these conditions, the Russian-language press helped to preserve Russians' 
cultural identity with Tsarist Russia. Its predominant function was the transmis­
sion of culture; its informational and entertaining functions were reduced. It also 
performed limited educational and entertainment roles for the audience, and 
some administrative and political information was also published. As the poten­
tial audience of these newspapers belonged to the poorest social strata, their cir­
culations were quite low, the largest of them reached a maximum of 5,000 copies 
(Tsassovskaja, 2001). The majority of these newspapers survived less than a year 
(Isakov, 1996). 
In the Russian-language press in Estonia, Russians were mostly construed as 
1) peasants, worrying mainly about agricultural issues; 
2) urban intelligentsia, poor but carefully preserving Russian culture in Estonia; 
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3) criminals; 
4) deprived people, including refugees from the USSR. 
Estonians were construed as a state-nation, while Russians mostly as a cultur­
al and language minority. 
As this press did not provide two-way communication between the Russian 
minority and the state institutions, and even between the different sectors of the 
Russian diaspora, it can be concluded that the press did not become an effective 
public forum on an all-Estonian scale and in the socialisation of the Russian 
minority. 
1.3. 1940-1987 
After the Second World War, when Estonia was annexed by the USSR, major 
changes took place in Estonia's economy, politics, structure of population, etc. 
Very quickly the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR), especially its north­
eastern region and Tallinn, became an industrial outpost of the USSR. Several 
ports were built and railway communications were developed, which had a sig­
nificant economic impact on the USSR in general. 
After the war, cities in north-east of Estonia were rebuilt and repopulated most­
ly by the newcomers from the Slavic Republics of the USSR, who considered 
migration to Estonia as moving within the borders of the unitary state. By 1989 
the share of non-Estonians in the Estonian population reached 38% (over 602,000 
people). Many Russian-speakers worked at so-called "Union factories," which 
served the economic needs of the USSR in general and where the working col­
lectives consisted mostly of Russian-speakers. Their Estonian language profi­
ciency wras low: according to different estimates, in 1990 only 13% of non-Estoni­
ans could communicate in Estonian, and 44% of non-Estonians reported in 1991 
that they did not speak Estonian at all (Arutunjan, 1995). Since their contact with 
Estonians was limited, the Russian-speakers developed their ideas about Estoni­
ans, their culture, and their attitudes towards Russians mostly from the Russian-
language newspapers. 
In 1940 all previously existing Russian-language newspapers in Estonia were 
closed down. Instead, three official Russian-language newspapers were set up, 
which existed until the German occupation. In the autumn of 1944, Soviet Russ­
ian-language newspapers were re-established, although their circulation was 
lower than that of the Estonian papers. They were issued only in the towns where 
large enclaves of Russian-speaking population developed: in Narva, Tallinn, 
Kohtla-Järve, Sillamäe, Jõhvi and only since 1987 in Tartu. 
These newspapers were financed and controlled by the local Communist Party 
Commitees, which combined the roles of media owner and organ of its control. 
The newspapers' circulations were stable and quite high: in 1977 the circulation 
of Soviet Estonija was 45,000 copies and of Molodjozh Estonii 46,000 copies (Hoyer, 
Lauk & Vihalemm, 1993: 343). During this period, the state combined the roles of 
a media owner and a controlling authority. It constructed a clear picture of the 
world and defined the USSR as the strongest and most developed country in it. 
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Soviet citizens were the bearers of the most progressive ideology, whose main 
component was labour. The press constructed a certain political identity of the 
Soviet people, which co-existed with the ethnic identities of titular nations, local 
identities (such as Soviet Estonian, where the main element uniting the popula­
tion of Soviet Estonia was common labour) and various social identities (profes­
sional, etc.). 
The Estonian ethnic identity was recognized and supported in the Russian-lan-
guage press. The press wrote about events in Estonian culture, usually portray­
ing Russians and Estonians as working together and communicating in Russian. 
Nevertheless, the history of Estonia was taught in the media in a sanitised way, 
with the result that Estonians (relying not only on the official version, but also on 
collective memories) and non-Estonians knew different versions of Estonian his­
tory. Russian-speakers thus had the illusion of "being informed" about Estonian 
culture and history, experiencing "international friendship" with Estonians and 
lacking the necessity to learn the Estonian language. Russian-speakers were con­
strued as the national majority and Estonians as one of the Soviet Peoples. In the 
1940s and 1950s, it was also emphasized that Russians are "older brothers" and 
the other nations are "younger" ones. Local Russian cultural life was not men­
tioned and supported until the 1980s: the word "Russian" was virtually non-exis-
tent in the Russian-language press until 1987. These editions were directed at the 
Soviet people, who spoke the Russian language and lived in the Estonian Soviet 
Socialist Republic. 
The state was also interested in following the moods of the population and pre­
serving a minimal veil of socialist democracy. Feedback from the population was 
therefore welcomed within a limited range of topics. The editorial correspon­
dence departments registered all incoming mail. If there were complaints regard­
ing the economy or daily life, the facts were sometimes verified. If journalists 
found that these complaints were well-grounded and somebody's rights were 
violated, they could apply to the appropriate institutions with a demand for a 
solution to the problem. Soviet legislation required any institution to which the 
press inquired to respond within a month. Thus, the population had an instru­
ment of influence over the state bureaucracy, used for solving life's daily prob­
lems and to some degree for the protection of their rights. 
In this period the media's informative function diminished; information was 
carefully selected and also combined with misinformation. Different variations of 
the regulative function dominated, just as in the Empire period in the 19th cen­
tury. In spite of censorship, the press to some extent performed a communicative 
function, involving governing institutions and population and to a certain degree 
functioning as a means of their reciprocal influence. It also helped people and 
groups from different regions of the USSR to establish and maintain contact. It 
played an important role in socialisation within the Soviet political and cultural 
context, spreading common norms, values, symbols and identities. For Russians 
it produced an illusion of being included in the local cultural context, symboli­
cally uniting them with Estonians on the basis of their common labour and 
mutual economic interest. On the other hand, it also performed a segregating 
sub-function, isolating local Russian-speaking "Soviet people" from both Estoni­
ans and their own ethnic Russian roots. Also, in some spheres the media were 
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used by the populace as the tool in the struggle with the bureaucracy and as 
a public forum for discussing a limited range of daily economic problems. 
1.4. 1988-1990 
In the period 1988-1990, the media could still influence practical matters, but also 
enjoyed virtually unlimited freedom. Due to an increase in the variety of infor­
mation, audience satisfaction increased and newspapers' circulation rapidly 
increased. The high circulation of the press together with the Soviet system of 
state financial support provided the media with financial stability. At the same 
time, one could observe a gradual growth of disappointment with the function­
ing of the press as it ceased to be an instrument of solving daily and personal 
problems and did not offer satisfactory explanations for the new political and 
economic situation. By 1990 the authority of newspapers started to decrease. 
Journalists, whose status became even higher, started using the press for their 
personal interests as a starting point for political and business careers (Tölz, 
1992). The press was celebrated as a deconstructor of an old regime, but the 
break-up of old social networks caused a decline in its role as an organiser. 
After years of stagnation, radical changes started to occur in 1988 in the Soviet 
economy and politic structure. The state was interested in promoting economic 
development as well as in preserving the existing political system and the integri­
ty of the state. At the same time, the Republics' Party Committees, who owned 
the local media channels, were interested in increasing the economic and politi­
cal independence of the Republics. Also, when the Estonian People's Front 
declared its goal of regaining national independence for the Estonian Republic, 
many local Russian-speakers (especially workers in the Union factories) felt 
threatened. 
The media during this period had virtually unlimited freedom to inform the 
audience about nearly all aspects of social and political life, because the political 
control over their content was abandoned. This led to a greater variety of content. 
Information finally appeared about the Estonian Republic and USSR history, and 
about the Russian-speaking community in Estonia. Discussion started about the 
Russian-speaking community's place and role in Estonian society, whether Rus­
sians had obligations towards native Estonians and rights as inhabitants and cit­
izens of Estonia (for example, were they obligated to study the Estonian language 
and culture, did they have the moral right to make decisions regarding the future 
of Estonia, etc.). Discussion also started about the future of the Russian language, 
culture and education in Estonia. It should be pointed out that the press at this 
time tried to fulfil two contradictory roles: it was concerned about increasing the 
separation between non-Estonians and Estonians, while at the same time trying 
to preserve their ideological and political proximity with the USSR in general. In 
order to do this, the press had to soften the existing contradictions and differ­
ences of opinion between supporters of state independence and USSR unity. The 
information in Estonian and Russian-language newspapers at this time was thus 
very different. In the Estonian newspapers of this period, there was negative feel­
ing towards Russian-speakers, offensive labels, demands to leave Estonia, etc. 
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In the Russian-language newspapers, there could be found only limited reflec­
tions of these moods together with calls for international friendship, co-operation 
and peace. The traditional Soviet period roles of Russians and Estonians were 
deconstructed. In the opinion of many Estonians, which was reflected in the 
Russian-language media, Estonians as an ethnic group were the victims and Rus­
sians were the bearers of collective guilt for their deportations, inhibition of the 
development of Estonian culture, Estonian-language extinction, etc. On the con­
trary, the Russian-language sources blamed Stalin's policy for the deportations of 
Estonians in the 1940s and "nationally-minded politicians" for the present ten­
sions, but not those Russians who were living in Estonia. In short, the Russian 
and Estonian views of each other's group, national relations and social reality in 
general were diametrically opposed during this period. 
On the one hand, the situation of uncertainty, distortion and disinformation 
increased stress and tension between Russian-speakers. On the other hand, the 
Russian-language media tried to some degree to decrease the social tension and 
prevent overt conflict, which took place in many other regions of the collapsing 
Soviet Empire. This latter view was repeated in many articles of the period: 
"Would you like Estonia to be like Pridnestrovje or Karabach?" Russian journal­
ists, public actors, businessmen and others stated that they strove to preserve sta­
bility and prevent conflict. It is likely that the efforts of these participants as well 
as the position of the press combined to play an inhibiting function in this peri­
od and avert conflict development. 
The importance of the informative function of press increased during this peri­
od, but the information itself had an unsystematic character; often the quality of 
information was quite low. Information also assumed an entertaining character, 
the function of the transmission of culture at this period was reduced to enter­
tainment. 
The press for the first time in its history played the role of public forum, as the 
range of sources represented and topics discussed was fairly wide. Due to an 
increase in the variety of information, the satisfaction of the audience rose and the 
newspapers' circulation reached 80,000-90,000 copies. At the same time, there 
was the gradual growth in disappointment in the press, as it ceased to be an 
instrument of solving daily and personal problems and did not provide satisfac­
tory explanations for the new political and economic situation. Thus by 1990, the 
authority of newspapers started decreasing. 
2. The role of the Russian-language press in Estonia in the 1990s 
2.1. Social background 
The break-up of the USSR and the restoration of state independence for the 
Estonian Republic caused a change in the position of the ethnic minority and 
majority. In 1991, Estonians from the ethnic minority turned into a state-nation. 
Conversely, Russians turned into a national minority, their political and civic sta­
tus rapidly changed. A number of laws (e.g., the Language Law, the Citizenship 
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Law, the Local Elections Law, the State Service Law) subsequently legitimised the 
situation in which access to citizenship, many jobs and positions, and to political 
activity depended upon a person's Estonian language proficiency. According to 
the Estonian Citizenship Law, adopted in February 1992, only 10% of non-Esto­
nians received Estonian citizenship automatically, the others had to undergo a 
procedure of naturalisation if they applied for citizenship. The legal status of 
non-citizens was indefinite until July 1993, when the Law on Foreigners was 
adopted. According to this law, non-citizens were declared to be foreigners who 
had to apply for temporary residence and working permits, even if they were 
born in Estonia. Non-citizens possessing residence permits preserved their social 
guarantees but they were deprived of the right to be members of political parties, 
to vote in Parliamentary elections, to take positions in state and municipal 
administrations, to serve in the Estonian army, etc. In 1992, non-Estonians were 
not represented or were weakly represented in the Parliament and other power 
and administrative structures of the Estonian Republic, although since 1996 their 
number in local administrations has grown. 
The decline of the old system of economic and political relations in the post-
Soviet era resulted in a rapid decrease of industrial output and agricultural pro­
duction in Estonia, especially from 1992 to 1994. A new network of social status 
emerged, in which new social groups were formed on the basis of legal status, 
nationality, income and other criteria. 
The crisis in industry (which employed many local Russian-speakers), poor 
knowledge of the Estonian language and a limited labour market has left Russ­
ian-speakers in Estonia with a generally low level of income, higher unemploy­
ment, a decrease in social status, and a high degree of dissatisfaction (Pavelson, 
2000). 
From 1991 to 1993, segregation and confrontation were the predominant ten­
dencies in inter-ethnic relations and especially in relations between the Estonian 
state and the Russian population. Since the second half of the 1990s, many stud­
ies have noted the beginning and strengthening of the process of integration at 
the societal level and the growth of mutual tolerance between Estonians and non-
Estonians (see Kruusvall, 1997, etc.). In 1998 the state launched the politics of 
national integration, as political stability and the absence of national conflict are 
mandatory requirements for joining EU. 
2.2. Control over the media or loyalty demands 
Since 1991, the Communist Party Committee has officially lost the function of 
control of media content. A logical expectation would be the rapid démocratisa­
tion of the Russian media. Surprisingly, the next development was a new demand 
of "loyalty," imposed in the Russian-language press in 1992-1996 by Estonian 
politicians and journalists. Russian-speaking newspapers and journalists were 
accused of "disloyalty." Any criticism of certain politicians or laws was inter­
preted by the Estonian authorities and media as disloyalty on the part of Rus­
sians. These accusations should be seen in a more general context of Estonians' 
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typical distrust of the political loyalty of non-Estonians and suspicions that they 
promote the interests of Russia inside Estonia (see Kolsto, 1996: 625; Kruusvall, 
1997: 133-140; Kirch, A., Kirch, M, Tuisk, 1997: 54-55; Haab, 1998: 110, 113; Raid, 
1996:130-131). Moreover, the boundaries and forms of expected loyalty were not 
demarcated. As a result, the Russian press strove to avoid any criticism of Eston­
ian state institutions on many topics related to the whole population of Estonia, 
such as economic issues, corruption, conflicts between Estonian political parties, 
legislation in the social sphere, etc., except for questions regarding the political 
and cultural rights of Russians and non-citizens. 
2.3. Owner's interests 
After the Estonian Communist Party Committee ceased in 1991, the former party 
newspapers were privatised. The largest Russian dailies, Estonija and Molodjozh 
Estonii, were privatised by their own journalists. Gradually their editors became 
the main shareholders. After 1992 the financial situation of these newspapers 
grew perilous, as the production expenses rapidly increased while the circulation 
of all newspapers was gradually falling. The newspapers in this period realised 
that they could not be financially independent and had to seek additional sources 
of financing such as advertising and outside investment. In 1996 the newspaper 
Estonija was privatised by Rukon-Info Ltd. and Molodjozh Estonii was officially 
privatised in September 2000 by the liquor-producing company Onistar. These 
two companies, as well as some companies that published advertisements in 
these newspapers, were also openly or latently sponsoring so-called Russian 
political parties/blocks/movements. 
The question thus arises as to whose interests were represented in the press in 
this period. A brief analysis of the Russian-language newspapers during the Par­
liamentary elections of 1996 and the local government elections of 1999 is useful 
in determining the answer. 
During the Parliamentary elections of 1996, the Russian-language newspapers 
mostly gave column space to the representatives of the Russian parties. The par­
ties stressed the necessity "to protect people's (non-citizens') rights." They for­
mulated the main problem of non-citizens as "difficulties in participation in the 
elections," although an analysis of reader feedback (see below) has shown that 
the readers themselves did not see any problems on this subject. In fact, all resi­
dents, including non-citizens with temporary residence permits, were allowed to 
vote in the municipal elections. Representatives of the Russian parties tried to 
create the illusion that the situation in Estonia could be quickly and radically 
changed if they were elected (they often used such expressions as it looks like, as 
if, like, etc.). They shifted the responsibility for the present problems on to Eston­
ian politicians. Until 1999, the latter were also constructed as enemies of Russians. 
Somebody finds pleasure in looking into the hungry eyes of Russian chil­
dren... The inhabitants of Toompea are hostile towards the non-Estonian 
majority of Ida-Virumaa. (Estonija, 9 May 1996) 
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In the autumn of 1999, the strategic political aim was changed from citizenship 
and "protection of people's rights" to the creation of a welfare society. 
It is necessary to increase the effectiveness of the heating systems of the dis­
trict, which will help to decrease expenses for communal services... to plan 
concrete measures in order to decrease unemployment, alleviate social prob­
lems... to build municipal living blocks for poor people... to organise local 
cultural and integration centres, to work out and accept the plan of co-oper­
ation of municipal council and government, NGOs, schools. (Molodjozh 
Estonii, 11 October 1999) 
Russian politicians also promised to fight for the legal equality of Russians and 
Estonians, the status of Russian as a second official language and the preserva­
tion of Russian culture. To achieve this, it would be necessary for Russian voters 
to support the Russian politicians: 
Estonian parties will not solve your problems. They have a detailed plan for 
eliminating the Russian population, aiming at the restoration of mono-eth­
nic state. ... Russian-speakers do not trust Estonian deputies to solve their 
problems. They seek support from the Russian Party and have the right to 
be represented in legislative bodies of the town and country. (Molodjozh 
Estonii, 13. October 1999) 
In general, in the election periods in 1996 and 1999, the Russian newspapers 
mainly supported Russian political parties and blocks. The methods used by 
Russian politicians, business leaders and journalists in 1996 and 1999, show that 
on the one hand they were interested in preserving a certain stability or at least 
avoiding social outburst, as it could harm their business and social position. In 
order to reach this goal, the Russian language press often softened the informa­
tion in crisis periods with calls for patience, expectation, peace: one should be 
patient, there is no sense in complaining, all the difficulties are determined by the stars, 
let's think, let's stop, don't hurry, etc. On the other hand, the Russian-language press 
was trying to maintain some degree of social tension, so that Russians would feel 
the need to view Russian politicians as saviours and advocates. The strategic 
aims of such behaviour were: 1) to inhibit the social processes; 2) to segregate the 
Russian population from the Estonian population and institutions; 3) to shift the 
responsibility for failures and problems on the others; and 4) to attract and keep 
the Russian-speaking voters. The underlying motive of these aims was apparent­
ly the preservation or improvement of the social status of the current leaders of 
the Russian community. 
2.4. The audience and its interests 
On the basis of studies of readers' letters and telephone calls published in the 
newspapers for 1991,1996 and 1999, it is possible to compare the topics prevalent 
during these years and to make a comparative table about how the audience used 
the press in 1991-1999 (see Table 7.1). Only texts produced by people on their 
own initiative were considered. 
The Role of the Russian-Language Media in Estonian Society 217 
Table 1. Types of readers' letters to the Russian-language press, 
1991-1999 
Type of letter 1991 1996 19991 
Complaints 45.6 60.9 10.5 
Expression of opinion (contains constructive proposals) 33.3 4.7 21.0 
Using as a channel of communication with politicians 6.0 >1.0 10.5 
Applying to newspaper as to collective board 5.2 0 0 
Using as an "Infotable" 4.7 28.2 36.8 
Using for solving personal problems 5.2 5.5 26.3 
1 In 1999, data was collected only a week before the elections, while in 1991 and 1996 
a content-analysis of all letters was carried out for 6 months. 
Sources: Jakobson, 1996; Jakobson & Iljina, 2000 
Two topics were dominant in 1996: 
1) problems connected with the legal status of non-citizens (31% of letters); 
2) the decrease in the quality of life in general (30% of letters). 
The topics of other letters were connected with these two (a decrease in the 
quality of medical service, the growth of unemployment and the crime rate, fam­
ily problems connected with the lack of documents or residence permits in Esto­
nia by one member of the family, etc.). In 1999 the main topics were the necessi­
ty of improving the quality of life in different spheres, social care, and the need 
for information necessary to protect peoples' rights in the economic daily sphere 
(63%). Thus, the topics connected with the decrease in living standards and daily 
economic problems dominated these years and their importance increased as 
time passed. 
It is also important to compare the ways the press was used by its audience 
during these years. Table 1 shows the ever-growing tendency of using the press 
as an "infodesk" (readers ask for information from the newspaper or its lawyer). 
Using the press for solving personal problems in 1999 became very similar to its 
usage as an "infodesk" (where a reader asks a journalist for help in getting infor­
mation from a certain institution). Also, the content of a category such as "expres­
sion of opinion and constructive proposals" changes, as in 1991 those proposals 
were addressed primarily to society in general, yet in 1999 were focused on cer­
tain addressees (for example, members of residents' cooperatives, management 
of a factory, administration of a district, specialists working out the programme 
of teaching Estonian to Russians, etc.). 
During the 1990s, the same primary traits of the "social ideal" of the audience 
could be observed: civic equality, stable legal status, financial stability and a high 
level of information. While in the period 1991-1996 the population expected that 
state and municipal institutions would help them reach this ideal, by 1999 the 
main methods proposed by representatives of the population had changed to the 
independent solving of problems, activity and self-organisation. At the same 
time, practically all other sources of information reported that the population 
increasingly turned to illegal ways of achieving their aims, probably because the 
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legal means were too complicated. People relied mainly upon themselves, and 
did not ask for help or complain. In 1999, people mostly asked the press questions 
of where to go or where to get additional information to solve a problem, but not 
how to solve the problem. Searching for ways of achieving aims, people seldom 
applied to the media and preferred alternative sources of information (rumours, 
or information obtained on an interpersonal level - Jakobson, 1996; Pettäi, 1999). 
2.5. Constructing the Russian and Estonian communities 
and their interrelations 
In 1999 the Russian community was described in the Russian-language press as 
mostly consisting of poor Russian voters, having no citizenship, and it was mostly 
differentiated on the basis of age and sex. The dominant definitions were con­
nected to various forms of deprivation, including moral and intellectual (passive, 
frightened, distressed, uninformed, unaware, offended, marginalised), economic (poor; 
deprived), and legal deprivation (non-citizens, discriminated). In cases where 
youngsters were mentioned, they were most often characterised by some form of 
deviance (drug-addicts, criminals, drunkards, poor). Only in a few articles was the 
audience was described as active (house dwellers). In 2000 the situation had 
changed. In a large number of articles (45% for Estonija and 70% for Molodjozh 
Estonii), representatives of the Russian community were described as active (town 
dwellers, successful high school students, Russian politicians, Russians as a cultural 
minority, simple readers). In other materials, the old paradigm is preserved: passive 
Russians are described as victims of discrimination (former KGB-officers, non-citi­
zens, Orthodox believers, youngsters, Russians in Estonia, deceived, children). It is nec­
essary to note that such different behaviours of the two dailies could be explained 
by the difference in their position. As Estonija is more middle class and local Russ­
ian élite-oriented, the old paradigm still prevails. At the same time, Molodjozh 
Estonii, whose circulation has dramatically fallen, desperately needs to attract 
readership in order to become an effective instrument for its owners, and tries to 
come closer to the audience. 
During the period 1992-1996, Estonians were construed in the Russian press as 
consisting of two main groups: 
1) "simple people," friendly to Russians and oppressed by the state; 
2) "national-radicals" (nationalist-minded politicians), hostile towards Russians. 
Under this construct, it was the Soviet regime or certain of its institutions, the 
pro-Soviet Intermovement or Estonian nationalist-minded politicians, who were 
guilty of creating tensions and misunderstanding, but not the Estonian Russian-
speakers or Estonians as ethnic groups. In 1998-1999, these images practically 
disappeared from the Russian press. The two main images presented in the Russ­
ian-language press were: 
1) the Estonian official, polite and neat, not overtly hostile towards Russians, but 
indifferent to the needs and problems of "simple people" and estranged from 
them; 
2) Estonian intellectuals and enthusiasts - teachers, scientists, bringing Estonian 
culture to Russians, helping them to integrate into Estonian society. 
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In many cases the Estonians were represented as "looking down from above," 
"teaching and civilising," and "tolerant" towards Russians. Thus, these images 
could hardly be accepted by representatives of the audience as "their own." 
In the 1990s the Russian-language press informed its audience about the main 
events of Estonian political, economic, social and cultural life, published essays 
on Estonian history, etc. It was certainly a difficult problem to select the propor­
tion and combination of materials to both bind the diasporal community with the 
major society and its historical motherland, and cover the life of this community 
in particular. Nevertheless, the press could evidently play a more important role 
in integrating the Russian-speaking community into Estonian society, as accord­
ing to many reports, local Russian-speakers (even those who have learned the 
Estonian language) entering into the Estonian environment feel a cultural shock. 
It is more likely that throughout the Russian-language press, non-Estonians were 
given the illusion of "being informed" about Estonians, the Estonian state and 
society. 
Conclusions 
Compared to the perestroika period, the 1990s saw a reduction in the informative 
function of the Russian press. The performance by the press of the sub-function 
of orienting the population and adapting it to the changing environment was lim­
ited. Its role in socialisation diminished, especially with regards to young people, 
and it remained unused as a tool of integration of society. 
The minority press instead performed such sub-functions of the regulative 
function as filtering, i.e., limiting information and segregating the Russian popu­
lation from Estonians and the institutions of the Estonian state. The press com­
pensated for the need for information instead of satisfying it, as only 20% of non-
Estonians in 1996 and 30% of non-Estonians in May 2000 considered themselves 
to be well-informed (Saar Poll 2000). Also, the sub-function of activisation 
declined throughout this period. The result of this functioning led to the per­
formance by the press of the role of social damper. 
In connection with the political struggle in general, especially during the elec­
tion periods, the press also played a role of "trader-mediator," trying to "sell" 
votes and the trust of the voters for the political élites. Nevertheless, it was not a 
very successful agent, as despite aggressive propaganda campaigns, in October 
1999 more than 50% of non-Estonians did not participate in municipal elections 
and over one third of the voters voted for "Estonian" parties. Also, in order to 
maintain political correctness, it was "selling" to the state and officials the loyal­
ties of Russian-speakers, giving column space to numerous explanations of their 
aims and methods, and promulgating calls to be patient and wait. 
The performance of these roles was effective until 1996. The press was a par­
ticularly effective "damper" in the years 1992-1993, when it helped to alleviate 
inter-ethnic conflict. Since 1997, however, an intensification of the integration 
process between the population groups has been observed. Poor quality infor­
mation, the lack of analysis and constructive proposals instigate a further 
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rejection of the press by the readership, as well as a preference for alternative 
sources of information (primarily interpersonal communication). 
The importance of the press to its potential audience decreased. This tendency 
is illustrated by the fact that only 33% of non-Estonians regularly read local Russ-
ian-language dailies and 56% do it as little as once per week (Vihalemm, 2000). It 
also reveals itself in the permanent decrease of press circulation from 68,000 
(Estonija) and 95,000 (Molodjozh Estonii) copies in 1989 to 22,000-25,000 copies in 
1992 and only 8,000 copies in 2001. Thus, the effectiveness of the performance of 
its roles has also decreased and as a result, the role of the Russian press in Esto­
nia is fast becoming superfluous. 
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8. Development of Media Regulation in Estonia: 
1988-2001 
Halliki Harro 
Estonia has experienced a free media only during 1920-1933 and since the very 
end of the 1980s. This is a fairly short time in which to develop media regulation 
in a democratic society, especially compared with societies where press freedom 
has lasted over one hundred years. Hence, in Estonia in the beginning of 1990s, 
after the first exuberance of media freedom, the need to achieve contemporary 
regulation of the mass media became paramount. 
A society in transition can copy the means of regulation (e.g., implementation 
of new laws and enforcement of a self-regulation system) from countries with 
long experience with democracy and press freedom. Another way is to learn the 
discourse of normative regulation of public communication and mass media and 
adopt the available concepts and laws selectively. The discourse can be devel­
oped and learned during the course of conflicts between the mass media and 
other interest groups and demands time-consuming public negotiations concern­
ing freedom of expression and the conflicting rights (e.g., an individual's right to 
privacy vs. protection of honour). The development of the discourse is verbally 
reflected in new legal acts, decisions of the courts and various press councils, 
public debates over media performance, etc. 
This chapter analyses the development of the discourse of the normative regu­
lation of mass media in Estonian during the 1990s. The media has traditionally 
been regulated legally. There are some laws that apply primarily to the mass 
media, but most of the legal norms are scattered throughout various codes. In 
practice the law is interpreted by lawsuits. Therefore one country might have 
"sleeping codes" that are not applied, while other statutes are interpreted by 
numerous lawsuits and therefore actively contribute to the normative media dis­
course. 
The chapter begins with an overview of the development of legal means of 
media regulation, followed the self-regulation system of mass media in Estonia. 
The chapter examines both the operating regulation in Estonia (laws and court 
practice) and the regulation of the mass media implemented in other democratic 
countries but which is not applied in Estonian laws and cases. The question of 
absent regulation is relevant in order to compare the communication norms with 
those of other democracies. To enable comparability, the analysis is based on a 
comparative research study made in 1993 on media regulation in eleven coun­
tries. This research used twenty-two categories (Coliver, 1993). The modified 
variant of the comparative research categories are: 
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• constitutional provisions; 
• statutory framework (Single Press Act, provisions affecting the media content) 
• access and disclosure of information (including official secrecy, commercial 
secrecy, etc.); 
• protection of personal data and invasion of privacy; 
• defamation (including insults to government institutions or officials); 
• right of reply and correction; 
• protection of sources; 
• blasphemy, obscenity and protection of public morals; 
• restrictions on advertising; 
• self-regulation system. 
Also examined is how the Estonian media regulation corresponds to Article 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, which defines the freedom of 
expression1. The first paragraph of Article 10 declares: "Everyone has the right to 
freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart information [emphasis added - H.H.] and ideas without inter­
ference ...". As the freedom of expression is not an absolute right, Article 10 also 
provides a list of rights that might conflict with the freedom of expression and 
therefore might limit it: 
• the right of the state to licence broadcasting, television and cinema enterprise; 
• interests of national security, territorial integrity and public safety; 
• prevention of disorder or crime; 
• the protection of health or morals; 
• the protection of the reputation or rights of others; 
• prevention the disclosure of information received in confidence; 
• maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
Hence, the analysis of the development of the regulation of public communi­
cation and media in Estonia will also assess the balance between the rights set 
forth by the Convention's Article. 
1. Late 1980s - middle 1990s 
The beginning of the 1990s can be characterised as the period when freedom of 
expression was interpreted as absolute freedom. After almost 50 years of living 
under censorship, the achievement of press freedom was the top priority. In addi­
tion, when the media played a significant role in the national independence 
movement, there was little ground for conflict between public, personal and 
media interests. The basis for conflicts emerged gradually in conjunction with the 
privatisation and commercialisation of the media that steadily started in the 
beginning of the 1990s. 
The So/iet regime precluded any special laws regulating the mass media as 
well as any lawsuits against the media. The channels of the mass media were 
1 Estonia signed the Convention on 14 May 1993; the Convention and its protocols 1, 4, 
and 7 were enacted in 1996. 
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considered a voice of the Communist Party; hence the directive documents of the 
Party were the only guidance for media performance. Still, the legal possibility to 
protect ones honour was available through Article 8 of the Soviet Estonian Civil 
Code (which covered untrue and defamatory data) or Article 13 of the Soviet 
Estonian Penal Code (insults). This law was not applied to media content until 
1988, when three Estonian politicians started a lawsuit against correspondents of 
TASS. The focus of this lawsuit was disseminating untrue and defamatory infor­
mation by the journalists. Although the information was circulated personally, 
i.e., not through the official media channels, the complainant emphasised that 
making the data available even to one person would be considered dissemina­
tion. The complainants did not sue to punish the journalists but pointed out their 
responsibility for publicising incorrect information. The court decided that an 
adjusted statement should be published (Harro, 1994: 113). 
The need for particular legislation covering the mass media was discussed in 
the early 1990s. Several drafts of the Press Law were written, but none of them 
passed. At first, no one could sufficiently define the object of regulation. Should 
the law be applicable to the printed press only, should it include also broadcast­
ing or should it regulate information processing? Another strong argument 
against a special press or media law was that Constitution should be passed first. 
The Constitution2 was passed in 1992. The public discussion finally determined 
that there was no need for special regulation of the mass media and that over-reg­
ulation might damage the newly achieved communication freedom rather than 
protect it. 
Paragraphs 44 and 45 of the Constitution of Estonia guarantee the right to free­
dom of expression and the right to receive information in the following terms: 
§ 44. Everyone has the right to freely obtain information disseminated for 
public use. 
All state agencies, local governments, and their officials have a duty to 
provide information about their activities, pursuant to procedure provided 
by law, to an Estonian citizen at his or her request, except information the 
disclosure of which is prohibited by law, and information intended exclu­
sively for internal use. 
An Estonian citizen has the right to access information about himself or 
herself held in state agencies and local governments and in state and local 
government archives, pursuant to procedure provided by law. This right 
may be restricted pursuant to laws to protect the rights and freedoms of oth­
ers or the confidentiality of a child's filiation, and in the interests of combat­
ing a criminal offence, apprehending a criminal offender, or ascertaining the 
truth in a criminal procedure. 
Citizens of foreign states and stateless persons who are in Estonia have the 
rights specified in paragraphs two and three of this section equally with 
Estonian citizens, unless otherwise provided by law. 
2 The unofficial translations of Estonian legal acts provided by the Estonian Legal Transla­
tion Centre are available at www.legaltext.ee. 
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§ 45. Everyone has the right to freely disseminate ideas, opinions, beliefs 
and other information by word, print, picture or other means. Laws to pro­
tect public order, morals, and the rights and freedoms, health, honour and 
good name of others may restrict this right. This right may also be restricted 
by law for state and local government public servants, to protect a state or 
business secret or information received in confidence, which has become 
known to them by reason of their office, and the family and private life of 
others, as well as in the interests of justice. There is no censorship. 
Article 17 of the Constitution guarantees the protection of honour. 
The Estonian Constitution is traditional in the sense that the freedom to express 
one's ideas may be limited by provisions of other laws including those which 
protect personal rights, national security, interest of justice, etc. One can conclude 
that it has taken almost 10 years to develop modern and comprehensive laws. 
In general, while society went through very basic reforms in the beginning of 
1990s, the regulation of public communication was not the highest priority, with 
the exception of the regulation of broadcasting. As the first commercial radio sta­
tions started in 1991, the lack of legislation concerning broadcasting became 
apparent. However, the political discussion on broadcasting law lasted until 
1994, when the first version of the Broadcasting Act was finally passed. That law 
was only "the frame law" that provided essential regulation for the performance 
of commercial and public television and radio stations. The law did not provide 
policy for fundamental questions such as: Is public broadcasting allowed to show 
advertising? If not, what should be the financial schema for public television and 
radio? What is the main function of public broadcasting programming and what 
should be the mechanism to decide the content and quantity of public service 
programmes? The Broadcasting Act has been amended several times during the 
1990s. Although several drafts of a new broadcasting law were proposed in the 
1990s, none of these have been passed. 
Whether a conflicts between individuals (organisations) and the media is taken 
to court depends on existing laws but also on the access and cost of a lawsuit. If 
a lawsuit against the media is complicated or very expensive, the legal regulation 
of the media is weak though there may be many laws. The "freedom of the press" 
thus appears to be very high but it is not the result of high esteem of public com­
munication and democracy, rather this "freedom" is achieved through defence­
less individual rights (e.g., right for honour, right for privacy, etc.). 
Until the middle 1990s, relatively few people sued media organisations. Most 
of those lawsuits concerned defamation. In 1991, the court case Tiit Made versus 
Eesti Ekspress (a politician against a weekly newspaper) entailed the first public 
discussion about the nature of defamation. 
In 1992 Väino Villik brought an action against Eesti Ekspress, drawing on Arti­
cle 25 of the Estonian Constitution, which gives an individual the right for repa­
ration in the event of moral damage. The case was deadlocked because the suit 
was against a trademark and not against the owners. That was a lesson about 
"who is responsible for published information and is a potential defendant" 
(Harro, 1994: 115). 
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In 1994 the Soviet Estonian Civil Code that had been in effect since 1965 was 
changed. The new Civil Code modified the definition of defamation (Article 23) 
and also included the right to privacy (Article 24), but media organisations and 
journalists have been sued on the basis of intrusion of privacy only in very few 
cases. 
Division 4 (Protection of Personal Rights) of the General Principles of the Civil 
Code states that: 
A person has the right to demand termination of defamation, refutation of 
defamatory information concerning the person and compensation for moral 
and proprietary damage caused by the defamation ... unless the defamer 
proves the accuracy of the information." In addition, if inaccurate informa­
tion is disseminated through mass medium, it shall be refuted in the same 
medium (Estonian Civil Code, Article 23/2). 
In addition, defamation is regulated by the Estonian Penal Code, which was 
passed in May 1992. It was a modification of an old Soviet Penal Code. Article 129 
states: 
Dissemination, knowingly, of false or embarrassing unfounded information, 
or in a petition or anonymous letter submitted to a state, non-profit or other 
organisation, is punishable by a fine or detention. (2) Defamation in print or 
by other means accessible by several persons, or in a petition or anonymous 
letter submitted to a state, non-profit organisation, is punishable by a fine or 
detention. 
Article 130 of the Penal Code defines an insult as "degradation of the honour or 
dignity of another person in an improper manner." 
In 1996, Toomas Liiva, the Editor-in-Chief of the most-sued newspaper Post, 
published an analytical summary of the defamation lawsuits against mass media 
organisations in 1994-1995. He analysed 18 civil and criminal charges against 
media organisations and journalists and concluded that, "Due to the court prac­
tice, press freedom has been limited significantly within the last years" (Liiva, 
1996: 1). Hence, during the first half of the 1990s the Estonian press learned that 
press freedom is a limited right, but the practice of deciding on the borders was 
inconsistent. 
If there are enough lawsuits against the mass media, the decisions of the court 
set the final rules and borders on public communication. In a transition society 
the court also goes through reformation; hence, the court might be not ready to 
solve complicated conflicts concerning the mass media. Legal acts concerning 
defamation were interpreted in many cases against the mass media during the 
1990s. One can point out now the deficiencies of these laws concerning the 
sophisticated concept of protection of an individual's honour. 
Until the middle of 1990s, different lawsuits about defamation reflected differ­
ent understanding about what was a defamatory statement, what was moral 
damage, who should prove the real damage, who could estimate the sum for 
compensation, etc. In most cases the judges decided that even if the defamation 
had taken place, the plaintiff had not proven the moral damage. 
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An example of the fact that typical citizens could not protect themselves from 
journalistic malpractice, as they could not afford sufficient legal aid, dates back to 
1996. On 13 July 1996, the national daily Postimees published a photo of a fat 
woman in the humour section. In an ironical way the woman was called a Sum­
mer Hag. The person depicted on the archive photograph happened to be a actu­
al living person. The photo was originally taken, but not published, for a story in 
the early 1990s about workers at a meat processing plant. After the photo was 
printed in 1996, the woman heard from her relatives. In her lawsuit, she claimed: 
"As I am paid for my tough work 3,000 kroons per month, I am able to pay the 
state duty in the amount of 300 kroons. If I can save money for the state duty, I 
will increase the demand." 
Postimees defended itself with the argument that according to the Article 23 of 
the Civil Code, "defamation" meant publication of inadequate data, not corre­
sponding to reality. Consequently, when the data is correct, although expressing 
an offensive and negative attitude towards the person, it cannot be the grounds 
for a lawsuit. Postimees also argued that the claim of direct and moral damages 
was not justified. The case never reached a verdict. 
2. Second half of the 1990s: Defined problems but open ends 
During the second half of the 1990s, Estonian society reached the stage of increas­
ing conceptual discussions on media regulation. The main problems can be list­
ed as following: defamation - a crime or civil tort; different status of people (pub­
lic persons and private individuals); difference between fact and opinion and the 
protection of opinion; definition of public and private information; access to pub­
lic information and state secrets. The discussion on the regulation of broadcast­
ing continued and did not reach any final decision. The Personal Data Protection 
Act was passed in 1996. The Advertising Act, the Databases Act and the Act to 
Regulate Dissemination of Works Which Contain Pornography or Promote Vio­
lence or Cruelty were passed in 1997. The regulation of information in Estonia 
became more sophisticated. 
2.1. Problems of defamation 
The Estonian Parliament ratified the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in April 1996; hence the Strasbourg 
Court practice was also applicable in Estonian courts. The change concerned con­
cepts that are not rooted in the Estonian legal system. For example, in Castells ver­
sus Spain (1992), the European Court ruled that governments are required to suf­
fer an even greater degree of scrutiny than politicians (Coliver, 1992: 251). Anoth­
er conceptual change concerned the protection of strong opinion in political dis­
cussion. The European Court ruled in Lingens and Oberschlich versus Austria (1997) 
holdings that the requirement that a journalist should prove a value judgement 
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is impossible and is itself an infringement on the freedom of expression (Coliver, 
1992: 251). 
The first Estonian suit where the status of the plaintiff was raised was held in 
Võru country court in 1995 (Tõnu Anton versus Postimees, a local politician versus 
leading daily). The newspaper's lawyer asked the court to take into consideration 
that the plaintiff was a politician who should sustain stronger critical opinions 
about his activities that ordinary people. The court accepted this view. 
Further court practice concerning the status of the plaintiff has been inconsis­
tent. The District Court of Tallinn ruled in 1996 that persons who run for parlia­
ment should anticipate higher public scrutiny and their tolerance of criticism 
should be greater than that of ordinary citizens (Ulvi Valdja and Heiki Sookruus ver­
sus Keila Leht, court decision 31 October 1996, p. 3). The District Court of Tallinn 
ruled in June 1997 that a "politician like any other citizen should be protected 
against insult, especially mass mediated insult." (Peeter Kreitzberg versus AS Cro-
noes, the article was published in the weekly Eesti Ekspress; Decision of the Dis­
trict Court of Tallinn, 13 June 1997, p. 3). However the State Court ruled in Octo­
ber 1997 about the same case (Kreitzberg versus AS Crones) that a public person 
who has voluntarily placed himself under public scrutiny could suffer moral 
damage only if the untrue information about him was extremely offensive (Deci­
sion of the District Court of Tallinn, 2 February 1998, p. 2). In summary, Estonian 
court practice had defined by 1998 that politicians should withstand sharper crit­
icism than a common citizen. 
The question about defamatory factual statement and opinion has also been 
inconsistent until two important cases reached the State Court (Supreme Court): 
Vilja Laanaru versus Enno Tammer (1996/1997) and Yens Marsen Luther versus Ülo 
Pärnits and AS Media (1997). With the suit Laanaru versus Tammer, Estonian socie­
ty discussed the question of whether an insult in the media can only be a tort or 
also a crime. Laanaru versus Tammer is also the only case in Estonia that was taken 
to the European Court on the basis of Article 10 (Tammer versus Estonia, applica­
tion no. 41205/98). 
As stated previously, Estonian legislation provides for criminal as well civil 
causes of action for defamation. Criminal charges for defamation are rare, how­
ever; the most discussed case of defamation was based on Penal Code Article 130, 
that defines "insult." That case reflected the insufficiency of legal understanding 
of the sophisticated concept of defamation. 
In 1996, Vilja Laanaru, at that time the mistress and assistant of prominent 
Estonian politician Edgar Savisaar, gave a series of interviews to journalist Ülo 
Russak with the intention of publishing her memoirs. In addition to intrigues 
between Estonian politicians, her interviews also revealed many facts about her 
life with Edgar Savisaar. Among other facts, Vilja said that their daughter had 
been living with her grandparents for several years. The interviews were pub­
lished as a serial and drew much public attention. Another Estonian journalist, 
Enno Tammer, published an interview with journalist Ülo Russak. One of the 
questions Tammer asked was: "By the way, don't you feel that you have made a 
hero out of the wrong person? A person breaking up another's marriage 
(abielulõhkuja), an unfit and careless mother deserting her child (rongaema). It does 
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not seem to be the best example for young girls." The question was printed with­
out a question mark and therefore was interpreted as an allegation. 
Vilja Laanaru sued Enno Tammer under Article 30 of the Penal Code for 
allegedly being insulted. The City Court of Tallinn found Enno Tammer guilty 
and awarded a penalty 220 kroons (a symbolic amount of money). An appeal did 
not change the final decision - the journalist was found guilty. However, the case 
broke new ground about personal rights versus press freedom. 
First, there was a discussion of whether defamation should belong in criminal 
law and, in case of conviction, is a journalist a criminal? The State Court refer­
enced its decision to a deficiency in the Civil Code. The State Court said that 
according to the Civil Code defamation could only be claimed when an untrue 
factual statement degrades the plaintiff's honour. If a person feels that his honour 
has been besmirched by a value judgement, it is impossible to prove that allega­
tion in a legal sense. Thus, Estonian law provides only criminal causes of action, 
namely, criminal law (Article 30) says that ignominy (improper estimation) is 
punishable. The Supreme Court had reversed this position in December 1997, 
holding that civil law provided remedies to protect a person's honour (Yens 
Marsen Luther versus Ülo Pärnits and AS Media). 
Another topic that was discussed briefly but was not addressed in court deci­
sions was the status of Vilja Laanaru: was she a public person? Tammer contend­
ed that Vilja Laanaru was a public figure in her own right, as she had played an 
independent role in the political life of Estonia by holding the high and influen­
tial position of Counsellor to the Minister of Interior. By putting herself in the cen­
tre of a secret tape-recording scandal, she had attempted to obtain additional 
publicity for herself. In addition, Vilja Laanaru had herself made public issue of 
her interference in Savisaar's marriage as well as her relationship with her 
daughter. 
The journalist appealed against the judgement of the Estonian courts to the 
European Court which passed a final judgement in January 2001. 
The court did not find that the impunged terms in relation to Vilja Laanaru's 
private life was justified by considerations of public concern. "... it has not been 
substantiated that her private life was among the issues that affected the public 
in April 1996. The applicant's remarks could therefore scarcely be regarded as 
serving the public interest." (Tammer versus Estonia, final judgement, p. 15). 
Here it is useful to connect the discussion with conventions of regulating pri­
vacy matters. Article 24 of the Estonian Civil Code does not provide a privacy 
definition that allows an individual's own activity to determine his private 
sphere. Instead, it forbids trespass into a private room, unlawful observation or 
the collection of private data. Article 24 also primarily protects the secrecy of pri­
vate communication. Thus, the legal approach to the protection of privacy 
according to the Civil Code is incomplete. 
The most celebrated insult case was based on Article 130 of the Criminal Code. 
In 1998, the television magazine Nädal published a one-question interview with 
popular TV journalist Urmas Ott about writer Olev Remsu, who had previously 
published a critical opinion about TV sports commentator Toomas Uba. Ott's 
opinion about Remsu was critical, which he expressed using vulgar vocabulary. 
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Ott also told the editor that the magazine could print his comments. The key fac­
tor in this case was that the words were indecent and they reached the offended 
person via the media. After Ott was found guilty by the criminal court (Article 
130 of the Penal Code - Ott was fined 10,800 kroons), Remsu sued Ott in civil 
court and in 2001 the Town Court awarded 200,000 kroons to Remsu for moral 
damages. This is the largest amount of money awarded to date for moral dam­
ages. As the court decision was made by default, the case is still continuing. 
2.2. Regulation of public and private information 
A substantial deficiency in the Estonian body of laws and legal interpretation 
comes from the limited understanding of the concept of "public information." 
Article 44 of the Estonian Constitution declares that every citizen has a right to 
receive public information according to the law. Article 44 leaves open the possi­
bility not to provide access to "official use" information and information that is 
"confidential according to the law." Thus, any administrative power-holder in 
Estonia has enough power to arbitrarily decide what data is not public. 
The discussion about the definition of public information and access to this 
information started in the middle 1990s. Several drafts have been discussed. In 
the spring of 1997, Parliament ordered the government to prepare a draft infor­
mation law named the Information Act. The first State Secrets Act had been 
passed in 1994, the second one in 1997. In addition, the Law of Public Service and 
Foreign-Service obligates public servants to keep official secrets and hold confi­
dential data. The Personal Data Protection Act (passed in 1996) is so vague that it 
allows almost any use of individual data. The Public Information Act was finally 
passed in November 2000 and might increase the transparency of society. 
At a seminar in Tallinn in February 2001, lawyers stated that much uncertainty 
can still be observed in the system of requests for public information. Although 
the Public Information Act states that any kind of information intended for pub­
lic use must be available immediately upon request, the law does not apply to the 
cases, in which access to the particular information has been regulated by some 
other law (Article 2). The lawyers stated that the number of these restrictions 
varies between 20 to 50 and there is no complete database of the restrictions. 
Thus, the public disclosure process can create a situation in which an official in 
charge of state secrets has wide discretion in interpreting the obligation to dis­
close public information. Also, in many cases the technical outfit disables neces­
sary procedures. 
Personal data is protected primarily by the Personal Data Protection Act, which 
provides definitions for personal data and delicate personal data. This is the area 
where the regulation also meets the confidence concept, namely, Article 128 and 
167 of the Penal Code regulate the disclosure of confidential data. There is as yet 
no court experience about the co-functioning of these two laws. 
Estonian laws cursorily regulate publishing information about court proceed­
ings. Article 4, Section 3, Clause 5 of the Personal Data Protection Act defines the 
"information collected in criminal proceedings or in other proceedings to 
232 Development of Media Regulation in Estonia: 1988-2001 
ascertain an offence before a public court session or before a judgement is made 
in a matter concerning an offence" as personal sensitive data. According to the 
Act, the inspection of data protection is conducted by the Data Protection Inspec­
torate, but there are no precedents so far. 
2.3. Regulation of public morals 
As mentioned previously, the dissemination of works containing violence and 
pornography are regulated by the Act to Regulate Dissemination of Works Which 
Contain Pornography or Promote Violence or Cruelty, and by the Broadcasting 
Act. The first also defines "pornography." Article 9 of the Broadcasting Act pro­
hibits the broadcasting of programmes with immoral contents. These two laws 
have been used against media once: on 18 May 2000, the very popular TV show 
Kahvel contained a portion of a show from a sex fair depicting a sexual act 
between two women. The broadcaster was fined 10,000 kroons. 
2.4. Restrictions on advertising 
Advertising in the mass media is regulated by the Advertising Act, and in broad­
casting also by the Broadcasting Act. In addition, some specific fields of adver­
tising are regulated by other laws such as the Medical Products Act, etc. 
The Advertising Act requires the distinction between advertising and editorial 
text. It also prohibits misleading, offensive and hidden advertising. Separate 
requirements are set for advertising targeted to children. The advertising of alco­
hol has special restrictions - for example, hard liquor cannot be advertised from 
7 a.m. to 9 p.m. on radio and television. Tobacco advertising is banned in any 
form. 
The inspection of advertising activities, especially concerning hidden advertis­
ing, is inefficient because it is often difficult to prove that there has been payment 
for published materials. Also, the monitoring sufficient to observe all advertise­
ments, particularly in broadcasting, is not availablable. 
3. Development of self-regulation 
The Estonian Newspapers' Association established the first Press Council in 1991. 
The pattern for the Estonian Press Council was taken from Finland. During the 
first two years the Press Council received few complaints. Neither the public nor 
the media knew much about the self-regulatory system. 
The Council became more active in 1993. Estonian journalists at that time had 
no code of professional conduct or any other written rules. The Council thus 
based its decisions on more or less universal rules operative in North European 
countries. 
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By the end of 1992 the Press Council received 19 complains; by the end of 1994, 
51 complaints. During the period 1995-1996, the total number of complaints was 
29. Until the middle of 1990s the subject matter of complaints varied, but the most 
common problem was linked with "contempt of court" - biased reporting about 
lawsuits in progress. This matter was and is not regulated legally, which may 
explain why the problem was put on the self-regulatory system. Another reason 
might be better-informed lawyers who were eager to test the new means of media 
regulation. 
The Estonian Press Council (EPC) was reorganised in April 1997 by six media-
related organisations: the Newspapers' Association, the Broadcasters' Associa­
tion, the Association of Media Educators, the Journalists' Union, national public 
radio and TV, and the Consumers' Union. The Network of Non-Profit Organisa­
tions and the Council of Churches joined the EPC in 1999. 
A Code of Ethics was adopted in December 1997. This was preceded by open 
discussion and the receipt of numerous amendments. The Estonian practice of 
introducing self-regulation was contrary to several other post-Communist soci­
eties (e.g., Slovenia and Latvia). The Estonian media first established the council 
and later passed the code of good practice. That was reasonable because the exis­
tence of the code itself does not provide interpretation of good and reprehensible 
journalistic practices; it remains a "sleeping code." The Press Council (or any 
other body designed to receive complaints about media performance) channels 
complaints and therefore serves as a bridge between the press and other interest­
ed parties discussing the rules of public communication. 
The ideology of the Estonian Press Council assumes that the professional com­
munity of journalists should not solely define the rules of good professional con­
duct; rather, it is a matter of public concern. The task was thus to promote the 
principles of self-regulation among the profession and to introduce it to the pub­
lic. Seminars were held in 1998 and a manual for the public, "How to Manage 
with the Media" was published and the website of the Council makes available 
all the adjudications (www.asn.org.ee). 
In 1995 the Press Council received 14 complaints; 1996 - 12; 1997 - 18, but then 
the numbers rose: 1998 - 32; 1999 - 37; and in 2000 - 37 complaints. As the func­
tion of the Press Council can be fulfilled only if the system is known and easily 
available to the public, it is also important to analyse the structure of the com­
plainants. 
According to Table 8.1, the number of private individuals as complainants has 
increased steadily and the number of high public figures among complainants 
has decreased from 1996. Hence, it is possible to conclude that the Estonian Press 
Council has fulfilled the objective that the self-regulation system should be acces­
sible to those people who can not afford a lawsuit against the media. It is impor­
tant to add that most of the lawsuits (defamation claims) against the media 
organisations were initiated by the public and by powerful people. 
About one third of the cases since 1997 have been upheld. During the last few 
years the most frequent reason has been the reckless control of embarassing facts 
and one-sided reporting (for example, 9 out of 13 upheld cases in 2000). In most 
such cases the reputation of an individual was harmed. Article 1.5 of the Code of 
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Table 8.1. The dynamics of the complaints and complainants, 1996-2000 
Complaints made by... 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
... an individual 1 4 9 12 15 
... high public figure or government institution 1 6 11 4 3 
... half-public figure 4 1 3 6 6 
... private company 3 3 0 2 4 
... NGO 0 1 1 1 3 
... other 6 8 9 12 6 
Total 15 23 33 37 37 
Source: Estonian Press Council 
Ethics of the Estonian press says: "The reputation of any individual shall not be 
unduly harmed without there being sufficient evidence that the information 
regarding the person is in the public interest." In addition, Article 5.1 of the Code 
of Ethics of the Estonian press says: "Individuals subjected to serious accusations 
should be offered an opportunity for immediate rebuttal in the same edition or 
programme." 
Sometimes the false, misleading or accusative facts have been emphasized by 
journalistic means, in headlines and in editorials. The first-mentioned tendency 
marks the growing pressure of creating interest in the news industry. Cases that 
are caused by the use of poorly controlled facts in editorials have impeached the 
simplified approach to the "freedom of opinion" concept. Sometimes Estonian 
journalists handle opinion-genres as a sort of privileged format that justifies inac­
curacy. In addition, journalists do not always remember that strong conclusions 
based on false or incomplete facts might reinforce groundless accusations. 
For example, in 1999 a previous chancellor was accused of being linked to cor­
ruption (case no. 188, Estonian Press Council). On 29 August 1999, Eesti Päevaleht 
published an article in which they revealed different facts about the illegal activ­
ity of a publishing company. Among other facts, the newspaper said the wife of 
the ex-chancellor was working at the company as a bookkeeper and that she was 
regularly getting money from the company. The next day the newspaper attempt­
ed to publish a correction by saying that the ex-chancellor's wife had never 
worked in the company but that one of his relatives was working as a bookkeep­
er. This fact was also false but was used in an editorial in which the newspaper 
directly stated that because the ex-chancellor's relative was working in the 
accused company, the newspaper could therefore speak about the corruption. In 
fact, the distantly related relative worked in the company as a language editor 
and started only two days after the article was published. 
The same type of problem - opinion based on poor reporting - has arisen in 
some other cases as well (Am Otstavel versus Eesti Päevaleht, 1998, case no. 136; 
Fertilitas versus Eesti Päevaleht, 1999, case no. 195). Not all these cases have been 
upheld, especially if the groundless accusations were not reinforced by the 
columnist. However, these cases reflect the specific problem of media ethics in 
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Estonia today: the conflicts often emerge from the poor quality of journalistic 
work instead of from serious ethical dilemmas. 
Sometimes journalists only mechanically understand the demand of complete 
and unbiased reporting. If a quote or reference from the accused party is pre­
sented in the story, journalists count the requirement as fulfilled even though the 
commentary of the accused party might be not be relevant to the accusation. 
Cases concerning the exposure of dead people and children in the media reflect 
more ethical choices made by the Estonian media and the position of the Eston­
ian Press Council. 
Problems with the exposure of dead people began with the case of a photo­
graph of five murdered people in 1994. In 1999, while discussing a photograph of 
an infant that starved to death, the Press Council phrased more general principles 
of publishing photography or video material of a corpse. "Showing a photograph 
or film is justified in case the material carries an aesthetic value or message ... 
That should be done with all respect towards death, the victim, his or her family, 
as well as the public." The matter is not violated by the press any more, but is still 
done so by some TV channels. 
The representation of children has been discussed in a different context. Most 
of these cases have been upheld by the Council. In 1996 a newspaper published 
a detailed and biased article about a lawsuit involving child custody (case no. 99). 
In 1998 a newspaper published an article about some children whose drunken 
parents were supposed to lose their parental rights (case no. 145). The children 
were identified (by a large photo) and their life was described as very wretched. 
In 1998 a weekly magazine published a list of the secondary schools that had the 
lowest final exam results. The cover picture of the magazine was designed to 
illustrate the article (depicting a boy with an opened skull full of chaff) and 
included the caption, "Where do chaff-heads grow?" The president of the Eston­
ian Union of Child Welfare made a complaint. In order to find out if the cover 
could offend children or teachers, the Estonian Press Council carried out an opin­
ion poll in one of the listed 50 schools (64 students answered). The majority of the 
students found the picture offensive although they were not informed why the 
question was asked. In 1999 Kimmo Koivikko, a student at Tartu University, con­
ducted an experiment: he asked the Finnish Press Council to evaluate the same 
case (Koivikko 2000). The Finnish Press Council interpreted the article and cover 
page as a critique against the educational system, not against those schools, stu­
dents and teachers. This case demonstrates that "good journalistic practice" is 
dependent on specific cultural context. 
In 1998 a newspaper fully identified a juvenile victim of harassment and pub­
lished embarrassing details about his life with his natural mother. In 2000 three 
newspapers published a photo of an eleven-year-old-boy who (under vague cir­
cumstances) set fire to his friend. Most of these cases have posed an ethical dilem­
ma: is the priority of the mass media to inform the public or to protect children? 
The Estonian Press Council has supported the latter value. 
The presumption of innocence in most cases is the result of journalistic misla­
belling: someone is named a murderer before conviction, just because the police 
suspect the person of being involved in a crime. But the most sophisticated case 
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in the whole history of the Estonian Press Council was discussed in 1999: 
"Unsolved Murder Case of a Provost". The article was considered several times 
by the EPC and the final decision (the case was upheld) was taken by majority 
voting. The article covered a ten-year-old unsolved murder case that was closed 
because there was not enough evidence to accuse anyone. The journalist present­
ed his version about the murderer. The journalist did not directly name anyone 
as a criminal; still, the story was presented in a way that excluded other possible 
suspects. The Press Council analysed the construction of the story. In addition, 
the article did not contain any new information that could have qualitatively 
changed the situation, e.g., impel the police to further investigate the case and 
take the case to court before expiring in April 2000. The Council asked about the 
actual public interest and did not find any that could outweigh the harm that was 
caused to the accused priest. In addition, from the text of that same article it 
became clear that the journalist should have known before publication that de jure 
the murder case would never be solved. The accused priest will thus never be 
able to free himself from public suspicion of murder. 
Such cases demand analytical experience from the Council. Therefore the per­
sonnel of the Estonian Press Council have been rotated differently. Some people 
are in Council for 2 or 4 years, others for 8 or 10 years. 
4. The 2000s: 
Amendment of laws, economic pressure on media freedom 
By the end of the 1990s the laws that affect individual rights, especially the right 
for the protection of one's honour, were in the process of renewal. As mentioned 
previously, the insufficient protection in the case of defamation was pointed out 
by the State Court in 1997 in the case Laanaru versus Tammer. 
In 1997 the special body between the criminal and the civil boards of the State 
Court tried to find a solution to the case Yens Marsen Luther versus Ülo Pärnits and 
AS Media (Ltd). 
A sentence by Pärnits served as basis for the case: "Luther is a classical black­
mailer as are all square heads." The court established that the sentence contained 
both a defamatory factual allegation, the compliance with actuality of which 
could be verified ("blackmailer"), and an offensive evaluation ("square head"). 
The highest court found that all rights mentioned in Article 23 ("right to demand 
termination of defamation, refutation of defamatory information and compensa­
tion for moral and proprietary damage") serve as an independent civil means of 
protection. Thus, termination of defamation can be requested and compensation 
for moral and proprietary damage can be awarded if the defamation was caused 
by a value judgement. 
This adjudication demonstrates clearly that the old defamation law had gone 
out of date. The problem was solved by a general private law reform, which 
included the Law of Obligations (passed in October 2001). 
The protection of honour is now regulated by the new Law of Obligations and 
the new Penal Code. The former will displace the Civic Code. The draft of Article 
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1151 says that it is unlawful to malign someone's honour, include an incorrect 
assessment, misuse someone's name or identification mark, violate a person's 
privacy or any other similar personal right. Article 1152 makes unlawful the pub­
lication of wrong or incomplete data about a person or his activities. In sum, the 
new law provides a more explicit defence against libel accusation for the media 
organisations. Namely, a plaintiff must prove that he checked the data with thor­
oughness in correspondence to the published accusation. Thus, if he proves that 
he had no doubts that the data were untrue, then he cannot be responsible for the 
libel. In addition, the publisher (as a defendant) might prove that publishing was 
in accordance with "justified interest" (Article 1152, p. 3). On one hand, this 
demand pushes media organisations to put more emphasis on checking the 
harmful facts, while on the other hand the clause provides a greater defence of 
publishing data in the public interest. The draft of the Law of Obligations also 
sets forth that the misuse of someone's name is wrongful. 
If the Law of Obligations had been passed, the lawsuit Müürsepp versus Eesti 
Ekspress would have been handled differently. In December 2000 the Town Court 
of Tallinn heard this lawsuit as a defamation case. The newspaper published a 
marriage announcement in the name of the sportsman without his consent. The 
Town Court of Tallinn acquitted the newspaper. The attorney for basketball play­
er Müürsepp alleged that his client's name was misused. Article 23 of the then-
valid Civil Code only gave the plaintiff the opportunity to demand the repudia­
tion of untrue and defamatory data. The court said that the damage to the 
sportsman's reputation was not proven and in addition, any reasonable person 
would recognise the announcement as humour. 
The case again raised the question of the media's right to use information that 
has been already revealed to the public by the individual. The case also raises the 
question of the boundaries of the freedom of press to damage the original context 
of the information. 
The decision of the court was appealed and therefore is not available publicly. 
Here the approach to public information is again confusing. Although the court 
should be public, the Law of Public Information does not cover court documen­
tation and immediate access to the information depends on one's relations with 
a certain judge. 
The Penal Code was also reformed. According to the new Penal Code, Article 
132 says that it is a crime to publish a defamatory statement against someone's 
reputation if the publisher knew that the statement was untrue. Article 133 pro­
vides a penalty (equivalent to 300 day's salary) if a person is insulted in an 
improper way. The first version of the draft provided the possibility for a heavier 
punishment for insults against an official person, but this version was criticised 
publicly and was withdrawn. 
Economic power is the third direct agency that influences the communication 
freedom in a society. A news organisation may enjoy freedom but that does not 
necessarily equate to independence for a journalist. If a journalist is forced to be 
loyal to the media organisation and not to his professional ethics and values, the 
journalistic community does not function as a counterbalance against the com­
mercial interests of the owners. In a transition society, the process of media 
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concentration and job shortages is a force that seriously affects the loyalty to high 
professional standards. 
In the end of the 1990s and the beginning of 2000, the journalistic job market 
considerably diminished. The largest daily Postimees moved in 1998 from Esto­
nia's second-largest city Tartu to the capital Tallinn. A small part of the staff 
remained to Tartu and started to publish a local edition of the daily. In 2000, two 
competing tabloids were merged and about 30 journalists lost their jobs. There 
are currently four national dailies in the Estonian language (all situated in 
Tallinn). The same companies that own the national dailies also own most of the 
local newspapers. Three national commercial TV stations incurred large losses 
throughout several years and in the autumn of 2001 the prognosis that at least 
some of them would merge or disappear came true - TV 1 went bankrupt. 
According to data from the Broadcasters' Association, of 28 functioning commer­
cial radio stations only seven stations in November 2001 had local news and 
views in their programme. 
The result is that opportunities to find a job in another media company are 
diminishing quickly and journalists feel insecure. In private conversations, jour­
nalists are increasingly complaining about restrictions on certain issues inside the 
media organisation. Freelance journalists complain about their defenceless situa­
tion in case their article is "edited" in a way such that they can hardly recognise 
it. The press freedom in Estonia is thus diminished on an individual level. The 
Union of Estonian Journalists is still too weak an organisation to be taken as a 
serious defender of professional values. 
The competitive situation at the end of the 1990s has also influenced the status 
of the Press Council. The Estonian Press Council seems to be toothless: newspa­
pers or broadcasting stations are only obliged to publish the decision of the 
Council. Some newspapers do it without showing their attitude. But some papers 
feel that a decision where the newspaper is "convicted" is an irrecoverable loss to 
their reputation. For example, when the Council decided that Eesti Ekspress had 
not breached good journalistic practice (case no. 197 "No Resting Place for Old 
Camels") the newspaper published the full text of the decision and added large 
photography of the claimant. When the Council "convicted" the newspaper, the 
decision was published in the usual place among letters to the editor, but in short 
form. In one case the same newspaper did not publish the decision at all. Before 
2000, Eesti Ekspress always published the decisions of the Council. Today, all deci­
sions of the Estonian Press Council are accessible on the Internet, but the exam­
ple illustrates a dangerous tendency in Estonian media at the beginning of the 
new millennium. 
The media as an institution is assumed to be a watchdog of society but toler­
ates very little criticism about itself unless there is a direct threat of a lawsuit. For 
example, when the rector of Tartu University was named a recidivist by Eesti Päe­
valeht in the spring of 2000, the newspaper allowed him to respond, otherwise the 
rector was ready to sue the newspaper. According to the rector's own words, he 
would have done it for the sake of the culture of public communication (per con­
versation of the author with Prof. Aaviksoo in April 2000). It is important to 
remember that the rector of the largest Estonian university is a very powerful 
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person who has various resources to bring to bear against a strong media organ­
isation. 
Summary 
By the autumn of 2001 Estonia has established a sophisticated body of legal texts 
on public communication. Neither the laws nor the court decisions limit the insti­
tutional freedom of the press. Personal rights are far less protected because the 
cost of taking a case to court would barely cover the sum one can obtain in com­
pensation for moral damage. Press freedom is more affected by the fact that the 
press market is shared by two corporations and the Estonian Union of Journalists 
is too weak to protect journalists' individual freedom. The Estonian media mar­
ket is small, therefore it is not always easy to protect editorial content from the 
influence of the marketing department. Most important is the continuing week-
ness in Estonia of the conventions of public communication used in the countries 
with long democratic traditions to harmonise the conflict between freedom of 
information and individual rights. For example, in Sweden the publication rules 
for criminal matters are mostly regulated by conventions of good journalistic 
practice, while in Estonia the reporting of criminal affairs is determined by attor­
neys, prosecutors and the police. There is no shortage of legal acts but a definite 
lack of wise interpretations of these laws. 
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1987 
February-June: Mass protest in Estonia against proposed phosphate mining. 
June 14: Demonstration in Riga commemorates the Soviet deportations to Siberia 
on 14 June 1941. Over 10,000 attend; it was probably the largest unofficial 
demonstration up to that time in recent Soviet history. 
August 23: Demonstrations in Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius to commemorate the 
anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on 23 August 1939. 
September 26: Four-Man Proposal on Estonian economic autonomy in the frame­
work of Soviet system. 
October: The USSR Council of Ministers decides to stop projects for new phos­
phate mines in Estonia. 
November 6: About a year after mass protests began against Moscow's project 
construct a hydroelectric dam on the Daugava, Latvia's largest river, the USSR 
Council of Ministers cancels the project. 
November 18: To avoid a mass demonstration on the anniversary of the national 
proclamation of independence on 18 November 1918, Soviet authorities sur­
round the Freedom Monument in Riga with militia and KGB troops. 
1988 
February 2: Demonstration in Tartu commemorating the Estonian-Soviet Peace 
Treaty of 1920 is brutally assaulted by the militia. This was the last major inci­
dent of brutality by the Soviet regime in Estonia. 
February 16: Demonstration in Vilnius to commemorate the 70th anniversary of 
independence. The militia harass protestors and arrests several leaders. 
April-June: Plenums of the Estonian and Latvian creative unions openly critisize 
the Communist Party elite and calls for genuine federalism. 
April 13: Initiation of the Popular Front of Estonia (PFE). 
June 3: Initiation of the Lithuanian Movement for Restructuring (Sajudis). 
June 16: Vaino Väljas replaces Karl Vaino as Communist Party of Estonia First 
Secretary, becoming the first native Estonian to hold that office since 1950. 
June 17: First massive political rally in Tallinn, organised by the PFE; almost 
150,000 attend. 
June 21: Initiation of the Latvian People's Front. 
June 23: Supreme Soviet of Estonia legalises the national colours and national 
flag. 
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July-November: Foundation of the pro-Moscow International movements -
Interfronts in Estonia and Latvia, Yedinstvo in Lithuania. 
August 20: Foundation of the Estonian National Independence Party, the first 
self-declared opposition party in the Soviet Union. 
September 11: Massive political rally in Tallinn, organised by PFE; almost 300,000 
attend. 
September 28: A demonstration organised by the Lithuanian Freedom League is 
violently dispersed by police. Gorbachev, piqued by the Lithuanian Commu­
nists' conservatism, reshuffles its leadership, appointing the reformist Algirdas 
Brazauskas as the Party First Secretary. 
September 29: Latvian Supreme Soviet declares Latvian the state language and 
legalises the national flag. 
October 4: Moderate Janis Vagris replaces Boris Pugo as the Communist Party 
First Secretary in Latvia. 
October: Inaugural congresses of Popular Fronts in Estonia and Latvia, Sajudis in 
Lithuania. 
November 16: Estonian Supreme Soviet passes the Declaration of Sovereignty, 
asserts its right to veto all-Union laws passed in Moscow. 
1989 
January 18: Language law passed in Estonia (Estonian declared the state lan­
guage). In Latvia and Lithuania the same happens in May 1989. 
February 18-19: Foundation of the Latvian National Independence Movement 
(LNNK). 
February 24: Registration of Estonian citizens and formation of citizens' commit­
tees begins. 
March 12: Manifestation of Popular Front in Riga, 200,000 attend. 
March 26: Elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, successful for 
Popular Fronts and Sajudis candidates. Baltic deputies in Moscow co-operate 
actively with democratic movements from other Soviet republics. 
August 9-17: Thousands of Russian factory and shipyard workers in Estonia 
walk off their jobs in protest "against discrimination." 
August 23: Baltic Chain - about two million people form a human chain from 
Tallinn to Vilnius to call for independence. 
August 26: The Communist Party Central Committee in Moscow issues a stern 
warning to Baits. 
November 12: The Estonian Supreme Council declares Soviet annexation illegal. 
November 18: Manifestation in Riga, almost 500,000 attend. 
November 27: The USSR Supreme Soviet adopts a law ceding the Baltic republics 
considerable economic autonomy; central ministries subsequently block imple­
mentation of the law. 
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December 6: The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet abolishes the Communists' monop­
oly on power, and establishes the first multi-party system in the Soviet Union. 
December 20: The Lithuanian Communist Party withdraws from the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union. 
December 24: Official denouncement of the secret protocols of the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact by the Soviet Parliament. 
1990 
January 11-13: Gorbachev visits Vilnius but fails to persuade the Lithuanian 
Communist Party to remain in the CPSU. 
February-March: Pro-independence candidates gain a majority in elections to 
the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. Vytautas Lansbergis 
becomes a leader of the Supreme Council of Lithuania and Kazimiera Prun-
skiene the Prime Minister. In Estonia Arnold Rüütel and Edgar Savisaar, 
respectively; in Latvia - Anatolis Gorbunovs and Ivars Godmanis. 
February 15: Pre-war Republic of Latvia symbolism restored. 
March 11: Lithuanian Supreme Soviet declares full independence, Moscow 
objects. 
March 11-12: The Congress of Estonia, elected by citizens of Estonia in late Feb­
ruary and early March, convenes and declares itself the constitutional repre­
sentative of the Estonian people 
March-May: Moscow an embargo on Soviet gas and oil supplies to Lithuania. 
March 30: The Estonian Supreme Soviet declares Soviet power illegal in Estonia 
and proclaims a transition period to independence. 
April: Communist Party in Latvia splits into pro-independent and pro-Moscow 
wings. 
May 4: Latvian Supreme Soviet declares Latvia de jure independent and restores 
the official name "Republic of Latvia." 
May 8: Pre-war Republic of Estonia symbolism restored, including the name of 
the state as the Republic of Estonia. 
May 15: Intermovement's attempt to seize the Estonian and Latvian parliament 
buildings fails. 
June: Landsbergis announces a moratorium on Lithuania's independence decla­
ration; the Soviet embargo on gas and oil supplies is lifted. 
November: Publication of the draft Union Treaty which is designed to replace 
that of 1922 with a new document devolving considerable powers to the 
republics while retaining a strong centre responsible for the economy, foreign 
affairs and defence. The Baltic States declare that they will not sign the Treaty. 
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1991 
January 11: Lithuanian premier Kazimiera Prunskiene resigns in the face of an 
impending no-confidence vote over recent price hikes. She is replaced by 
Albertas Simenas, who is himself replaced several days later by Gediminas 
Vagnorius. 
January 13: Thirteen civilians are killed and 500 injured by Soviet troops at the 
Vilnius television station. Demonstrations in Riga (500,000 attend), people built 
barricades. Demonstrations in Moscow (200,000 attend) to protest the Lithuan­
ian crackdown and call on Gorbachev to resign. 
January 14: Yeltsin in Tallinn, signs mutual recognition of sovereignty with all 
three Baltic countries and urges Soviet troops not to fire on Baltic civilians. 
January 20: Soviet troops kill six civilians in occupying the Ministry of Interior in 
Riga. 
January: Communist Party in Estonia Splits into pro-independent and pro-
Moscow wings. 
February 9: More than 90% of Lithuanian voters support independence. 
March 3: Referendum on independence in Estonia and Latvia, 78% of voters in 
Estonia and 74% in Latvia say yes. 
August 19-21: Reactionary coup in Moscow, Yeltsin emerges as a dominant Russ­
ian leader. 
August 20: Estonian Supreme Council declares full independence. 
August 21: Latvian Supreme Council declares full independence and re-adopts 
the 1922 Constitution. 
August 21: Lithuanian Parliament reaffirms its 1990 declaration on independ­
ence. 
August 23 - September 16: All three Baltic States receive international diplomat­
ic recognition. The United States recognises the independence of the Baltic 
States on 2 September, the State Council of the Soviet Union on 6 September. 
September 17: The Baltic States are admitted to the United Nations. 
November 6: Estonian Supreme Council renews 1938 citizenship law granting 
automatic citizenship to citizens of Estonia in June 1940 and their descendants. 
All other residents can apply for naturalisation, after demonstrating a mini­
mum proficiency of Estonian. 
December 11: Latvian Supreme Council adopts a law on registering citizens from 
pre-1940 Latvia and their descendants. 
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1992 
January 11: Estonian government's austerity measures include food rationing. 
January 23: After widespread protests against the Government's emergency 
measures Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar resigns and is replaced by 
Tiit Vähi. 
March 21: Several thousands Russians protest in Tallinn against price hikes and 
the Citizenship Law. 
June 7: Introduction of the Latvian rouble. 
June 14: In a referendum, 90% of Lithuanian voters support an immediate with­
drawal by Russian troops. 
June 20: Introduction of the Estonian kroon, the first independent, convertible 
currency in the former Soviet Union. 
June 28: Referendum on a new constitution in Estonia, 91% vote for its passage. 
July 6: Latvia re-institutes its 1922 constitution, Guntis Ulmanis elected as Presi­
dent, Valdis Birkavs (Latvia's Way) nominated as Prime Minister. 
September 20: Parliamentary elections in Estonia result in a majority for a right-
of-centre coalition. Some weeks later Mart Laar (Pro Patria) becomes Prime 
Minister and Lennart Meri President. 
October 1: Temporary coupons are issued in Lithuania to take place of the rouble 
until the national currency (litas) is introduced. 
October 25: Referendum on a new constitution and parliamentary elections in 
Lithuania. The latter result in political comeback of former Communists, the 
Democratic Labour Party, led by Algirdas Brazauskas. 
1993 
February 14: Algirdas Brazauskas elected as President in Lithuania's first direct 
presidential elections. Some weeks later Adolfas Slezevicius (Democratic 
Labour Party) becomes Prime Minister. 
May-June: Estonia and Lithuania are admitted to the Council of Europe, 
notwithstanding of Russia's opposition to Estonia's admission. 
June 5-6: Parliamentary elections in Latvia result in a majority for a right-of-cen-
tre coalition. Some weeks later the Latvian Parliament elects Guntis Ulmanis as 
President and confirms Valdis Birkavs as Prime Minister. 
June 21: Estonian Parliament passes Law on Aliens, which requires all non-citi­
zens to apply for residence permits and is criticized as anti-Russian; the law is 
later moderated. 
July 20: The litas replaces the temporary coupon as the sole legal tender in 
Lithuania. 
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August: Russian troops withdraw from Lithuania. 
October 18: The lat replaces the Latvian rouble as the sole official currency in 
Latvia. 
1994 
January 27: The Baltic States join NATO's Partnership for Peace programme. 
June 21: Latvian Parliament approves a new citizenship law, including quotas on 
the naturalisation of non-Latvians. 
August: Russian troops withdraw from Estonia and Latvia. 
September 15: A new Latvian cabinet is formed under Maris Gailis. 
September 28: Estonia ferry catastrophe, worst post-war transport disaster in 
Europe. 
September-October: Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar resigns, Andres Tarand 
becomes Prime Minister. 
1995 
January 31: Latvia becomes a member of the Council of Europe. 
March 5: In Estonian parliamentary elections, the left-of-centre bloc of the Coali­
tion Party and rural parties win 42%t of seats. During the next four years, this 
bloc forms four different governments, led by Hit Vähi and Mart Siimann. Nev­
ertheless the mainstream course of liberal economic policy and rapid integra­
tion into European political and economic structures continues. 
June 12: The European Commission signs association agreements with Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania. 
September-December: Latvian parliamentary elections do not produce a clear 
winner; Parliament finally approves an eight-party right-of-centre coalition, led 
by businessman Andris Skële as Prime Minister. 
1996 
June 18: Guntis Ulmanis is elected Latvia's President for a second three-year 
term. 
August-September: Presidential elections in Estonia: Lennart Meri continues as 
President until October 2001. 
October-November: Lithuanian parliamentary elections result in a majority for 
a right-of-centre coalition; Gediminas Vagnorius (Homeland Union) becomes 
Prime Minister. 
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1997 
July 16: Recommendation of the European Commission to invite Estonia into 
negotiations about joining the EU, among the first five post-Communist coun­
tries selected. 
July: Andris Škele resigns as Latvian Prime Minister due to personal conflicts 
caused by his energetic/aggressive style of behaviour. Guntars Krasts (For 
Fatherland and Freedom) leads the government until general elections in 
autumn 1998. 
1998 
January 4: Valdas Adamkus is elected Lithuania's President. 
January 16: The Presidents of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the United States 
sign a US-Baltic Charter of Partnership. 
March: Beginning of negotiations on Estonia's accession to the European Union. 
August: Beginning of financial and economic crisis in Russia. 
October: Parliamentary elections in Latvia, successful for right-of-centre parties. 
Valdis Krištopäns (Latvia's Way) becomes Prime Minister but only for seven 
months. 
1999 
March 7: Parliamentary elections in Estonia result in majority for a right-of-cen-
tre coalition of Fatherland, Reform Party and Moderates. Mart Laar becomes 
Prime Minister again. 
April: Vagnorius resigns as Prime Minister of Lithuania. For a short period 
Rolandas Paksas becomes Prime Minister; after him, Andrius Kubilius. 
June: Vaira Vfke-Freiberga is elected Latvia's President. 
July: Andris Škele becomes Latvian Prime Minister for second time but is 
replaced in May 2000 by Andris Berziijš. 
December 11: The European Council decides to invite Latvia and Lithuania, 
along with three other post-Communist countries, into negotiations on joining 
the EU. 
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2000 
October: In Lithuania's parliamentary elections a left-wing coalition wins 36% of 
the seats, but an alliance of centrist parties forms the government. Rolandas 
Paksas again becomes Prime Minister. 
2001 
June: Lithuanian governmental coalition dissolved. Social Liberals form another 
alliance with the Social Democratic coalition. Algirdas Brazauskas becomes 
Prime Minister. 
September 21: Arnold Rüütel is elected Estonia's President. 
Main sources 
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Appendix 2. 
Comparative Statistics 
of Development of the Baltics 
in the Context of Post-Communist Transition 
Table 1. Comparative data of the Baltics 
Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Total area (km2) 45,227 64,600 65,301 
Share of agricultural land (%) 32 38 53 
Share of forest and woodland (%) 45 44 31 
Demographic indicators 
Population (thousands, 1 January 2001) 1, 367 2,366 3,693 
Natural increase of population in 1999 - 5,910 - 13,448 
- 3,588 
Natural increase of population in 2000 - 5,340 - 11,950 
- 4,557 
Net migration in 1991-1999 (emigration mainly to Russia and other CIS countries) -81,367 - 133, 999 
-47,515 
Net migration in 2000 - 1,169 - 1,836 - 1,120 
Share of urban population, 1 January 2001 69.1 68.2 68.1 
Share of Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians in the respective country in 2000 67.9 57.9 81.8 
Share of Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians in the capital of the country in 2000 53.7 41.2 52.5 
Economic indicators 
GDP change in 2000 6.9 6.6 3.9 
GDP change in 2001, 1st quarter 5.8 8.3 4.4 
GDP change in 2001, 2nd quarter 5.0 9.2 5.7 
GDP in current prices, 2000 (million USD) 4,969 7,150 11,232 
GDP per capita in 2000 (USD) without taking into account the purchasing power parity 
(PPP) 3,635 3,013 3,039 
GDP per capita, based on PPP, data of 1999 (USD) 8,068 6,234 6,480 
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CONTINUATION. Table 1. Comparative data of the Baltics 
Economic indicators Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Exports, 2000 (million USD) 3,829 3,449 3,809 
Exports per capita, data of 1999 (USD) 2,092 1,030 1,418 
Share of OECD countries in exports 77 59 65 
Imports, 2000 (million USD) 5,055 5,834 5,457 
Imports per capita (USD) 2,849 1,475 2,399 
Share of OECD countries in imports 70 47 58 
Average monthly gross wages and salaries, 2nd quarter of 2001 (USD) 322 248 267 
Change in average wages in comparison with 2nd quarter 2000 (%) 14.6 5.3 0.1 
Employment by sectors, 2000 (%) 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 7 15 20 
Industry and construction 34 25 26 
Service activities 59 60 54 
Source: National statistical offices 
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Table 2. Nations in Transit 2001 ratings for démocratisation, rule of law and economic liberalisation 
in post-Communist countries 
Ratings and scores are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level and 7 representing the lowest level of democratic development. 
The 2001 scores and ratings reflect the period 1 July 1999 through 31 October 2000. 
Central Europe PP CS IM CPA 
Démocra­
tisation CLIP CO 
Rule 
of law PR MA Ml 
Economic 
liberalisation 
Czech Republic 1.75 1.50 2.00 2.00 1.81 2.50 3.75 3.13 1.75 2.25 2.00 2.00 
Hungary 1.25 1.25 2.25 3.00 1.94 2.00 3.00 2.50 1.50 2.25 2.00 1.92 
Poland 1.25 1.25 1.50 1.75 1.44 1.50 2.25 1.88 2.00 1.50 1.50 1.67 
Slovakia 2.25 2.00 2.00 2.75 2.25 2.25 3.75 3.00 3.00 3.25 3.50 3.25 
Slovenia 1.75 1.75 1.75 2.50 1.94 1.50 2.00 1.75 2.25 2.00 2.00 2.08 
Balkans 
Albania 4.00 4.00 4.25 4.25 4.13 4.50 5.50 5.00 3.75 4.50 4.25 4.17 
Bosnia 4.75 4.50 4.50 6.00 4.94 5.50 5.75 5.63 5.00 5.50 6.00 5.50 
Bulgaria 2.00 3.50 3.25 3.50 3.06 3.50 4.75 4.13 3.50 3.25 3.75 3.50 
Croatia 3.25 2.75 3.50 3.50 3.25 3.75 4.50 4.13 3.50 3.50 3.75 3.58 
Macedonia 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 4.25 5.00 4.63 4.00 4.75 5.00 4.58 
Romania 3.00 3.00 3.50 3.75 3.31 4.25 4.50 4.38 3.75 3.75 4.50 4.00 
Yugoslavia 4.75 4.00 4.50 5.25 4.63 5.50 6.25 5.88 5.00 5.50 5.50 5.33 
Baltics 
Estonia 1.75 2.25 1.75 2.25 2.00 2.00 2.75 2.38 1.75 2.00 2.00 1.92 
Latvia 1.75 2.00 1.75 2.25 1.94 2.00 3.50 2.75 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 
Lithuania 1.75 1.75 1.75 2.50 1.94 1.75 3.75 2.75 2.50 3.00 2.75 2.75 
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CONTINUATION. Table 2. Nations in Transit 2001 ratings for démocratisation, rule of law and economic liberalisation 
in post-Communist countries 
CIS PR CS IM CPA 
Démocra­
tisation CLIF CO 
Rule 
of law PR MA Ml 
Economic 
liberalisation 
Armenia 5.50 3.50 4.75 4.50 4.56 5.00 5.75 5.38 3.25 3.50 4.00 3.58 
Azerbaijan 5.75 4.50 5.75 6.25 5.56 5.25 6.25 5.75 4.75 5.00 5.00 4.92 
Belarus 6.75 6.50 6.75 6.25 6.56 6.75 5.25 6.00 6.00 6.25 6.50 6.25 
Georgia 4.50 4.00 3.50 4.75 4.19 4.00 5.25 4.63 3.25 4.00 4.00 3.75 
Kazakhstan 6.25 5.00 6.00 5.00 5.56 5.75 6.25 6.00 4.25 4.50 4.75 4.50 
Kyrgyzstan 5.75 4.50 5.00 5.25 5.13 5.25 6.00 5.63 4.50 3.75 3.75 4.00 
Moldova 3.25 3.75 4.25 4.50 3.94 4.00 6.00 5.00 3.50 4.25 4.25 4.00 
Russia 4.25 4.00 5.25 5.00 4.63 4.50 6.25 5.38 3.75 4.25 4.50 4.17 
Tajikistan 5.25 5.00 5.50 6.00 5.44 5.75 6.00 5.88 5.75 5.50 5.25 5.50 
Turkmenistan 7.00 7.00 7.00 6.75 6.94 7.00 6.25 6.63 6.75 6.25 6.50 6.50 
Ukraine 4.00 3.75 5.25 4.75 4.44 4.50 6.00 5.25 4.25 4.25 4.50 4.33 
Uzbekistan 6.75 6.50 6.75 6.00 6.50 6.50 6.00 6.25 6.00 6.25 6.25 6.17 
Démocratisation score - average of political process (PR), civil society (CS), independent media (IM), and governance and public administration (CPA) 
ratings. 
Rule of law score - average of constitutional, legislative, and judicial framework (CLIF) and corruption (CO) ratings. 
Economic liberalisation score - average of privatisation (PR), macroeconomic policy (MA), and microeconomic policy (Ml) ratings. 
Source: Karatnycky, Motyl & Schnetser 2001 
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Table 3. Cumulative scores of démocratisation and market-orientation, 
1997-2001 
Nations in Transit classification and ratings 
Most advanced 
(democratic market-oriented states) 1997 1998 2000 2001 
Poland 13 13 12 12 
Hungary 13 13 14 16 
Czech Republic 13 14 15 16 
Estonia 17 16 16 16 
Slovenia 17 16 16 16 
Latvia 18 18 18 17 
Lithuania 19 18 19 18 
Mean 16 15 16 16 
Middle: moving upwards 
Slovakia 29 29 22 21 
Bulgaria 36 30 28 26 
Croatia 33 33 33 28 
Romania 34 33 30 30 
Mean 33 31 28 26 
Middle (parasitic authoritarian states) 
Georgia 36 35 31 32 
Moldova 32 33 32 32 
Macedonia 34 34 32 33 
Armenia 36 36 34 34 
Albania 35 37 36 34 
Mean 35 35 33 33 
Middle: moving downwards 
Ukraine 33 36 36 35 
Russia 30 32 34 36 
Kyrgyzstan 32 34 35 38 
Mean 32 34 35 36 
Least advanced (despotic states) 
Yugoslavia 
-
39 44 40 
Kazakhstan 40 40 41 42 
Azerbaijan 43 43 43 42 
Tajikistan 49 48 47 44 
Uzbekistan 51 51 51 51 
Belarus 48 50 51 52 
Turkmenistan 53 54 54 54 
Mean 47 46 47 46 
Source: Motyl 2001 
Table 4. EBRD transition indicators, 1999 
Privatisation and restructuring Market liberalisation and competition Financial markets reform 
Aggregate 
transition 
indicator 
Large-
scale 
privati­
sation 
Small-
scale 
privati­
sation 
Governance 
and enterprise 
restructuring 
Price 
liberali­
sation 
Trade & 
foreign 
exchange 
system 
Competition 
policy 
Banking 
reform & 
interest rate 
liberalisation 
Securities 
markets & 
nonbank 
financial 
institutions 
EU candidates in Central Europe and Balkans 
Bulgaria 3.0 3.3 2.3 3.0 4.3 2.0 2.7 2.0 2.9 
Czech Republic 4.0 4.3 3.0 3.0 4.3 3.0 3.3 3.0 3.4 
Hungary 4.0 4.3 3.3 3.3 4.3 3.0 4.0 3.3 3.7 
Poland 3.3 4.3 3.0 4.3 4.3 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.5 
Romania 2.7 3.7 2.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 2.7 2.0 2.8 
Slovak Republic 4.0 4.3 3.0 4.3 4.3 3.0 2.7 2.3 3.3 
Slovenia 3.3 4.3 2.7 4.3 4.3 2.0 3.3 3.0 3.3 
Baltic countries 
Estonia 4.0 4.3 3.0 3.0 4.0 2.7 3.7 3.0 3.5 
Latvia 3.0 4.0 2.7 3.0 4.3 2.7 3.0 2.3 3.1 
Lithuania 3.0 4.3 2.7 3.0 4.0 2.3 3.0 2.7 3.1 
Other south-eastern European countries 
Albania 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 2.0 1.7 2.5 
Croatia 3.0 4.3 2.7 3.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 2.3 3.0 
Macedonia 3.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 1.0 3.0 1.7 2.8 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 2.0 2.0 1.7 3.0 2.7 1.0 2.3 1.0 1.8 
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CONTINUATION. Table 4. EBRD transition indicators, 1999 
Privatisation and restructuring Market liberalisation and competition Financial markets reform 
Aggregate 
transition 
indicator 
Large-
scale 
privati­
sation 
Small-
scale 
privati­
sation 
Governance 
and enterprise 
restructuring 
Price 
liberali­
sation 
Trade & 
foreign 
exchange 
system 
Competition 
policy 
Banking 
reform & 
interest rate 
liberalisation 
Securities 
markets & 
nonbank 
financial 
institutions 
CIS 
Armenia 3.0 3.3 2.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.7 
Azerbaijan 1.7 3.0 2.0 3.0 3.3 1.0 2.0 1.7 2.2 
Belarus 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.7 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.5 
Georgia 3.3 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 2.3 1.0 2.5 
Kazakhstan 3.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.7 
Kyrgyzstan 3.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.8 
Moldova 3.0 3.3 2.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.8 
Russia 3.3 4.0 1.7 2.7 2.3 2.3 1.7 1.7 2.5 
Tajikistan 2.3 3.0 1.7 3.0 2.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 
Turkmenistan 1.7 2.0 1.7 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.4 
Ukraine 2.3 3.3 2.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.4 
Uzbekistan 2.7 3.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.7 2.0 2.1 
Source: EBRD Transition Report 1999 
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Table 5. Macroeconomic indicators of selected post-Communist countries, 2000 
Population 
(mil) 
GDP growth 
(%) 
Industrial 
production 
growth (%) 
GDP 
per capita 
PPP (USD) 
Average 
monthly wage 
(USD) 
Inflation 
(%) 
Unemploy­
ment (%) 
FDI stock 
(bil USD) 
FDI stock 
per capita 
(USD) 
Central Europe 
Czech Republic 10.3 3.1 5.7 13,750 366 1 3.9 8.8 17.5 1 1,699 1 
Hungary 10.0 5.3 18.2 12,230 327 1 9.8 8.7 20.2 2,020 
Poland 38.6 4.1 4.3 9,440 430 1 10.1 15.0 28.0 1 7251 
Slovakia 5.4 2.2 9.1 11,260 2611 12.1 17.9 3.6 666 
Slovenia 2.0 4.7 6.2 16,790 953 1 8.9 11.9 2.7 1,350 
Balkans 
Bulgaria 8.2 5.8 2.3 5,610 107 1 9.9 17.9 3.9 476 
Croatia 4.5 -0.4 1 1.7 7,600 640 1 6.2 22.5 3.6 1 800 
Romania 22.4 1.6 8.7 6,240 128 1 45.7 10.5 5.4 1 223 
Baltics 
Estonia 1.4 6.9 9.1 5,456 2 324 1 4.0 13.7 2.4 1 1,714 1 
Latvia 2.4 6.6 3.2 4,136 2 246 1 2.4 1 14.5 3.9 1 1,625' 
Lithuania 3.7 3.3 -9.9 1 4,425 2 285 2.5 1 15.4 2.1 1 568 1 
CIS 
Russia 144.9 7.6 9.0 7,620 64 1 20.2 10.2 18.6 1 127 
Ukraine 49.3 6.0 12.9 3,350 1 44 1 28.2 4.2 3.2 1 64 
1 Data from 1999. 2 Data from 1998. Sources: Business Central Europe (EBRD, Economist Intelligence Service), Statistical Yearbook of Lithuania 2001 
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Table 6. GDP growth in EU-candidate countries, 1993-2001 (%) 
Annual Quarterly 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1999 2000 2001 
Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 
Bulgaria -1.5 1.8 2.9 -10.1 -7.0 3.5 2.4 5.8 1.0 4.5 5.7 6.1 6.5 4.5 5.1 
Cyprus 0.7 5.9 6.1 1.9 2.5 5.0 4.5 4.8 na na na na na na na 
Czech Republic 0.1 2.2 5.9 4.3 -0.8 -1.2 -0.4 2.9 1.1 3.2 2.4 2.4 3.8 4.1 3.9 
Estonia -9.0 -2.0 4.3 4.0 10.4 5.0 -0.7 6.9 2.5 6.5 7.8 7.3 6.0 5.8 5.0 
Hungary -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 4.9 4.2 5.2 5.9 6.5 5.6 4.5 4.2 4.4 4.0 
Latvia -14.9 0.6 -0.8 3.3 8.6 3.9 1.1 6.6 3.9 6.1 5.0 6.6 8.7 8.3 9.2 
Lithuania -16.2 -9.8 3.3 4.7 7.3 5.1 -3.9 3.3 -4.8 4.6 0.9 6.1 3.9 4.4 5.7 
Malta 4.5 5.7 6.2 4.0 4.9 3.4 4.1 5.0 6.2 7.1 2.0 4.4 7.2 2.1 -0.6 
Poland 3.8 5.8 7.0 6.0 6.8 4.8 4.1 4.0 6.2 5.9 5.0 3.1 2.4 2.3 0.9 
Romania 1.5 3.9 7.1 3.9 -6.1 -4.8 -2.3 1.6 -1.5 1.2 2.0 2.2 1.3 4.8 5.1 
Slovakia -3.7 11.0 6.7 6.2 6.2 4.1 1.9 2.2 2.3 1.5 1.9 2.5 2.9 3.0 2.8 
Slovenia 2.8 5.3 4.1 3.5 4.6 3.8 5.2 4.6 5.5 6.2 3.4 5.5 3.5 3.2 2.7 
Turkey 8.4 -5.5 7.2 7.0 7.5 3.1 -4.7 7.2 -2.1 5.6 6.4 7.8 8.3 -2.2 -9.3 
Aggregate 
of EU-candidate 
countries 1 
3.2 0.8 6.1 5.0 4.7 2.9 0.0 5.2 1.8 5.1 4.9 5.0 4.9 1.5 -1.5 
Aggregate 
of EU-candidate 
countries 2 
na na na 3.9 3.3 2.9 2.5 3.9 na 4.8 4.1 3.4 3.1 3.4 2.7 
EU countries -0.5 2.8 2.3 1.6 2.5 2.9 2.5 3.3 3.4 3.4 2.5 2.5 2.9 2.5 2.5 
1 All 13 EU candidate countries. 2 Without Turkey and Malta. Source: Eurostat (Fasanen, 2001a: 2001b) 
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Figure 1. Trends in GDP of the Baltics, 1990-2000 
Annual percentage change at constant prices 
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Sources: Business Central Europe, Annual 2001; Statistical Yearbook of Estonia 2001; Estonian Statistics, No. 9, 2001 
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Table 7. GDP per capita in EU-candidate countries, 1996-2000 
In euros, in PPS EU average =100 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Bulgaria 5,400 5,100 5,500 5,700 6,300 29 26 27 27 28 
Cyprus 15,400 16,000 17,000 18,100 19,400 83 83 84 85 86 
Czech Republic 11,900 12,100 12,200 12,400 13,200 64 62 60 59 59 
Estonia 6,200 7,100 7,700 7,800 8,600 34 37 38 37 38 
Hungary 8,500 9,200 9,800 10,600 11,500 46 47 48 50 51 
Latvia 4,800 5,400 5,700 6,100 6,700 26 28 28 29 30 
Lithuania 6,000 6,600 7,100 7,000 7,500 32 34 35 33 33 
Malta 9,900 10,600 11,000 11,700 12,600 54 54 55 55 56 
Poland 6,600 7,300 7,800 8,300 8,900 36 37 38 39 39 
Romania 5,300 5,100 5,000 5,000 5,200 29 26 25 24 23 
Slovakia 8,500 9,300 9,800 10,200 10,800 46 48 48 48 48 
Slovenia 11,800 12,800 13,500 14,500 15,600 64 66 67 68 69 
Turkey 5,100 5,600 5,800 5,600 5,900 27 29 29 26 26 
Aggregate 
of EU-candidate countries 6,400 6,800 7,100 7,200 7,600 34 35 35 34 34 
EU countries 18,500 19,400 20,300 21,200 22,500 100 
Source: Eurostat (Fasanen, 2001b) 
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Table 8. Diffusion of modem technology and technological innovations in post-Communist countries, 1999 
Electricity 
consumption 1 
(kwh per capita) 
Medium-technology 
exports 
(as % of all exports) 
High-technology 
exports 
(as % of all exports) 
Telephone 
mainlines 
(per 1,000 people) 
Cellular mobile 
subscribers 
(per 1,000 people) 
Internet hosts2 
(per 1,000 people) 
OECD average na 38 21 509 322 75.0 
Average of post-
Communist countries na 26 8 205 35 4.7 
Central Europe 
Czech Republic 4,748 40 12 371 189 25.0 
Hungary 2,888 40 24 371 162 21.6 
Poland 2,458 28 8 263 102 11.4 
Slovakia 3,899 42 7 308 171 10.2 
Slovenia 5,096 38 12 378 309 20.3 
Balkans 
Albania 678 2 2 36 3 0.1 
Bulgaria 3,166 24 6 354 42 3.7 
Croatia 2,463 33 8 365 66 6.7 
Macedonia na 21 3 234 24 1.9 
Romania 1,626 21 4 167 61 2.7 
Baltics 
Estonia 3,531 15 17 357 268 43.1 
Latvia 1,879 6 6 300 112 13.4 
Lithuania 1,909 22 7 311 90 7.5 
Continued ... 
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CONTINUATION. Table 8. Diffusion of modem technology and technological innovations in post-Communist countries, 1999 
Electricity 
consumption 1 
(kwh per capita) 
Medium-technology 
exports 
(as % of all exports) 
High-technology 
exports 
(as % of all exports) 
Telephone 
mainlines 
(per 1,000 people) 
Cellular mobile 
subscribers 
(per 1,000 people) 
Internet hosts2 
(per 1,000 people) 
CIS 
Armenia 930 8 4 155 2 0.9 
Azerbaijan 1,584 5 1 95 23 0.1 
Belarus 2,762 42 5 257 2 0.3 
Georgia 1,257 na na 123 19 0.4 
Kazakhstan 2,399 12 3 108 3 0.6 
Kyrgyzstan 1,431 7 4 76 1 0.0 
Moldova 689 4 2 127 4 0.7 
Russia 3,937 13 3 210 9 3.5 
Tajikistan 2,046 na na 35 na 0.1 
Turkmenistan 859 na na 82 1 0.3 
Ukraine 2,350 na na 199 4 1.2 
Uzbekistan 1,618 na na 67 2 na 
1 Data from 1998. 2 Data from 2000. Source: Human Development Report 2001 
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Table 9. Index of Economic Freedom rankings, selected countries 
2002 
rank 
Scores 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 
Free economies 
1 Hong Kong 1.35 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.40 1.30 1.30 1 2.0 2.0 1 1 1 2 1 1 1.5 
2 Singapore 1.55 1.55 1.45 1.40 1.40 1.50 1.50 1.50 1 2.5 3.0 1 1 2 2 1 1 1.0 
3 N. Zealand 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.85 1.80 1.80 na 2 4.0 4.0 1 1 1 2 1 2 1.0 
4 Estonia 1.80 2.05 2.20 2.35 2.30 2.50 2.50 2.40 1 3.5 2.0 2 1 1 1 2 2.5 
4 Ireland 1.80 1.65 1.85 1.90 1.90 2.10 2.10 2.10 2 3.5 2.0 2 1 1 2 1 2 1.5 
4 Luxembourg 1.80 1.75 1.80 1.95 1.85 2.00 2.00 na 2 4.0 3.0 1 1 1 2 1 2 1.0 
4 Netherlands 1.80 1.85 2.05 2.05 2.10 1.95 1.90 na 2 4.0 2.0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1.0 
4 USA 1.80 1.75 1.80 1.80 1.85 1.80 1.85 1.90 2 3.5 2.0 1 2 1 2 1 2 1.5 
14 Finland 1.95 2.15 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.15 2.20 2.30 2 4.5 2.0 1 2 2 2 1 2 1.0 
Mostly free economies 
17 Sweden 2.05 2.25 2.35 2.35 2.45 2.45 2.65 2.65 2 4.5 4.0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1.0 
20 Germany 2.10 2.10 2.20 2.20 2.30 2.20 2.20 2.10 2 4.5 2.0 1 1 3 2 1 3 1.5 
29 Lithuania 2.35 2.55 2.90 3.00 3.00 3.10 3.45 na 2 5.0 2.0 1 2 3 2 3 3 3.0 
32 Czech Republic 2.40 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.35 2.20 2.20 2.20 2 4.5 2.0 2 2 1 2 2 3 3.5 
32 Hungary 2.40 2.55 2.55 2.95 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2 4.5 1.0 3 2 2 2 2 3 2.5 
38 Latvia 2.50 2.65 2.65 2.75 2.85 2.95 3.05 na 2 3.5 2.0 2 2 2 2 3 3 3.5 
45 Poland 2.70 2.75 2.80 2.80 2.90 3.10 3.10 3.30 2 4.5 2.0 3 2 2 3 2 3 3.5 
Mostly unfree economies 
131 Russia 3.70 3.70 3.70 3.50 3.35 3.55 3.50 3.40 4 3.5 2.5 5 3 4 3 4 4 4.0 
1 - Trade. 2 - Fiscal burden of government. 3 - Government intervention. 4 - Monetary policy. 5 - Foreign investments. 6 - Banking and finance. 
7 - Wage / prices. 8 - Property rights. 9 - Regulation. 10 - Black market. Source: 2002 Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation & The Wall Street Journal) 
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Appendix 2. Statistics of Development of the Baltics 267 
Table 10. Corruption Perception Indices, 1998-2001 
Grouped by 2001 ranking 
1998 2000 2001 
Index Rank Index Rank Index Rank 
Finland 9.6 2 10.0 1 9.9 1 
Denmark 10.0 1 9.8 2 9.5 2 
New Zealand 9.4 4 9.4 3 9.4 3 
Iceland 9.3 5 9.1 6 9.2 4 
Singapore 9.1 7 9.1 6 9.2 4 
Sweden 9.5 3 9.4 3 9.0 6 
Canada 9.2 6 9.2 5 8.9 7 
Netherlands 9.0 8 8.9 9 co
 
00
 
8 
Luxembourg 8.7 11 8.6 11 8.7 9 
Norway 9.0 8 9.1 6 8.6 10 
Estonia 5.7 26 5.7 27 5.6 28 
Hungary 5.0 33 5.2 32 5.3 31 
Slovenia na na 5.5 28 5.2 34 
Lithuania na na 4.1 43 4.8 38 
Poland 4.6 39 4.1 43 4.1 44 
Czech Republic 4.8 37 4.3 42 3.9 47 
Bulgaria 2.9 66 3.5 52 3.9 47 
Slovakia 3.9 47 3.5 52 3.7 51 
Latvia 2.7 71 3.4 57 3.4 59 
Romania 3.0 61 2.9 68 2.8 69 
Russia 2.4 76 2.1 82 2.3 79 
Ukraine 2.8 69 1.5 87 2.1 83 
Nigeria 1.9 81 1.2 90 1.0 90 
Source: Transparency International (www.transparency.org) 
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Table 11. Main trading partners 
of the Baltic countries, 1991, 1996 and 2000 (%) 
Estonia 
Exports 1991 1996 2000 
Finland 2 22 32 
Sweden 1 14 21 
Germany 0.2 8 9 
Latvia 8 9 7 
United Kingdom 0.1 4 4 
Denmark 0.1 4 3 
Lithuania 4 5 3 
Netherlands 0.3 4 2 
Russia 57 15 2 
Norway 0.1 2 2 
Others 27 13 15 
Total (mil USD) na 2,077 3,829 
Imports 
Finland 2 31 27 
Sweden 1 9 10 
Germany 1 11 9 
Russia 46 11 8 
Japan 0.2 2 6 
China 0.1 1 4 
Italy 0.2 3 3 
Latvia 5 2 3 
Denmark 0.1 3 2 
United Kingdom 0.1 3 2 
Others 44 24 26 
Total (mil USD) na 3,224 4,786 
Latvia 
Exports 1991 1996 2000 
United Kingdom 0.1 3 17 
Germany 1 14 17 
Sweden 1 7 11 
Lithuania 5 7 8 
Denmark 0.1 4 6 
Estonia 3 4 5 
Russia 54 23 4 
Netherlands 0.1 2 4 
USA 0.1 1 3 
Ukraine 12 6 2 
Others 24 29 23 
Total (mil USD) na 2,515 3,449 
Continued ... 
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CONTINUATION. Table 11. Main trading partners 
of the Baltic countries, 1991, 1996 and 2000 (%) 
Latvia 
Imports 1991 1996 2000 
Germany 1 14 16 
Russia 45 20 12 
Finland 1 9 9 
Lithuania 10 6 8 
Sweden 0.4 8 7 
Estonia 5 6 6 
Poland 0.1 3 5 
Italy 0.1 2 4 
Denmark 0.1 4 4 
Netherlands 0.1 4 3 
Others 38 23 26 
Total (mil USD) na 3,495 5,834 
Lithuania 
Exports 1991 1996 2000 
Latvia 7 9 15 
Germany 1 14 14 
United Kingdom 0.4 4 8 
Russia 57 24 7 
Poland 1 3 6 
Denmark 0.3 3 5 
USA 0.1 3 5 
Netherlands 0.1 3 5 
Ukraine 11 8 4 
France 0.1 2 4 
Others 22 27 27 
Total (mil USD) na 3,356 3,809 
Imports 
Russia 50 29 27 
Germany 1 16 15 
Poland 1 4 5 
United Kingdom 0.1 3 5 
France 0.1 2 4 
Italy 0.1 4 4 
Sweden 0.1 3 3 
Denmark 0.1 4 3 
Finland 0.1 3 3 
USA 0.1 3 2 
Others 29 29 29 
Total (mil USD) na 4,559 5,457 
Sources: Statistical Yearbooks of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 1992, 1997, 2001 
Figure 2. Foreign direct investments stock in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
Percentage of cumulative investments, as of 31 December 2000 
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Sources: Statistical Yearbooks of Latvia and Lithuania 2001; Estonian Bank Newsletter, No. 2, 2001 
Table 12. Human development indicators of post-Communist countries, 1999 
Human 
development index 
1999 
GDP per 
capita 
(PPP 
USD) 
Life expectancy 
at birth (years) Enrolment 
ratio 
Population 
below 4 USD 
per day, 
% (1993-1995) 
Gini index 
(latest available 
data) 
Public 
education 
expenditure 
(as % of GDP, 
1995-1997) Value Rank Female Male 
OECD average 0.900 - 22,020 79.61 73.2 1 87 na na na 
Average of post-
Communist countries 0.777 - 6,290 73.81 64.11 77 na na na 
Central Europe 
Czech Republic 0.844 33 13,018 78.0 71.2 70 below 1.0 25.4 5.4 
Hungary 0.829 36 11,430 75.4 66.8 77 4.0 24.4 4.6 
Poland 0.828 38 8,450 77.3 69.0 84 20.0 31.6 7.5 
Slovakia 0.831 35 10,591 77.0 69.1 76 below 1.0 19.5 4.7 
Slovenia 0.874 29 15,997 78.9 71.5 83 below 1.0 28.4 5.7 
Balkans 
Albania 0.725 85 3,189 76.1 70.2 71 na na na 
Bulgaria 0.772 57 5,071 74.8 67.1 72 15.0 26.4 3.2 
Croatia 0.803 46 7,387 77.6 69.6 68 na 29.0 5.3 
Macedonia 0.766 60 4,651 75.1 70.9 70 na na 5.1 
Romania 0.772 58 6,041 73.3 66.5 69 59.0 28.2 3.6 
Baltics 
Estonia 0.812 44 8,355 75.8 64.8 86 37.0 37.6 7.2 
Latvia 0.791 50 6,264 75.6 64.3 82 22.0 32.4 6.5 
Lithuania 0.803 47 6,656 77.0 66.5 80 30.0 32.4 5.9 
1 Data from 1998. Continued ... 
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CONTINUATION. Table 12. Human development indicators of post-Communist countries, 1999 
Human 
development index 
1999 
GDP per 
capita 
(PPP 
USD) 
Life expectancy 
at birth (years) Enrolment 
ratio 
Population 
below 4 USD 
per day, 
% (1993-1995) 
Gini index 
(latest available 
data) 
Public 
education 
expenditure 
(as % of GDP, 
1995-1997) Value Rank Female Male 
CIS 
Armenia 0.745 72 2,215 75.6 69.6 80 na 44.4 2.0 
Azerbaijan 0.738 79 2,850 74.8 67.7 71 na 36.0 3.0 
Belarus 0.782 53 6,876 74.4 62.8 77 22.0 21.7 5.9 
Georgia 0.742 76 2,431 77.0 68.8 70 na 37.1 5.2 
Kazakhstan 0.742 75 4,951 70.2 58.9 77 65.0 35.4 4.4 
Kyrgyzstan 0.707 92 2,573 71.4 63.4 68 88.0 40.5 5.3 
Moldova 0.699 98 2,037 70.3 62.8 72 66.0 40.6 10.6 
Russia 0.775 55 7,473 72.5 60.1 78 50.0 48.7 3.5 
Tajikistan 0.660 103 1,031 70.4 64.5 67 na na 2.2 
Turkmenistan 0.730 83 3,347 69.3 62.5 81 61.0 40.8 na 
Ukraine 0.742 74 3,458 73.5 62.7 77 63.0 29.0 5.6 
Uzbekistan 0.698 99 2,251 71.7 65.8 76 63.0 33.3 7.7 
Source: Human Development Report 2001 
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Figure 3. Birth rate in the Baltics, 1990-2000 
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Sources: Statistical Yearbooks of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 2001 
Figure 4. Life expectancy at birth by sex in the Baltics, 1990-2000 (years) 
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Figure 5. Registered crimes in the Baltics, 1995-2000 
Offences rate per 10,000 inhabitants 
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Figure 6. Suicides and homicides in the Baltics, 1990-2000 
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Table 13. Ethnic minorities in Eastern 
and Central Europe, the middle 1990s 
Country 
Minimum 
estimation (%) 
Maximum 
estimation (%) 
Bosnia 49 55 
Latvia 43 47 
Estonia 32 38 
Moldova 32 35 
Macedonia 30 34 
Serbia 26 31 
Montenegro 25 30 
Ukraine 25 27 
Cyprus 23 24 
Belarus 18 21 
Czech Republic 18 18 
Lithuania 18 20 
Bulgaria 17 26 
Slovakia 14 22 
Croatia 14 16 
Romania 11 17 
Slovenia 6 8 
Greece 5 14 
Hungary 3 13 
Albania 2 6 
Poland 2 3 
Source: Dogan 1997 
Table 14. Population of the Baltics by nationality 
ESTONIA 2000 1 Population LATVIA 2001 2 Population LITHUANIA 1999 3 Population 
N (thous) Share N (thous) Share N (thous) Share 
Estonians 930 67.9 Latvians 1,370 57.9 Lithuanians 3,027 81.8 
Russians 351 25.6 Russians 696 29.4 Russians 301 8.1 
Ukrainians 29 2.1 Belarussians 96 4.0 Poles 255 6.9 
Belarussians 17 1.3 Ukrainians 63 2.7 Belarussians 53 1.4 
Finns 12 0.9 Poles 59 2.5 Ukrainians 37 1.0 
Tatars 3 0.2 Lithuanians 33 1.4 Jews 5 0.1 
Latvians 2 0.2 Jews 10 0.4 
Poles 2 0.2 Gypsies 8 0.3 
Jews 2 0.1 Germans 4 0.1 
Lithuanians 2 0.1 Estonians 3 0.1 
Germans 2 0.1 
Others 17 1.3 Others 25 1.1 Others 24 0.7 
Total 1,370 100.0 Total 2,366 100.0 Total 3,701 100.0 
1 Data of population census on 31 March 2000. 2 Estimation, based on population census on 31 March 2000. 3 Estimation. 
Sources: 2000 Population and Housing Census II: Statistical Yearbook of Latvia 2001; Statistical Yearbook of Lithuania 2000 
M 
CTn 
43 
3 
kl 
S' 
tsj 
О 
Sr 
to 
a 
Appendix 2. Statistics of Development of the Baltics 277 
Table 15. Changes in inequality during transition 
Gini coefficient (income per capita) 
1987-1988 1993-1995 
Kyrgyzstan 26 55 
Russia 24 48 
Ukraine 23 47 
Lithuania 23 37 
Moldova 24 36 
Turkmenistan 26 36 
Estonia 23 35 
Bulgaria 23 34 
Kazakhstan 26 33 
Uzbekistan 28 33 
Latvia 23 31 
Romania 23 29 
Poland 26 28 
Belarus 23 28 
Czech Republic 19 27 
Slovenia 22 25 
Hungary 21 23 
Slovakia 20 19 
Source: Kolodko, 2000 
Table 16. Evaluation of changes by Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, 1993-2000 (%) 
Estonians Latvians Lithuanians 
1993 1996 2000 1993 1996 2000 1993 1996 2000 
Positive evaluation of the socialist economy before independence 53 48 44 59 74 76 75 76 83 
Positive evaluation of the present economic system 43 69 79 21 22 37 22 25 25 
Negative evaluation of the present economic system 40 20 13 62 64 51 66 64 70 
Positive evaluation of the economic system in the next five years 83 86 92 72 54 60 67 60 47 
Positive evaluation of the former Communist regime 1 32 22 48 36 41 52 46 43 56 
Positive evaluation of the present system of governing 58 69 70 46 37 49 46 37 45 
Negative evaluation of the present system of governing 26 21 22 38 45 37 40 53 49 
Positive evaluation of the system of governing in next five years 88 89 87 81 69 74 81 70 61 
Agree with the statement "We should return to the Communist rule"2 na 1 4 na 3 1 na 8 9 
Disagree with the statement "We should return to the Communist rule"2 na 89 92 na 87 98 na 78 91 
Rating of the economic situation of one's own family: 
very or fairly satisfactory 29 45 39 22 26 35 28 34 40 
Economic situation of the family is better now than five years ago3 29 39 28 17 19 18 20 20 20 
Economic situation of the family is worse now than five years ago3 53 38 49 64 64 65 63 62 66 
Believe that economic situation of the family will be better in five years 52 53 40 46 43 43 42 57 40 
1 In the questionnaire of 2000 - Soviet regime. 2 In the questionnaire of 2000 - Socialist rule. 
3 In the questionnaire of 2000 the comparison was made with the time before independence. Sources: Rose & Maley, 1994; Rose, 1997; Rose, 2000 
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Table 17. Evaluation of changes in Estonia, 1993-2000 (%) 
Estonians Non-Estonians 
1993 1995 1996 2000 1993 1995 1996 2000 
Positive evaluation of the socialist economy before independence 53 61 48 44 76 80 79 87 
Positive evaluation of the present economic system 43 61 69 79 41 49 55 63 
Positive evaluation of the economic system in the next five years 83 88 86 92 77 81 71 77 
Positive evaluation of the former Communist regime 1 32 28 22 48 65 57 67 76 
Positive evaluation of the present system of governing 58 75 69 70 50 57 49 62 
Positive evaluation of the system of governing in next five years 88 92 89 87 79 83 72 71 
Agree with the statement "We should return to the Communist rule" 2 na 1 1 4 na 9 14 25 
Strongly disagree with the statement 
"We should return to the Communist rule"2 na 87 89 74 na 52 55 27 
Rating of the economic situation in one's own family: 
very or fairly satisfactory 29 41 45 39 25 31 36 37 
Economic situation in the family is better now than five years ago3 29 34 39 28 20 20 25 28 
Economic situation in the family is worse now than five years ago 3 53 44 38 49 60 61 51 51 
Believe that the economic situation of the family will be better in five years 52 74 53 40 33 43 41 30 
1 In the questionnaire of 2000 - Soviet regime. 2 In the questionnaire of 2000 - Socialist rule. 
3 In the questionnaire Of 2000 the comparison was made with the time before independence. Sources: Rose & Maley, 1994; Rose, 1995; Rose, 1997; Rose, 2000 
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Appendix 3. 
Statistical Data of Development of the Media 
in the Baltics 
Table 18. Media use in the Baltics, 2000 
Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
All EST Non-EST All LAT Non-LAT All LIT Non-LIT 
Reading any national daily (% aged 15-74)1 58 70 34 71 77 63 65 66 59 
Reading any national weekly (% aged 15-74)1 48 49 49 57 50 66 54 51 67 
Reading any regional or local paper (% aged 15-74)1 62 73 43 56 67 42 34 36 24 
Reading any weekly magazines (% aged 15-74)2 63 64 62 43 56 28 33 36 20 
Reading any monthly magazines (% aged 15-74)2 57 72 29 51 64 36 52 56 34 
Reading any foreign publications (% aged 15-74)2 24 17 37 16 10 2 12 3 7 3 33 3 
Average television viewing time per day 
(hours and minutes, population at age 12-74) 4:10 3:55 4:38 4:18 4:22 4:13 3:49 3:45 4:04 
Weekly share of national public TV channel(s) 17 25 3 18 26 5 10 12 5 
Average radio listening time per day 
(hours and minutes, population at age 12-74) 3:32 3:54 2:52 4:01 4:15 3:33 1:41 1:45 1:25 
Weekly share of national public radio channels 33 33 32 32 44 10 32 35 14 
Have used computer during last 6 months (% aged 15-74)4 39 na na 29 na na 21 na na 
Have used computer during last 7 days (% aged 15-74)4 31 na na 23 na na 16 na na 
Have used Internet during last 6 months (% aged 15-74) 4 30 na na 13 na na 10 na na 
Have used Internet during last 7 days (% aged 15-74) 4 22 na na 9 na na 7 na na 
1 Reach of last six numbers read. 2 Has read during last six months. 3 Data from 1999. 4 Data from autumn 2000. Source: Baltic Media Book 2001 
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Table 19. Printed matter in the Baltics, 1990-2000 
Number of newspapers (titles) 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Estonia 165 146 119 102 109 105 109 
Latvia 172 286 252 229 226 235 227 
Lithuania 324 477 443 439 415 377 361 
Newspapers in language of the titular nation (% of titles) 
In Estonian 67 76 72 73 72 70 80 
In Latvian 60 67 70 70 69 69 69 
In Lithuanian 84 86 88 89 88 88 89 
Number of magazines and other periodicals (titles) 
Estonia 434 501 517 572 578 930 1 956 
Latvia 243 235 229 273 266 262 325 
Lithuania 159 321 351 378 412 418 465 
Annual number of copies of periodicals per inhabitant 
Estonia 16.6 13.6 13.5 13.1 15.4 13.5 13.8 
Latvia 25.8 6.1 5.8 6.1 13.3 8.7 10.4 
Lithuania 9.6 2.7 3.8 5.8 9.2 11.7 11.9 
Books and brochures (titles) 
Estonia 1,628 2,635 2,628 3,317 3,090 3,265 3,466 
Latvia 1,564 1,968 1,965 2,320 2,596 2,952 2,546 
Lithuania 2,499 3,164 3,645 3,827 4,109 4,097 3,709 
Annual number of copies of books per inhabitant 
Estonia 11.9 5.3 4.5 5.0 4.1 4.9 4.1 
Latvia 7.8 3.8 3.1 3.0 3.3 3.0 3.0 
Lithuania 8.2 3.8 4.0 3.9 3.6 3.5 na 
1 Change in statistical methodology - scientific and other serials also counted as periodicals. Sources: Statistical Yearbooks of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 2001 
M 
oo 
гъ 3 CL 
S' 
Oo 
о 
Kl 
a 
,o 
a. 
S' 
oa 
а 
Appendix 3. Statistical Data of the Media in the Baltics 285 
Table 20. Top 10 newspapers in the Baltics, autumn 2000 
By average issue readership 
Title Type Readership (thous) 
Circulation 
(thous) 
Estonia 
Postimees National daily 283 66 
SL Õhtuleht Daily tabloid 268 66 
Linnaleht Free weekly in cities 221 60 
Eesti Päevaleht National daily 202 48 
Eesti Ekspress National weekly 162 46 
Maaleht National weekly 146 41 
Kuldne Börs Advertising paper, twice a week 146 15 
Den za dnjom 1 National weekly 103 16 
Vesti Nedelja Pljus 1 National weekly 88 23 
Äripäev National daily, business paper 80 17 
Latvia 
Diena National daily 383 66 
Rigas Santims Free advertising weekly (in Latvian and Russian) 294 250 
Lauku Avize National semi-weekly (3 times a week) 246 70 
Subbota 1 National weekly 170 52 
TeleProgramma 1 Weekly TV guide 145 126 
Vesti Segodnja 1 National daily 143 16 
Rigas Viini Programma Weekly TV guide 138 50 
Vesti1 National weekly 130 43 
Chas 1 National daily 129 17 
Neatkariga Rita Avize National daily 125 33 
Lithuania 
Lietuvos rytas National daily 710 80 
Akistata National weekly, tabloid (criminal news) 300 54 
Lietuvos žinios National daily 202 20 
Respublika National daily 201 45 
Kauno diena Regional daily 188 42 
Valstieciu laikraštis National semi-weekly (3 times a week) 144 27 
TV per savaite Weekly TV guide 113 62 
Obzor1 National weekly 107 34 
Šeimininke National weekly, housekeeping 98 21 
Alio reklama Free advertising weekly 75 15 
1 In Russian. Source: Baltic Media Book 2001 
Table 21. Leading Estonian newspapers, November 2001 
Circulation 
(thous) 
Readership 
(thous)1 
Volume (pages 
without 
supplements) 
Page size Ownership 
National dailies 
SL Õhtuleht (tabloid) 68 247 24 A3 Eesti Meedia AS2 (50%), Ekspress Grupp AS 3 (50%) 
Postimees 62 260 24 A3 Eesti Meedia AS2 
Eesti Päevaleht 42 193 24 A3 Ekspress Grupp AS 3 (50%), Jaan Manitski (50%) 
Äripäev (business paper) 19 86 32 A3 Bonnier Group 
Estonija (in Russian) 7 62 12 A2 Rukon-lnfo AS 
Molodjozh Estonii (in Russian) 7 71 24 A3 Moles AS 
Regional dailies 
Pärnu Postimees 15 52 16 A3 Eesti Meedia AS2 
Sakala 11 40 8 A3 Eesti Meedia AS2 
Põhjarannik 9 52 8 A3 Eesti Meedia AS2 
Weeklies 
Eesti Ekspress 48 165 56 A3 Ekspress Grupp AS3 
Maaleht 40 149 32 A3 Maaleht AS 
Vesti Nedelja Pljus (in Russian) 21 93 44 A3 Rukon-lnfo AS 
Den za dnjom (in Russian) 14 103 56 A3 DD-Kirjastus OÜ 
1 BMF Gallup Media data from January-March 2001. 2 Owned by Schibsted Print Media (92.5%). 3 Owned by Hans H. Luik (100%). 
Sources: Estonian Newspapers' Association; BMF Gallup Media 
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Table 22. Circulation of selected leading Estonian newspapers and magazines, 1985-2001 
In January of indicated year, thousands 
Dailies 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 
Rahva Hääl (People's Voice), until 1990 Communist Party newspaper, 
1990-1992 official newspaper, published until 2 June 1995 151 205 175 158 64 49 - - -
Eesti Päevaleht (Estonian Daily), until 1990 newspaper of the Communist Youth 
Noorte Hääl (Voice of the Youth), 1990-1995 Päevaleht (Daily) 159 187 92 49 32 23 35 49 38 
Postimees (Postman), 1948-1990 regional paper Edasi (Forward) 99 154 130 103 74 50 58 58 64 
Äripäev (Business Day), established in 1989, weekly until 1996 
-
50 15 17 17 14 15 16 18 
Estonija, until 22 August 1991 Sovetskaja Estonija (Soviet Estonia), 
until 1990 Communist Party newspaper, 1990-1992 official newspaper 46 76 35 29 17 16 8 8 8 
Molodjozh Estonii (Youth of Estonia), 
until 1991 the newspaper of the Communist Youth 52 90 66 47 22 20 11 6 8 
Weeklies 
Maaleht (Countryside Paper), established in 1987 95 1 219 169 116 62 50 41 42 44 
Political and cultural weekly Eesti Ekspress (Estonian Express), 
established in 1989 - 50 60 42 40 49 52 47 49 
Cultural weekly Sirp (Sickle), until 1989 Sirp ja Vasar (Sickle and Hammer) 71 88 31 15 9 4 3 3 4 
Magazines 
Eesti Naine (Estonian Woman), until 1989 Nõukogude Naine (Soviet Woman) 175 223 196 97 38 15 17 19 23 
Environmentalist magazine Eesti Loodus (Estonian Nature) 56 35 17 10 6 5 4 5 4 
Popular science magazine Horisont (Horizon) 40 39 17 11 5 4 4 4 4 
Literary magazine Looming (Creation) 22 35 13 6 6 2 2 2 2 
Family and home magazine Kodukiri (Home Magazine), established in 1992 
- - -
25 32 67 50 35 25 
Entertainment magazine Kroonika (Chronicle /of Fashionable Society/), 
established in 1996 - - - - - - 45 45 35 
1 Data from 1987. Sources: Estonian Newspaper Association; National Library 
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Table 23. Penetration of television equipment in Estonia, 1994-2000 
Adults aged 15-74 
% of households 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
TV set 96 98 98 97 97 97 97 
2 or more TV sets 36 35 32 28 31 33 30 
Color TV set 78 85 87 89 92 94 96 
TV set with remote control 22 31 44 56 65 77 83 
Text-TV 13 16 24 29 34 41 48 
VCR 16 20 23 26 30 32 35 
Video camera 1 1 1 2 2 4 na 
Any satellite TV / cable TV 
channel na na na 41 42 50 na 
Cable TV 13 22 32 32 35 39 37 
SMATV na 1 na na 1 1 na 
Private dish 3 4 3 na 4 4 4 
Sources: BMF; EBU; EAO; IP Peaktime 
Table 24. Penetration of television equipment in the Baltics, 1999 
Adults aged 15-74 
Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
TV set 97 97 98 
2 or more TV sets 33 25 34 
Color TV set 94 84 89 
TV set with remote control 77 57 47 
Text-TV 41 11 10 
VCR 32 36 23 
Video camera 4 3 2 
Any satellite TV / cable TV channel 50 66 na 
Cable TV 39 41 25 
SMATV 1 1 3 
Private dish 4 2 2 
PC 14 6 6 
Mobile phone 33 15 12 
Sources: BMF; EBU; EAO; IP Peaktime 
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Figure 7. Domestic TV-production in Estonia 1993--2000 
Ratio of ETV and private TV-channels production 
100 
• ETV 
19 П Private TV-channels 
75- 32 R 
50-
47 45 49 
/-
62 61 
25- 80 .... 
0-
-H 
-H + + + + + 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Sources: ETV; ESA 
Figure 8. Purchased TV programming in Estonia, 1993-2000 
Ratio of ETV and private TV-channels purchased programming 
I I Private TV-channels 
Sources: ETV; ESA 
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Figure 9. Income and expenditures of private TV-channels, 1993-2000 
(million EEK) 
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Figure 10. Income and expenditures of ETV, 1992-2000 (million EEK) 
152.9 154.1154.4, ,160.3 
113.9114.2 
99.499.9 
38.238.7 
21.220.5 
1992 1993 1994 
Income Q Expenditure 
1995 1996 1997 
Net result 
-29.9 
1998 1999 2000 
Source: ETV 
Figure 11. Average TV viewing time per week in Estonia, 1995-2001 (hours) 
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Table 25. Programme structure of ETV and private channels, 
1999-2000 (%) 
1999 2000 
ETV Private ETV Private 
News 8.7 10.1 7.6 8.8 
Information 16.0 4.3 9.2 2.8 
Infotainment 9.0 0 3.9 0 
Sport 8.2 1.4 9.4 1.1 
Serious drama 2.2 0.1 2.4 0 
Arts and humanities 3.3 0.7 2.6 0.3 
Religion 0.7 0.1 0.9 0 
Education 0.9 0.4 2.6 0.2 
Science 0.4 0 1.0 0 
Human interest 7.4 3.1 7.4 3.5 
TV games and competitions 3.4 1.8 4.0 1.0 
Advertising 4.3 6.8 3.8 3.1 
TV-shop 2.7 4.2 5.2 2.7 
Animation 1.0 4.5 1.3 3.8 
Entertainment 1.6 4.9 2.7 8.9 
Music 2.2 6.1 4.1 3.5 
Movies 2.9 11.3 3.7 8.6 
Series and serials 14.4 37.6 17.5 25.0 
Other, programme promotion 10.0 2.6 10.7 27.2 
Sources: ETV; Statistical Office of Estonia 
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Table 26. Top 5 recurrent programmes 
in Baltic leading TV channels, 2000 
Estonia 
Title Country of origin Genre Rating (%) 
ETV (public) 
Õnne 13 Estonia Serial 27.0 
Pealtnägija Estonia Infotainment 25.4 
Reisile sinuga Estonia TV game 24.3 
Aktuaalne kaamera Estonia News 23.1 
Tähed muusikas Estonia Entertainment 22.3 
TV 3 
Politseinädal Estonia Publicism 17.8 
Kahvel Estonia Infotainment 13.3 
Kuldvillak Estonia TV game 12.2 
The Bold and the Beautiful USA Serial 11.4 
Seitsmesed uudised Estonia News 10.9 
Kanal 2 
Politseikroonika Estonia Publicism 18.1 
Reisile sinuga Estonia TV game 17.2 
Nunca Te Olividare Latin America Serial 12.2 
Dinosaurs UK Serial 11.3 
La Muier de mi Vida Latin America Serial 10.1 
TV 1 
Home and Away Australia Serial 12.5 
Princess International Serial 12.0 
Naise aroom International Serial 9.0 
Black Pearl Argentina Serial 8.7 
Kriminaalne Venemaa Russia Documentary 7.9 
Latvia 
Title Country of origin Genre Rating (%) 
LNT 
Kamenska Russia Serial 19.3 
Rosalinda Mexico Serial 18.0 
Gipsy love Mexico Serial 16.7 
Miledy Argentina Serial 15.7 
Ubojnaja siia Russia Serial 15.1 
LTV 1 (public) 
Panorama. Latvia News 15.2 
Kommissar Rex Austria Serial 12.1 
Mini mani Latvia TV game 12.1 
The Bold and the Beautiful USA Serial 10.2 
And the Sea will Tell International Movie 9.7 
Continued ... 
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CONTINUATION. Table 26. Top 5 recurrent programmes 
in Baltic leading TV channels, 2000 
Latvia 
LTV 2 (public) Country of origin Genre Rating (%) 
Ice hockey world championship International Sports 7.0 
Bobsled world championship International Sports 6.1 
Biathlon world championship International Sports 5.7 
Summer Olympic Games 2000 International Sports 5.6 
Ice hockey, Check-Game International Sports 5.1 
TV 3 
Agent Nacionalnoi Bezopasnosti Russia Serial 6.4 
Maroseika 12 Russia Serial 5.9 
Mr. Bean UK Serial 5.7 
Ulica razbityh fonarei Russia Serial 5.6 
Kriminalnyi Peterburg Russia Serial 5.4 
Lithuania 
Title Country of origin Genre Rating (%) 
LNK 
Dviracio žynios Lithuania Entertainment 24.5 
Ižiebk Kaledu žvaigžde Lithuania TV game 22.4 
Atleisk Lithuania Entertainment 22.3 
Pavojinga zona Lithuania Documentary 20.9 
Svores Lithuania Publicism 20.7 
TV 3 
Be tabu Lithuania Entertainment 23.7 
TV 3 krepšinis Lithuania Sports 21.0 
TV 3 žinios Lithuania News 20.8 
Lietuvos ryto televizija Lithuania Publicism 18.1 
X sektorius Lithuania Documentary 17.3 
Baltijos TV 
Dviracio sou Lithuania Entertainment 15.1 
Matulevocius laida Lithuania Publicism 11.1 
Perlas Lithuania TV game 10.2 
Kruvinoji banga Lithuania Documentary 9.7 
Martial Law USA Serial 9.3 
LRT (public) 
Panorama Lithuania News 16.1 
Paskutine kryžkele Lithuania Publicism 9.5 
Spaudos klubas Lithuania Publicism 9.1 
Akiraciai Lithuania Cultural magazin 8.4 
Autodafe Lithuania Publicism 8.1 
Source: Baltic Media Book 2001 
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Figure 12. Comparison of ETV programme structures, 
2001 and forecast for 2004 (%) 
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Figure 13. Comparison of the structure of ETV produced programmes, 
2001 and forecast for 2004 (%) 
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Table 27. Internet-connected hosts in Europe, November 2001 
Population (thous) Real hosts (thous) People per host 
1. Iceland 276 51 5 
2. Netherlands 15, 678 2,633 6 
3. Finland 5,154 851 6 
4. Denmark 5,270 525 10 
5. Sweden 8,875 737 12 
6. Switzerland 7,299 525 14 
7. Norway 4,419 305 14 
8. Austria 8,140 507 16 
9. United Kingdom 58,649 2,177 27 
10. Estonia 1,429 51 28 
11. Belgium 10,141 352 29 
12. Ireland 3,681 121 30 
13. Luxemburg 422 14 31 
14. Germany 82,133 2,411 34 
15. Czech Republic 10,282 210 49 
16. Portugal 9,869 179 55 
17. Hungary 10,116 160 63 
18. Slovenia 1,993 29 68 
19. Italy 57,369 837 69 
20. France 58,683 814 72 
21. Spain 39,628 537 74 
22. Greece 10,600 143 74 
23. Cyprus 771 10 75 
24. Slovakia 5,377 71 76 
25. Poland 38,718 505 77 
26. Latvia 2,424 25 98 
27. Lithuania 3,694 33 110 
28. Croatia 4,481 29 153 
29. Russia 147,434 761 194 
30. Bulgaria 8,336 25 328 
31. Romania 22,474 50 452 
32. Turkey 64,479 105 614 
33. Yugoslavia 10,635 15 687 
34. Macedonia 1,999 2 896 
35. Ukraine 50,861 57 897 
36. Belarus 10,315 3 3,181 
Source: RIPE Network Coordination Centre 
Table 28. Internet-development in EU-candidate countries, 1998-2001 
Internet hosts 
(thous) 
Internet hosts 
per 100 inhabitants 
Number of Internet users 
per 100 inhabitants 1 
1998 2 1999 2 2000 2 2001 2 Growth (%) 2001/2000 1998 1999 2000 2001 1998 1999 2000 
Bulgaria 9.1 15.2 18.4 24.1 31.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.8 2.9 5.2 
Czech Republic 70.1 102.2 143.7 185.4 29.0 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.8 3.9 6.8 9.7 
Hungary 89.3 105.5 119.1 138.0 15.9 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.4 3.9 5.9 7.1 
Poland 109.6 142.1 228.7 535.0 133.9 0.3 0.4 0.6 1.4 4.1 5.4 7.2 
Romania 18.5 28.5 36.3 47.6 31.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 2.2 2.7 3.6 
Slovakia 18.3 26.1 29.1 63.0 116.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 1.2 9.3 11.1 12.0 
Slovenia 20.3 22.8 21.5 28.7 33.5 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.4 10.1 12.6 15.1 
Estonia 20.6 27.2 33.3 44.9 34.8 1.4 1.9 2.3 3.1 10.3 13.8 25.4 
Latvia 9.6 16.0 19.7 22.9 16.2 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.9 3.3 4.3 6.2 
Lithuania 7.4 11.9 16.3 29.1 78.5 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.8 1.9 2.8 4.1 
Aggregate 
of EU-candidate countries 429 589 770 1,233 60.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.7 2.6 4.1 5.5 
EU countries 5,497 6,778 9,322 12,364 32.5 1.5 1.8 2.5 3.3 9.2 14.9 24.2 
1 At least once during last three months, children included. 2 July of the indicated year. Source: Eurostat (Deiss, 2001 ) 
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Table 29. Internet-development in the Baltics and CIS countries, 1991-1999 
Number of hosts per 10,000 adults, in January of indicated year 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Estonia 0.0 0.2 1 0.6 3.3 11.8 34.2 76.4 141.2 202.1 
Latvia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 3.0 9.8 28.9 31.4 69.6 
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 2.2 6.5 15.0 35.1 
Russia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.1 4.0 9.9 14.1 
Kyrgyzstan na na na na na na na na 5.9 2 
Turkmenistan na na na na na na na na 5.8 2 
Ukraine 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 1.7 3.9 5.0 
Armenia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.8 2.1 4.2 
Kazakhstan na na na na na na na na 2.1 2 
Moldova 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.8 2.0 
Georgia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 1.0 1.9 
Belarus 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.9 1.4 
Azerbaijan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.9 
Tajikistan na na na na na na na na О 
С
П
 
Uzbekistan na na na na na na na na 0.4 2 
1 This figure is from June 1992, the first date when Estonia had a recorded host count. 
2 The Central Asia states first appeared in the RIPE database in 1999. Source: Herron, 1999 
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Table 30. Internet user's profile in the Baltics, autumn 2000 
Share of different social groups among those who have used Internet during last 6 months 
Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
All population 
aged 15-74 
Internet 
users 
Internet 
users 1 
Internet 
users 
Males 47 53 53 56 
Females 53 47 47 44 
Estonians / Latvians / Lithuanians 65 81 67 84 
Non-Estonians / Non-Latvians / 
Non-Lithuanians 35 19 33 16 
Age 15-19 9 27 23 21 
Age 20-29 19 30 38 34 
Age 30-49 37 34 35 39 
Age 50-74 35 9 4 6 
Basic education 24 24 18 12 
Secondary education 58 50 47 32 
Higher education 18 26 35 56 
Live in capital 29 35 52 47 
Live in other town 41 37 35 44 
Live in the countryside 30 28 13 9 
Working 58 60 69 68 
Non-working 42 40 31 32 
1 Weekly users. Sources: Emor; Baltic Media Book 2001 
Table 31. Mobile phone subscribers in EU-candidate countries, 1995-2000 
Number of mobile phone subscriptions 
at the end of the year (thousands) 
Growth 
2000/1999 
(%) 
Number of mobile phone subscriptions 
per 100 inhabitants 
1995 1998 1999 2000 1995 1998 1999 2000 
Bulgaria 20 127 350 738 110.9 0.2 1.5 4.3 9.0 
Cyprus 44 116 161 218 44.6 6.0 15.5 20.1 32.7 
Czech Republic 49 965 1,944 4,346 123.6 0.5 9.4 18.9 42.3 
Estonia 30 247 387 557 43.9 2.0 17.0 26.8 38.7 
Hungary 265 1,070 1,628 3,000 84.3 2.6 10.6 16.1 29.9 
Latvia 15 168 274 401 46.5 0.6 6.8 11.2 16.6 
Lithuania 14 268 332 524 57.8 0.4 7.2 9.0 14.2 
Malta 11 23 37 114 209.2 3.0 6.1 9.6 29.5 
Poland 75 1,928 3,956 6,747 70.6 0.2 5.0 10.2 17.5 
Romania 9 643 1,400 2,499 78.5 0.0 2.9 6.2 11.1 
Slovakia 12 465 918 1,294 40.9 0.2 8.6 17.0 24.0 
Slovenia 27 196 614 1,086 76.9 1.4 9.9 31.0 54.6 
Turkey 437 3,506 8,122 16,133 98.6 0.7 5.3 12.2 24.2 
Aggregate of 
EU-candidate countries 1,008 9,722 20,113 37,658 87.2 0.6 5.6 11.7 21.8 
EU countries 21,160 90,145 146,579 235,745 60.8 5.7 24.1 39.1 62.6 
Source: Eurostat (Deiss 2001) 
b* 
я 
kl 
*' 
Oj 
СЛ 
О 
03 
00 
о 
302 Appendix 3. Statistical Data of the Media in the Baltics 
References for the Appendices 2 and 3 
Baltic Media Book 2001. Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius: Emor. 
Deiss, R. (2001). Information Society Statistics: Data for Central European Candi­
date Countries. Statistics in Focus. Industry, Trade and Service. Theme 4, 37. Avail­
able electronically www.europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat 
Dogan, M. Nationalism in Europe: Decline in the West, Revival in the East. 
Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, Vol 3, No 3. Autumn 1997, 66-85. 
EBRD Transition Report 1999. London: EBRD. 
Herron, E. S. (1999). Democratization and the Development of Information 
Regimes: The Internet in Eurasia and the Baltics. Problems of Post-Communism, 
46, 6, 56-68. 
Human Development Report 2001. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Karatnycky, A., Motyl, A. & Schnetzer, A. (2001) (eds.). Nations in Transit 2001: 
Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Inde­
pendent States. New Brunswick, NJ: Freedom House & Transaction Publishers. 
Kolodko, G. (2000). From Shock to Therapy: The Political Economy of Postsocialist 
Transformation. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press. 
Motyl, A. (2001). Ten Years after the Soviet Collapse: Persistence of the Past and 
Prospects for the Future. In Karatnycky, A., Motyl, A. & Schnetzer, A. (2001) 
(eds.), Nations in Transit 2001: Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East Cen­
tral Europe and the Newly Independent States. New Brunswick, NJ: Freedom 
House & Transaction Publishers. 
Pasanen, J. (2001a). The GDP of the Candidate Countries. Statistics in Focus. Econ­
omy and Finance. Theme 2, 35. Available electronically at www.europa.eu.int/ 
comm/eurostat 
Pasanen, J. (2001b). The GDP of the Candidate Countries. Figures for the Second 
Quarter of 2001. Statistics in Focus. Economy and Finance. Theme 2, 42. Available 
electronically at www. europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat 
2000 Population (2001). Tallinn: Statistical Office of Estonia. 
2000 population and Housing Census II (2001). Tallinn: Statistical Office of Estonia. 
Rose, R. (1995). New Baltic Barometer II: A Survey Study. Studies in Public Policy 
Number 251. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde. 
Rose, R. (1997). New Baltic Barometer III: A Survey Study. Studies in Public Policy 
Number 284. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde. 
Rose, R. (2000). New Baltic Barometer IV: A Survey Study. Studies in Public Policy 
Number 338. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde. 
Rose, R. & Maley, W. (1994). Nationalities in the Baltic States. Studies in Public Pol­
icy Number 222. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde. 
Statistical Yearbooks of Estonia 1992-2001. Tallinn: Statistical Office of Estonia. 
Statistical Yearbooks of Latvia 1995-2001. Riga: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia. 
Statistical Yearbooks of Lithuania 1995-2001. Vilnius: Statistics Lithuania. 
The Baltic and the Nordic Countries (1996). Riga: Central Statistical Bureau of 
Latvia. 
Appendix 3. Statistical Data of the Media in the Baltics 
Internet sources 
Bank of Estonia - www.epbe.ee 
Bank of Finland - www.bof.fi 
Business Central Europe - www.bcemag.com 
Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia - www.csb.lv 
EBRD - www.ebrd.com 
Economist Intelligence Service - www.economist.com 
Emor (BMF Gallup Media) - www.mediafacts.com;www.emor.ee 
Estonian Association of Newspapers - www.eall.ee 
Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs - www.vm.ee 
Eurostat - www.europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat 
Heritage Foundation - www.heritage.org 
IMF - www.imf.org 
RIPE Network Coordination Centre - www.ripe.net 
Statistical Office of Estonia - www.stat.ee 
Statistics Finland - www.stat.fi 
Statistics Lithuania - www.std.lt 
Transparency International - www.transparency.org 
UNDP - www.undp.org 
Abbreviations and Symbols 
(-) - absence of the phenomenon (indicator) 
BMF - Baltic Media Facts Ltd. 
BNS - Baltic News Service 
CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States 
CP - Communist Party 
CPE - Communist Party of Estonia 
CPSU - Communist Party of Soviet Union 
EBRD - European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
EBU - European Broadcasting Union 
EEK - Estonian kroon 
EMOR - Estonian Market and Opinion Research Centre Ltd. 
ER - Estonian Radio 
Estonian SSR - Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic 
ETV - Estonian Television 
EU - European Union 
FDI - Foreign direct investments 
GDP - Gross domestic product 
KGB - State Security Department of the USSR 
LNT - Latvian Independent Television (commercial) 
LRT - Lithuanian Radio and Television 
Ls - Latvian lat 
LTV - Latvian Television (public) 
na - Data not available 
NGO - Nongovernmental organisation 
OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PFE - Popular Front of Estonia 
PPP - Purchasing power parity 
PPS - Purchasing power standard 
Q - Quarter 
TPÜ - Tallinn Pedagogical University 
TV - Television 
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme 
USD - United States dollar 
USSR - Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics 
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Baltic Media in Transition 
In the summer of 1993, the first comprehensive book about the develop­
ment of the Baltic media was published in Tartu: Towards a Civic 
Society: The Baltic Media's Long Road to Freedom (edited by Svennik 
H oyer, Epp Lauk and Peeter Vihalemm). 
The book traced the manifold and complex history of the Baltic media 
from the 1760s, when the first Estonian and Latvian periodicals were 
published, to the early 1990s, the new beginning of democratic develop­
ment in an environment of restored national independence. 
In the present volume, media scholars from four Baltic universities con­
tinue the comparative analysis of media developments in Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania. 
This examination explores the general trends of society and media 
development in the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium. 
A more detailed insight is focused on the peaks and crises of public 
broadcasting in Estonia. 
Specific chapters deal with the role of the Russian-language media, as 
well as media regulation in Estonia. 
The appendices provide comprehensive statistical data about society 
and media development in the Baltics in the context of the post-
Communist transition in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Tartu University Press 
78 Tiigi Str., Tartu 50410, Estonia 
